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 The purpose of this study is to examine the status of academic freedom and, 
more specifically, intramural and extramural speech at universities in the U.S. since 
2000. Court opinions and briefs from benchmark court cases and the faculty’s 
perspective of current academic freedom issues are analyzed to determine dominant 
trends and themes that have evolved since 2000. While others have studied the 
relationship between the First Amendment and academic freedom, this analysis brings 
current the discourse concerning the effect First Amendment court decisions have on the 
faculty speech. The central research question is to determine the effect court decisions 
have on the intramural and extramural speech of faculty and specifically to study how 
federal, state, and local events since 2000 have affected (a) the academic freedom of 
faculty in general, (b) the way universities handle faculty intramural speech, (c) the way 
universities handle faculty extramural speech when they speak both as a citizen and a 
public university employee, and (d) the ability of faculty to defend their academic 




and analyzes (a) the six First Amendment court opinions and briefs and (b) the 19 
interviews of public university faculty members. The first phase identified 11 dominant 
themes, which were used as the basis for the coding and the 19 interviews of public 
university faculty members. The interview coding and analysis identified 15 themes. 
Based on the Pearson Correlation Coefficient, four themes were identified in the court 
opinions and six in the interviews are discussed. The second phase also included surveys 
of the faculty interviewed and a quantitative analysis of the responses in order to classify 
the sample. The study found that public universities have complete control over 
academic freedom, and that it is a privilege granted to faculty based on their scholarly 
association with the university, not a right. Public university administrators, general 
counsels, deans, department chairs, and faculty will benefit from the study as it provides 
an intensive analysis of post-2000 court case logic and the current perceptions and 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 Everyone will remember where they were on September 11, 2001 when the first 
plane hit the north tower of the World Trade Center at 8:46 a.m. (Smith, 2003), but few 
will evaluate the impact that the event has had on Constitutional rights and the academic 
freedom rights of faculty for the decade to come. The 9/11 attacks and “[t]he war [on 
terrorism have] unquestionably brought a new level of scrutiny to our politically correct 
campuses” (Denvir, 2003, para. 1) and caused “free and frank intellectual inquiry [to be] 
under assault by overt legislative acts and by a chilling effect of secrecy and intimidation 
in the government, media, and on college campuses” (O’Neil, 2003, para. 2). 
Universities and faculty have endured these assaults in the past but 9/11 has forced them 
to compromise their values and beliefs to evade the risk of persecution for classroom 
discussions and external speeches considered un-American. As O’Neil warns, 
“prominent among the risks of this anxious period is the one of which the cartoon 
character Pogo wisely warned, during the darkest days of the McCarthy era, that ‘we 
have met the enemy and it is us’” (O’Neil, 2003, para. 22). 
In fact, 9/11 is the most recent example of a series of historical events that have 
impacted academic freedom in America. Since 1900, four distinct periods have occurred 
in which ideological fears triggered public scrutiny and political pressure to impose 
restrictions on citizen’s rights in the name of national security. The four periods are 
designated as the pre-McCarthy (1890 to 1939), McCarthy (1940 to 1959), post-
McCarthy (1960 to 1999) and neo-McCarthy (2000 to present) eras. Each resulted in 




rights as well as corresponding defensive efforts by the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) and American Association of University Professors (AAUP) to protect them. 
The pre-McCarthy era (1890 to 1939) coincided with Americans’ fear in the late 
1800s that communism was infiltrating the U.S. and ended in 1939 with the start of 
World War II (WWII). During this era, the public’s fear of communism bolstered 
patriotic behaviors, which resulted in citizens with communist beliefs or affiliations 
being persecuted as subversive and un-American. Academics teaching in the areas of the 
social sciences and humanities were especially vulnerable as their subjects included 
discussions, research, and publications on communism, economics, politics, and 
psychology. Legislators and university benefactors who disagreed with the topics of 
these discussions used their influence to pressure boards to silence or terminate faculty. 
These injustices resulted in organized movements by professional associations to 
establish the faculty’s right to teach, to speak as citizens, and to conduct research. The 
formation of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) in 1915 gave 
faculty an organization dedicated to defending faculty rights and monitoring due process 
when academic disputes occurred. The AAUP’s 1915 Declaration of Principles on 
Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure (American Association of University 
Professors [AAUP], 2006) became the quintessential document for academic freedom 





 The McCarthy era (1940 to 1959) coincided with the AAUP’s 1940 Statement of 
Principles of Academic Freedom and Tenure (AAUP, 2006) and the second Red Scare 
(Bigsby, 2006). The era was remembered for WWII, the Korean conflict, the Cold War, 
and Senator Joseph McCarthy’s investigations and prosecutions of people suspected of 
communist activities and disloyalty to America (O’Neil, 2008). These events epitomize 
the ideological battles fought not only in foreign countries but also in the House Un-
American Activities Committee (HUAC), formed in 1938, and the Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI), formed in 1952 and chaired by McCarthy. These 
committees acted as the federal government’s arm for investigating communist 
activities. Even though most universities endorsed the AAUP’s 1940 Statement, the 
1950s were a time of AAUP inaction with no investigations into academic freedom 
violations being conducted until 1956, due to lack of leadership (O’Neil, 2008). 
Unchecked, McCarthy’s efforts resulted in at least 100 tenured university professors 
being put on trial by the courts, dismissed, or denied tenure for suspicion of being 
communist sympathizers, or for refusing to expose accused colleagues to legislative 
committees (O’Neil, 2008). Hundreds, if not thousands, of lives were ruined in the 
process. The era ended with the demise of McCarthy’s unrelenting pursuit of communist 
organizations and sympathizers in 1957 and the AAUP regaining its leadership and 
reestablishing its position as the guardian of academic freedom (AAUP, 1989). 
The post-McCarthy era (1960 to 1999) coincided with the start of the Vietnam 
War, the civil rights movement, the rapid expansion of higher education, and the Persian 




communism and democracy, occurred as the Vietnam War intensified and U.S. citizens 
considered the moral justification of and purpose of war (Bigsby, 2006). These events 
brought universities and academics into the fray as faculty and students openly discussed 
political and social issues in classrooms and demonstrated on campuses. With the 
constraints of the McCarthy era lifted, faculty and students united in their demands for 
due process and freedom of expression (Brunner & Haney, n.d.). A number of legislative 
Acts provided support for their demands. These Acts included the Civil Rights Act 
(1964), Equal Pay Act (1963), Age Discrimination Act (1967), Rehabilitation Act 
(1968), and the Individuals with Disabilities Act (1973). Each recognized and supported 
the notion that all Americans are equal regardless of race, ethnicity, age, or gender.    
In the 1960s, the Supreme Court also recognized individual rights as 
Constitutionally protected under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments and 
academic freedom as a special concern of the First Amendment (Kaplan & Lee, 1995). 
In Shelton (1960), the courts ruled that refusing to divulge an individual’s involvement 
with an organization could not be a condition of employment (Kaplan & Lee, 1995). In 
Keyishian (1967), the courts declared that “our nation is deeply committed to 
safeguarding academic freedom [and] is therefore a special concern of the First 
Amendment” (pp. 301-302). These decisions provided faculty with protection of their 
intramural and extramural speech. The AAUP provided further support as the new 
leadership investigated 191 (AAUP, January 2009) violations of academic freedom with 




 The technology revolution of the 1990s changed the methods faculty used to 
instruct, conduct research, and publish but also made the information readily accessible 
to the public for review. The speed and openness of the Internet allowed written, filmed, 
or recorded opinions to be published and shared with millions within seconds. The 
advancements gave faculty unfettered speech but also provided well-funded advocacy 
groups, alumni, and legislators with a medium for collecting information and countering 
faculty speech. As the 1990 Persian Gulf War began, these issues again led to conflicts 
between faculty rights to unfettered classroom discussion and extramural speech and the 
right of the university as the employer to control them. As a result, the faculty 
confronted the same academic freedom issues entering the 21st century as it did at the 
start of the 20th century.   
  The post-9/11 period is the focus of this study and designated as the Neo-
McCarthy era (2000 to present). The September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center 
and the Pentagon, symbols of U.S. financial and military supremacy, launched the “war 
on terrorism.” The government responded with efforts aimed at reassuring a nation 
uncertain of the future by quickly passing the Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (2001) 
otherwise known as the USA Patriot Act (Dudziak, 2003). The Act provided for “an 
unprecedented peacetime abrogation of civil liberties in a single legislation whose name 
[alone] discouraged dissent” (p. 12). The Act increased the government’s rights to 
secrecy, surveillance, and suppression of information. It restricted faculty from 




unwarranted gathering of private conversations and electronic information for 
intelligence purposes, and permitted the suspension of U.S. citizens’ Constitutional 
rights to free speech, association, and due process (AAUP, November 2003). 
Conservative advocacy groups such as Students for Academic Freedom and Campus 
Watch supported these efforts and called for McCarthy-style investigations into hiring 
and tenure practices of universities and for increased oversight of curriculum taught by 
faculty that they deemed radical (O’Neil, 2003). These activities revived memories 
within the Academy from a half-century earlier when, during the McCarthy era, the 
AAUP (along with many other civil liberties groups) failed to exert the level of 
leadership that the academic community expected of such a consistently protective 
organization. To address these doubts, the AAUP formed the Special Committee on 
Academic Freedom and National Security in Times of Crisis to maintain a close eye on 
the situation (O’Neil, 2003). 
Problem Statement 
Currently, academic freedom faces the most serious challenges and setbacks 
since the McCarthy era (Doumani, 2006). The hasty passage of the USA Patriot Act in 
2001 and the subsequent efforts of well-funded and politically-connected advocacy 
groups have threatened the faculty’s academic right to free and open inquiry and 
research; to design curriculum and teach freely within their university or college 
disciplines; and to unfettered extramural utterance and action as citizens (AAUP, 2006). 
As the 1915 Declaration infers, faculty in the social, political, and economic disciplines 




punitive actions by individuals and organizations internal and external to the university 
(AAUP, 2006). These actions have resulted in faculty in these disciplines being labeled 
as radical, unpatriotic, or subversive and their actions have been countered by 
legislators, courts, governing boards, alumni, students, and the media, who all impelled 
faculty to censor their behaviors or face the possibility of legal prosecution and 
dismissal. The question of whether these actions, a decade after September 11, 2001, 
continue to dominate the discourse and chill intramural and extramural speech in the 
social sciences, humanities, and communications fields requires further study. 
Significance 
 As in previous eras, academic freedom in the post-9/11 moment faces an 
uncertain future as pressures attempt to curtail free speech and silence faculty. Giroux 
(2006) attributes these activities to rightwing forces that have hijacked political power 
and are undermining the principles of academic freedom in the name of patriotic 
correctness. Cole adds in stating that increased “attacks on professors…in the name of 
national security suggest that [academia] is headed toward another era of intolerance and 
repression” (2005, p. 5). Affirming these comments, Somers states that, “academic 
freedom of expression for faculty, staff, and students has become a casualty in the post-
9/11 world” (n.d., p. 1) and concludes that “the mass psychology of wartime capitalizes 
upon citizens’ fear to allow for restricted freedoms” (p. 7). Together, these comments 
suggest the need for continued research to understand the influences effecting academic 




Academic freedom must be regularly redefined in the context of the cultural and 
political debates currently shaping higher education’s public identity. Like it or 
not, academic freedom is not simply an unchanging platonic ideal. It is reshaped 
in response to contemporary political struggles and changing legal, economic, 
and technological realties. (pp. 1-2) 
Public university administrators, general counsels, deans, department chairs, and faculty 
benefit from the study as it provides an intensive analysis of post-9/11 court case logic 
and faculty perceptions of their intramural and extramural speech rights and adds to 
existing research concerning faculty speech rights.  
Method 
The mixed methods study focuses on the changing academic landscape since 
2000. The sources of data include both qualitative (pre-selected free speech court cases 
and interviews of selected public university faculty) and quantitative (surveys of faculty 
at public U.S. universities) data. The first part of the qualitative research is the review of 
six Supreme, appellate, and district court cases pertinent to intramural and extramural 
faculty speech. The analysis utilizes court briefs by various scholars and civil liberties 
organizations. Analysis of the logic in these cases and related documents provides the 
judicial reasoning for the courts’ actions and the courts’ changing attitude toward 
academic free speech rights at the national and state levels. 
 The second part of the qualitative analysis includes 19 interviews of faculty 
members from U.S. public universities. The interviews were conducted in person or by 
phone. The interviewer asked five open-ended questions that were recorded, transcribed, 




provide the broad academic perspective of what is happening to faculty intramural and 
extramural speech a decade after the attacks. 
The quantitative analysis includes surveys of the faculty interviewed. The survey 
consists of seven multiple choice questions that collect demographic information such as 
region of country, age group, ethnicity, gender, assignment type, whether the participant 
has participated in shared governance at their institution, and whether the faculty 
member has published on the topic of academic freedom. The survey assists in defining 
the characteristics of sample to make it replicable at other universities if further research 
is needed.  
Delimitations 
1. The study is restricted to the U.S. Supreme, appellate, and district court 
cases specific to free speech and faculty intramural and extramural free 
speech rights at public universities in the U.S. 
2. The AAUP provides many academic freedom policies and statements that 
are outside the scope of this study. This study focuses on AAUP policies 
and statements concerning faculty intramural and extramural speech at U.S. 
universities. 
3. The cases used in the study are retrieved from the Lexus-Nexus database 
and law libraries. 
4. Definitions, policies, and legal briefs published by American Association of 





5. The primary focus of the study is First Amendment cases adjudicated from 
2000 to present in the U.S. Supreme, appellate, and district courts.    
6. Primary focus is on the tenured and tenure-track faculty teaching at U.S. 
universities and, therefore, part-time, temporary, and visiting scholars are 
excluded. 
Definitions 
The study uses terms, acronyms, and abbreviations that refer to various 
government agencies, academic associations and legislation. To avoid confusion, a list 
of the key terms used in the research is presented below. 
Academic freedom. The right (especially of a university teacher) to speak freely 
about political or ideological issues without fear of loss of position or other 
reprisal (Garner, 1999). In the context of this study, academic freedom refers to 
intramural speech (classroom discussion) and extramural speech (faculty speech 
outside the classroom). 
Chilling effect. The result of a law or practice that seriously discourages the 
exercise of a Constitutional right, such as the right to appeal or the right of free 
speech (Garner, 1999). 
Constitutional freedom. A basic liberty guaranteed by the Bill of Rights of the 
U.S. Constitution, such as the freedom of speech (Garner, 1999). 
Constitutional law. The body of law deriving from the U. S. Constitution and 





Culture wars. A metaphor used to define the political conflict, based upon the set 
of conflicting cultural values, between those considered traditional or 
conservative and those considered liberal. 
Extramural speech. The AAUP defined faculty right to be free from institutional 
censorship or discipline when they speak or write as citizens (AAUP, 2007a). 
Intramural speech. The AAUP defined faculty right to full freedom in the 
classroom in discussing their subject (AAUP, 2007a).  
McCarthyism. The ideology defined by the time period between 1950 and 1954 
in which Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin chaired the Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) and instigated widespread investigations 
into alleged Communist infiltration in U.S. public life (Bigsby, 2006). The study 
uses the term thematically to identify periods during which the U.S. government, 
university authorities, or external organizations acted to restrict free speech and 
behaviors deemed anti-American. 
September 11th or 9/11. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon on September 11, 2001.  
Terrorism. Activities that “(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human 
life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State 
within… (B) appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, 
to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or  to affect 
the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping, 




United States, or transcend the national boundaries in terms of the means by 
which they are  accomplished, the persons they appear to intimidate or coerce, or 
the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum” (United States 
Criminal Code 18, 2002). 
United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act or Patriot Act). 
Legislation signed by President George W. Bush on October 26, 2001 that 
“consists of ten titles, revises fifteen existing federal statutes, and deals with 
numerous activities related to terrorism, ranging from laundering money to 
providing support to the victims of terrorism” (AAUP, November 2003, p. 38). 
The Act was amended and reauthorized in 2006. Provisions of the Act expired in 
February 2011 (American Civil Liberties Union, February 2011).  
Organization of the Study 
Chapter one provides an introduction to the study and includes a problem 
statement and the significance of the problem with salient information discovered in the 
literature review. Also included is the summary of the research method discussed in 
chapter three with the central research question, the assumptions and limitations of the 
research study, and the definitions of key terms used in the study. Chapter two contains a 
review of the relevant literature. The purpose of the literature review is to present an 
epistemological basis for the research surrounding the faculty academic intramural and 
extramural speech rights on public college and university campuses. To accomplish this 




periods, pre-McCarthyism, McCarthyism, post-McCarthyism, and neo-McCarthyism. 
Each period is presented with a discussion of the contemporary period’s position on 
academic freedom, an historical perspective of the major events and legislation passed, 
and the court cases relevant to speech rights in general and academic freedom, in 
particular. The chapter concludes with a summary of the literature and its relevance to 
the research study.  
 Chapter three discusses the research methodology of the study. The chapter 
defines the problem, emphasizes the rationale for the study, and presents the research 
questions addressed. The analytic paradigm section discusses the postmodern approach 
used to guide the research and interpret and extrapolate the data from the court cases, 
faculty interviews, and surveys. The relationship of these data sources is discussed to 
provide an understanding of how the study proceeded. The discussion includes diagrams 
illustrating the flow of research, participants in the study, and methods used for 
validation testing. It also provides the list of questions for the interviews and surveys and 
the characteristics of the data collected by the online survey. This methodology allows 
the research to follow a structured path to determine the effect major events since 2000, 
such as 9/11, have had on the intramural and extramural speech rights of faculty when 
speaking as public university employees and U.S. citizens. 
 Chapters four through ten discuss the research and findings of the first phase of 
the study. Chapters four though nine provide an analysis of the court opinions and briefs 
of the six cases selected as they progressed through the courts. The cases include Grutter 




(2005), Hong v. Grant (2010), Churchill v. University of Colorado (2011), and Adams v. 
University of North Carolina – Wilmington (2011). The chapters provide a detailed 
analysis of the major themes found in the court opinions and briefs of each case using 
tables and figures to illustrate them. Chapter ten concludes with a discussion of the 
combined case themes and the findings of the first phase of the research. 
 Chapter eleven discusses the research and findings of the second phase of the 
research. The chapter provides a detailed analysis of the themes found in the 19 faculty 
interviews conducted as part of the research. The analysis discusses the findings and 
concludes the research of the study. 
 Chapter twelve concludes the research with a discussion of the major findings 
and the researcher’s observations. This chapter presents a summary of the study and 
important conclusions drawn from the data and findings presented in chapters four 
through eleven. Included is a discussion of the implications of the study and the 
recommendation for further research on academic freedom.  
Summary 
Almost immediately after 9/11, conservative advocacy groups accused professors 
of indoctrinating and intimidating students and pointed to U.S. foreign policy and 
academic freedom as the reason (Gerstman & Streb, 2006). To illustrate this belief, the 
AAUP reported handling “1,121 complaints and cases regarding academic 
freedom…from May 2002 to May 2004” (p. 18). As occurred in each of the four periods 
discussed, national events and ideological conflicts have driven America’s discourse 




been compromised and why faculty need protection of their academic freedom, requires 
a review of historical events and landmark court decisions. These and other 
controversies are discussed in the literature review. 
The literature review discusses the pre- and post-9/11 battles fought to defend 
faculty’s freedom of inquiry, research, teaching, and extramural utterance. The chapter is 
divided into the four distinct periods (pre-McCarthyism, McCarthyism, post-
McCarthyism, neo-McCarthyism). Each section includes historical perspectives of the 
major events and academic free speech court decisions that faculty have confronted 
since 1890. The impact of these cases on faculty intramural and extramural speech rights 





Chapter Two: Literature Review 
  Chapter two provides an historical background of four distinct periods from the 
19th century to 2010 that delineate American academic freedom as it pertains to faculty 
intramural and extramural speech. The time periods are centered on the McCarthy era as 
it signifies a moment when citizen’s ideological beliefs were used against them to curtail 
their Constitutional rights and, therefore, faculty academic speech. Veysey commented 
that, “the history of academic freedom has become a rather accurate reflection of social 
alarm felt at any given moment by the more substantial elements in the American 
population” (1965, p. 410). Understanding these moments and the background of 
academic freedom in America provides a basis for examining whether faculty in the 
social sciences and humanities are being silenced in the new McCarthyism of the 21st 
Century.   
 The time periods in this chapter are designated as pre-McCarthyism (through 
1939), McCarthyism (1940 to 1959), post-McCarthyism (1960 to 1999), and neo-
McCarthyism (2000 to present) eras. The discussion of each includes an historical 
perspective to ground the time period and to understand the external forces affecting 
academic free speech in America. Policies and procedures from the American 
Association of University Professors are presented to explain the evolution of academic 
freedom and to present the national issues surrounding intramural and extramural free 
speech. Included in the discussion are major external influences, legislation, and court 




institutions. The chapter concludes with a synopsis of the current status of academic 
freedom and introduces the research that is conducted in the study.    
Pre-McCarthyism–Academic Freedom to 1939 
 Historical perspective. Crabtree noted, “the first noteworthy incident of 
academic freedom occurred in classical Greek times” (2002, para. 5). Socrates’ efforts to 
awaken “the people of Athens from their intellectual and moral complacency [resulted in 
his trial] for not worshiping the gods of Athens and corrupting [Greek] youth” (para 5). 
Socrates believed that his pursuit of “Truth” was a divine calling and that “he could not 
allow any person or human institution to deter him from carrying [it] out (para. 5). 
During the Medieval Period, the Christian universities in Europe adopted these tenets as 
these academics believed that they were “charged with the God-given task of searching 
out and teaching truth [and] that academics were carrying out a mission that transcended 
the authority of any man or human institution to countermand” (para. 7). “Between 1820 
and 1890, almost nine thousand Americans studied at German universities [and] 
returned as fully trained professionals in their disciplines” (Goodschild & Wechsler, 
1989, p. 184). The concept of academic freedom was imported to the U.S. by these 
scholars (Veysey, 1965). It originated from the German ideas of “Lernfreihiet, the 
freedom of the student to select their own studies in an elective system, and of 
Lehrfreiheit, the freedom of the professor to investigate and teach the results of their 
research without government interference” (p. 384). These callings and searches for 




established in the colonies by Europeans and faculty educated in England, France, and 
Germany arrived to live and teach in the new world.  
President Charles Eliot addressed Lernfreihiet, the student’s right to choose with 
the implementation of the “elective system” at Harvard in the mid-1800s. The elective 
system represented America’s attempt to recognize college students as adults and 
provide them with the academic freedom to investigate and choose their career paths 
from a variety of disciplines. The system allowed students to select courses outside of a 
structured core curriculum in an effort to promote individual decision-making and 
diversity in education (Goodschild & Wechsler, 1989). Elliot asserted that the system 
gave “the great majority of the students…liberty to pursue some subject or subjects with 
a reasonable degree of thoroughness [and to] choose subjects which are related to, or 
underlie, their future professional studies” (p. 377). Elliot believed that this liberty 
resulted in concentrated studies and developed into single lines of advanced teaching 
that raised the level of instruction (Goodschild & Wechsler, 1989). These beliefs kindled 
the need for faculty to teach freely and conduct more research in their areas of specialty. 
The American concept of Lehrfreiheit, faculty academic freedom, focused on the 
definitions and protections of faculty intramural and extramural speech (Goodschild & 
Wechsler, 1989). Doumani echoed, “America’s scholars produced their own Lehrfreiheit 
that reflected a strong social, cultural and Constitutional commitment to freedom of 
speech and a more pragmatic commitment to the social utility of professional 
scholarship” (2006, p. 63). This version restricted classroom discussion to materials 




(Goodschild & Wechsler, 1989). It also extended the definition of academic freedom to 
include speech outside of the university and insisted “that a professor should no more be 
penalized for exercising [their] Constitutional rights of free speech than any other 
citizen,” (p. 186) thus associating academic freedom with civil liberties. These 
definitions and protections allowed faculty to be independent from outside interference 
and more responsive to the social and economic needs created by the accelerated 
urbanization, industrialization, and settlement of post-Civil War America (Goodschild & 
Wechsler, 1989). 
In the late 19th century, these concepts of academic freedom reshaped higher 
education. Demands by businesses and the government for students with scientific and 
technical knowledge, resulted in new university models (Goodschild & Wechsler, 1989). 
Small, tightly regulated, rural colleges were supplanted by university centers dedicated 
to free inquiry, “the education of mass society, the expansion rather than perpetuation 
and transmission of knowledge, and the teaching of vocational and technical skills” (p. 
182). Serving these centers were professional schools specializing in law, medicine, and 
the sciences that assumed equal ranking with subjects in the humanities and provided 
diversified and specialized curricula (Goodschild & Wechsler, 1989).  
Supported by the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862, universities expanded to 
handle new curricula in agricultural and mechanical arts training for the “common man” 
(Goodschild & Wechsler, 1989). The Act provided 17.5 million acres of federal land 
nationwide, or 30,000 acres per state, as grants to expand existing universities and 




they stood “for the all-purpose curriculum and for service to the community” (p. 189) 
and to “promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes” (p. 262). 
After the Civil War, the Hatch Act of 1887 and Morrill Land Grant Act of 1890 
developed agricultural research centers as part of the land-grant universities and 
established Black land-grant universities through cash to the Confederate states 
respectively (Goodchild & Wechsler, 1989). These Acts, along with funds from wealthy 
benefactors, reshaped public higher education and resulted in pressures being exerted on 
faculty to refrain from criticizing socio-economic and immigration policies that the 
government and business supported.   
 The start of the twentieth century represented one of the “most repressive periods 
in American history” (Blanchard, 2002, p. 360). As World War I (WWI) began, “the 
three branches of the federal government acted to ensure that executive policy, 
legislation and judicial decisions combined to silence disagreement with the wartime 
policies of Woodrow Wilson” (p. 360). WWI ended in 1918 with a barrage of legislation 
being passed that reduced freedoms in the name of national security and restricted 
immigrations to the U.S. 
 Two pieces of legislation passed in 1917, the Immigration Act and 
Espionage/Sedition Act, provided the government with the legal authority to deny 
Asians access to the U.S. and to silence and jail citizens who did not believe in 
organized government. The Immigration Act, also known as the Asiatic Barred Zone 




December 1916 veto (Tucker & Creller, 2007). The Act banned the immigration of 
citizens of eastern Asia and Pacific Islands and excluded admission into the U.S. of all  
anarchists or persons who advocate the overthrow of the government of the 
United States, or who disbelieve in or are opposed to organized government [or 
are] members of or affiliated with any organization entertaining or teaching 
disbelief in or opposed to organized government. (Immigration Act, 1910-1917) 
 
These provisions were amended in 1924 to include any alien who by virtue of race or 
nationality or lineage was ineligible for U.S. citizenship. As Chinese were already 
banned from entering the U.S., the 1924 provision was directed at Asians not previously 
banned from immigrating such as the Japanese (U.S. Department of State, 2010).  
The Espionage Act of 1917 as amended by the Sedition Act of 1918 provided the 
second major action by the federal government to control expression and activities. The 
Act stated that the:  
uttering, printing, writing or publishing any disloyal, profane, scurrilous or 
abusive language, or language intended to cause contempt, scorn, contumely or 
disrepute as regards the form of government of the United States, or (3) the 
Constitution, or (4) the flag, or (5) the military or naval forces, or (6) the uniform 
of the army or navy; (7) any language intended to incite resistance to the United 
States or promote the cause of its enemies.  (Virginia Law Review Association, 
1920, p. 54)  
The Sedition Act provided the U.S. government with the right to suppress academic 
freedom and free speech rights. Combined with the Immigration Act, the U.S. now could 
control access to the U.S. and regulate controversial speech. 
 With this legislation enacted, the federal government entered a second phase of 
repression from 1919 to 1920 called the first Red Scare. Blanchard (2002) asserts that 
this phase “stemmed from the nation’s first encounter with the Communist Party and its 




Spurred by propagandist George Creel, chairman of the United States Committee on 
Public Information, the Red Scare resulted in thousands of suspected unpatriotic 
dissenters and draft resisters being jailed as communists, socialists, anarchists, or 
dissidents and hundreds being deported with little regard for due process (Bigsby, 2006). 
The repeal of the Espionage and Sedition Acts in 1920 and end of the first Red Scare in 
the same year did not end the tension between government and academia as the country 
entered the Great Depression of 1920-1921. 
Under this autocratic governance through the end of the 19th century, a 
distinguished roster of academicians exercised their academic freedom and, as a result, 
clashed with legislators and wealthy benefactors (Rudolph, 1990). From 1890 to 1910, a 
number of prominent faculty were criticized or terminated for their intramural and 
extramural speech. The faculty members included 
• economist Richard Ely in 1894 at the University of Wisconsin for speaking in 
favor of strikes and boycotts,  
• economist Edward Bemis in 1897 at the University of Chicago for criticizing the 
public railroads during the Pullman strike,  
• political scientist James Allen Smith in 1897 at Marietta College (Ohio) for 
opposing monopolies,  
• economist, E. Benjamin Andrews, President at Brown University, in 1897 for his 
preference for free silver and free trade,  
• economist John R. Commons in 1894 at the University of Syracuse for his 




• historian John Spenser Bassett in 1900 at Trinity University in North Carolina 
for supporting Black civil rights, and  
• numerous economics faculty in the 1890s at Kansas State University (Rudolph, 
1990).  
The trend of these dismissals changed with the termination of sociologist Edward Ross 
at Stanford University (Veysey, 1965). 
In 1900, Stanford University Professor Edward A. Ross was dismissed for 
“advocating free silver and against the importation of cheap Asian labor” (Doumani, 
2006, p. 65) which, at the time, was used extensively for the westward development of 
the railroads. Leland Stanford, a politician, railroad builder, and the university founder, 
and his wife became distressed by Ross’ activities and demanded his dismissal 
(Doumani, 2006). The demand came from the co-founder and proprietor of the 
university, Mrs. Leland Stanford. In a letter, she ordered President David Starr Jordan to 
notify Ross “before the close of the semester” that he would “not to be reengaged for the 
new year” (Doumani, 2006, p. 65). The president obeyed Mrs. Stanford’s orders and 
dismissed Ross who resigned in protest. In response to Stanford’s actions, seven other 
faculty members resigned and a group of members of the American Economic 
Association, the most powerful of the academic disciplinary groups of the time, opened 
an investigation (Scott, 2009).   
Economist Edwin R.A. Seligman and philosophy professor Author Lovejoy, 
outraged by Starr’s decision, were two of the seven faculty members who resigned their 




investigation into the dismissal of Ross with the formation of a joint committee of their 
peers from members of the American Economic Association, the American Political 
Science Association, and the American Sociological Society. Their goal was to change 
the professoriate’s doctrine of employment-at-will and the trustee’s ability to terminate 
faculty without cause (Doumani, 2006). The joint committee was to report on academic 
freedom and tenure as it related to their fields (AAUP, 2006) and present their 
preliminary report at the combined meeting of the three associations in December 1914. 
After review, the associations recommended that the report be presented at a meeting of 
the newly formed American Association of University Professors (AAUP) as the 
mission of this new group was to protect academic freedom, develop a code of ethics, 
and create agreed upon standards for promotion and tenure of faculty (Rudolph, 1990). 
The report was presented at the January 1915 meeting. AAUP President John Dewey 
authorized the formation of a 15-member committee with Seligman as the chairperson to 
investigate the problem of academic freedom. The committee was charged with 
reviewing the issues and presenting their findings and recommendations to the AAUP 
(AAUP, 2006). 
Just as the committee was starting their investigative work, 14 cases 
documenting violations of academic freedom were referred for review and consideration 
(Kaplan & Lee, 1995). The cases were diverse in nature and included “dismissals of 
individual professors, dismissals or resignations of groups of professors including the 
dismissal of a university president, and complaints from a university president against 




demonstrated the importance of the committee’s charge and the need for such assistance 
for academics of all ranks. To address the complaints and continue the committee’s 
work on the larger issue of academic freedom, sub-committees were formed to consider 
the details and make recommendations (AAUP, 2006). 
AAUP 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic 
Tenure. The report and recommendations of the committee were presented to the AAUP 
as the 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure. The 
report provided 
a clear understanding of the principles which bear upon the matter, and the 
adoption by the universities of such arrangements and regulations as may 
effectually prevent any infringement of that freedom and deprive of plausibility 
all charges of such infringement. (AAUP, 2006, p. 292) 
The report was divided into two sections: the General Declaration of Principles relating 
to academic freedom and Practical Proposals which outlined rules and procedures for 
universities to follow concerning academic freedom (AAUP, 2006).  
General Declaration of Principles. The first section, the General Declaration, 
identified the origins of academic freedom, provided an overview of academic freedom 
of the American university faculty and addressed the purposes for the existence of public 
universities. The German origins of academic freedom, lernfreihiet and lehrfreiheit, as 
discussed above, provided the basis for the three discernible pillars of American 
academic freedom: freedom of inquiry and research, freedom of teaching within the 
university or college, and freedom of extramural utterance and action without 
interference from government (AAUP, 2006). The Declaration stated that the first, 




second and third, freedom of teaching and extramural utterance, were more often the 
ones that resulted in complaints. With the third element, extramural speech without 
interference by government, protected by each citizen’s freedom of expression and 
speech rights, the faculty’s right to teach became the focus of the report with 
clarifications on related issues provided as necessary (AAUP, 2006). The problem was 
viewed as a “dispute between the upstart profession and the regental authority…and a 
confrontation over the status of the faculty within the institution of the university” 
(Doumani, 2006, p. 67). The committee found three matters of concern that were 
documented and presented in the Declaration. 
Basis of academic authority. The first matter of concern was “the scope and 
basis of the power exercised by those bodies having ultimate authority in academic 
affairs” (AAUP, 2006, p. 292). The discussion focused on the differences between 
proprietary institutions and institutions established as public trusts. The proprietary 
institution is characterized as one that is “designed to propagate a specific doctrine 
prescribed by those who furnished the endowment” (AAUP, 2006, p. 292). Proprietary 
trustees were therefore bound to implement the terms of the endowment as part of their 
duties. Universities, colleges, and institutions set up by religious orders and industrialists 
are included in this category. Institutions in this category,  
do not accept…the principles of freedom of inquiry, of opinion, and of teaching; 
and their purpose is not to advance knowledge by the unrestricted research and 
unfettered discussion of impartial investigators, but rather to subsidize the 
promotion of opinions held by the persons…who provide the funds for their 




The committee provided no opinion on proprietary institutions and instead focused on 
public institutions (AAUP, 2006). 
Institutions characterized as public trusts, were governed by trustees who work 
as representatives of the public interest (AAUP, 2006). Public trusts exemplified the 
bond between the public and higher education institutions. Without it, this “inextricable 
link between the public and its institutions faced decreased support from public funds” 
(Leveille, 2006, p. 13), reduced donations from benefactors, adversarial policymakers, 
and institutional autonomy being replaced by increased governmental intervention 
(Leveille, 2006). To maintain these bonds, public universities had to provide an 
environment dedicated to the propagation of truth and the advancement of unrestricted 
and unfettered discussion. Institutions of higher education that did not provide these 
freedoms were “branded as proprietary institutions [that] subsidized the opinions held by  
the persons [providing] the funds for their maintenance” (Doumani, 2006, p. 68) and, 
therefore, were not considered public institutions with the rights and privileges granted 
thereof (AAUP, 2006). Trustees were expected to understand the differences and 
implications of this distinction. 
The nature of the academic calling. The second matter of concern was the status 
of the professor as an economic commodity and the idea that the university professor 
was an employee serving at the sufferance of the employer who has the right to control 
the curriculum and teaching (Doumani, 2006). The principles that were outlined in the 
report attacked the concept of the university as an ordinary business venture, and of 




the university-professor relationship. The new relationship characterized professors as 
appointees to the university rather than employees of the university (Doumani, 2006) 
who serve their professional function independent of outside interference (AAUP, 
2006). The committee’s report contrasted the relationship between faculty and trustees 
to that of federal judges. 
So far as the university teacher’s independence of thought and utterance is 
concerned - though not in other regards - the relationship of professor to trustees 
may be compared to that between judges of the federal courts and the [president] 
who appoints them. University teachers should be understood to be, with respect 
to the conclusions reached and expressed by them, no more subject to the control 
of the trustees, than are judges subject to the control of the president, with 
respect to their decisions; while of course, for the same reason, trustees are no 
more to be held responsible for, or to be presumed to agree with, the opinions or 
utterances of professors, than the president can be assumed to approve of all the 
legal reasonings of the courts. (AAUP, 2006, p. 295) 
The appointee characterization provided faculty with the freedom to serve the public 
interest as professionals in their fields and instruct their subject without Board 
interference (AAUP, 2006).  
In order for this relationship to be successful, the committee outlined three 
principles that discussed why academic institutions existed and how they served the 
public’s interest. Institutions existed “to promote inquiry and advance the sum of human 
knowledge; to provide general instruction to the students; and to develop experts for 
various branches of the public service” (AAUP, 2006, p. 295). These principles were 
discussed in relation to the freedom of the faculty to provide instruction without mental 
reservation in order to give the student the best instruction available, to pursue research 
and scientific inquiry, and to declare their research results no matter where it leads 




 [the] responsibility of the university as a whole is to the community at large, and 
any restriction upon the freedom of the instructor is bound to react injuriously 
upon the efficiency and the morale of the institution, and therefore ultimately 
upon the interests of the community.  (AAUP, 2006, p. 296) 
The public university and appointed faculty relationship existed to serve the public 
interest and to provide an unrestricted and open forum for discussion and debate 
(Doumani, 2006). The new relationship was the beginning of employment protections 
for faculty, which evolved into the tenure system (Doumani, 2006). 
Infringements of and constraints on academic freedom. The third matter of 
concern was to decide how these three principles of academic freedom functioned in the 
social and political environment in which universities and faculty operated. The 
committee’s report reviewed three interrelated potential points of conflict that 
universities faced as publicly funded institutions and that faculty faced in their dual roles 
as university employees and citizens with civil rights (AAUP, 2006). The three points of 
conflict included the role and obligation of the university as a public trust, the obligation 
of the university to the faculty as an appointee, and the duties and obligations of the 
faculty as appointees of the university with their right to speak freely inside and outside 
of the university without persecution or penalty.  
To address the first point, the committee stated that public universities should not 
be in the position of being dependent on any social class, group, legislative favor, or 
political consideration (AAUP, 2006). The existence of the university as a publicly 
funded entity in a modern democracy creates the danger that “pressure from vested 
interests may, sometimes deliberately and sometimes unconsciously, sometimes openly 




authorities” (p. 297). These pressures could be the direct result of the tendency in a 
modern democracy of like-minded men to gather in order to influence public opinion on 
matters that can disrupt and suppress the faculty’s search for truth and delivery of 
knowledge. The acceptance of these principles of academic freedom and the inherent 
freedoms that faculty have to teach as professionals and experts in their fields were 
paramount to protecting and defending these rights in a free society (AAUP, 2006).   
These rights do not come without obligations on the part of both university and 
the faculty (AAUP, 2006). One such obligation was the ideal of academic responsibility, 
which required faculty to be accurate and professional as representatives of the 
Academy and their profession when exercising their academic freedom and rights to free 
expression (AAUP, 2006). The Declaration conceived of academic freedom not as an 
individual right to be free from constraints but rather as the freedom based on the 
standards of their profession (AAUP, 2006). Based on these freedoms, faculty were 
viewed as experts in their fields and, as such, allowed the privilege of self-regulation in 
their instruction and research (Doumani, 2006). The committee suggested that the ones 
best suited to oversee faculty were their academic peers and the external organizations 
that governed their professional standards (AAUP, 2006) thus implying “academic 
freedom as a professional freedom” (Doumani, 2006, p. 64). 
 The disciplines best served by professional oversight were the medical, legal, 
engineering, and science areas. Well-established internal curricula and external 
professional standards, theories, and practices were required of all those entering and 




were not a concern to the committee as funding and control followed well-established 
guidelines (AAUP, 2006). 
The disciplines of Sociology, Political Science, and Economics, which were the 
most open to discussion and interpretation, caused the most conflict for public 
universities and faculty (AAUP, 2006). Dewey pointed out that these disciplines were 
especially vulnerable as they “dealt face-to-face with the problems of life [and] hence 
the right and duty of academic freedom [were] even greater here than elsewhere” (Scott, 
2009, p. 454). The Declaration also warned of the possible conflicts between open 
discussion and funding issues inherent in these disciplines. 
In the political, social, and economic field almost every question, no matter how 
large and general it at first appears, is more or less affected by private or class 
interests; and, as the governing body of a university is naturally made up of men 
who through their standing and ability are personally interested in great private 
enterprises, the points of possible conflict are numberless. When to this is added 
the consideration that benefactors [and] the university are dependent for funds 
upon legislative favor, it has sometimes happened that the conduct of the 
institution has been affected by political considerations. (AAUP, 2006, p. 297) 
[W]here there is a definite governmental policy or a strong public feeling on 
economic, social, or political questions, the menace to academic freedom may 
consist in the repression of opinions that in the particular political situation are 
deemed ultra-conservative rather than ultra-radical. The essential point, however, 
is not so much that the opinion is of one or another shade, as that it differs from 
the views entertained by the authorities. (AAUP, 2006, p. 297) 
These warnings reflected the dilemmas faced by the leaders of public universities as they 
worked to placate legislators, alumni, and board members, competed for state, federal, 
research, and private funding, and had defended the rights of the faculty to academic 
freedom and non-academic free speech. Differences between these groups have been at 




The final point of conflict was the professor’s intra-university and extra-
university rights of academic freedom and free speech. These rights flowed from two 
principles. The first was that academic freedom was protected by professional standards 
that guide the curriculum, instruction, research, and reporting of findings and the second 
that faculty, as citizens, have First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to expression and 
due process (AAUP, 2006). When faculty have bridged these two principles by bringing 
non-academic discussions into the classroom or taking academic discussions to the 
public, the faculty member, the institution, and the judicial system have been placed in 
the position of deciding whether or not their speech was protected. The 1915 
Declaration provided guidance on extramural utterances in stating that, 
Academic teachers are under a peculiar obligation to avoid hasty or unverified or 
exaggerated statements, and to refrain from intemperate or sensational modes of 
expression. But, subject to these restraints, it is not, in this committee’s opinion, 
desirable that scholars should be debarred from giving expression to their 
judgments upon controversial questions, or that their freedom of speech, outside 
the university, should be limited to questions falling within their own specialties. 
It is clearly not proper that they should be prohibited from lending their active 
support to organized movements which they believe to be in the public interest 
nor desirable to deprive a college professor of the political rights vouchsafed to 
every citizen.  (AAUP, 2006, p. 299) 
This statement inferred that faculty members, as citizens, possessed professional, 
academic, and had individual rights that were protected by the First Amendment when 
speaking outside of the institution. The position of AAUP on extramural speech was 
expanded in the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure and the 
1970 Interpretative Comments. The Declaration continued with a set of practical 
proposals to support institutional due process and to use university judicial boards to 




Practical proposals of report. The committee’s report concluded with three 
practical proposals to be implemented in order to protect administration and faculty from 
violating or being the victim of violations of academic freedom. 
First: To safeguard freedom of inquiry and of teaching against both covert and 
overt attacks, by providing suitable judicial bodies, composed of members of the 
academic profession, which may be called into action before university teachers 
are dismissed or disciplined, and may determine in what cases the question of 
academic freedom is actually involved. 
Second: By the same means, to protect college executives and governing boards 
against unjust charges of infringement of academic freedom, or of arbitrary and 
dictatorial conduct—charges which, when they gain wide currency and belief, 
are highly detrimental to the good repute and the influence of universities. 
Third: To render the profession more attractive to men of high ability and strong 
personality by insuring the dignity, the independence, and the reasonable security 
of tenure, of the professorial office. (AAUP, 2006, p. 300) 
The proposals provided foundation principles for universities to use in the development 
of internal policies and procedures for institutional due process and a tenure process to 
attract, protect, and retain faculty.  
The acceptance of the Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and 
Academic Tenure by the AAUP provided universities and faculty, for the first time, with 
an organization and a doctrine that protected their pursuit of truth and defended their 
academic speech rights (Rudolph, 1990). The protections provided by the Declaration 
included the rejection of the doctrine of employment-at-will and the reinforcement for 
the premise that employment decisions should be made that are consistent with the 
definition and principles of academic freedom (Doumani, 2006). The AAUP conjectured 
that these protections overlapped the First Amendment freedom of speech and 




Amendment guarantee of procedural due process, of the faculty as a citizen; and 
provided legal legitimacy to the principles of academic freedom when the courts handled 
academic freedom cases (Kaplan & Lee, 1995).  
 From 1915 through 1939, the AAUP’s Committee A on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure investigated 55 cases (AAUP, January 2011) involving violations of faculty 
rights that resulted in 15 universities being censured (see Appendix A). These 
investigations have not only resolved academic freedom violations but also provided an 
opportunity for the AAUP to review and expand their policies. During this time period, 
two investigations resulted in clarifications to the Declaration. The first case was at the 
University of Utah in 1915. The termination of a faculty member for criticizing the 
board of trustees resulted in the development of a definition of what it means for faculty 
to be equal and independent participants at higher education institutions. The second 
case, at the University of Louisville in 1927, concerning the dismissal of a faculty 
member for criticizing the president resulted in the development of a theory of 
intramural speech and expression as a full-fledged academic freedom (Nelson, 2010). 
These cases and investigations gave the AAUP relevance and credibility as the U.S. 
entered World War II and the second period of restrictions on academic freedom. 
McCarthyism - Academic Freedom from 1939 to 1960 
Historical perspective - the second Red Scare. The end of World War II 
codified the U.S. as a global power and opened the door for an ideological war between 
democracy and communism, also known as the Cold War. A number of laws were 




and to purge society of people that did not value American beliefs. The Hatch Act of 
1939, amended in 1940, banned and criminalized public employee association with 
political groups who planned to overthrow the government. Two Acts, the National 
Security Act of 1947 and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Act of 1949, 
established the National Security Council and the first peacetime intelligence and 
counter-intelligence agency, the CIA, in order to maintain national security. The 
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 required members of the Communist party to 
register with the Department of Justice and to provide information, such as lists of their 
members, for review by the Subversive Activities Control Board for action up to and 
including the loss of citizenship and deportation (Duke Law Journal, 1965). The 
Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 (INA) lifted the ban on Asian immigrants 
and changed the quota system from being based on nationality to one based on race and 
skills, but the new Act remained focused on linking immigration to concerns over 
national security and national interests (TAHPDX, n.d).  
 The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), formed in 1938, and 
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI), formed in 1952 and chaired by 
Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin, was the federal government’s arm for 
investigating communist activities and silencing faculty dissent. The time period, 1947 
to 1958, was the beginning of the Cold War, also known as the second Red Scare, and 
began the implantation of the McCarthyist ideology. The era was renowned for its 
witch-hunts and investigations and prosecutions of people suspected of disloyalty, 




sources for damaging information about their colleagues, friends, and neighbors (O’Neil, 
2008).  
 During this period, at least 100 tenured university professors were dismissed or 
denied tenure “for suspect political affiliations or…for refusing to expose accused 
colleagues when asked to do so by legislative committees” (O’Neil, 2008, p. 23) and 
hundreds if not thousands of others’ lives were ruined. The issue became especially 
acute for universities in 1953 when the House Un-American Activities Committee 
investigators announced a hearing on higher education (Schrecker, 2010). In response, 
University officials “scrambled for a way to deal with the impending investigations and 
to turn the political sins of their prospective unfriendly witnesses into academic ones” 
(p. 51).  
 The Association of American Universities (AAU, 1953) provided a response in 
their statement on The Rights and Responsibilities of Universities and their Faculties. 
The statement affirmed that professors, “in all acts of association…accept conventions 
which become morally binding” (p. 4) and require them to speak with “complete candor 
and perfect integrity” (p. 4) if called upon to do so. The AAU warned professors that 
refusing to speak or invoking the Fifth Amendment “cannot fail to reflect upon a 
profession that claims for itself the fullest freedom to speak and the maximum protection 
of that freedom available” (p. 4). These actions placed “upon a professor a heavy burden 
of proof of his fitness to hold a teaching position and [laid] upon his university an 
obligation to reexamine his qualifications for membership in its society” (p. 4). The 




“appointment to a university position and retention after appointment require[d] not only 
professional competence but involve[d] the affirmative obligation of being diligent and 
loyal in citizenship” (p.6) and that “present membership in the Communist 
Party…extinguishe[d] the right to a university position” (p. 6). Endorsement of this 
statement by AAU member institutions placed the burden on professors to answer to the 
HUAC for their personal and professional convictions and beliefs or face scrutiny by 
their institutions up to and including the loss of their tenured position.  
 Whether faculty spoke before the HUAC or PSI as friendly witnesses who 
asserted their Fifth Amendment right of self-incrimination or unfriendly ones, most still 
faced academic investigations by their institutions. In New York, municipal colleges 
invoked a provision in the city charter meant for corrupt officials to fire unfriendly 
witnesses. At Ohio State University, a tenured physics professor, Byron Darling, was 
suspended as soon as he asserted his Fifth Amendment rights and fired after an ad-hoc 
committee determined that his refusal to answer questions constituted gross 
insubordination and demonstrated a lack of candor and moral integrity (Schrecker, 
2010). These events exemplified the government’s and the institution’s determination to 
connect the faculty member’s ability to teach with [his or her] extramural political 
activities and beliefs and to “assault the faculty’s political autonomy and freedom of 
speech” (p. 54).  
 Loyalty oaths were a less obvious method used to control the faculty speech and 
political activities. Almost all states required loyalty oaths in some form or another for 




the University of California’s Board of Regents, which “adopted a disclaimer oath 
[requiring] faculty to swear not only that they upheld the Constitution [but also] did not 
belong to the communist Party” (p. 55). The disclaimer oath resulted in the firing of 31 
non-signers but, all were reinstated when the California Supreme Court invalidated the 
University of California oath, as it could not supersede the one used by the state 
(Schrecker, 2010).  
AAUP 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic 
Tenure. In 1934, the Association of American Colleges began developing what 
culminated in the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic 
Tenure commonly referred to as the Statement (Kaplan & Lee, 1990). The Statement 
sharpened the principles of the 1915 Declaration and emphasized the need for full 
freedom in research, the classroom, and from institutional censorship for faculty 
extramural expression as citizens (Doumani, 2006).  The Statement was adopted at the 
November 1940 annual meeting and confronted the “chilling effect” caused by the 
Smith Act (1940) (AAUP, 2006). 
As with the 1915 Declaration, the endorsement of the 1940 Statement occurred 
as World War II started in 1939 and the nation faced another period of heightened 
national security. The Smith Act, passed as the Alien Registration Act in 1940, 
addressed security by restricting immigration and un-American behaviors in the same 
way the Immigration Act of 1916 and Espionage/Sedition Act of 1917 did. The Alien 
Registration Act made punishable as a crime the printing, publishing, editing, 




advocating or teaching the overthrow of the government (Donner, November 1952). The 
restrictions on teaching, advocating, publishing, and circulating provided legislation to 
control controversial political speech and punish those who spoke on social, political, 
and economic issues or attempted to overthrow the government.  
In response, the AAUP 1940 Statement reiterated the Declaration’s assertion that 
teachers were entitled (1) to full freedom in research and in the publication of the results, 
(2) to discuss their subject in the classroom, and (3) to speak as citizens without 
institutional censor. The Statement clarified the roles of the faculty as instructors, 
researchers, and citizens but continued with two warnings. First, teachers should be 
careful not to teach controversial matter, which has no relation to their subject. Second, 
when speaking as citizens, they should be free from institutional censorship and at all 
times be accurate, exercise appropriate restraint, show respect for the opinions of others, 
and make every effort to indicate that they are not speaking for the institution (AAUP, 
2006). These warnings espoused the political environment in which public institutions 
operated and made faculty accountable for their classroom and extramural speech. As a 
result, institutions and professors walked the fine lines between freedom and restraint, 
publishing and censorship, and patriotic and non-patriotic expression.  
 The Statement was ratified at the combined AAUP and AAC conference in 
November 1940 with three clarifications. The first clarification affirmed that the 
ratification was not retroactive and the second provided that all faculty claims made 
prior to the endorsement of the Statement must follow the principles set forth in the 1925 




to be used for past issues (AAUP, 2006). The third clarification justified the right of the 
institution to charge and dismiss faculty for extramural speech but that,  
 [i]n pressing such charges, the administration should remember that teachers are 
citizens and should be accorded the freedom of citizens. In such cases the 
administration must assume full responsibility, and the American Association of 
University Professors and the Association of American Colleges are free to make 
an investigation. (AAUP, 2006, pp. 4-5) 
From 1939 through the end of the 1940s, AAUP policy was largely shaped by 
investigative committees assigned to review complaints and respond to violations 
(Nelson, 2010). Nineteen institutions were investigated by Committee A (AAUP, 
January 2011) for academic freedom violations during this time, with 15 institutions 
censured (see Appendix A.). With these clarifications and structures in place, college 
executives and faculty entered the McCarthy era with the tools to defend academic 
freedom.  
AAUP missing in action. Despite endorsing the 1940 Statement, during the next 
six years (1950 to 1955), there were no AAUP academic freedom investigations 
(O’Neil, 2008). Fearful of reprisals and severely understaffed (Nelson, 2010), the 
association and its leadership were considered missing in action and, therefore, 
ineffective. Adding to these organizational issues was the faculty’s “political vacillation 
and the professional culture of the Academy’s emphasis on caution, rationality and 
judiciousness” (Schrecker, 2010, p. 55) in the wake of McCarthy’s assault on civil 
rights. The result was the second time that the faculty limited or curtailed their free 




In 1956, the AAUP reasserted its leadership in the area of academic freedom. 
Led by General Secretary Ralph Fuchs and President William E Britton, the AAUP 
began to eliminate the backlog of cases in the association’s files. The report at the next 
annual meeting alleged 18 violations of academic freedom, 6 universities were 
recommended for censure, and 2 for further investigation. All eight appeared on the 
1956 censure list and included Saint Louis University, North Dakota Agricultural 
College, University of California at Berkeley, University of Oklahoma, Jefferson 
Medical College, Rutgers University, Temple University, and Ohio State University. 
When the members at the annual meeting accepted the report and approved the censures, 
the AAUP reclaimed the ground that it had lost (AAUP, 1989).  
Post McCarthyism (1960 to 2000) 
Historical perspective – the end of the Cold War and the war on terrorism. 
The 1960s and early 1970s were periods of turbulence due to the start of the Vietnam 
War, struggles for racial and gender equality, and the rapid expansion of higher 
education. With the constraints of the McCarthy era lifted, faculty and students joined in 
their demands for due process and freedom of expression. Teach-ins, political protests, 
and freedom movements with activist speakers became commonplace events. Examples 
included the 1960 Students for Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) formed at 
Shaw University, the 1961 Freedom Riders efforts to register voters in Mississippi, the 
1963 Great March on Washington by Martin Luther King, the 1964 Free Speech 
Movement at the University of California Berkley, and the 1965 peace movement. These 




the Voter Rights Act of 1965, and the 1965 Executive Order 11246 (Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, September 1965) mandating affirmative action for all 
government contractors (Brunner & Haney, n.d.), including universities. Students joined 
a new generation of faculty empowered by the Civil Rights movement and energized the 
older ones to overcome their fear and to speak out, organize, and demonstrate 
(Schrecker, 2010) for rights lost in the previous decades.     
 Campus activism was increased by the addition of new 4-year institutions and 
community colleges. From 1960 to 1970, enrollments increased by 120%, faculty 
positions from 331,000 to 551,000 (Schrecker, 2010), and the number of community 
colleges surged from 412 to 909 (AACC, n.d.). The expansion created a massive force 
of young academics who had been educated during the McCarthy era and served as 
faculty, mentors, speakers at demonstrations, and intellectual counselors for the students 
(Schrecker, 2010). “As a result, universities and colleges became politicized in ways that 
had never happened before” (p. 61).  
During the 1960s and 1970s, new legislation was passed aimed at ending 
discrimination, funding for education, respecting privacy, and increasing access to 
education and the workforce. The Civil Rights Act (1964) prohibited discrimination in 
employment, education, public accommodations and housing and provided the 
government with the tools to promote equity. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment (1964) 
and the Voter Rights Act (1965) prohibited the use of literacy tests and poll taxes. The 
Equal Pay Act (1963), Higher Education Act (1965), Age Discrimination in 




workforce based on gender, age, and disability and provided financial aid to make 
college affordable for low-income students (Cornell University Law School, n.d.). These 
Acts were the result of political activism and social awareness and led to an emerging 
environment that promoted multiculturalism. 
This move toward inclusiveness was labeled “political correctness” by those who 
opposed it. Political correctness was critiqued during the 1980s – the Reagan-Bush era. 
Schrecker asserts that such critiques went as far as saying that “some of the disciplines, 
especially in the Humanities, had been so perverted by radicals, feminists, and 
deconstructionists that their practitioners no longer engaged in the scholarly pursuit of 
truth” (Schrecker, 2010, p. 106). This type of critique existed in the U.S. prior to the 
1980s but remained in the background. As the country became more politically 
conservative, this critique emerged as a mainstream ideology.  
 The 1990s witnessed a continuing conservative trend in the media and public and 
the Academy was viewed as infested with unpatriotic, politically correct, and radical 
faculty. As a result, support for higher education and individual civil rights declined and 
forced institutions to be diligent in their oversight of faculty teaching.  Political 
correctness (PC) became the mantra of conservative advocacy groups such as the 
Americas Trustees and Alumni and the Foundation of Individual Rights in Education as 
the new prejudice. Challenges from Lynne Cheney and Alan Bloom, past presidents of 
the National Endowment for the Humanities, found national attention in their 
condemnation of many university campuses as “islands of oppression in a sea of 




2008, p. 238) and academics as “indoctrinating, not educating, their students (Schrecker, 
2010, p. 118). These organizations used the power of the media to deliver their messages 
to the public. In 1991, when debates occurred over national standards for teaching 
History, national radio talk show host Rush Limbaugh “portrayed the academic 
community as unpatriotic and was able to persuade Congress to repudiate them” (p. 
122). In 1994, when the Smithsonian Institute was planning to exhibit the Enola Gay on 
the 50th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima, a group of historians investigated the 
need for dropping the atomic bomb and were chastised by TV newsman David Brinkley 
as “haters of [their] own country [who] never pass up a chance to be critical of it” (p. 
122). The assault was so thorough and well publicized that “no major figure outside of 
higher education was willing to stand up for academic freedom” (p. 107). 
AAUP activities. The AAUP published the 1964 and 1970 Interpretive 
Comments to defend and safeguard academic freedom. Working with the American 
Association of Universities, the two organizations updated and interpreted the 1940 
Statement to reflect the current challenges to academic freedom, due process, and the 
status of faculty given the previous decade’s court rulings. With the concept that the 
1940 Statement was “not a static code but [rather] a fundamental document designed to 
set a framework of norms to guide adaptations to changing times and circumstances” 
(AAUP, 2006, p. 5), the Interpretive Comments refined the principles on the use of 
controversial material and topics in the classroom and the professor’s responsibility 
when exercising extramural speech. The refinements reinforced academic freedom as a 




duty to their students and to the public as representatives of their university and 
profession. On the issue of controversial materials and topics, the Interpretive Comments 
recognized that “[c]ontroversy is at the heart of the free academic inquiry” but 
“underscore[s] the need for teachers to avoid persistently introducing material which has 
no relation to their subject” (p. 6). Similarly, on the issue of extramural speech, the 
Interpretive Comments and 1964 Statement on Extramural Utterances reiterated that 
“faculty members expression of opinion as a citizen cannot constitute grounds for 
dismissal” but continued with the caveat that faculty can be dismissed by the 
administration and university for utterances that raise grave doubts concerning the 
faculty member’s fitness for his or her position (p. 6). The AAUP reinforced these 
statements in the 1992 Statement on Freedom of Expression and Campus Speech Codes 
in stating that the university’s  
mission guides learning outside the classroom quite as much as in class, and 
often inspires vigorous debate on those social, economic, and political issues that 
arouse the strongest passions. In the process, views will be expressed that may 
seem to many wrong, distasteful, or offensive. Such is the nature of freedom to 
sift and winnow ideas. On a campus that is free and open, no idea can be banned 
or forbidden. No viewpoint or message may be deemed so hateful or disturbing 
that it may not be expressed. (AAUP, 2006, p. 37) 
The refinements and clarifications presented in these statements closed 40 years of 
academic freedom efforts and gave universities responsibility for policing academic 
freedom without court interference.  
 From 1960 to 2000, the AAUP investigated a record 191 violations of academic 
freedom (AAUP, December 2009) and censored 143 universities (see Appendix A). The 




December 2009) resulted in 82 censures (see Appendix A). These numbers were double 
the cases investigated and censured in the previous 45 years of AAUP’s existence and 
the result of increased staffing and effective leadership (O’Neil, 2008).     
Court cases. Violations of academic freedom and investigations of suspect 
behavior continued until the end of the McCarty era in 1957. In the 1960s, the courts 
provided Constitutional status to academic freedom under the First, Fifth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments (Kaplan & Lee, 1995). The Warren court of 1953 to 1969 
became known for its expansion of civil liberties and laws that reduced external political 
intrusions on faculty, granted institutions freedom from the State (Euben, 2002), and 
provided faculty with classroom autonomy to serve the public interest. The landmark 
Supreme Court cases exemplifying these struggles included Sweezy v. New Hampshire 
(1957), Shelton v. Tucker (1960), Pickering v. Board of Education (1968), and Connick 
v. Meyers (1983).  
 In Sweezy (1957), the New Hampshire Attorney General called the professor to 
answer questions under the New Hampshire Subversive Activities Act (1951) of his or 
others’ affiliation with the Progressive party. The professor refused to answer questions 
and was held in contempt. On appeal, courts found that the professor was improperly 
held in contempt and improperly ordered to disclose the nature of his past expressions 
and associations because such an order was an unconstitutional governmental 
interference in the professor’s rights safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment (Sweezy v. University of New Hampshire, 1957). The courts for 




subject matter of a University of New Hampshire lecturer’s presentation was 
“unquestionably an invasion of his liberties in the areas of academic freedom and 
political expression – areas in which the government should be extremely reticent to 
tread” (Euban, 2002, p. 15). In his concurrence with the decision, Justice Frankfurter 
quoted a statement by University of Cape Town, South Africa, scholars “categorizing 
four essential freedoms of a university [as the] freedom to determine for itself on 
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught and who 
may be admitted to study” (Sweezy v. University of New Hampshire, 1957). The 
statement was the first recognition of institutional autonomy in an academic decision by 
the Supreme Court. The notion of the “four essentials” was also recognized in Ewing 
(1985) as the court held that the university’s freedom to decide who may study at the 
university was implied (Goldberg & Sarabyn, 2011). 
 In Shelton (1960), the freedom of association and due process were upheld when 
the courts invalidated an Arkansas law that required public school and college faculty to 
“file annually, as a condition of employment, an affidavit listing every organization to 
which he has belonged or regularly contributed within the preceding five years” (Cornell 
Law School, 1960, para. 1). Similarly, in Keyishian, the courts again upheld a 
professor’s claim to freedom of expression and association by invalidating a state 
requirement that all employees sign loyalty certificates stating that they were not and 
had never been affiliated with Communists or the Communist party (Keyishian v. Bd. Of 
Regents, 1967). Keyishian placed academic freedom directly under the First Amendment 




Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of 
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That 
freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not 
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. (Kaplan & Lee, 
1995, pp. 301-302) 
 In Pickering (1967), the courts extended the reach of academic freedom when it 
upheld a public high school teacher’s right to free speech outside of the institution 
(extramural speech) by ruling in favor of the claim of the plaintiff that she was dismissed 
for criticizing the board of education’s financial plans for the high school (Pickering v. 
Board of Education, 1967). The ruling of the appeal court considered the balance of 
factors between the teacher’s freedom of public expression as a citizen and the interest 
of the state in maintaining an efficient educational system, which became known as the 
“Pickering Balancing Test” (Kaplan & Lee, 1995). The court ruled that teachers were 
protected as long as their speech did not damage the legitimate institutional objective of 
state employers (Doumani 2006). These rulings validated the AAUP’s principles of 
extramural speech in that faculty “are obliged to be accurate and to exercise appropriate 
restraint of external speech” (p. 86). Pickering completed two decades of key academic 
freedom cases and civil rights activities that ended loyalty oaths and recognized 
academic freedom as a protected First Amendment right (Euban, 2002). 
From 1970 to 2000, the courts became more conservative and refocused on 
issues related to public and private speech, classroom instruction, research and 
publication, teacher privacy, and institutional affairs. The decisions considered “not only 
the content but also the manner, time and place in which it [was] delivered” (Kaplan & 




Court opinions concerning the employees First Amendment protections of public and 
private speech.  
In Connick (1983), the court denied the claim of the plaintiff (Meyers) that his 
termination for circulating a questionnaire concerning internal office affairs violated his 
First Amendment rights (Kaplan & Lee, 1995). “The issue was whether Pickering 
protected public employees who communicated views to office staff about office 
personnel matters” (p. 394). The court refused to apply Givhan and ruled that Meyers 
spoke not as a citizen but rather as an employee on private matters. The limited First 
Amendment interest involved in the case did not require the supervisor to tolerate action 
which he reasonably believed disrupted the office, undermined his authority, and 
destroyed close working relationships (Connick v. Meyers, 1983). Although Connick 
appeared to limit protection provided by Pickering, the court emphasized that its opinion 
was limited to the facts of the case and that future courts must be vigilant to the facts of 
each (Kaplan & Lee, 1995). The Pickering/Connick test is referenced where the decision 
of whether public employee speech, made publicly and privately, is protected by the 
Constitution. 
 A century that began with the formation of the AAUP and the reaffirmation of 
faculty rights ended with the courts upholding both institutional and faculty academic 
freedom as protected under the Constitutional. However, the right of the institution to 
govern faculty intramural and extramural speech continued to be challenged by the 




issues led to new challenges and conflicts that weakened the position of the professorate 
at the turn of the century and the start of a new era.      
Neo-McCarthyism (2000 to 2012) 
 Historical perspective. On September 11, 2001, Americans awoke to deadly 
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, revered as a symbol of prosperity and 
economic might, and the Pentagon, a universally recognized emblem of U.S. military 
strength and global domination (Pyszczynski et al., 2002). The September 11, 2001 
headline, “Nothing Will Ever Be the Same” (Altman et al., 2001), as proclaimed by 
Philadelphia City Paper, exemplified the national moment. It designated September 
11th as the dividing line between the nation’s feeling of normalcy, security, and 
prosperity prior to the attacks and those of disbelief, fear, anxiety, and anger afterward 
(Pyszczynski et al., 2002). So much, that “in November 2001, 40% of all Americans 
believed that they or a family member [would] be the victim of a future terrorist attack 
[with] 74% [believing] that such an attack was quite likely in the near future” (p. 95).  
Historically, the government’s domestic arsenal in times of crisis like this has 
included secrecy, surveillance, and suppression (AAUP, November 2003). The 
government repeated history when it passed the United and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 
(USA Patriot Act). The Act provided the catalyst for sweeping legislation that had many 
detrimental consequences for faculty speech and association rights. The Act allowed the 
suppression of controversial materials, topics, and research by requiring federal review 




According to Doumani, the result has been “take back the campus campaigns by 
well-funded and politically connected private conservative advocacy groups [whose aim 
is to] influence the production of knowledge by promoting certain lines of inquiry 
[within the Academy] while delegitimizing others” (2006, p. 14) with “attacks on 
specific scholars, course offerings, and programs of study” (p. 15). Advocates such as 
David Horowitz, Daniel Pipes, and Lynne Cheney have established organizations such 
as Students for Academic Freedom and their Academic Bill of Rights (ABR), 
NoIndoctrination.org, Campus Watch, and the American Council of Trustees and 
Alumni (ACTA) to stifle thought, limit speech, and silence faculty (Gerstman & Streb, 
2006). Horowitz, like his counterparts, asserted that the majority has become 
“dispossessed of its right to speech because that right has been taken over by a radical 
faction” (Goodman, 2006, p. 118). To resolve the problem, each advocacy organization 
focused on different on-campus groups, disciplines, and agendas. The Students for 
Academic Freedom’s Academic Bill of Rights focused on student free speech and stated 
that their mission is “the creation of appropriate conditions and opportunities on the 
campus as a whole as well as in the classrooms and lecture halls [that] reflect the values 
[of] pluralism, diversity, opportunity, critical intelligence, openness and fairness” 
(Students for Academic Freedom, para. 1) and to promote “intellectual diversity that 
protects and fosters independence of thought and speech” (para. 2). Campus Watch 
focused on Middle Eastern studies programs in North America and states that their 
mission is to identify “analytical failures, the mixing of politics with scholarship, 




(Campus Watch, 2011, para. 1). The ACTA focused on alumni, donors, trustees, and 
education leaders across the United States and the mission to “uphold high academic 
standards, safeguard the free exchange of ideas on campus, and ensure that the next 
generation receives a philosophically rich, high-quality college education at an 
affordable price” (ACTA, n.d., para. 1).  
ABR’s lack of success has spawned similar legislation from the Students for 
Academic Freedom titled the “Student Bill of Rights” and “Intellectual Diversity.” The 
legislation was introduced in 10 states in 2007 and carried much of the same language as 
ABR (AAUP, 2007b). Most institutions expected these bills to die in committee but 
some state legislatures, such as Texas, are “encouraging action to be taken at the campus 
level” (Byrd, 2007, para. 2). The success and/or failure will not stop these attempts to 
infuse conservative values into their version of academic freedom and to use the students 
and national security agenda to infuse conservative values into the curriculum. 
In 2006, Horowitz continued his mission and published The Professors: The 101 
Most Dangerous Academics in America, which included short essays discussing the 
ways each professor uses his or her classroom to indoctrinate students. The book jacket 
promised information about professors who “say they want to kill White people,” 
“support Osama bin Laden,” and “defend pedophilia” (Jaschik, February 2006, para. 4). 
An analysis of The Professors by Free Exchange on Campus, a collation of academic 
and civil liberties groups, concluded that “the majority of the profiles in Mr. Horowitz’s 
book contained no evidence of professors’ in-class conduct whatsoever” (p. iv), that 




their classrooms” (p. iv) and that “Horowitz manipulated facts to make them fit his 
arguments” (p. vi).  
In 2002, the American Council of Trustees and Alumni report, Defending 
Civilization: How Our Universities Are Failing America and What Can be Done About 
It, was published. The report provided the university, disciplines, lecture quotations, and 
the names of faculty who the organization believed were intimidating students “if they 
question[ed] politically correct ideas or failed to conform to a particular ideology” 
(Martin & Neal, 2002, p. 5). The original report contained 117 faculty names but was 
retracted after angry protests by faculty associations (Doumani, 2006). ACTA reports in 
subsequent years have provided online report cards on the organization’s assessment of 
academic freedom at several public universities and colleges including the University of 
North Carolina (2005), the University of Georgia (2008), the University of Illinois 
(2009), and the University of Minnesota (2010). The reports focused on “four key areas 
of the public’s interest: what students are learning (the curriculum), whether the 
marketplace of ideas is vibrant (intellectual diversity), how the universities are run 
(governance), and what a college education costs (affordability)” (ACTA, 2010). These 
groups have successfully assumed the AAUP’s and other professional organization’s 
terms and language such as “public interest” and “academic freedom” to support and 
promote their agenda. 
Federal regulation and the courts. The most controversial legal cases of this 
period have been focused on the conflicts between cultures and ideologies and their 




the Patriot Act and political pressures from conservative and religious advocacy groups 
have brought these issues to the forefront. These issues have resulted in legal cases and 
campus controversies that have forced institutions to evaluate their cultural values and 
ethical responsibilities to their mission and the Academy. The landmark cases and events 
related to the survival of controversial programs, balance of the curriculum, 
germaneness of classroom discussions, research and federal compliance, faculty 
speaking as employees, and extramural free speech and due process provide insight into 
their effect on academic freedom. 
Balancing the discussion. Advocacy groups such as the Students for Academic 
Freedom, National Association of Scholars, and American Council of Trustees and 
Alumni have learned how to exploit faculty speech and use the fears created by 9/11 to 
support their conservative agendas to end the political abuse of the university, support 
intellectual freedom, and defend American civilization (Students for Academic 
Freedom, n.d.; National Association of Scholars, 2011; American Council of Trustees 
and Alumni, n.d.). Past experience has informed them that the court system is not 
friendly to attacks on intramural speech. So instead, the power of technology and the 
media provides them with a conduit for an echo-chamber of messages that is sent to 
campus-based groups stereotyping higher education as being “politically correct.” This 
closed network of communication offers faculty and students a means to report 
complaints, receive legal advice, and publicize incidents of indoctrination (Cavalho & 
Downing, 2010) with limited discussion or feedback from the faculty being accused. 




universities are pressured to react and spend time responding to claims better handled 
internally. 
Faculty speaking as employees. Two landmark cases concerning the free speech 
of faculty as employees, Schrier v. University of Colorado (2005) and Ceballos v. 
Garcetti (2006) were decided during this time. These cases provide the potential to undo 
the definition of a faculty member as an appointee established by the 1915 Declaration. 
In Schrier, the courts differentiated between academic free speech and speech on 
university related matters that are a public concern. Dr. Robert Schrier was a tenured 
faculty member in the University of Colorado’s School of Medicine and chair of the 
department. In October of 2002, Schrier was stripped of his chairmanship. He contends 
that this action was taken because he spoke out against the university’s plan to move the 
medical school (Schrier v. University of Colorado, 2005). In 2005, the District court 
ruled in favor of the university recognizing academic freedom as a special concern of the 
First Amendment but distinguishing academic speech from speech outside of the 
classroom when it pertains to an issue of public concern (Levinson, 2007). The “court 
concluded that the administration’s interest in suppressing Schrier’s speech outweighed 
his right to free expression” (p. 5). The ruling was issued before the Supreme Court 
decision on Garcetti but demonstrated how one district court differentiates between 
intramural and extramural speech on university matters.  
 In Garcetti (2006), the Supreme Court ruled that when public employees make 
statements pursuant to their official duties, they are not speaking as citizens and can 




of public concern (Levinson, 2007). The Garcetti decision added a preliminary step to 
the Pickering balance test. “The first step determines whether the employee spoke as a 
citizen on a matter of public concern” (Griffin, 2007, p. 153). The second step invokes 
the Pickering test “to determine whether the employer had a reason to treat the public 
employee differently from a member of the general public” (p. 153). The two-part 
Garcetti test created a measure for employee speech and provided government 
employers with broad discretion over their operations (Griffin, 2007). Griffin comments 
that this “test eliminates judicial balancing and replaces it with definite boundaries that 
are clear to both the employee and employer” (p. 54).  
 The question of whether Garcetti affects teaching and scholarship was raised by 
Justice Souter who expressed the hope that the majority decision “does not imperil the 
First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public colleges and universities” 
(DelFattore, 2011, para. 7). The court responded with the “Garcetti reservation” 
recognizing that the court’s analysis did not apply in the same manner to a case 
involving speech related to academic scholarship and classroom instruction (DelFattorre, 
2011). The Garcetti decision still creates uncertainties for faculty when they speak as 
department chairs or committee members on non-academic issues. The result could be 
that faculty refrain from participating in decision-making and are silent on issues 
considered controversial. As such, faculty must be especially careful when speaking 





 Employee speech rights were exemplified in two termination cases, Mayer v. 
Monroe County Community School Corporation (2007) and Payne v. University of 
Arkansas (2006).  In Mayer an elementary school teacher was asked by a student 
whether she participated in political demonstrations. Mayer responded that she had 
honked her horn in support of a peace demonstration. When parents complained, the 
principal reprimanded her for taking a political stance and her contract for the following 
year was not renewed. Mayer believed her classroom speech was the reason that her 
contract was not renewed and filed a lawsuit claiming a First Amendment violation. The 
district court ruled in favor of the school district stating that “the teacher had a right to 
express her views on the subject, but [that] the right was qualified in the workplace by 
the requirement that expression not disrupt an employer’s business unduly” (Mayer v. 
Monroe County Community School Corporation, “Case Summary,” 2007, para. 2). On 
appeal, “the court held that public-school teachers had to follow the approach prescribed 
by principals [and that the] Constitution did not entitle teachers to present personal 
views to captive audiences against the instructions of elected officials” (para. 2). Even 
though university instruction was irrelevant, the court “remarked that because college 
instructors are hired to instruct students, the court has no doubt that employers are 
entitled to control speech from an instructor to a student during working hours” 
Levinson, 2007, p. 3) which demonstrated how courts might approach higher education 
institutions under Garcetti (Levinson, 2007). 
 Similarly in Payne, the court ruled in favor of the university. Diana Payne, a 




explaining her concern about a university policy concerning workload, which she felt 
reduced university donations. Payne was terminated soon after and she filed a retaliation 
lawsuit against the university. The Court used Garcetti to determine that “government 
employers, like private employers, need a significant degree of control over their 
employee’s words and actions, and therefore, the First Amendment does not prohibit 
managerial discipline based on an employee’s expressions made pursuant to official 
responsibilities” (Payne v. University of Arkansas, 2006, para. 1). The court ruled that 
the email was not protected speech even though it did not pertain to a concern of public 
interest namely the university policy (Levinson, 2007). 
Extramural speech. Two cases, United States v. Al-Arian (2008) and Churchill 
v. University of Colorado at Boulder (2010), demonstrate the high-stakes legal and 
political environments in which universities operate. The cases exemplify the speed at 
which the media are able to track and report news, and the influence that legislators, 
alumni, and boards have over public institutions when faced with controversial 
extramural speech by tenured faculty members. The Al-Arian and Churchill cases also 
illustrate how extramural speech initiated internal due process methods to dismiss 
tenured faculty members and how the courts have deferred their decisions in support of 
the institution’s academic freedom as a public interest.   
United States v. Al Arian. In the fall of 2001, Dr. Sami Al-Arian, a Kuwaiti-born, 
University of South Florida (USF) computer engineering professor, appeared on the 
FOX television show The O’Reilly Factor.  He was interviewed about his pro-




calls from angry alumni, parents, and local citizens (Gerstmann & Streb, 2006). Two 
days later, Al-Arian was placed on paid leave for his safety and a month later the USF 
Board voted to recommend his dismissal. The blatant disrespect for his due process was 
charged in a grievance filed by the faculty senate to which there was no response. The 
paid leave turned into a suspension. To avoid AAUP censure, the USF president filed a 
lawsuit in district court seeking the dismissal of Dr. Al-Arian for activities that 
undermined the orderly and effective functioning of the university. The case was moved 
to a federal court where the judge faulted USF for not following due process and 
recommended the use of the university’s grievance and arbitration procedure. Then, in 
February 2003, Al-Arian was arrested by federal authorities for raising funds and 
providing material support for Islamic terrorist organizations in violation of the Patriot 
Act. The arrest and 50-count indictment was supported by wiretaps and information 
gathered legally under Electronic Communications Privacy Act and Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act. A week later, Al-Arian was fired from his USF position without ever 
being found guilty of anything (AAUP, November 2003). “The notice of termination 
stated that he had used USF’s name and resources for illegal and improper purposes” 
(Vroom, 2003, para. 3). 
 From 2003 to 2008, Al-Arian was imprisoned. The six-month trial in 2005 
featured 80 witnesses and 400 transcripts of phone conversation. At the end of the 
prosecution’s case, Al-Arian’s attorneys rested without offering a defense. The jury 




acquittal (Ave, December 2005). The case exemplifies the line that faculty walk when 
extramural activities collide with legislators, university alumni, and taxpayers.  
Churchill v. University of Colorado at Boulder. Soon after 9/11, Ward Churchill, 
chair of the Ethnic Studies department and a professor in American Indian Studies at the 
University of Colorado (UC), published an essay titled On the Justice of Roosting 
Chickens on an obscure website (AAUP, December 2010). Churchill (2003) argued that 
U.S. foreign policy had provoked the attacks on the World Trade Center and suggested 
that the people working in the financial services companies in the Twin Towers were 
complicit. He labeled these people as a “technocratic corps at the very heart of 
America’s global financial empire” and called them “little Eichmanns” (para. 24), a 
reference to the mastermind of the Holocaust, Adolf Eichmann, and stated, “the 
hijackers were not cowards as they had manifested the courage of their convictions” 
(para. 25). Just prior to a lecture at Hamilton College in February 2005, a student found 
the essay and published it in the student newspaper, which was picked up five days later 
by the Syracuse Post-Standard (Schrecker, January 2010). The controversy soon spread 
outside of Hamilton with Fox news talk show host, Bill O’Reilly, “claiming that 
Churchill should be arrested for sedition and calling on all of his viewers to demand that 
Hamilton cancel Churchill’s appearance” (p. 3). The speed of the media action provoked 
an enormous amount of attention at Hamilton College which resulted in President Joan 
Hinde Stewart relenting on her principles of academic freedom and cancelling 




  On February 1st, Colorado Governor Bill Owens wrote a letter to the university 
president demanding Churchill’s resignation. The letter was followed by a legislative 
resolution, which unanimously demanded that Churchill be fired. In response, Churchill 
relinquished his position as department chair but not his tenured faculty position 
(Schrecker, January 2010). UC-Boulder President Elizabeth Hoffman “invoked the 
McCarthy era as she cited the threat to academic freedom that Churchill’s case might 
pose” (p. 4). Three days later Governor Owens and the Board of Regents forced 
Hoffman to resign for refusal to fire Churchill and replaced her with former Colorado 
Senator Hank Brown who was an early supporter of the ACTA and an entrenched 
member of the Republican Party (Schrecker, January 2010).  
 Schrecker (January 2010) reported that, “in all official statements and press 
releases, both the regents and the president [reiterated that Churchill] like every citizen 
of the United States had the right to make controversial political views” (p. 19) and that 
they were not punishing him for his “little Eichmanns statement” (p. 19). The statements 
not only emphasized the use of due process to remove a tenured faculty member and the 
institution’s right to academic freedom but also provided distance to the president and 
the Board from the real academic freedom issue at hand; Churchill’s right to extramural 
speech as an academic. Soon after his termination, Churchill filed a suit against UC in 
Denver district court. The Churchill  case is analyzed at length in Chapter ten. 
Institutional academic freedom. Grutter v. Bollinger provided Supreme Court 
opinions that recognized university control over academic decisions. The cases 




speech specifically, but implied a “degree of deference” to the university to decide what 
speech should be censored and valued within the institution’s ideals (Goldberg & 
Sarbyn, 2011). The Supreme Court left the lower courts to determine the extent that state 
or federal laws should interfere with the institution’s autonomy and its ability to make 
academic decisions. 
Grutter v. Bollinger. In Grutter, a University of Michigan law school applicant 
sued the law school, university regents, and university officials, claiming race 
discrimination in the school’s admission policy. The trial court concluded that the policy 
was unlawful and granted an injunction however the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment and vacated the injunction. The Supreme Court 
upheld the circuit court’s decision that the law school’s narrowly tailored use of race in 
its admissions decisions did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. In upholding the 
law school’s policy, the Grutter court provided “Constitutional deference to a university 
decision” as long as the decision was made on academic grounds. If so, the university is 
provided a degree of deference as the decision is presumed to have been made in good 
faith, absent showing the contrary as defined in Bakke (Goldberg & Sarabyn, 2011). The 
court also invoked the “four essentials” from Sweezy and Ewing, leaving universities 
empowered to make core and academic decisions on intramural and extramural speech 
when it conflicts with the institution’s pursuit of their mission. The Supreme Court left 
the details to the lower courts to determine the extent to which the Grutter court meant 




 AAUP. As discussed, the AAUP was proactive in maintaining a watchful eye on 
the violations and challenges of the rights of faculty. Investigations and reports on 
violations of academic freedom continued to shape AAUP policy. Since 2000, 
Committee A, the AAUP’s, largest and oldest standing committee, has published 16 
clarifications and position statements on issues related to academic freedom which 
include tenure, academic boycotts, research, student rights, faculty speech, outside 
speakers, overseas campuses, and political controversies (AAUP, n.d.).  
In addition, the AAUP formed three special committees for limited time 
“periods, to deal with specific issues that were either outside the scope of the AAUP’s 
standing committees or required sustained special attention” (AAUP, n.d., para. 1). The 
committees investigated issues related to “Academic Freedom and National Security in a 
Time of Crisis,” “Hurricane Katrina and New Orleans Universities,” and “The Status of 
Librarians in the Academy.” Each focused on a specific event and reported on how it 
had impinged faculty academic freedom.  
 The special committee assigned to review national security in times of crisis was 
established on the first anniversary of the event of September 11, 2001. The committee 
assessed the risks to academic freedom and free inquiry that faculty are facing as a result 
of the nation’s response to the attacks (AAUP, November 2003) and more specifically 
the effects that the USA Patriot Act has had to empower federal authorities with the right 
to access academic business information such as library records and to restrict university 
employees from revealing the act (AAUP, November 2003). The report provided a 




9/11 that have resulted in external pressure being used to force institutions to terminate 
faculty for extramural speech without due process, restrict classroom speech, and deny 
foreign students and speakers access to U.S. higher education opportunities (AAUP, 
November 2003). The report concluded with 11 national and 8 campus-level 
recommendations to protect academic free speech due to “society’s failure adequately to 
protect those values during the McCarthy era” (p. 57).  
 These national and campus recommendations acknowledged the need for 
security and methods to deal with the terrorist threat but explained that the basic 
precepts of academic freedom were not negotiable (AAUP, November 2003). Specific to 
faculty speech, the report called for collaboration between academic and disciplinary 
associations and university leaders to support Congressional measures to (1) reduce 
threats to academic freedom, (2) oppose efforts to expand measures to protect national 
security, and (3) exercise vigilant and effective oversight of the power delegated to 
federal agencies by the USA Patriot Act (AAUP, November 2003). The report 
recommended communication of these issues widely to the academic community and 
public via conferences, faculty unions, and other media (AAUP, November 2003). 
The campus-level recommendations focused on the development and 
communication of internal policy. The report called for the faculty to be vigilant in the 
monitoring of changes “to institutional policies on academic freedom and free 
expression to ensure that the policies contain adequate protection against political 
pressures freedom within and outside the institution” (AAUP, November 2003, p. 57). 




in policy development, wide communication of policy changes, improved contact 
between faculty organizations and the internal departments that maintain and interpret 
institutional policies, and a heightened awareness of the sensitive documents being 
turned over to government officials (AAUP, November 2003). The recommendations 
concluded with a call for faculty and students. 
Faculty, faculty unions, and other faculty organizations should use the 
mechanisms available to them…to inform the entire university community of 
faculty concerns about national security measures and the effect of these 
measures on academic freedom and free inquiry of faculty, staff, and students. 
There must also be resistance to pressures from individuals and groups, on and 
off the campus, who seek to bar speakers whose views they oppose, to ban 
events for purposes they loathe, or to punish or silence faculty, students, and staff 
whose opinions they cannot abide. (AAUP, November 2003, p. 58) 
During the neo-McCarthy era, the calls to unify were heard and the AAUP acted upon 
them. AAUP’s Committee A investigated 30 violations of academic freedom (AAUP, 
January 2011) with 20 resulting in censure (see Appendix A).  
Figure 2.1 illustrates the number of institutions that the AAUP has censured 
since 1930. The chart depicts the increased number of censures during the pre-McCarthy 
and McCarthy periods to a peak in the post-McCarthy period and the steady decline 
starting in 1980 and continuing through 2012. Noteworthy is the fact that the number of 
institutions censured between 2000 and 2012 was almost equal to the 1950s. The main 
reason in both periods was the increased influence of government caused by fear 
(communism and terrorism) and the increased use of each period’s conservative courts 
to control unwanted academic intramural and extramural speech. Other contributing 





the hiring of part-time, at-will, non-tenured faculty nationwide. These factors have 
resulted in faculty being more cautious when participating in shared governance and 
faculty chilling their speech to reduce their exposure to controversy and discipline.  
 
Figure 2.1. Number of Institutions Censured by Decade 
In defense, the AAUP’s Litigation Committee has filed amicus briefs “in cases 
involving academic freedom, tenure, discrimination, affirmative action, sexual 
harassment, and intellectual property issues” (AAUP, December 2010, para. 1). The 
committee provided expertise in such matters as employment law, education law, the 
First Amendment, intellectual property, labor law, and civil liberties and has filed 47 
amicus briefs in federal and state courts (AAUP, December 2010; AAUP, 2004). The 
briefs were filed in conjunction with organizations such as the Thomas Jefferson Center 
































National Coalition Against Censorship (NCAC), and the Foundation for Individual 
Rights in Education (FIRE) on cases which include Otero-Burgos v. Inter-American 
University (2009), Hong v. Grant (2007), Schrier v. University of Colorado (2005), Saxe 
v. Board of Trustees of Metropolitan State College of Denver (2005), and Pittsburg State 
University/Kansas NEA v. Kansas Board of Regents, PSU, PER(2003) (AAUP, 
December 2010).  
Conclusion 
 This discussion of the evolution of academic freedom since 1890 designated four 
distinct time periods in which universities and faculty faced criticism for their 
controversial classroom speech and opinions. On September 11th, the new wave of 
challenges by conservative advocacy groups, the courts, and legislation by state and 
federal government began to cloud the bond between faculty academic intramural and 
non-academic extramural speech. These groups goal continued to be a separation of 
academic and non-academic speech based on who was speaking, what was said, and the 
location of the speech. By censoring and silencing the offenders, these organizations 
intend to enforce the “idea that politics and scholarship are separable entities” (Scott, 
2009, p. 477) and are not compatible. As occurred in each period, these efforts continue 
to test disciplines in which current events and controversial issues are discussed.  
 To this end, Nelson asserted that, “the future of academic freedom is both 
uncertain and unstable [and that] faculty now stand on weakened cultural and political 
ground” (2010, p. 166). Courts continue to profess the place of academic freedom as a 




silence the intramural and extramural speech of faculty. As Cole (2005) stated, these 
actions “coupled with other actions taken by the federal government in the name of 
national security, suggest that we may well be headed for another era of intolerance and 
repression” (p. 5). Using court decisions and interviews and surveys of faculty at U.S. 
flagship public universities, this study analyzes the opinions of the courts and the 
academic environment to determine whether faculty are being silenced since 2000 and, 






Chapter Three: Methodology 
 This chapter provides the methodology used to study the effect that events like 
the September 11th attacks and the subsequent efforts by legislators, conservative 
advocacy groups, and the courts have had on the intramural and extramural speech of 
faculty since 2000. The problem statement emphasizes the rationale for the study and 
presents the research questions on which the mixed methods focuses. A postmodern 
approach is used to guide the research as it provides a framework for deconstructing the 
discourse between the opinions of the courts and the faculty’s views of the current 
academic environment. A brief discussion of the participants interviewed and surveyed 
provides an overview of the faculty characteristics and the degree of involvement 
expected during the study. A diagram of the research design illustrates the flow of the 
study and along with a discussion of the data sources and methods of analysis, provides 
a complete outline of how the study proceeds. This methodology allows the research to 
follow a structured path to determine the effect court decisions and federal, state, and 
local events have had on faculty intramural and extramural speech rights, when faculty 
speak as public university employees and U.S. citizens. 
Problem Statement and Research Questions 
Academic freedom currently faces the most serious challenges and setbacks 
since the McCarthy era (Doumani, 2006). The hasty passage of the USA Patriot Act in 
2001 and the subsequent efforts of well-funded and politically-connected advocacy 
groups, have threatened the faculty’s academic right to free and open inquiry and 




disciplines; and to unfettered extramural utterance and action as citizens (AAUP, 2006). 
As the 1915 Declaration infers, faculty in the social, political, and economic fields are 
the ones most likely to speak and express diverse opinions that have resulted in punitive 
actions by individuals and organizations internal and external to the university (AAUP, 
2006). Their successful portrayal of the higher education system as “subverted by 
unpatriotic, politically correct, and radical faulty” has “undermined support for public 
education [and] deprived the academic profession of its previously respected voice 
within the American political discourse” (Schrecker, 2010, p. 122). As O’Neil (2008) 
stated, “[t]hose beyond the campus need to appreciate why the silencing or dismissal of 
a single faculty crackpot or nutcase potentially effects the entire community” (p. 281). 
The question of whether these actions, a decade after September 11, 2001, dominate the 
discourse and chill academic freedom in the social sciences, humanities, and 
communications fields requires further study. 
The mixed methods study focused on the changing academic landscape since 
2000. The sources of data included court cases, interviews of select university faculty, 
and online surveys of faculty at public U.S. universities. The data analysis allowed 
dominant patterns and themes to be extricated from both the legal and practical 
spectrums by providing the court’s case logic and the faculty perspective of current 
academic freedom issues. The faculty surveys improved the analysis as the diverse 
sample of faculty at a public university located throughout the U.S. provide further 




Throughout these analyses, the study focused on intramural and extramural speech to 
address the following research questions. 
1. How have federal, state, and local events affected academic freedom since 2000? 
2. How have these events changed the way universities and faculty handle 
intramural speech? 
3. How have these events changed the way universities and the faculty handle 
extramural speech when speaking both as a citizen and a public university 
employee? 
4. How have these events affected the faculty’s ability to defend their academic 
freedom since 2000?   
Analytical Paradigm 
 A postmodern approach was used to deconstruct the changing academic and 
legal climate of faculty free speech. Postmodernism was selected because it allowed the 
researcher to engage reflexity, fragment authority, and to interrogate the notion of 
consensus in order to expose binaries (Hassumani, 2002). Deconstruction is about 
recognizing the resident hierarchy within a text and flipping it. As a strategy, 
deconstruction begins with a close reading, articulates the “center” of a text, and then 
goes on to notice the other meanings also resident within the text that are marginalized 
or silenced by the “central” meaning. In her preface to Jacques Derrida’s Of 
Gramatology, Gayatri Spivak offers the following definition of deconstruction: 
To locate the promising marginal text, to disclose the undecidable moment, to 




hierarchy, only to displace it; to dismantle it in order to reconstruct what is 
always already inscribed. (1974, p. lxxvii) 
This study found the following major binary opposition operating within the overarching 
text of academic freedom: court cases and faculty voices. Within academic freedom, 
court cases were centralized and faculty voices were pushed to the margins. The study 
analyzed and discussed the centrality of the court cases but then went on to give voice to 
that which had been silenced. Using deconstruction, the study parsed meaning from the 
diverse samples and data to qualify what faculty academic freedom is and is not, post-
2000. 
 Other binaries such as discourse and silence, conformity and freedom, oppressor 
and oppressed, were analyzed to surface inherent hierarchies within the themes and to 
discuss how the dominant discourse privileges language and actions to silence dissenting 
voices and marginalizes nonconformists. The duality of the language that was and was 
not privileged allowed patterns and themes to surface with some proving to be more 
prevalent than others.  As binaries emerged, the postmodern approach also provided a 
way to identify them as separate entities or “polycenters” with dominant beliefs and 
inherent hierarchies of their own. Hogue stated that the principle of polycentrism 
“advocates for the existence of independent power within a singular political, cultural, or 
economic system [with its own] hierarchy system that privileges a center with a 
subordinate periphery” (2003, p. 3). Polycentrism allowed unique aspects and individual 
voices such as those from the analysis of case logic and interviews to emerge as themes 
with distinct dominant beliefs, structures, norms, and prejudices. Understanding these 




margins, understand the power relations (Hogue, 2003), and characterize the academic 
landscape from multiple perspectives.  
Need for Study 
 Since 2000, a number of federal, state, and local events have changed the 
landscape of the university and academic freedom. The Great Recession of 2008 
provided a unique opportunity for administrators, politicians, and pundits to change 
university structure, alter employment policies, and eliminate unwanted departments and 
programs (Schrecker, 2010). Coupled with the conservative mood and the emphasis on 
national security, the result has been a concerted effort to change the tenets of free 
speech and the academic freedom at public universities. During the Red Scare, the 
McCarthy era, and the culture wars of the 1980s and 1990s, these efforts were countered 
by court cases, appeals, and protests by the faculty and students in order to emphasize 
the importance of providing an academic environment that was open to controversial 
ideas and freedom to express dissenting opinions. As a result, academic freedom 
continued to be upheld as a right necessary for the advancement of knowledge in a free 
society. But, once again, faculty found their rights challenged. 
 In this era, universities, administrators, and faculty continue to face pressures 
from government, community leaders, and the media to repress classroom discussion 
considered radical or off topic, publications that criticize current events, and extramural 
speech deemed un-American. The decisions by the courts to challenge intramural speech 
in Schrier (2006), Garcetti (2006), Hong (2007), and Adams (2010), extramural speech 




examples of faculty and public employees who have not been silent and been chastised 
for their political opinions. Some say that academic freedom is being defended in the 
court system (O’Neil, 2007). But, the conflicts resurface whenever America’s security 
and belief system are threatened (Schrecker, 2010). This study reveals the binaries and 
resulting resident hierarchies within these conflicts and provides an analysis of the 
academic environment to determine whether intramural and extramural speech is being 
protected.  
Site 
 The two-phased study was conducted at various locations using in-person, 
phone, and online tools. The first phase of the study was a qualitative analysis of the 
logic behind select court case decisions and of the faculty interviews. The analysis of the 
cases used resources obtained from the legal databases. The second phase of the study 
was the interviews of 19 full time public university faculty, conducted in-person or by 
phone at locations convenient to the interviewees. All interviews were digitally 
recorded, transcribed by a bonded service, and coded using NVivo, a qualitative data 
analysis package. The second phase also included a quantitative component consisting 
of a seven question survey of the 19 faculty interviewed. All survey data was uploaded 
to MS Excel for analysis and reporting. 
Sources of Data 
 Full transcripts of the six selected court cases were obtained from the LexisNexis 
database and law libraries. Briefs related to the six cases were accessible online from the 




Speech and provided discussions of the legal arguments and perspectives raised in the 
court cases. 
 The initial stratified sample of 23 interviewees was selected by searching public 
university governance websites from each of the Supreme Court districts. Each potential 
interviewee was sent an email introducing the researcher, explaining the purpose of the 
study, and requesting their participation in the study. Faculty who declined were asked 
to recommend faculty who could be contacted. The snowball sampling process 
continued until 19 faculty agreed to be interviewed.  After each interview, faculty were 
emailed the demographic survey and given 30 days to respond. Follow-up emails were 
sent two weeks into the data collection process to remind faculty of the deadline in order 
to maximize response. After 30 days, the survey closed and the data were uploaded to 
MS Excel for analysis. All responses were anonymous unless the interviewee waived 
their confidentiality. All interviews and survey data were stored in encrypted format. 
This methodology was submitted to The University of Texas’s Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) and approved on October 2011 and October 2012. 
Participants 
The participant selection process entailed two sample selection methodologies. A 
stratified sampling method followed by a snowball sampling process was used to reach 
the goal of interviewing 16 to 21 faculty. The initial stratified sample included 23 public 
university faculty who were active in the governance structure of their institution or 
were past faculty senate officers. The sample was selected based on a review of public 




the study and the consent form and asked if they would be available to be interviewed 
(see Appendices B, C, and D for the email invitation, description of the study, and 
consent form). Faculty who did not respond were sent one follow-up email. If no 
response was received, they were dropped from the sample. The stratified sample 
identified eight faculty members who agreed to be interviewed with eight declining, and 
seven not returning the first or second invitation.  
Next, a snowball sampling methodology was used. Snowball sampling is an 
open-ended socio-metric method that allows the researcher to build the sample of 
interviewees, present the list to a preselected group, and expand the list based on 
extended associations (Kadushin, 1968). The method allowed the sample to build based 
on the context and criteria specific to the study.  
To achieve the goal of interviewing 16 to 21 faculty, the participants in the 
stratified sample who declined to be interviewed were contacted immediately and asked 
to provide recommendations of faculty at public universities who might be willing to 
participate in the study. In addition, faculty who agreed to be interviewed were asked to 
provide recommendations during the follow-up survey. This methodology yielded 26 
additional potential participants of which 11 agreed to be interviewed, 11 did not return 
the request, and four declined. Faculty who did not return the request were not contacted 
again and dropped from the sample. The total number of faculty interviewed and 






 As Onwuegbuzie and Leech inferred, conducting a mixed methods study 
“involves collecting, analyzing, and interpreting qualitative and quantitative data in a 
single study or in a series of studies that investigate the same underlying phenomenon” 
(September 2006, p. 474). A mixed methods design was selected because it provides the 
researcher with the ability to approach a problem in a more holistic manner. By 
validating and linking qualitative and quantitative data, the ability of the researcher to 
utilize results from one method to inform the results of another improves (Onwuegbuzie 
& Leech, December 2004) at the micro and macro levels of the study and allows the data 
set to be probed further to understand its meaning. 
 The mixed methodology was primarily a qualitative (QUAL) study and utilized a 
quantitative (QUAN) study as illustrated in Figure 3.1. As characterized by Neuman and 
Benz (1998), the design was an “interactive continuum” where quantitative data analysis 
validated the qualitative testing process to significantly enhance overall study results. 
The interactive design allowed what Onwuegbuzie and Leech (September 2006) called 
complementarity and expansion of the research. With this design, researchers are able to 
elaborate and inform results from one method with results from the other method as well 
as “expand the breadth and range of the investigation by using different methods for 
different inquiry components” (p. 480). The rationale maximized the interpretation of 
the data and significantly enhanced the results of the research (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 




study provided data to define the sample demographics and determine if the sample was 
representative of the overall sample population.  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Mixed Method Sequential Research Design 
 As illustrated, the first phase of the research included two qualitative 
components. The first component was the non-random selection and analysis of six court 
cases decided by the district courts, appellate courts, or U.S. Supreme Court from 2000 
to present that are specific to intramural and extramural academic free speech. The cases 
included Churchill (2010) for extramural speech, Schrier (2006), Garcetti (2006), Hong 
(2007), and Adams (2010) for faculty speech as employees, and Grutter (2003) for 




courts’ decisions and to highlight the themes, patterns, and issues discussed in the 
second part of the qualitative phase, the faculty interviews. 
 The second component of the qualitative study was one-on-one interviews of 19 
public university faculty. The non-random sample consisted of a stratified sample of 23 
faculty at public universities who have participated in the governance structure of their 
institution and were experienced in the area of academic free speech rights. The faculty 
were selected from public university governance websites and were sent an email with 
information about the study and a consent form requesting their participation in the 
study. As some faculty declined to be interviewed, a “snowball” method of sampling 
was then implemented. Faculty were asking to recommend additional faculty to be 
interviewed. The “snowball” method continued until the goal of interviewing19 faculty 
from public U.S. universities was achieved. 
 The interview format consisted of a general background statement to introduce 
the past and current issues facing academic freedom and to focus the interviewee on the 
study. The open-ended format of the interview questions allowed the researcher to probe 
and ask follow-up questions with the intent of identifying prevalent themes and 
arguments. The interview questions included the following: 
1. How have federal, state, and local events affected academic freedom at your 
institution since 2000? 
2. Is academic freedom a right or a privilege at your institution? What criteria 




speech as a public employee and private citizen converge and become an 
issue? 
3. In what ways do the faculty governance structures at your institution respond 
when challenges to faculty intramural and extramural speech occur? 
4. What effect does institutional academic freedom have on the faculty’s role in 
the governance structure at your university? 
5. How have faculty at your institution altered their intramural and extramural 
speech since 2000? 
The reactions of the interviewees and the environmental issues were noted in order to 
identify uncontrolled interferences and interviewer bias (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  
 The second phase, the quantitative analysis, of the study was a follow-up survey 
of the faculty interviewed. The survey had seven multiple-choice questions to 
demographic data including region of country, age group, gender, ethnicity, appointment 
track and type, whether they have participated their institution’s faculty governance 
structure since 2000, and whether they have published on the topic of academic freedom. 
Respondent’s confidentiality was protected at all times. 
Analysis of Data 
 The qualitative analysis of archival information utilizes a content analysis 
approach.  Krippendorff (2004) defined content analysis as “a research technique for 
making replicable and valid inferences from texts to the contexts of their use” (p.18) 
and, therefore, inferred that every “content analysis must have a context within which 




on the phenomenon studied and reduce the diversity of the interpretations. Defining the 
context as academic intramural and extramural free speech since 2000 focused the data 
collection. 
 Full transcripts of the court case opinions and amicus briefs from professional 
academic organizations, were retrieved, dated, and filed in order to increase the 
descriptive validity of the data collection phase. First-level descriptive and interpretive 
codes (Miles & Huberman, 1994) such as case jurisdiction (federal, district), type 
(faculty speech as employee, intramural and extramural speech, intuitional academic 
freedom), decision (plaintiff, defendant, appealed), and consequence (termination, hire, 
rehire, tenure, loss of tenure) were used to code, reduce, and categorize the data for 
analysis. As codes became obsolete, they were removed or combined with other codes. 
As codes emerged, they were added or a second-level coding schema developed in order 
to allow for further data reduction and analysis. The data was entered into a qualitative 
data package (NVivo) for further review, reduction, clustering, counting, patterning, 
matching, and theme identification.  
 The faculty interviews provided information on the changing landscape of 
academic freedom on U.S. university campuses. The interview questions and process 
were piloted with a public university faculty member to validate the flow and clarity of 
the questions, to determine the amount of time required for each interview, to resolve 
technical issues, and to deal with any researcher bias. Feedback from the pilot was used 





 The 19 interviews were digitally recorded and archived for future reference. The 
archive provides descriptive validity as the actual one-on-one interviews become a 
permanent unchanged record of the study. The recordings were sent to a bonded 
transcription services and transcribed into Microsoft Word for final review, correction, 
and storage. Field notes taken at the time of the interviews were incorporated into the 
transcript review and correction process and loaded into a qualitative statistical package 
for content analysis and coding. Themes and codes derived from the logic of the court 
case and interview analysis provide focus to the study on the macro-level issues of 
public university academic freedom in the U.S.  
 The research then proceeded to the quantitative phase of the study in which a 
survey was used to collect demographic data in order to identify the characteristics of 
the sample. The survey collected demographic data such as region of country broken 
down by Supreme Court district, appointment track and type, generational age group, 
gender, ethnicity, whether they had participated in faculty governance at their institution 
since 2000, whether they had published on academic freedom, and a space for additional 
comments. Participants had seven days from the date of the interview to respond.
 Research findings utilized four validation methods to test data quality; 1) pattern 
checking, 2) replication, 3) phenomenological validity, and 4) triangulation (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). The collection of data from archival documents, interviews, and 
surveys allowed the multiple independent sources to be used to complement their 
findings. The mixed methods provided both qualitative and quantitative analysis to be 




 To further test data quality, the researcher effect on the interview process was 
checked prior to the start and during the interview stage. First, the pilot interview 
determined not only the validity of the questions but also provided feedback on the 
researcher’s communication style and the effect of the researcher on the study (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). Feedback from the pilot was recorded for verification during the 
interviews and incorporated in the actual interviews. Second, the faculty interviews 
included an environmental scan of the location, documented any interruptions during the 
interview, and recorded any reactions to questions, or changes in the setting during the 
interview. At the start of the interview, the interviewees were provided a list of questions 
to be asked in order to keep the interview focused. All interviews were digital audio 
recorded, transcribed in full so that all points of view are included, and coded for 
patterns and themes. After each interview, the researcher documented any changes from 
the previous interview that might have affected the data interpretation.  
 After all interviews were completed, the researcher provided the full transcript of 
each interview to the participant for validating the outcomes and providing clarifications 
if needed. This “phenomenological validity” test further identifies any research bias that 
the researcher had on the interview as well as the interview on the researcher (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). The data analysis included a write-up of any observations, responses, 
changes, and effects realized during the interviews. 
 Outliers in the data analysis were tested to determine the strength of the study’s 
findings. Validating the patterns and themes identified in the qualitative phase with the 




smoothing and provided a way to strengthen the findings by defining what a finding is 
not. Understanding outliers protects the study against self-bias and builds a better 
explanation of the results (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
 Finally, findings were replicated from multiple independent data sources 
throughout the study. First, the information from case logic analysis was pulled from 
cases that have been decided in the federal, district, or state courts. The logic used by the 
various courts included a review of the amicus briefs in order to provide a cross case 
analysis of the rulings. Second, the interviews included faculty from different regions of 
the U.S., universities, academic departments, and types of appointment to provide 
diversity in the opinions and patterns identified. Third, the surveys of the faculty 
interviewed provided a basis for determining if the sample was representative of the 
study population. The replication methods outlined compliment the triangulation method 
discussed earlier. By using data from multiple sources as well as multiple analysis 
methods, the researcher eliminates what Miles and Huberman (1994) call “holistic 
fallacy,” or the mistake of basing findings and results on biased information because 
outliers were ignored. The validity testing affords the data a level of reliability for future 
studies.  
 The analysis used the data extracted and coded from each phase to identify 
dominant patterns and themes. Using postmodern theory to deconstruct the free speech 





Chapter Summary  
 This chapter provided an overview of the analytical approach used, the 
participants in the study, the data collected, and the techniques used to validate the data. 
In turn, postmodern theory is discussed to explain the perspective from which the data is 
to be deconstructed and used to interpret the findings. A mixed research methodology is 
used throughout the data collection and analysis and includes two qualitative and one 
quantitative method(s). The data was transcribed, coded, and analyzed to identify 
dominant and subordinate patterns and themes. The data and findings were validated 
using triangulation, replication, outlier identification, and statistical analysis methods. 





Chapter Four: Grutter v. Bollinger 
Background  
 In 1996, Plaintiff Barbara Grutter applied to the University of Michigan Law 
School for admission. Grutter’s application was initially placed on the Law School’s 
waitlist but was rejected in June 1997 (Grutter, 1998). Grutter, who is White, alleged 
that she was rejected because of her race and the law school’s admissions policy 
whereby “students from favored racial groups had a significantly greater chance of 
admission than students with similar credentials from disfavored racial groups” (p. 4). 
On December 3, 1997, Grutter filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, alleging “that this policy was not 
justified by any compelling state interest…to remedy past or social discrimination” (p. 
4).  The defendants in the case were 
Lee Bollinger, the dean of the law school from 1987 to 1994 and president of the 
University of Michigan from 1997 to the present; Jeffrey Lehman, the dean of 
the law school from 1994 to the present; Dennis Shields, the director of 
admissions at the law school from 1991 to 1998; the [elected] regents of the 
University of Michigan; and the University of Michigan Law School. (Grutter, 
2001, p. 5) 
Grutter based her lawsuit on two claims.  
First, plaintiff claims that the defendants discriminated against her on the basis of 
her race thereby violating her rights to equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Second, she claims that defendants violated Title VI of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act which prohibits recipients of federal funds from discriminating 
on the basis of race. (p. 5)  
She sought “a declaratory judgment to the effect that her rights were violated; an 




damages; an order requiring defendants to admit her to the law school; and attorney fees 
and costs” (p. 5).  
 The Grutter case is discussed in two parts. First, the opinions and actions of the 
District Court of Michigan, United States District Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 
and U.S. Supreme Court are reviewed and discussed to provide a chronology of the case 
and the variations in the decisions as the case progressed through the court system. 
Second, the dominant four themes are identified for analysis. The dominant themes are 
race-based/conscious admissions, validity of Justice Powell’s decision in Bakke, racial 
discrimination (past and present), compelling state interest, and achieving a critical 
mass. The relationship between these themes as well as the ten sub-themes that were 
also identified are further analyzed and discussed using the opinions and decisions made 
by the district court, court of appeals, and Supreme Court. 
Court Actions 
 The Grutter case started in the District Court of Michigan and was appealed all 
the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. While the case focuses on racial diversity, it is 
significant to this study because it is one of the first post-2000 cases in which the 
Supreme Court upheld the right of the university to make academic decisions and 
demonstrated the Courts’ continued reluctance to interfere in university business unless 
a compelling state interest existed. These decisions exhibited not only the Courts’ 
hesitation but also the acceptance by the courts to have academic decisions controlled at 




 District Court of Michigan. On July 15, 1998, the defendants made a motion to 
reassign the civil rights action filed against them to the judge handling a similar case, 
Gratz v. Bollinger. The motion requested that (1) Grutter be reassigned from Judge 
Freidman to Judge Duggan who was presiding over the Gratz case and (2) that Judge 
Freidman assign Grutter as a companion case to Gratz (Grutter, 1998).  
Defendants argued that the complaints in Grutter and Gratz are “virtually 
identical”; that the parties are represented by the same attorneys in both cases; 
that in the two cases “most of the defendants overlap”; and that reassignment 
“will promote docket efficiency and conserve judicial resources by avoiding 
duplication of efforts and the risk of inconsistent rulings.” (p. 5)  
The motion was sent to Chief Judge Taylor who disqualified herself because her 
husband was a regent at the University of Michigan (Grutter, 1998). Taylor, in turn, 
“reassigned the motion…for consideration and decision by two former chief justices 
who remain in service, Judge John Feikens and Judge Abele Cook, Jr.” (p. 5).  
 On August 6, 1998, the two judges filed an advisory opinion addressing the 
second part of the motion but not the first. The judges did not rule on the reassignment 
of the case to Judge Duggan. The judges concluded but did not rule that Grutter and 
Gratz were companion cases under Michigan Local Rule 83.11 (Grutter, 1998).  
Because the judges’ opinion was not accompanied by an order, the court viewed it as an 
advisory opinion and struck it from the record of the case. Friedman, the presiding judge 
in the case, also ruled that “Judge Fiekens and Cook had no authority to take action or 
issue any rulings in this case and [that] their opinion [was therefore nullified]” (p. 5) for 





reassign the case to district judges who are in active service, present in the district, and 
able and qualified to act” (p. 6).  Instead, Taylor designed her own procedure and 
personally selected and reassigned the case to two former chief judges. After 
disqualifying herself, she should have “refrained from taking any further action in the 
case [and as a result] violated both her legal and ethical duty by selecting the judicial 
officers who were to act in her stead” (p. 6). Because the reassignment violated federal 
statute and the opinion was not accompanied by an order, the court concluded that Judge 
Fieken’s and Cook’s opinion was unlawful, void, and must be stricken from the record 
of the case (Grutter, 1998). 
 The second part of the motion designating Grutter and Gratz as companion 
cases was denied by presiding Judge Freidman. He ruled based on Michigan Local 
Rule 83.11 which defined a companion case as one in which “(i) substantially 
similar evidence will be offered at trial, or (ii) the same or related parties are 
present, and the cases arise out of the same transaction or occurrence” (p. 9). The 
court decided that plaintiffs Grutter and Gratz were applicants in two separate 
university programs, the law school and the undergraduate college respectively, 
and would therefore have dissimilar evidence offered at trial, that the only 
connection between the two was Lee Bollinger, President of the University of 
Michigan, that plaintiffs would be represented by two different lawyers, and that 
the timing of the motions in each case was different. For these reasons the court 
struck the opinions of Feikens and Cook and denied the motion to reassign Grutter 




 On August 10, 1999, the defendants appealed the ruling by the United 
States District Court of Michigan to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to disallow 
defendant-intervenors in both the Grutter and Gratz cases. “In each of the cases 
before the court, a group of students and one or more coalitions [appealed] the 
denial of their motion to intervene in a lawsuit brought to challenge a race-
conscious admissions policy at the University of Michigan” (Grutter, 1999, p. 1). 
In order to intervene, the proposed intervenors had to establish, 
(1) that the motion to intervene [was] timely (2) that they [had] a 
substantial legal interest in the subject matter of the case; (3) that their 
ability to protect that interest might be impaired in the absence of 
intervention; and (4) that the parties already before the court might not 
adequately represent their interest. (p. 4) 
The proposed intervenors filed their motion in a timely manner and 
“argued that their interest in maintaining the use of race as a factor in the 
University’s admissions program is a sufficient substantial legal interest to support 
intervention as of a right” (p. 4). The court ruled on the second criteria that the 
intervenors had “enunciated a specific interest in the subject matter of this case, 
namely their interest in gaining admission to the University” (p. 5). 
 To satisfy the third criteria of the intervention test, the proposed intervenors had 
to “show only that impairment of its substantial legal interest is possible if intervention 
is denied” (p. 5). The court said “that access to the University for African-American and 





the enrollment of these students [might] well result if the University is precluded from 
considering race as a factor in admissions” (p. 6). The court noted, that “recent 
experiences in California and Texas suggested such an outcome [and that] the 
probability of similar effects in Michigan [was] more than sufficient to meet the minimal 
requirements of the impairment element” (p. 6). 
 For the last criteria, the proposed intervenors had to demonstrate that the 
university would not adequately defend their interests in the outcomes of the case. They 
argued that there would be inadequate representation of their interests  
because the University is subject to internal and  external institutional pressures 
that may prevent it from articulating some of the defenses of affirmative action 
that the proposed intervenors intend to present. They also argue that the 
University is at less risk of harm than the applicants if it loses this case and, thus, 
that the University may not defend the case as vigorously as will the proposed 
intervenors. (p. 6) 
The appeals court found that the proposed intervenors had satisfied the “intervenors 
test,” that they had articulated that their interests would “be impaired by an adverse 
determination, and that the existing defendant, the University, may not adequately 
represent their interests” (p. 6). The appeals court reversed the district court’s order 
denying intervention in Grutter and Gratz and remanded the cases to permit intervention 
by the proposed defendant-intervenors (Grutter, 1999). 
 On December 22, 2000, the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan heard oral arguments on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and 





the trial would focus on the following three issues: (1) the extent to which race 
[was] a factor in the law school’s admissions decisions; (2) whether the law 
school’s consideration of race in making admissions decisions constituted a 
double standard in which minority and non-minority students are treated 
differently; and (3) whether the law school could take race into account to “level 
the playing field” between minority and non-minority applicants. (pp. 5-6) 
To evaluate each of these issues, the court reviewed the university’s rationale for 
using race as factor in the admissions processes. A full review of the university’s 
admissions policy was done due to its central role in the case as well as the procedures 
used to evaluate and select candidates (Grutter, 2001). The court highlighted the law 
school’s “desire to admit a group of students who individually and collectively are 
among the most capable students applying to American law schools in a given year” (p. 
6). The policy also noted that, “no applicant should be admitted unless we expect that 
applicant to do well enough to graduate” (p. 6). To determine success, the admission 
evaluators placed emphasis on Law School Admissions Tests (LSAT) and 
undergraduate grade point averages (UGPA) as well as a number of “soft variables” 
including “the enthusiasm of recommenders, the quality of the undergraduate institution, 
the quality of the applicant’s essay,” (p. 6) and the difficulty of undergraduate course 
work. The law school used these evaluation variables to diversify the entering class, to 
correct past race-based discrimination, and to achieve a “critical mass” of minority 
students. The admissions director at the time of the appeal defined “critical mass” as a 
“meaningful number or meaningful representation that is sufficient so that minority 





To achieve a critical mass, the university’s witnesses testified that the law school 
selected applicants from three separate groups to achieve enrollment diversity of student 
views, ethnicity, and race. The first applicant group was based solely on LSAT and 
UPGA scores, the second group was based on soft variable such as their enthusiasm, the 
quality and difficulty of their undergraduate institution and course selection, and their 
applicant essay, and the third group which was known as “‘special admissions,’ for 
minority students who did not fall within the other two groups” (Grutter, 2001, p. 9). 
Law school admissions officers testified that race had to be used “because a critical mass 
of minority students could not be enrolled if admissions decisions were based primarily 
on LSAT scores and UGPAs” (p. 10). No admissions officer testified that they were told 
to admit a particular number or percentage of minority students to achieve a critical 
mass but they testified that admission reports indicating race and other soft variables 
were reviewed daily “to make sure that admissions goals, including those regarding the 
admission of a critical mass of minority students, [were] being achieved” (p. 11). The 
law school conceded that race was one of many factors used during the applicant 
evaluation process and was “not a trump card” (p. 13).   
After review of the testimonies, the district court found that “the Law School 
clearly considers an applicant’s race in making admissions decisions” (Grutter, 2001, p. 
13) with the major contention being the extent and weight race is given during the 
process. The admissions policy, analytical reports provided by specialists, testimonies by 
admissions officers, and daily reports used in the achievement of diversity all indicated 




court concluded that “that the law school explicitly considers the race of applicants in 
order to enroll a critical mass of underrepresented minority students” (p. 18).   
The court next considered whether “the Constitution permits the consideration of 
race in order to achieve racial diversity [or] whether the achievement of racial diversity 
is a compelling state interest and, if so, whether the law school’s admissions policy is 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest” (p. 18). The court turned to the Supreme Court 
opinion provided in the Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978) because 
it was one of the few landmark cases in which the Supreme Court had addressed the 
rational for diversity at the time of the trail. “Of the six separate opinions issued by the 
Supreme Court in Bakke, Justice Powell’s was the only one that considered whether a 
state educational institution [had] a compelling interest in admitting a racially diverse 
class of students” (p. 19). While various Supreme Court Justices joined in sections of 
Powell’s opinion in Bakke, a majority did not join the section that considered race a 
compelling state interest which introduced the question of whether a minority opinion 
could be used to decide whether the law school’s interest in creating a diverse student 
body was constitutionally protected (Grutter, 2001).  
 After review, the district court concluded that “Justice Powell’s discussion of 
diversity rationale was not among the governing standards to be gleaned from Bakke” (p. 
21) and that “the Supreme Court in Bakke did not recognize the achievement of racial 
diversity in university admissions as a compelling state interest...because it is not a 
remedy for past discrimination” (p. 22). The court did not doubt the importance of 




if it were narrowly defined to serve that [compelling state] interest” (p. 23) for five 
reasons. First, the need to achieve a “critical mass” of underrepresented student was not 
uniformly defined and therefore, not narrowly tailored to serve a state interest. Second, 
the university’s use of race in the admissions process was not narrowly tailored and had 
no time limits as indicated by their statement that they would “use them as long as 
necessary to admit a ‘critical mass’ of underrepresented students” (p. 23).  Third, by 
using race to ensure the enrollment of a certain minimum percentage of 
underrepresented minority students, the law school made the admissions policy 
practically indistinguishable from a quota system. Fourth, no logical basis existed for the 
law school to give special attention to particular racial groups under the admissions 
policy (Grutter, 2001). Finally, the law school failed “to investigate alternative means 
for increasing minority enrollment” (p. 25).  For these reasons, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that the law school’s attainment of racial diversity was not a state interest 
and “that the law school’s 1992 admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act” (p. 25). 
 Even though the policy violated Title VI, the court held that individual 
defendants had qualified immunity from damages. The court’s rejection of Bakke as a 
governing standard and the fact that the individual defendants did not participate in the 
adoption or administration of the admissions policy led the courts to conclude that the 
individual defendants had no reason to believe that they were violating constitutional 
law (Grutter, 2001). The district court found “that the individual defendants in this case 




adopting and administering the policy in question” (p. 26). The court granted the 
individual defendant’s motion for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity 
but, in turn, denied the Board of Regent’s motion for protection of liability damages 
under the Eleventh Amendment immunity clause. The court reasoned that the 
admissions policy “intentionally endorsed, or acquiesced in, an admissions policy that 
treats applicants differently because of their race” (pp. 26-27).  
 The court addressed the third issue of “leveling the playing field” between 
minority and non-minority applicants. Expert witnesses and concerned parties provided 
testimony, data, and information 
about the history and current status of racial discrimination in this country; the 
causes of the “achievement gap” between underrepresented minority and non-
minority students; the alleged cultural bias in standardized tests such as the SAT 
and the LSAT; and the recent experiences of some African American and 
Mexican American students at high schools, colleges and universities. (p. 27)  
After 30 hours of testimony, the court acknowledged the long and tragic history of racial 
discrimination in the U.S and its lingering effect on school systems. Minority students 
from these impoverished and ineffective schools have been plagued with negative 
performance in college and lower UGPA and LSAT scores (Grutter, 2001). The court 
attributed this “to general, societal racial discrimination against these groups” (p. 36) but 
concluded that (1) that there is  
no evidence, or even an allegation, that the law school or the University of 
Michigan has engaged in racial discrimination and (2) that, as a matter of 
constitutional law, the law school cannot use a race conscious admissions policy 
and process to correct these problems…to “level the playing field.” (p. 36) 
The court concluded that the law school may not consider the use of race in their 




“remedying of societal discrimination, either past or present, has not been recognized as 
a compelling state interest” (p. 39). In conclusion, the court (1) granted plaintiff’s 
request for declaratory relief as the admission policy violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, (2) 
granted plaintiff injunctive relief forcing the Law School from using race in admission 
decisions, and (3) denied the motion for summary judgment except for those individual 
defendants granted qualified immunity (Grutter, 2001). 
 On April 3, 2001, the only remaining defendant, the university, motioned 
for a stay of injunctive relief forcing the law school from considering race as a 
factor in the admissions process. Plaintiff opposed the motion. To prevail, 
defendants had to demonstrate,  
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely 
to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably 
injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially 
injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the 
public interest lies. (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2001, p. 4) 
 In response, the defendants argued  (1) that “there is a reasonable possibility that 
[their] position [would] ultimately prevail” (p. 4), (2) that the law school would be 
irreparably harmed unless the injunction was stayed as their “admissions process for the 
current season [would] be disrupted, (3) that the disruption would prevent them from 
admitting a racially diverse class” (p. 5), and (4) that the law school’s “First Amendment 
rights to academic freedom and the pursuit of educational goals” (p. 5) were being 




The district court stated that the defendants argument of “reasonable possibility” 
to prevail was not the same as a “strong showing” as required in the test. The court 
added that the defendants had not, “at a minimum, demonstrate[d] the existence of 
serious questions going to the merits” (p. 4).  The court found that the law school’s use 
of a race-conscious admission process to enroll a “critical mass” of minority students 
was not a compelling interest and was indistinguishable from a quota system, which was 
unconstitutional. The court was also not convinced that the law school’s admission 
process would halt or prevent them from admitting a diverse class and injuring the 
public as their admission process called for examining each application. While the 
members of the plaintiff’s class with pending law school applications have a strong 
interest in keeping the injunction in place, the public has a “strong public interest in 
ensuring that public institutions comply with the Constitution” (p. 7). For these reasons, 
the court denied the defendant’s motion for a stay of injunction. 
 District Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. On April 5, 2001, the 
defendants appealed the district court’s decision to the District Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit. The court determined that the injunction would cause “irreparable 
damage” to the law school because the development of new admissions policies would 
take time and delay the admissions process (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2001). The delay could 
cause some students to accept admission at other institutions “thus, diminishing the 
University’s ability to compete with other selective law schools for highly qualified 




appellate court reversed the district court’s decision and granted the defendant’s motion 
for a stay of injunction pending appeal. 
 In December 2001, the defendants appealed the district court’s decision to the 
United States District Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The district court had held  
 (1) it was not bound by Justice Powell’s conclusion in Bakke, and (2) achieving 
a diverse student body cannot be a compelling state interest because the Supreme 
Court has suggested that the only such interest is remedying specific instances of 
discrimination. (Grutter, 2001/2002, p. 5) 
The court of appeals reviewed “de novo the district court’s finding that the law school’s 
efforts to achieve a diverse student body through the consideration of race and ethnic 
origin is unconstitutional and violates Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964” (p. 5). 
The court stated that, “to survive constitutional review, the Law school’s consideration 
of race must (1) serve a compelling state interest and (2) be narrowly tailored to achieve 
that interest” (p. 5). The defendants contended that their interest in enrolling a “diverse 
student body [was] compelling under Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 
and that [their] admissions policy [was] narrowly tailored to serve that interest” (p. 3).  
The court began with a review of the fragmented opinions held by Justices Powell and 
Brennan in Bakke to determine the case’s relevance in the current moment. 
In Bakke, Justice Powell’s opinion (which four other justices joined) found that 
the University of California at Davis (UC Davis)  
could constitutionally justify its consideration of race as an effort to remedy the 
effects of societal discrimination [and that] the attainment of a diverse student 
body…clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher 




Further support for Powell’s opinion was found in a footnote in Brennan’s opinion, 
which referenced the Harvard Plan, a race-conscious admissions practice, as 
“constitutional…so long as the use of race to achieve an integrated student body is 
necessitated by the lingering effects of past discrimination” (p. 8). The Harvard plan 
considered “the race and ethnicity of applicants [as a plus], but…not the exclusive 
components of academic diversity, [and] treated each applicant as an individual in the 
admissions process” (p. 9) to achieve a diverse student body. As the Harvard plan did 
not segregate admissions or enforce quotas to accomplish diversity, the Bakke court 
recognized it as constitutional and held that it was narrowly tailored not to offend the 
Equal Protection Clause. In turn, the court of appeals rejected the district court’s first 
conclusion and held that it was “bound by Justice Powell’s opinion because Bakke 
remains the law until the Supreme Court instructs otherwise” (p. 5).  
Next, the court of appeals considered the district court’s second conclusion and 
reviewed the five factors that the district court used to determine that the law school’s 
use of race was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.  The factors 
reviewed were that  
 (1) the law school did not define “critical mass” with sufficient clarity; (2) the 
apparent lack of a time limit on the law school’s consideration of race and 
ethnicity; (3) the admissions policy was “practically indistinguishable” from a 
quota system; (4) the law school did not have a logical basis for considering the 
race and ethnicity of African-Americans, Native Americans and Puerto Ricans; 
(5) the law school did not “investigate alternative means for increasing minority 
enrollment.” (p. 12)  
The majority concluded that the law school’s use of the term “critical mass” did not 




minority students [tracked] the Harvard plan’s pursuit of a class with ‘meaningful 
numbers’ of minority students” (p. 11). To accomplish a critical mass, the law school 
used race as one of many factors in their admissions evaluation process, which did not 
segregate applicants to different criteria. In developing the process, the court found that 
record showed that the law school had considered alternative methods for achieving 
diversity but also recognized the law school’s need to make academic decisions to 
support its mission. The court stated that courts “are ill-equipped to ascertain which 
race-neutral alternatives merit which degree of consideration or which alternatives will 
allow an institution such as the law school to assemble both a highly qualified and richly 
diverse academic class” (p. 14). The court deferred judgment on the issues of 
determining what constitutes a “critical mass” or “meaning numbers” of 
underrepresented minorities and the amount of time required to maintain their race-
conscious admissions process to the law school. In doing so, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals “reversed the judgment of the district court and vacated its injunction 
prohibiting the law school from considering race and ethnicity in its admissions 
decisions” (p. 15). The majority opinion was enjoined by four chief justices.   
Circuit Judge Boggs wrote the dissenting opinion rejecting the majority’s 
acceptance of the law school’s admission practices as “a straightforward instance of 
racial discrimination by a state institution, [which] in the highly charged context of 
discrimination in educational decisions in favor of ‘underrepresented 
minorities’…would not pass even the slightest scrutiny” (p. 28). Boggs stated (1) that 




that “the majorities reading of Bakke was erroneous” (p. 30) as Powell’s concurring 
opinion on race-conscious admission to promote diversity was not held by a majority of 
the Bakke court, and (3) that, “even if student diversity were a compelling state interest, 
[Justice Powell’s] and the Law School’s admissions scheme was not narrowly tailored to 
serve that interest” (p. 30).  
Boggs discussed the majority’s use of Marks (1977) to discern the majority’s 
decision to apply the holding of the fractured Bakke court. In Marks, the Court stated 
that,  
when a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the 
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed 
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 
narrowest grounds. (p. 32) 
Boggs asserted that the majority read Marks “broadly, to provide a basis for discerning 
the holding of the Court in circumstances where a majority of the Justices agree on an 
outcome but not on a rationale for the outcome” (p. 32). Applying this to the opinions in 
Bakke, the Grutter majority contended that Powell’s opinion was the holding of the 
Supreme Court, because he concurred in the judgment of the Court on the narrowest 
grounds, striking down UC Davis’s admission policy for the use of quotas but adding, in 
a concurring opinion, that “race could be taken into account in admissions decisions in 
certain circumstances, namely to promote diversity” (p. 32). Boggs argued that (1) the 
majority decision in Bakke to invalidate UC Davis’ admissions policy was separate from 
Powell’s concurring opinion justifying race-conscious admissions policies and (2) that, 
even if Powell’s concurring opinion was considered a subset of the holding, it would not 




opinion, the majority should have used Justice Brennan’s opinion which narrowed the 
use of race in the admission process “at least so long as the use of race to achieve an 
integrated student body is necessitated by the lingering effects of past discrimination” (p. 
35).  Boggs’ purpose was to demonstrate that the conflicting opinions of concurring 
Justices could not be used as the holding decision of the Court under Marks and that the 
majority could not apply Powell’s opinion “to divine a clear holding from a decidedly 
unclear decision” (p. 35). Justice Brennan acknowledged this issue in his concurrence 
when he wrote that “the difficulty of the issue presented [in Bakke] and the mature 
consideration which each of our Brethren has brought to it have resulted in many 
opinions, no single one speaking for the Court” (p. 36). Since Bakke, Boggs pointed to 
two cases, in Fullilove (1980) and Adarand (1995), in which the courts have “refused to 
adopt the ‘formulas of analysis’ set out in Bakke” (p. 36). Other cases cited were Metro 
Broadcasting (1990), which called “into question the permissibility of using race for 
diversity purposes” (p. 38) and Croson (1989), which stated that, “race should only be 
used for remedial settings” (p. 38). Boggs dissented due to the majority’s refusal to use 
Bakke and the law school’s use of Powell’s concurring opinion for a race-conscious 
admissions practice as the basis for a decision. 
Finally, Boggs asserted that the admission practice of the law school was not 
narrowly tailored to endure strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment and serve a 
state interest. He argued that  
the majority…applies extremely subtle reasoning to come to the conclusion that 




constitutional so long as it does not specify a number of seats to be reserved for 
minorities and so long as it arguably tracks the Harvard plan. (p. 31) 
Boggs contended that the law school’s admission practice of “achieving a critical mass 
did not meet the constitutional requirements of narrow tailoring” (p. 39). He stated that 
the law school’s “efforts to achieve a critical mass [were] functionally indistinguishable 
from a numerical quota” (p. 39) even though it did not “articulate a precise numerical 
target for admitted minorities” (p. 39). While the law school could have used other 
factors for achieving diversity as Powell discussed in Bakke, the lack of how the law 
school defined and favored specific groups left Boggs to believe that ultimately the 
decision was based on “who is, and is not, an African-American, Hispanic, or Native 
American” (p. 41) to remedy past discrimination.   
To satisfy the strict scrutiny test, a compelling state interest for achieving a 
diverse student body at the law school must exist and the employment of only those 
means narrowly tailored to that purpose must be used (Grutter, 2001/2002). Boggs 
argued that the law school’s admission practice “to assemble both a highly qualified and 
richly diverse academic class” (p.  45) operated on two-tracks with race acting, “as a 
‘tip’…that overbalances a…closely divided or nearly evenly balanced choice” (p. 46). 
While the majority argued that there were no criteria in Bakke stating how large racial 
preference should be, Boggs contended that race was the only factor in the law school’s 
admission decisions and that the law school’s use of race raised minority applicants’ 
“chance of admission from zero to 100% in many cases” (p. 46). He added that the lack 
of evidence that other soft factors had any effect on past admission decisions indicated 




student enrollments. With this, Boggs stated, “that the Law school’s admissions scheme 
was functionally…indistinguishable from a quota system [and that], at the very least, the 
Law school’s admission plan seems far from employing the mere ‘plus’ or ‘tip’ that the 
majority characterizes its racial preference to be” (p. 48). Boggs dissented from the 
majority because the Michigan plan sought “racial numbers for the sake of the comfort 
that those abstract numbers may bring…at the expense of the real rights of real people to 
fair consideration” (p. 54) and was therefore unconstitutional. Boggs’ dissent was joined 
by three of the other circuit judges. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and vacated the injunction 
issued by the district court “in which the applicant argued that the law school engaged in 
admission practices that violated the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII” (p. 1). 
 U.S. Supreme Court. In April of 2003, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
review the case. Justice O’Connor delivered the majority opinion of the court and Justice 
Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and 
Thomas (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003). Justice O’Connor provided an overview of the law 
school’s admission practice, and summarized testimonies of the witnesses, opinions of 
the judges, and the holdings as the case has progressed through the Michigan District 
Court and Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court  
granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement among the courts of appeals on a 
question of national importance: Whether diversity is a compelling interest that 
can justify the narrowly tailored use of race in selecting applicants for admission 





To answer this question, Justice O’Connor’s opinion began by discussing the 
splintered decisions in Bakke, which was the last time the Supreme Court addressed 
equal protection and race-conscious admissions policies in public higher education 
(Grutter, 2003). In Bakke, O’Connor stated that Powell “approved the university’s use of 
race to further only one interest: the attainment of a diverse student body” (p. 20). He 
added that Powell  
grounded his analysis in the academic freedom that long has been viewed as a 
special concern of the First Amendment [and] emphasized that nothing less than 
the nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to the 
ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples. (p. 20) 
He believed that race was one factor that universities could use to achieve this diversity 
and serve a compelling state interest. O’Connor endorsed “Powell’s view that student 
body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university 
admissions” (p. 21).  
 Second, O’Connor addressed the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as it applied to the protection of people, not groups. O’Connor stated that 
race as a group “should be subject to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal 
right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed” (p. 22). Race-conscious 
admission policies must be strictly scrutinized by the courts to ensure they are narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest (Grutter, 2003). 
 Third, Justice O’Connor discussed the law school’s admission policy in the 
context of higher education’s interest in having a diverse student body. Deferring to the 
law school’s mission and educational judgment, O’Connor stated that their practice “is 




academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits” (p. 22). She acknowledged 
the Court’s past recognition of public education as serving an important purpose and 
occupying a special niche in our Constitutional tradition, cases grounded in the First 
Amendment providing universities with educational autonomy, and the expansive 
freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment, which 
includes the selection of its student body that can provide a robust exchange of ideas 
(Grutter, 2003). On this point, the Court concluded that the law school had a compelling 
interest in a diverse student body as it was “the heart of the law school’s proper 
institutional mission, and that ‘good faith’ on the part of a university [was] presumed 
absent a showing to the contrary” (p. 22).  
 Fourth, the Court discussed the law school’s practice of enrolling a “critical 
mass” of minority students to “achieve the educational benefits that diversity is designed 
to produce” (p. 23). O’Connor acknowledged that the district court emphasized the law 
school’s “admissions policy [promoted] ‘cross-racial understanding,’ [helped] to break 
down racial stereotypes, and [enabled] students to better understand persons of different 
races” (p. 23). She recognized the need of business and government to employ people 
with “the skills needed in today’s increasingly global marketplace [that] can only be 
developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints” 
(p. 23). O’Connor stated that the law school had “determined, based on its experience 
and expertise, that a ‘critical mass’ of underrepresented minorities [was] necessary to 




body” (p. 24). She held that the law school had “a compelling state interest in attaining a 
diverse student body” (p. 22).  
 Finally, O’Connor discussed the “narrow tailoring” of the admission policy 
required to “serve the state interest” and survive “strict scrutiny” by the courts. 
O’Connor wrote that the compelling state interest must ensure that “the means chosen 
‘fit’…the compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive 
for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype” (Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 2003, p. 24). To be narrowly tailored, the law school’s “admission program 
must be flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the 
particular qualifications of each applicant, and place them on the same footing for 
consideration, although not necessarily according them the same weight” (p. 24) without 
“unduly burden[ing] individuals who are not members of the favored racial and ethnic 
groups” (p. 27). The law school’s program must also have considered alternatives and be 
limited in length of time that it is to be used. O’Connor determined that the admission 
practice of the law school considered many factors other than race, that they did “not 
unduly harm nonminority applicants,” (p. 27) and that the Court took the law school at 
its word that it would “terminate [their] race-conscious admissions program as soon as 
practicable” (p. 28). 
In conclusion, the majority held that “the Equal Protection Clause does not 
prohibit the law school’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further 
a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse 




joined by Stevens, Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg (in part), and Thomas (in part). Ginsburg, 
joined by Breyer, wrote a concurring opinion “observing that race-conscious programs 
must have a logical end point [even though many minorities still cannot] meet the high 
threshold requirements set for admission to the country’s finest undergraduate and 
graduate educational institutions” (p. 29).  
 Justice Rehnquist wrote the dissenting opinion for the Court. He agreed that “in 
the limited circumstance when drawing racial distinctions is permissible,” the 
government must ensure that its means are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
state interest [but disagreed that] the University of Michigan Law School’s…means 
[were] narrowly tailored to the interest it assert[ed]” (Grutter, 2003, p. 30).  He argued 
that the law school never provided reasons “explaining why significantly more 
individuals from one underrepresented minority group [were] needed in order to achieve 
‘critical mass’ or further student body diversity” (p. 31). He contested that the law 
school’s practice of achieving a “critical mass” based on each underrepresented minority 
group’s statistical representation in the applicant pool was “a naked effort to achieve 
racial balancing” (p. 30). Under previous Supreme Courts, these practices would not 
have passed “strict scrutiny” and would have been “call[ed] patently unconstitutional” 
(p. 33). Justice Kennedy joined in full with the Rehnquist dissent and added a discussion 
of the majority’s application of “strict scrutiny” to approve “how the law school’s 
admission policy is implemented” (p. 34).   
 Justice Kennedy contended that the law school had “the burden of proving, in 




unconstitutional way” (p. 34). To accomplish this, the school had “either to produce a 
convincing explanation or to show it has taken adequate steps to ensure individual 
assessment” (p. 34).  Kennedy concluded that the law school did neither (Grutter, 2003). 
He argued that,  
the consultation of daily reports during the last stages of the admissions process 
suggests there was no further attempt at individual review save for race itself 
[and that the] admissions officers could [have used] the reports to recalibrate the 
plus factor given to race depending on how close they were to achieving the Law 
School’s goal of critical mass. (p. 34) 
To be constitutional, the individual must be safeguarded throughout the admissions 
process where “race does not become a predominant factor in the admissions decision 
making” (p. 35). Justice Kennedy found regrettable the Court’s important holding 
“allowing racial minorities to have their special circumstances considered in order to 
improve their educational opportunities [through the] suspension of the strict scrutiny 
which was the predicate of allowing race to be considered in the first place” (p. 36) and, 
therefore, dissented. 
 Justice Thomas, joined by Scalia, provided an opinion in which they concurred 
in part and dissented in part. They concurred with the Court’s decision confirming “that 
further use of race in admissions remains unlawful [and] the Court’s holding that racial 
discrimination in higher education admissions will be illegal in 25 years” (p. 38). They 
dissented from the remainder of “the Court’s opinion and the judgment…because…the 
Law School’s current use of race violates the Equal Protection Clause and that the 






 The Grutter case began in the district courts of Michigan in August 1998 and 
ended in the U.S. Supreme Court in June 2003 (59 months). The analysis of the court 
opinions as the case progressed through district court, court of appeals, and Supreme 
Court identified 14 themes with 159, 267, and 250 coded references respectively for a 
total of 676 coded references. The 14 themes, the corresponding number of coded 
references in each court opinion, and the total references for each theme are provided in 
Table 4.1. The themes are sorted by the Totals by Theme column from largest to smallest 
to illustrate a hierarchy of the most significant themes discussed across the court 
opinions. 
Table 4.1 
Coded References by Theme and Court  









Diversity through race-conscious admissions 42 72 64 178 
Validity of Powell’s opinion in Bakke 16 54 29 99 
Racial discrimination (past and present) 31 17 36 84 
Compelling state interest 14 23 28 65 
Achieving a critical mass 4 20 21 45 
Race-neutral admissions 0 28 17 45 
Use of enrollment quotas 5 20 7 32 
Narrow tailoring/strict scrutiny 6 9 15 30 
Equal Protection Clause (14th Amendment) 4 12 12 28 
Hard admissions variables 11 5 5 21 
Academic freedom 4 2 9 15 
Affirmative Action 10 2 2 14 
Summary judgment motion 11 0 0 11 
Soft admissions variables 1 3 5 9 
Totals by Court 159 267 250 676 
 To validate the ranking, the researcher developed two queries to determine the 




and assigned to each of the above themes. The first query scanned word frequency 
across all the Grutter court opinions to identify the 50 most frequently used, three or 
more letter keywords. The contextual usage of each keyword in each court opinion was 
analyzed to determine whether the individual keyword was significant or required one or 
more adjacent words from the opinions to improve meaning. Themes with no applicable 
keywords utilized the theme title or words within the title and were added to the list of 
keywords or phrases. The keywords and two or more word phrases were aligned with 
each theme and used in a second text search query across all the opinions to determine 
the number of references in each court opinion and compared to the theme coding 
hierarchy to validate them. 
Of the original 50 keywords queried, 32 remained relevant to the analysis and 18 
were dropped due to irrelevance, vagueness, or lack of specificity. Twenty-three of the 
remaining keywords were used individually or combined with NVivo search wildcards 
(~, *) to reduce redundancy. Twelve phrases consisting of keywords and adjacent words 
in the opinions or theme titles were identified.  Each keyword and phrase was aligned 
with one of the 16 themes and used in the second word search query to count the number 
of times the words or phrases were referenced in each opinion. Each occurrence in each 
opinion was reviewed to eliminate redundancy and duplicity of reference counts. Where 
redundancy was found, the query was refined and rerun. The query results were 
tabulated by court opinion and sorted in descending order by total number of references 






Keywords and Phrases Totaled Theme and Court Cases and Sorted by Theme 













decisions, student body, 
race conscious, race 
based 
461 731 354 1546 
Validity of Powell’s 
opinion in Bakke 
Bakke, Harvard, Powell 90 449 133 672 
Racial discrimination 
(past and present) 
Discriminat* 57 76 104 237 
Compelling state interest Compelling 31 95 64 190 
Narrow tailoring/strict 
scrutiny 
Tailor*, strict scrutiny 26 84 69 179 
Summary judgment Summary judgment 31 74 56 161 
Affirmative action Affirmative action 36 51 12 99 
Achieving a critical mass Critical mass 36 51 12 99 
Use of enrollment quotas Quota* 17 53 27 97 
Hard admissions variables LSAT, UGPA, SAT, 
GPA 
62 25 4 91 
Race neutral admissions Neutral, blind 17 45 22 84 
Equal Protection Clause 
(14th Amendment) 
Equal protection clause, 
Fourteenth Amendment 
23 30 26 79 
Academic freedom First Amendment, 
academic freedom 
6 9 14 29 
Soft admissions variables Soft 1 10 1 12 
   The theme rankings in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 were compared to validate the 
hierarchy of the themes and identify anomalies. As indicated in the tables, the four most 
prevalent themes were; 1) diversity through race-conscious admissions, 2) validity of 
Powell opinion in Bakke, 3) racial discrimination (past and present) and, 4) compelling 
state interest. To determine the linear relationship between each of these themes, a 
Pearson correlation coefficient of word similarity was calculated as shown in Table 4.3. 




and racial discrimination (past and present) themes (0.94544) and the validity of Powell 
opinion in Bakke and compelling state interest themes (0.91395).  
Table 4.3 

















conscious admission 1.00000 0.90547 0.94544 0.88347 
Validity of Powell’s opinion in 
Bakke 0.90547 1.00000 0.86685 0.91395 
Racial discrimination (past and 
present) 0.94544 0.86685 1.00000 0.85961 
Compelling state interest 0.88347 0.91395 0.85961 1.00000 
The prevalent themes are discussed based on the order provided in Table 4.4. A line 
graph of Table 4.4’s coded references by opinion and brief is provided in Figure 4.1. 
Table 4.4 
Number of Coded References in Prevalent Themes by Court Opinion 









Diversity through race-conscious admissions 42 72 64 178 
Validity of Powel opinion in Bakke 16 54 29 99 
Racial discrimination (past and present) 31 17 36 84 





Figure 4.1.  Four Most Prevalent Themes Based on Coded References  
 Diversity through race-conscious admissions. The dominant theme was 
diversity through race-conscious admissions. The theme exemplifies the conscious use 
of race by the law school in their admissions policies and their justification for its use 
based on Justice Powell’s splintered Supreme Court opinion in Bakke. The number of 
coded references was the highest of all themes which is to be expected because the 
“major bone of contention in this case has been the extent to which race is considered in 
the admissions process” (Grutter, 2001, p. 16). One hundred and seventy-eight 































Diversity through race-conscious admission 
Validity of Powell's opinion in Bakke 
Racial discrimination (past and present) 




of appeals, and Supreme Court respectively. Based on a matrix coding query of all 
themes and reference coding bands within the opinions and brief, the theme overlapped 
the validity of Bakke opinion, racial discrimination (past and present), race-neutral 
admission, and achieving critical mass themes 41, 27, 20, and 19 times respectively. 
Table 4.5 provides the results of the query for each opinion and brief. The analysis 
includes examples from each court opinion and brief showing how these four themes 
relate to the diversity through race-conscious admissions theme. 
Table 4.5 
Matrix Coding of the Four Prevalent Themes That Overlap the Diversity Through Race-










Validity of Powell’s opinion in Bakke 7 22 12 41 
Racial discrimination (past and present) 3 8 16 27 
Race neutral admission 0 13 7 20 
Achieving a critical mass 3 5 11 19 
 
District court. The district court reviewed the law school’s reasons for including 
race as an admission factor as “the law school clearly considered an applicant’s race in 
making admissions decisions” (Grutter, 2001, p. 15) with preference given to African 
American, Native American, Mexican American, and Puerto Rican applicants (Grutter, 
2001). The law school’s statistician testified on the use of race to achieve diversity and 
stated that that “the number of underrepresented minority admittees would drop ‘sharply 
and dramatically’ if race were not considered in the admissions process” (p. 17). The 




the law school’s ‘daily admissions reports,’ which classif[ied] applicants by race” (p. 18) 
and that statistics showed that “10% to 17% of each entering class [were] of African 
American, Native American, and Hispanic students” (p. 18). The court found that the 
“admissions policy [was] explicit about the extent of this commitment [as] race is 
considered at least to the extent necessary to enroll a ‘critical mass’ of students from 
these groups” (p. 24). The court concluded, “that the law school accords the race of the 
applicants a great deal of weight” (p. 17). 
The district court continued with a review of Powell’s opinion in Bakke 
concerning the use of race as a factor in admissions decisions at the University of 
California at Davis and whether the use of race to achieve racial diversity satisfied a 
state interest. While “racial diversity in the law school population may provide these 
educational and societal benefits” (p. 23), the court stated “that Bakke [did] not stand for 
the proposition that a university’s desire to assemble a racially diverse student body 
[was] a compelling state interest” (p. 21) and “that the achievement of such diversity 
[was] not a remedy for [specific instances of] past discrimination” (p. 22). The court 
concluded that the splintered decisions in Bakke did not constitute a majority opinion 
and ruled that, even though the law school’s admission policy was modeled after the 
Harvard Plan discussed in Bakke, it was not narrowly tailored enough to survive strict 
scrutiny by the courts. 
With Powell’s opinion invalidated, the court had to determine whether the law 
school’s use of race as an admissions factor was constitutional or not. The district court 




discrimination cannot constitutionally be remedied by race-conscious decision-making” 
(p. 36). As such, the court ruled that federal constitutional law does not permit the law 
school “to ‘level the playing field’ and may not consider the race of applicants in order 
to compensate for the effects of discrimination by others or by society generally” (p. 36). 
The law school’s race-based/conscious admission policy was, therefore, 
unconstitutional.   
Court of appeals. Judge Martin wrote the majority opinion for the court and 
discussed the district court’s decision. He stated that “Powell’s opinion constitute[d] 
Bakke’s holding and provides the governing standard here” (Grutter, 2002, p. 7) for 
utilizing race as one factor in admissions decisions and “that the law school [had] a 
compelling state interest in achieving a diverse student body” (p. 7). In addition, he 
added that “this court cannot ignore the distinction between a constitutionally 
permissible goal– ‘achieving an integrated student body’ –and a constitutionally 
permissible use of race to achieve that goal so long  as necessitated by the lingering 
effects of past discrimination” (p. 8). The majority was 
satisfied that the law school’s admission policy sets appropriate limits on the 
competitive consideration of race and ethnicity [and noted] the Law School[‘s 
intent] to consider race and ethnicity to achieve a diverse and robust student body 
only until it becomes possible to enroll a “critical mass” of under-represented 
minority students through race-neutral means. (p. 14)  
Martin reversed the district court’s ruling and held that the Michigan’s race based 





 Judge Boggs’ dissenting opinion argued that the law school’s use of race would 
not survive strict scrutiny by the courts as the “rationale proffered…was not tied to 
remedying past discrimination” (p. 38) but rather to increase academic diversity. He 
used Grutter’s admission rejection to ponder the fairness of the law school’s race-based 
admissions policy in the following hypothetical.  
As I put it to the counsel for the Law School in oral argument, if Heman Sweatt, 
the plaintiff in the famous case of Sweatt v. Painter (1950), had been able to ask 
the Dean of the University of Texas Law School, “Dean, would you let me in if I 
were [W]hite?” [T]he dean, if he were honest, would surely have said “Yes.” I 
then asked counsel, “If Barbara Grutter walked in to whoever the current Dean of 
the Law School is and said, ‘Dean, would you let me in if I were [B]lack?’ 
wouldn’t he have to honestly say either ‘Yes’ or ‘pretty darn almost certainly’”? 
Counsel agreed, but responded that “a [B]lack woman who had otherwise an 
application that looked like Barbara Grutter, that would be a different person.” 
(p. 29) 
He validated his hypothesis during the oral argument when he “asked counsel whether, 
if [Barbara Grutter] were of a different race, she would have been admitted whether she 
had come of age in inner-city Detroit or in Grosse Pointe [and] he answered: ‘That’s 
probably right.’” (p. 40). Boggs concluded that “it is a long road from Sweatt to Barbara 
Grutter [but] both ended up outside a door that a government’s use of racial 
considerations denied them a fair chance to enter” (p. 54) and dissented from the 
majority’s legitimation of the Michigan’s use of race in their admissions policy. 
U.S. Supreme Court. As previous courts had done, Justice O’Connor discussed 
Powell’s opinion as it related to the laws school’s concept of admitting a critical mass of 
students from specific racial groups and the duration of time that a race-conscious 
admissions policy would need to be in place to be considered narrowly tailored. 




and private universities across the Nation have modeled their own admissions programs 
on Justice Powell’s views on permissible race-conscious policies” (Grutter, 2003, p. 20). 
To further a compelling state interest, the policy  
cannot establish quotas for members of certain racial groups or put members of 
those groups on separate admissions tracks [or] insulate applicants who belong to 
certain racial or ethnic groups from the competition for admission [but can] 
consider race or ethnicity more flexibly as a “plus” factor in the context of 
individualized consideration of each and every applicant. (p. 24) 
She found that “the Law School’s race-conscious admissions program adequately 
ensures that all factors that may contribute to student body diversity are meaningfully 
considered alongside race in admissions decisions” (p. 26) and satisfied all the criteria 
for narrow tailoring and strict scrutiny. 
 O’Connor continued with a discussion of the amount of time the program would 
need to be in effect to remedy past discrimination. She recognized that “race-conscious 
admissions policies must be limited in time [to satisfy a compelling state interest and] 
employed no more broadly than the interest demands” (p. 27). To satisfy this 
requirement, the policies must have “sunset provisions…and periodic reviews to 
determine whether racial preferences are still necessary to achieve student body 
diversity” (p. 27) to which the law school agreed. She concluded that “the Equal 
Protection Clause does not prohibit the law school’s narrowly tailored use of race in 
admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational 
benefits that flow from a diverse student body” (p. 28) and affirmed the court of appeal’s 




 Justice Ginsburg disagreed on the law school’s use of race to create a critical 
mass of racially diverse students. Ginsburg stated that the “Court confuse[d] deference 
to a university’s definition of its educational objective with deference to the 
implementation of this goal [and] refused to be faithful to the settled principle of strict 
review designed to reflect these concerns” (p. 34). To not be unconstitutional, required 
the “law school either to produce a convincing explanation or to show it has taken 
adequate steps to ensure individual assessment” (p. 35) is enforced throughout the 
admissions process. Ginsburg concluded that Michigan did neither. She stated that 
[i]t is regrettable the Court’s important holding allowing racial minorities to have 
their special circumstances considered in order to improve their educational 
opportunities is accompanied by a suspension of the strict scrutiny [standard] 
which was the predicate of allowing race to be considered in the first place.  If 
the Court abdicates its constitutional duty to give strict scrutiny to the use of race 
in university admissions, it negates my authority to approve the use of race in 
pursuit of student diversity. (p. 36) 
Ginsburg approved the right to classify students based on race but dissented in this case 
as she believed that the law school’s practice was not narrowly tailored by time limits to 
survive a strict scrutiny test. 
  In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist rejected the use of race-conscious 
admissions practices by the law school to achieve a critical mass of minority students. 
He contended that, “the ostensibly flexible nature of the Law School’s admissions 
program that the Court finds appealing appears to be, in practice, a carefully managed 
program designed to ensure proportionate representation of applicants from selected 
minority groups” (p. 33). He inferred that the law school’s admissions practice is 




admission to members of selected minority groups in proportion to their statistical 
representation in the applicant pool” (p. 33) which is called racial balancing. In addition, 
Rehnquist agreed with Ginsburg that the time limits necessary for the policy would not 
survive strict scrutiny as the majority stated and, therefore, dissented. 
  Validity of Powell’s opinion in Bakke. The validity of Powell’s opinion in 
Bakke theme focused on the Supreme Court’s analysis of the Bakke case and specifically 
whether Powell’s tie-breaking, splintered opinion could be generalized to other cases. 
Specifically, the analysis was guided by Powell’s statement “that a state educational 
institution has a compelling interest in admitting a diverse student body, and that ethnic 
diversity…is only one element in a range of factors a university properly may consider 
in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student body” (Grutter, 2001, p. 18). Ninety-
nine references were coded from the opinions with 16, 54, and 29 in the district court, 
court of appeals, and Supreme Court respectively. Based on a matrix coding query of all 
themes and reference coding bands within the opinions and brief, the theme overlapped 
the diversity through race-conscious admissions, compelling state interest, race-neutral 
admission and use of enrollment quotas themes 45, 25, 16, and 14 times respectively. 
Table 4.6 provides the results of the query for each opinion and brief. The analysis 
includes examples from each court opinion and brief showing how these four themes 






Matrix Coding of the Four Prevalent Themes That Overlap the Validity of Powell’s 










Diversity through race-conscious admission 7 22 12 41 
Compelling state interest 8 8 9 25 
Race neutral admission 0 11 5 16 
Use of enrollment quotas 4 9 1 14 
 
District court. The district court was faced with piecing together the conflicting 
opinions of Brennan and Powell of the Bakke court to determine if Bakke’s holding was 
applicable and still valid. The justices siding with Brennan “did not believe that the 
diversity rationale was before the Court, as those Justices stated that the ‘issue 
presented’ in the case was ‘whether government may use race-conscious programs to 
redress the continuing effects of past discrimination’” (Grutter, 2001, p. 20). Powell 
“cited Justice Frankfurter’s statement in Sweezy v. New Hampshire [(1957) that] 
universities must have the freedom to decide which students to admit, as this is relevant 
to providing an atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and 
creation” (p. 19) and that “a state educational institution may have a compelling interest 
in admitting a racially diverse class of students” (p. 19). In Grutter, the district court 
determined “that, while the Brennan group and Justice Powell agreed that race may be 
considered in admissions, …they disagreed entirely as to the reasons why” (p. 20).  





no Supreme Court decision since Bakke has addressed the constitutionality of 
affirmative action in university admissions, and Bakke itself, to borrow a phrase, 
“is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” Lower courts have tried for 
years, with little success, to divine the legal principles to be gleaned from Bakke, 
and to understand how, if at all, the teachings of other affirmative action cases 
may apply to the higher education context. (p. 25) 
The district court concluded that 
the Supreme Court in Bakke did not recognize the achievement of racial diversity 
in university admissions as a compelling state interest [and] that under the 
Supreme Court’s post-Bakke decisions, the achievement of such diversity is not a 
compelling state interest because it is not a remedy for past discrimination. (p. 
22) 
The district court did not deny that racial diversity provided benefits to education and 
society but determined that racial diversity was not recognized as a remedial interest in 
Bakke (Grutter, 2001) and, therefore, not a governing standard.    
Court of appeals. The court of appeals reviewed the case from the standpoint of 
whether the law school’s use of race in their admission policy was a compelling interest. 
The court returned to Brennan’s and Powell’s opinion in Bakke to interpret and resolve 
the issue. Judge Martin, who wrote the opinion of the court, stated, that “neither party 
question[ed] the applicability of Justice Powell’s opinion regarding the narrowly tailored 
component of strict scrutiny, and it [was] our view that whether the law school’s 
admission policy pass[ed] constitutional muster turn[ed] on Justice Powell’s opinion” 
(Grutter, 2002, p. 10). He added that “Bakke remain[ed] the law until the Supreme Court 
instruct[ed] otherwise, [rejected] the district court’s conclusion and [found] that the Law 
School has a compelling interest in achieving a diverse student body” (p. 6). His holding 




 Judge Boggs, in his dissenting opinion, rebutted the majority’s decision that 
Michigan’s interest in “achieving of a critical mass” was not a compelling state interest 
and was therefore unconstitutional. Boggs stated that  
the majority applies extremely subtle reasoning to come to the conclusion that 
Bakke should…be read to hold that the use of race, no matter how extensive, is 
constitutional so long as it does not specify a number of seats to be reserved for 
minorities and so long as it arguably tracks the Harvard plan. (p. 31) 
Boggs added that,  
since Justice Powell rejected the past discrimination rationale and Justice 
Brennan can be read to have implicitly rejected the diversity rationale, there is no 
continuum to be found in Bakke; instead of a broader holding and a narrower 
holding, what we might have are two different and non-comparable holdings. If 
such a reading is adopted, the “holding” that the majority of this court has 
divined from the Supreme Court’s Bakke decision is a rationale set out by one 
Justice and rejected by eight. (p. 34) 
He concluded that “Bakke remains good law” (p. 30) but “that the majority’s reading of 
Bakke is erroneous” (p. 30) and that their achievement of a critical mass would not 
survive strict scrutiny. The majority assumed, “along the lines suggested by…Powell, 
that the law school act[ed] in good faith in exercising its educational judgment and 
expertise” (p. 13) and concluded that, “contrary to the dissent’s assertion, there [was] 
nothing to indicate that the law school’s admission’s policy has ‘taken’ anything ‘from 
the Barbara Grutters of our society’” (p. 23). The court held “that diversity in a student 
body is a recognized compelling governmental interest pursuant to Powell’s controlling 





U.S. Supreme Court. Justice O’Connor endorsed Powell’s view that “student 
body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university 
admissions” (Grutter, 2003, p. 15). O’Connor recognized that the “only holding for the 
Court in Bakke was that a State has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served 
by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of 
race and ethnic origin” (p. 20). Powell’s interest in diversity went beyond race 
encompassing a far broader array of qualification and classifications of which race and 
ethnicity were one of a number of elements to be considered (Grutter, 2003).  
In announcing the principle of student body diversity as a compelling state 
interest, Justice Powell invoked our cases recognizing a constitutional dimension, 
grounded in the First Amendment, of educational autonomy: “The freedom of a 
university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its 
student body.” From this premise, Justice Powell reasoned that by claiming “the 
right to select those students who will contribute the most to the robust exchange 
of ideas,” a university seeks to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in 
the fulfillment of its mission. (p. 22) 
As such, the majority endorsed “Justice Powell’s view that student body diversity is a 
compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions” (p. 21) 
“and that ‘good faith’ on the part of a university is ‘presumed’ absent ‘a showing to the 
contrary’” (p. 22). 
 Joined in full by Rehnquist in his dissenting opinion, Kennedy stated that the  
separate opinion by Justice Powell in...Bakke is based on the principle that a 
university admissions program may take account of race as one, non-
predominant factor in a system designed to consider each applicant as an 
individual, provided the program can meet the test of strict scrutiny by the 






He concluded that, “the opinion by Justice Powell, in my view, states the correct rule for 
resolving this case [but that the] Court…does not apply strict scrutiny [which] 
undermines both the test and its controlling precedents” (p. 33). He agreed that race 
could be used in admissions but disapproved of the Court’s suspension of strict scrutiny 
in this case (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003). 
 Thomas and Scalia concurred with Kennedy in part and dissented in part. 
Thomas stated that “Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke and the court’s decision today 
rest on the fundamentally flawed proposition that racial discrimination can be 
contextualized so that a goal, such as classroom aesthetics, can be compelling in one 
context but not in another” (p. 40). He disagreed with the court’s “expansion of 
permissible use of race for something as trivial…as the assembling of a law school 
class” (p. 40). He concluded that without judicial review these uses could not be 
justified. In spite of these arguments, the Supreme Court held that Powell’s opinion in 
Bakke was still valid.   
 Racial discrimination (past and present). The racial discrimination (past and 
present) theme focused on the past racial discrimination of the nation and federal laws 
that have prompted universities to implement policies that use race, ethnicity, and socio-
cultural factors in their enrollment criteria. Eighty-four references were coded from the 
opinions with 31, 17, and 36 in the district court, court of appeals, and Supreme Court 
respectively. Based on a matrix coding query of all themes and reference coding bands 
within the opinions, the theme overlapped the diversity through race-conscious 




Protection Clause (Fourteenth Amendment) themes 27, 9, 7, and 6 times respectively. 
Table 4.7 provides the results of the query for each opinion. The analysis includes 
examples from each court opinion showing how these four themes relate to the racial 
discrimination (past and present) theme.  
Table 4.7 
Matrix Coding of the Three Prevalent Themes That Overlap the Racial Discrimination 










Diversity through race-conscious admission 3 8 16 27 
Validity of Powell’s opinion in Bakke 2 3 4 9 
Compelling state interest 2 2 3 7 
Equal Protection Clause (14th Amendment) 1 4 1 6 
  
District court. The district court heard testimony from students, professors, and 
statisticians on race discrimination issues at universities. Four minority students 
provided testimony. Ms. Dowdell, an African American, student stated that, 
as an undergraduate student at the University of Michigan, Ms. Dowdell testified 
that she feels isolated because African Americans are in the minority. She also 
testified that she experiences racism on a daily basis, and she gave examples of 
insensitive remarks by other students and instructors. While Ms. Dowdell is 
doing well academically, she feels that racism negatively affects her performance 
because it is discouraging and distracting. (Grutter, 2001, p. 27) 
Concepcion Escobar, a Mexican American and Native American student at the 
University of Michigan’s Law School, testified on her experiences at a predominately 
Black high school in Chicago and at Amherst, a predominately White university. She 




she did not often speak in class at Amherst because the student population was 
predominantly white and she did not want to play the role of representing her 
race. She also testified about some of the difficulties she and her classmates had 
in understanding one another, as they came from such completely different 
backgrounds. (p. 27) 
Crystal James, an African American student at UCLA’s Law School, stated that she felt 
Isolate[d] and believe[d] that students and teachers expect her to represent the 
“black viewpoint” when racial issues are discussed. She also has experienced a 
loss of self-confidence and optimism, and a decline in her academic 
performance, which she attributes to her racial isolation and to subtle forms of 
racism on campus. The latter phenomenon has taken the form of students making 
anti-affirmative action comments, teachers failing to direct classroom discussion 
of racial issues in a positive manner, and teachers neglecting to call on her in 
class because, she believes, they assume she would not be able to respond. (p. 
27) 
Dr. Walter Allen, a professor of Sociology at UCLA, studied the racial climate at four 
feeder colleges to the Michigan Law School. He testified that the participants in the 
study 
described the overall racial climate of their campuses as a place where they feel 
their presence is questioned and belittled. The underrepresented minority focus 
group participants described various items which contributed to this climate, 
including insensitive or racist remarks by faculty and students, a feeling of 
isolation due to the low number of fellow students of the same race, avoidance of 
racial issues in classroom discussions, the lack of minority role models such as 
faculty members, exclusion from white study groups, and unequal treatment by 
campus police. Some of the focus group participants also indicated that the 
negative racial climate caused them to feel alienated and discouraged and that 
this harmed their academic performance. (p. 30) 
While the testimonies provided background information on past social discrimination, 
the district court concluded that the law school cannot use race as a factor to level the 
enrollment playing field (Grutter, 2001).  
Court of appeals. The court of appeals argued that the rewards current students 




called the law school’s practice “a straightforward instance of racial discrimination by a 
state institution [that] would not pass even the slightest scrutiny” (Grutter, 2002, p. 28). 
The majority rebutted that it 
is insulting to African Americans, or to any race or ethnicity that has known 
oppression and discrimination the likes of which slavery embodies, to think that 
a generation enjoying the end product of a life of affluence has forgotten or 
cannot relate the enormous personal sacrifice made by their family members and 
ancestors not all that long ago in order to make the end possible. (p. 22) 
Boggs continued that if he 
asked counsel, “If Barbara Grutter walked in to whoever the current Dean of the 
Law School is and said, ‘Dean, would you let me in if I were black?’ wouldn’t he 
have to honestly say either ‘Yes’ or ‘pretty darn almost certainly’?” Counsel 
agreed, but responded that “a black woman who had otherwise an application 
that looked like Barbara Grutter, that would be a different person.” (p. 29) 
In the majority opinion, Judge Martin rebutted that,  
the dissent’s arguments as to why diversity cannot serve as a compelling state 
interest constitute nothing more than myopic, baseless conclusions that ignore 
the daily affairs and interactions of society today which very well may be 
experienced by all. And the dissent’s offer to “stipulate” to the fact that race 
continues to play a negative role in the lives of minorities is nothing more than a 
mere expression of words made in an attempt to minimize the force of the many 
benefits of diversity. (p. 23) 
The court of appeals reversed the district court’s decision and found the law school’s 
admissions policy constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment (Grutter, 2002). 
U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court’s decision. 
Ginsburg found “that the law school’s program fail[ed] strict scrutiny because it is 
devoid of any reasonably precise time limit on the law school’s use of race in 




it [was] appropriate for the University  of Michigan Law School to use racial 
discrimination for the purpose of putting together a “critical mass” that will 
convey generic lessons in socialization and good citizenship, surely it is no less 
appropriate…for the civil service system of the State of Michigan to do so. (p. 
37) 
Dissenting, Thomas responded that 
[t]he Court will not even deign to make the Law School try other methods, 
however, preferring instead to grant a 25-year license to violate the Constitution.  
And the same Court that had the courage to order the desegregation of all public 
schools in the South now fears, on the basis of platitudes rather than principle, to 
force the Law School to abandon a decidedly imperfect admissions regime that 
provides the basis for racial discrimination. (p. 46) 
[i]t has been nearly 140 years since Frederick Douglass asked the intellectual 
ancestors of the Law School to “[d]o nothing with us!” and the Nation adopted 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Now we must wait another 25 years to see this 
principle of equality vindicated. I therefore respectfully dissent from the 
remainder of the Court’s opinion and the judgment. (p. 49) 
 Compelling state interest. The compelling state interest theme focuses on the 
court’s differing opinions concerning a “state institution’s desire to assemble a racially 
diverse student body is a compelling government interest” (Grutter, p. 19) and whether a 
public university has a right to include factors in their admissions process to accomplish 
this interest. Thirty-two references were coded from the opinions and brief with 14, 18, 
and 0 in the district court, amicus brief, and court of appeals respectively. Based on a 
matrix coding query of all themes and reference coding bands within the opinions and 
brief, the theme overlapped the validity of Powell’s opinion in Bakke, diversity through 
race-conscious, admission, Equal Protection clause (Fourteenth Amendment), and racial 
discrimination (past and present) themes 25, 17, 8, and 7 times respectively. Table 4.8 




examples from each court opinion and brief showing how these four themes relate to the 
compelling state interest theme. 
Table 4.8 














Validity of Powell’s opinion in Bakke 8 8 9 25 
Diversity through race-conscious admission 5 5 7 17 
Equal protection clause (14th Amendment) 0 3 5 8 
Racial discrimination (past and present) 2 3 3 7 
  
District court. The district court’s dilemma was to determine “whether the 
achievement of racial diversity [was] a compelling state interest and, if so, whether the 
law school’s admissions policy [was] narrowly tailored to serve that interest” (Grutter, 
2001, p. 18). Each party argued the validity of Powell’s opinion in Bakke of whether 
attaining “a diverse student body…clearly [was] a constitutionally permissible goal for 
an institution of higher education” (p. 19). Judge Freidman stated,  
[in] our history, such distinctions generally have been used for improper 
purposes. Even when used for “benign” purposes, they always have the potential 
for causing great divisiveness. For these reasons, all racial distinctions are 
inherently suspect and presumptively invalid. This presumption may be 
overcome only upon a showing that the distinction in question serves a 
compelling state interest, and that the use of race is narrowly tailored to the 
achievement of that interest. (p. 38) 
The district court concluded “that Justice Powell’s discussion of the diversity rationale is 
not among the governing standards to be gleaned from Bakke” (p. 38) and “that under 




compelling state interest because it is not a remedy for past discrimination” (p. 22). The 
district court ruled that the law school’s use of race was “unconstitutional and a violation 
of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act” (p. 38).  
Court of appeals. The court of appeals reviewed de novo the district court’s 
ruling to determine if the use of race and ethnic origin was constitutional. “To survive 
constitutional review, the Law School’s consideration of race must 1) serve a compelling 
state interest and 2) be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest” (Grutter, 2001/2002, p. 
5). The concurring and dissenting opinions discussed Powell’s opinion in Bakke to 
determine whether diversity was a compelling state interest. The Grutter dissenting 
opinion concluded, “that the state’s interest in a diverse student body, at least as 
articulated by the Law School, cannot constitute a compelling state interest sufficient to 
satisfy strict scrutiny” (p. 30). In turn, the majority recognized,  
that a diverse student body is a compelling interest because it promotes the 
atmosphere of higher education to which our nation is committed inasmuch as it 
allows the students to train in an environment embodied with ideas and mores 
"as diverse as this Nation of many peoples. (p. 21) 
The court of appeals reversed the district court’s decision that diversity was not a 
compelling state interest and that the law school’s admission policy violated the Equal 
Protection Clause and Title VII (Grutter, 2001/2002). 
U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reviewed the question of whether 
having a diverse student body was a compelling state interest with Justice O’Connor 
delivering the majority opinion of the court. O’Connor endorsed Justice Powell’s 
opinion that “diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far 




single though important element” (Grutter, 2003, p. 21). O’Connor added that, “when 
race-based action is necessary to further a compelling governmental interest, such action 
does not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection so long as the narrow-
tailoring requirement is also satisfied” (pp. 21-22). Rehnquist dissented stating that the 
law school’s “interest in providing educational benefits was accomplished through racial 
balancing that the Court itself calls ‘patently unconstitutional’” (p. 33) and that their 
admissions policy was not narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny. He contended that 
the law school’s  
argument, as facile as it is, can only be understood in one way: Classroom 
aesthetics yields educational benefits, racially discriminatory admissions policies 
are required to achieve the right racial mix, and therefore the policies are 
required to achieve the educational benefits [and that it] is the educational 
benefits that are the end, or allegedly compelling state interest, not “diversity.” 
(p. 40)  
He furthered his argument with the opinion that “Michigan has no compelling interest in 
having a law school at all, much less an elite one” (p. 41) and that the law school’s 
“interest in remaining elite and exclusive that the majority thinks so obviously critical 
requires the use of admissions ‘standards’ that, in turn, create the law school’s ‘need’ to 
discriminate on the basis of race” (p. 42). In conclusion, the majority of the Court 
recognized the law school’s compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body and 
affirmed the decision of the circuit court (Grutter, 2003). Twenty-five years later, the 
courts continued to evaluate the effectiveness of public university admissions practices 






 The Supreme Court found that the “law school’s race-conscious admissions 
policy did not violate the [Equal Protection Clause of the] Fourteenth Amendment” 
(Grutter, 2003, p. 5) which affirmed the appellate court’s decision to reverse the district 
court’s injunction. In doing so, the Supreme Court held that “the law school had a 
compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body; and [that their] admission 
policy’s race-conscious program bore the hallmark of a narrowly tailored plan (p. 6). 
They also “took the law school at its word that the law school would have liked nothing 
better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula” and would terminate the race-
conscious program as soon as it is practical. (p. 6). The Court’s decision to take the 
University of Michigan at its word exemplified their past deference to being involved in 
decisions best left to university professionals and reinforced their commitment to uphold 
decisions made in Bakke (1978) and Sweezy (1957). Even though the case lasted 59 
months as it moved through the court system, Grutter served as one of the first Supreme 






Chapter Five: Garcetti v. Ceballos 
Background 
 Richard Ceballos worked as a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County 
District Attorney’s office. In February 2000, Ceballos was contacted by a defense 
counsel in a criminal case and asked to review the affidavits used by the police to obtain 
a critical search warrant to determine if there were inaccuracies (Garcetti, 2006). “After 
examining the affidavit and visiting the site, Ceballos determined that the affidavit 
contained serious misrepresentations. Ceballos relayed his findings to his supervisors, 
Carol Najear and Frank Sundstedt, and followed up with a deposition memorandum 
recommending dismissal of the case” (p. 8).  
 Based on Ceballos’ statements, a meeting was held with Ceballos’ supervisors 
and other employees of the sheriff’s department to discuss the memo. The discussion 
became heated (Garcetti, 2006).  Despite Ceballos’ concerns, his supervisors who were 
also the petitioners in the case, proceeded with the prosecution (p. 1). “At the hearing on 
a defense motion to challenge the warrant, Ceballos recounted his observations but the 
trial judge rejected the challenge” (p. 6). “After the events, Ceballos claimed that he was 
subjected to a series of retaliatory employment actions [which] included reassignment 
from his calendar deputy position to a trial deputy position, transfer to another 
courthouse, and denial of a promotion” (Garcetti, 2006, p. 8).  Ceballos filed a grievance 
with the department, which was denied. In January 2002, he initiated a lawsuit in the 
District Court for the Central District of California “claiming that petitioners then 




Amendments” (p. 6) rights for the employment retaliation based on his disposition 
memo. 
Court Actions 
 Ceballos filed his lawsuit in the District Court for the Central District of 
California against the defendants, Gil Garcetti, Frank Sundstedt, and Carol Najera, for 
violating his First Amendment rights and retaliating against him. Garcetti et al. motioned 
for and were granted summary judgment on January 30, 2002 and the decision was 
appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court reversed 
the lower court’s decision in favor of Ceballos on March 22, 2004. The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and, on March 30, 2006, reversed the appellate court’s decision in 
favor of the defendants, allowing public employers to control employee speech that is 
part of their job responsibilities and adding a fifth part to the four part 
Pickering/Connick test. The new five-part test, called the Garcetti/Pickering analysis, 
evaluates whether an employee’s speech is pursuant to their job duties. If so, there are no 
protections under the First Amendment. The progression of the case through the courts 
and the amicus brief filed by the American Association of University Professors 
(AAUP) are discussed in this chapter. 
 District Court for the Central District of California. In January 2002, Gil 
Garcetti, head of the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office, Sundedt, and Najra, filed a 
motion for summary judgment (Garcetti, 2002). In turn, Ceballos’ alleged 1) a federal-
law claim of “violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and 2) a state 




argued that they were entitled to summary judgment under the doctrine of qualified 
immunity for the first allegation. They “argue[d] there is no evidence of either 
outrageous conduct or severe emotional distress and [that] they [were] entitled to 
immunity under California Government Code Section 821.6” (p. 1). The Court held that 
Ceballos’ constitutional free speech right was not protected because generating a 
disposition memo was pursuant to his duties as a public prosecutor and that it “was not 
‘clearly established’ that [his] memorandum addressed a matter of public concern” (p. 
6). “A right is ‘clearly established’ when the contours of the right are sufficiently clear 
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right" 
(Garcetti, 2004, p. 13). Further, the court held that it “is sufficient to establish that the 
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions” (Garcetti, 2002, p. 6). In 
January 2002, the court granted summary judgment to Garcetti on Ceballos’ federal-law 
claim because government officials are “shielded from liability for civil damages insofar 
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known” (p. 4). The court also dismissed without 
prejudice the Ceballos’ second state-law claim because “the court declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction” (p. 6).  
 Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In June 2003, Ceballos appealed the 
summary judgment ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Garcetti, 
2004). The court of appeals determined that Ceballos’ speech was of public concern and 
that, based on the Pickering balancing test, his interest in the speech outweighed the 




2004). The court held “that, for summary judgment purposes, his speech was protected 
by the First Amendment” (p. 12) and that the right was clearly established which means 
that “qualified immunity is unavailable” (p. 13) to the individual defendants. Without 
qualified immunity, the court determined that the county could not assert sovereign 
immunity or protections under the Eleventh Amendment unless Garcetti, the district 
attorney, was acting in his official capacity at the state level. The court held that Garcetti 
was acting in most respects in his county capacity when the retaliatory acts against 
Ceballos occurred. Therefore, Garcetti is “not entitled to Eleventh Amendment 
immunity, and thus the county may not seek summary adjudication on the ground that he 
was acting on behalf of the state” (p. 16).  In October 2004, the court reversed the 
district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.  
Garcetti et al. filed a petition for on writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. 
The “petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit” was granted on February 28, 2005 (Garcetti, 2005). 
  Amicus Brief. On July 21, 2005, the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection 
of Free Speech and the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) filed an 
amicus brief with the U.S. Supreme Court in the Ninth Circuit. “Amici urged affirmation 
of the judgment of the Court of Appeals” (American Association of University 
Professors, 2005, p. 6) and argued that (1) the “First Amendment protection for 
employee speech on matters of ‘public interest’ includes expression within the scope of 




[U.S. Supreme Court] has conferred special First Amendment protection, could be 
imperiled by a recasting of the ‘public concern’ doctrine” (p. 12).   
 The first argument urged affirmation of the court of appeals’ judgment to 
recognize Ceballos’ speech as a public employee protected under the First Amendment 
(American Association of University Professors, 2005). The second argument addressed 
the concern “that…lessening First Amendment protection for job-related public 
employee speech would threaten academic freedom” (p. 6). Amici stated that 
“controversial expression by university professors [related] to the subject matter of the 
speaker’s academic expertise could be deemed unprotected under a diminished and 
distorted concept of ‘public concern’” (p. 7) and when professors speak as public 
employees on controversial issues related to their area of expertise. Without protection, 
amici argued that professors would only be protected when speaking on subjects that are 
not in their area of expertise, which is at variance with the court’s past actions. For these 
reason, amici submitted their brief in support of the court of appeals decision.  
 U.S. Supreme Court. On October 12, 2005 and March 21, 2006, the Supreme 
Court heard arguments from the defendants and the respondents. On May 30, 2006, the 
court ruled, in a 5-4 decision, that  
the employee’s allegation of unconstitutional retaliation failed because he was 
not speaking as a citizen for First Amendment purposes since he made the 
statements pursuant to his official duties. The employee did not speak as a citizen 
by writing a memo that addressed the proper disposition of a pending criminal 
case. The First Amendment did not prohibit managerial discipline based on the 
employee’s expressions made pursuant to official responsibilities. (Garcetti, 




“The Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and remanded the case for 
further proceedings” (p. 1). Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion and was joined 
by Justices Roberts, Thomas, Scalia, and Alito. They held that 
(1) When public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, 
such employees are not speaking as private citizens for First Amendment 
purposes, and thus the First Amendment does not prohibit managerial discipline 
of such employees for such speech.  
(2) This result was consistent with the Supreme Court’s precedents to the effect 
that government employees who make public statements outside the course of 
performing official duties retain some possibility of First Amendment protection.  
(3) This holding likewise was supported by the emphasis of the Supreme Court’s 
precedents on affording government employers sufficient discretion to manage 
their operations.  
(4) A contrary rule would commit state and federal courts to a new, permanent, 
and intrusive role involving judicial oversight of communications among 
government employees and their superiors in the course of official business.  
(5) The deputy’s allegation of unconstitutional retaliation failed, for the deputy 
had spoken (a) not as a private citizen, but (b) pursuant to his official duties as a 
prosecutor fulfilling a responsibility to advise his supervisor about how best to 
proceed with a pending case. (p. 4) 
Kennedy added one reservation to his opinion concerning academic speech that 
“expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates 
additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s 
customary employee-speech jurisprudence” (p. 12). Because of this argument, the Court 
stated, “[w]e need not, and…do not, decide whether the analysis…conduct[ed] would 
apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching” 
(p. 12). In support of First Amendment speech, Justice Stevens found no difference 
between speech made by a public employee and a citizen stating,  
(1) a government employee’s supervisor could, consistent with the First 
Amendment, take corrective action when the employee’s speech was 






(2) with respect to public employees, there was no categorical difference 
between speaking as a citizen and speaking in the course of one’s employment. 
(p. 4)  
Justice Souter, joined by Stevens and Ginsburg in dissent, expressed the opinion that 
(1) private and public interests in addressing official wrongdoing and threats to 
health and safety could outweigh the government’s stake in the efficient 
implementation of policy;  
 
(2) a public employee commenting on subjects in the course of duties ought not 
to prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim unless the employee (a) was 
speaking on a matter of unusual importance, and (b) satisfied high standards of 
responsibility in so speaking; and  
 
(3) because the deputy’s action had alleged retaliation not only for submitting the 
memorandum, but also for making other statements--not all of which would have 
been made pursuant to official duties in any obvious sense--it would be open to 
the Court of Appeals, on remand, to consider any retaliation shown for those 
other statements. (p. 4) 
Finally, Justice Breyer, in dissent, expressed the opinion that 
(1) the First Amendment sometimes authorized judicial actions based on a 
government employee’s speech that (a) involved a matter of public concern, and 
(b) took place in the course of ordinary job-related duties;  
(2) this was so only in the presence of (a) augmented need for constitutional 
protection, and (b) diminished risk of undue judicial interference with 
governmental management of the public’s affairs; and  
(3) these conditions were met in the case at hand. (p. 4)   
The Court ruled that Ceballos did not speak as a citizen but as a public employee as part 
of his job duties and that their public employers have a right to control their speech and 
discipline their employees for said speech. While Kennedy recognized academic 






The Garcetti case began in the District Court for the Central District of 
California in January 2002 and ended in the U.S. Supreme Court in May 2006 (53 
months). The analysis of district court opinion, amicus brief, and court of appeals 
opinion identified 11 themes with 40, 120, 108, and 205 coded references respectively 
for a total of 473 coded references. The themes, the corresponding number of coded 
references in each court opinion, and the total references for each theme are provided in 
Table 5.1. The themes are sorted by the Totals by Theme column from largest to smallest 
to illustrate a hierarchy of the most significant themes discussed across the court 
opinions and brief. 
Table 5.1 













Expression pursuant to official job 
duties 5 17 25 44 91 
First amendment 7 35 18 27 87 
Speech as a public employee versus 
private citizen 
1 7 8 44 60 
Matter of public concern 5 17 12 24 58 
Employers rights to control speech 0 5 16 30 51 
Academic freedom 0 1 17 11 29 
Immunity of public officials 18 10 0 1 29 
Content-form-context of expression 3 7 9 4 23 
Employers right to efficient 
operations 1 11 0 8 20 
Adverse employment action 0 6 3 6 15 
Whistleblower 0 4 0 6 10 




To validate the theme ranking, the researcher developed two queries to determine 
the most frequently used words in all the opinions and briefs. The usage of each word 
was reviewed and assigned to each of the above themes.  The first query scanned word 
frequency across all the court opinions to identify the 50 most prevalent, three or more 
letter keywords. The contextual usage of each keyword in each court opinion was 
analyzed to determine whether the individual keyword was significant or required one or 
more adjacent words from the opinions to improve meaning. Themes with no applicable 
keywords utilized the theme title or words within the title and were added to the list of 
keywords or phrases. The keywords and two or more word phrases were aligned with 
each theme and used in a second text search query across all the opinions to determine 
the number of references in each court opinion and compared to the theme coding 
hierarchy to validate them. 
Of the original 50 keywords queried, 29 remained relevant to the analysis and 21 
were dropped due to irrelevance, vagueness, or lack specificity. Seventeen of the 
remaining keywords were used individually or combined with NVivo search wildcards 
(~, *) to reduce redundancy. Ten phrases consisting of keywords and adjacent words in 
the opinions or theme titles were identified.  Each keyword and phrase was aligned with 
one of the 11 themes and used in the second word search query to count the number of 
times the words or phrases were referenced in each opinion. Each occurrence in each 
opinion was reviewed to eliminate redundancy and duplicity of reference counts. Where 




tabulated by court opinion and sorted in descending order by Totals by Theme column. 
The results are provided in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 
Keywords and Phrases Totaled Theme and Court Cases or Brief and Sorted by Theme 













First Amendment First amendment, 
free speech, 
protected speech 
13 80 49 65 207 
Expression 
pursuant to official 
job duties 
Pursuant, official 
duties, job duties, 
employment 
3 53 5 82 143 




19 49 31 26 125 







5 38 9 42 94 






31 39 2 7 79 
Academic freedom Academic 
freedom 
0 0 43 4 47 





1 8 3 11 23 












1 14 1 2 18 





0 4 0 0 4 
The theme rankings in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 were compared to validate the 




four most prevalent themes in descending order were expression pursuant to official job 
duties, First Amendment, speech as a public employee versus private citizen, and matter 
of public concern. To determine the linear relationship between each of these themes, a 
Pearson correlation coefficient of word similarity was calculated as shown in Table 5.3. 
The highest correlations were between the expression pursuant to official job duties and 
First Amendment themes (0.96912) and the matter of public concern and First 
Amendment themes (0.95892). 
Table 5.3 















Expression pursuant to official 
job duties 
1.00000 0.96912 0.96912 0.94166 
First Amendment 0.96912 1.00000 0.95343 0.95892 
Speech as a public employee 
versus private citizen 
0.95421 0.95343 1.00000 0.93985 
Matter of public concern 0.94166 0.95892 0.93985 1.00000 



















Expression pursuant to 
official job duties 5 17 25 44 91 
First Amendment 7 35 18 27 87 
Speech as a public employee 
versus private citizen 1 7 8 44 60 
Matter of public concern 5 17 12 24 58 
Totals by court and brief 18 76 63 139 296 
A line graph of Table 5.4’s coded references by opinion and brief is provided in Figure 
5.1. 
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 Expression pursuant to official job duties. The dominant theme was 
expression pursuant to official job duties. The theme concentrated on all written and 
verbal expression made by Ceballos as he conducted his official job duties and 
responsibilities as a deputy district attorney. Ninety-one references were coded from the 
cases and brief with 5, 17, 25, and 44 in the district court, court of appeals, amicus brief, 
and Supreme Court respectively. Based on a matrix coding query of all themes and 
reference coding bands within the opinions and brief, the theme overlapped the 
expression pursuant to official job duties, First Amendment, speech as a public 
employee versus private citizen, employer’s right to control speech, matters of public 
concern, and academic freedom themes 42, 34, 28, 20, and 14 times respectively. These 
themes dominated the discussion of the expression pursuant to official job duties theme. 
Table 5.5 provides the results of the query for each opinion and brief. The analysis 
includes examples from each court opinion and brief showing how these five themes 
relate to the expression pursuant to official job duties theme. 
Table 5.5 
Matrix Coding of the Five Prevalent Themes That Overlap the Expression Pursuant to 













First Amendment 2 12 12 16 42 
Speech as a public employee 
versus private citizen 
1 2 6 25 34 
Employer’s right to control speech 0 1 10 17 28 
Matters of public concern 2 4 8 6 20 




District Court for the Central District of California. The district court evaluated 
Ceballos’ speech from the perspective of the employee’s First Amendment right to 
speak on matters of public concern. The court referenced Connick to define the 
jurisdiction for handling workplace expression in stating that Ceballos’  
argument is premised on Connick…where the Supreme Court held that ‘when a 
public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern but 
instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest a federal court is 
not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision 
taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee’s behavior. 
(Garcetti, 2002, p. 5) 
 
Testimony determined that Ceballos’ expression, a disposition memo, was not requested 
by his supervisors but that, because Ceballos’ lawyer acknowledged that Ceballos’ 
expression was common for a prosecutor, he admitted that it was “pursuant to his duties 
as a prosecutor “ (p. 5). As his duties included “exposing possible perjured testimony” 
which was the purpose of the memo, the court found that his speech was not protected 
by the First Amendment.  
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The court of appeals discussed Ceballos’ 
expression as a matter of public concern, which may or may not be protected from 
employer discipline by First Amendment. To determine whether his expression is 
protected, the Court used Connick “to distinguished between speech "as a citizen upon 
matters of public concern" at one end and speech "as an employee upon matters only of 
personal interest” (p. 8). The court stated, 
[t]he right of public employees to speak freely on matters of public concern is 
important to the orderly functioning of the democratic process, because public 
employees, by virtue of their access to information and experience regarding the 




positioned uniquely to contribute to the debate on matters of public concern. (p. 
9) 
The court added that “[s]tripping them of that right when they report wrongdoing or 
other significant matters to their supervisors would seriously undermine our ability to 
maintain the integrity of our governmental operations” (p. 9) and “inconsistent with the 
very nature of the Connick test” (p. 11). As such, the majority found that “Ceballos was 
doing his job by investigating allegations of law enforcement misconduct in a case being 
prosecuted under his direction and reporting those that appeared to be meritorious to his 
supervisors” (p. 12) and that his speech was protected by the First Amendment. 
 In concurrence, Judge O’Scannlain discussed his concern for an employee’s 
personal stake in his or her job-related speech. He contended, 
that when public employees speak in the course of carrying out their routine, 
required employment obligations, they have no personal interest in the content of 
that speech that gives rise to a First Amendment right. Instead, their speech is, in 
actuality, the State’s. (p. 19) 
 
He added,  
Connick teaches that although speech uttered by public employees must address 
an issue of public import in order to come within the protective shelter of the 
First Amendment, satisfaction of such a virtually necessary condition is not by 
itself sufficient to trigger constitutional constraints on governmental action. 
Instead, employee speech solicits the protection of the First Amendment only 
when it also results from the employee’s decision to express his or her personal 
opinions--that is, those views he or she holds as a citizen and not as a public 
employee. The First Amendment, in short, does not protect public employees’ 
routine and required speech on behalf of the government. (p. 22) 
 
While he did not disagree with the court’s conclusion, he stated that it is time “to 
reappraise our jurisprudence concerning the free speech rights of the publicly-employed 




Amicus brief. The AAUP wrote the amicus brief and linked the Supreme Court’s 
recognition of academic freedom as a special interest of the First Amendment with the 
employee’s right to speak on matters of public concern. Amici’s concerns focused on 
two connected ideals; that “any suggestion that [an employee would] forfeit First 
Amendment protection because [their speech is] job-related, or…made within the 
speaker’s scope of employment, would be seriously at variance with the central premises 
of this Court’s decisions” (American Association of University Professors, 2005, p. 6) 
and that lessening First Amendment protection for job-related public employee speech 
would threaten academic freedom. The concerns were discussed in the context of the 
employee’s right to speak freely on matters of public concern and the faculty right to 
speak freely on topics related to their profession without fear of reprisal. The concept of 
the faculty member as a public employee was of specific interest.  
Amici agreed with the Court’s conclusion that Ceballos’s speech was protected 
by the First Amendment. Amici stated that this “view was consistent with the Court’s 
judgment in [Connick] which set forth the criteria that have since been applied to 
distinguish between protected speech ‘as a citizen upon matters of public concern’ and 
unprotected speech ‘as an employee upon matters only of personal interest’” (p. 9). 
Amici argued that “none of Connick’s disqualifying characteristics [existed] in this case” 
and that finding to the contrary  
would pose daunting tasks for the lower courts [and seriously diminish] First 
Amendment protection for a vital sector of expression, that of public employees 
on matters of public concern that may relate to their assigned responsibilities or 





As such, amici urged the Supreme Court to validate the court of appeals holding that 
employee speech pursuant to job duties is protected by the First Amendment. 
Second, amici requested that the Supreme Court reaffirm its support for 
academic freedom as a special concern of the First Amendment by upholding the court 
of appeals’ decision. Amici argued,  
the present case derives directly from this unwavering affirmation of academic 
freedom as a core First Amendment interest. The central premises of such 
protection would be poorly served – indeed, could be gravely undermined – by a 
narrowing of the “public concern” doctrine to exclude job-related expression. (p. 
14) 
The effect on faculty of reversing the court’s decision “would introduce a perverse irony 
[where] First Amendment academic freedom would extend only to those public 
statements on which faculty members were least well informed…Only those statements 
clearly beyond academic expertise would be considered matters of public concern” (p. 
24). As such, amici requested the court of appeals decision to be upheld by the Supreme 
Court. 
U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court focused on whether Ceballos’ 
expressions were made pursuant to his job responsibilities (Garcetti, 2006). The court 
held (a) that, “when public employees speak in the course of the routine, required 
employment obligations, that they have no personal interest in the content of that speech 
that gives rise to a First Amendment right” (p. 5), (b) “the Constitution does not insulate 
their communications from employer discipline” (p. 9), and (c) “[e]mployers have a 
heightened interests in controlling speech made by an employee in his or her 




Ceballos’ right to First Amendment protection of his job-related expression. Justice 
Kennedy wrote the majority opinion and Justice Souter the dissenting opinion. 
First, the court ruled that Ceballos’ expression was made as part of his 
employment obligations. Kennedy stated, 
Ceballos wrote his deposition letter because it is part of what he, as a calendar 
deputy, was employed to do. It is immaterial whether he experienced some 
personal gratification from writing the memo; his First Amendment rights do not 
depend on his job satisfaction. The significant point is that the memo was written 
pursuant to Ceballos’ official duties. (pp. 9-10) 
He added, 
Ceballos did not act as a citizen when he went about conducting his daily 
professional activities, such as supervising attorneys, investigating charges, and 
preparing filings. In the same way he did not speak as a citizen by writing a 
memo that addressed the proper disposition of a pending criminal case. When he 
went to work and performed the tasks he was paid to perform, Ceballos acted as 
a government employee. (p. 10) 
As such, his speech was not owned by him and, therefore not protected by the First 
Amendment. 
 Justice Stevens rebutted stating that “[t]he proper answer to the question of 
‘whether the First Amendment protects a government employee from discipline based 
on speech made pursuant to the employee’s official duties,’…is ‘Sometimes,’ not 
‘Never’” (p. 2). He reminded the Court of Justice Rehnquist’s unanimous decision in 
Givan, which rejected “the conclusion that a public employee forfeits his protection 
against governmental abridgment of freedom of speech if he decides to express his 
views privately rather than publicly” (p. 1). He argued that, “it is senseless to let 
constitutional protection…hinge on whether [an employee’s words] fall within a job 




 Second, because Ceballos had no personal interest in his expression, the court 
held that his employer had the right to discipline him. Kennedy affirmed that  
[s]upervisors must ensure that their employees’ official communications are 
accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote the employer’s mission. 
Ceballos’ memo is illustrative. It demanded the attention of his supervisors and 
led to a heated meeting with employees from the sheriff’s department. If 
Ceballos’ superiors thought his memo was inflammatory or misguided, they had 
the authority to take proper corrective action. (p. 7) 
He stated that “[t]o hold otherwise would be to demand permanent judicial intervention 
in the conduct of governmental operations to a degree inconsistent with sound principles 
of federalism and the separation of powers” (p. 11). Kennedy concluded that Ceballos’ 
employer had the right to discipline him for his speech as it was pursuant to his job 
duties. 
 Justice Souter rebutted that employee’s as citizen servants have an obligation to 
speak in their areas of expertise without fear of reprisal. He stated that “[t]here is no 
question that public employees speaking on matters they are obliged to address would 
generally place a high value on a right to speak, as any responsible citizen would” (p. 6). 
If disciplined, employees may cease to contribute to the public good. He added that 
“[t]he interest at stake is as much the public’s interest in receiving informed opinion as it 
is the employee’s own right to disseminate it” (p. 7). He concluded that “[i]t is thus no 
adequate justification for the suppression of potentially valuable information simply to 
recognize that the government has a huge interest in managing its employees” (p. 8) and 
dissented from the majority.   
 Third, the court recognized the employer’s right to control employee speech to 




has broader discretion to restrict speech…that has some potential to affect its 
operations” (p. 2). The dissenting justices recognized the “need to afford government 
employers sufficient discretion to manage their operations” (p. 3) and agreed with the 
majority stating, that “government needs civility in the workplace, consistency in policy, 
and honesty and competence in public service” (p. 7). Souter cautioned the court that the 
majority’s holding could have a negative impact on academic freedom suggesting that  
today’s decision may have important ramifications for academic freedom, at least 
as a constitutional value. There is some argument that expression related to 
academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional 
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s customary 
employee-speech jurisprudence. We need not, and for that reason do not, decide 
whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case 
involving speech related to scholarship or teaching. (p. 13) 
The court recognized Souter’s note but the majority granted employers the right to 
control speech made pursuant to their official job duties. 
 First Amendment. The second most prevalent theme was First Amendment. 
The theme concentrated on the court’s discussion of Ceballos’ speech rights based on 
protections provided by the First Amendment and holdings of previous the courts. 
Eighty-seven references were coded from the cases and brief with 7, 35, 18, and 27 in 
the district court, court of appeals, amicus brief, and Supreme Court respectively. Based 
on a matrix coding query of all themes and reference coding bands within the opinions 
and brief, the theme overlapped the expression pursuant to official job duties, matters of 
public concern, speech as a public employee versus private citizen, employer’s right to 
control speech, and academic freedom themes 42, 33, 26, 18, and 12 times respectively. 




provides the results of the query for each opinion and brief. The analysis includes 
examples from each court opinion and brief showing how these five themes relate to the 
First Amendment theme. 
Table 5.6 














Expression pursuant to official job 
duties 
2 12 12 16 42 
Matters of public concern 4 12 8 9 33 
Speech as a public employee versus 
private citizen 
0 7 2 17 26 
Employer’s right to control speech 0 2 6 10 18 
Academic freedom 0 1 9 2 12 
  
District Court for the Central District of California. The district court discussed 
Ceballos’ First Amendment right in the context of whether his speech as an employee 
was protected when he spoke on matters of public concern. Using the Pickering/Connick 
balancing test, the court decided if his statements addressed a matter of public concern 
and “weigh the interests of the employee in commenting on matters of public concern 
with the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs” (Garcetti, 2002, p. 4). Judge Matz added that if the court 
determined that, 
the statements do not address matters of public concern, the First Amendment is 
not triggered and it is unnecessary to scrutinize the reasons for the employer’s 





public concern, that [it was] not sufficient, standing alone, to warrant 
constitutional protection. (p. 4) 
As such, the court “scrutinize[d] the content, form and context of the statement” (p. 4) in 
order to determine if Ceballos wrote his memo as part of his job. After a review of the 
“precise context in which [Ceballos] uttered his speech, [the court] establish[ed] that, in 
fact, it was not constitutionally-protected” (p. 6). 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The court of appeals discussed Ceballos’ 
First Amendment rights in the context of his speech as a public employee. Whether 
Ceballos spoke in this role as a matter of public concern and whether his speech was 
protected or part of his daily job duties, was the focus of Circuit Judge Reinhart’s 
opinion. Reinhart inferred that “[a]lthough public employees do not relinquish their right 
to free speech by virtue of their employment, neither do they enjoy absolute First 
Amendment rights” (Garcetti, 2004, p. 7). To determine whether Ceballos was 
protected, Reinhart stated that the court is required to  
(1)…ask whether the speech addresses a matter of public concern, and, if it does,  
(2)…engage in an inquiry, commonly known as the Pickering balancing test, to 
determine whether Ceballos’s interest in expressing himself outweighs the 
government’s interests in promoting workplace efficiency and avoiding 
workplace disruption. (p. 8) 
He discussed each requirement to determine Ceballos’ right to First Amendment 
protection. 
 First, Reinhart debated whether the issues Ceballos’ memo was a matter of 





Speech that concerns issues about which information is needed or appropriate to 
enable the members of society to make informed decisions about the operation of 
their government merits the highest degree of first amendment protection.  In 
contrast, speech that deals with individual personnel disputes and grievances and 
that would be of no relevance to the public’s evaluation of the performance of 
governmental agencies, is generally not of public concern. (p. 8) 
He concluded that Ceballos’ speech as a matter of public concern, stating,  
the right of public employees to speak freely on matters of public concern is 
important to the orderly functioning of the democratic process, because public 
employees, by virtue of their access to information and experience regarding the 
operations, conduct, and policies of government agencies and officials, are 
positioned uniquely to contribute to the debate on matters of public concern. (p. 
9) 
He added that “[s]tripping them of that right when they report wrongdoing or other 
significant matters to their supervisors would seriously undermine our ability to maintain 
the integrity of our governmental operations” (p. 9) and that “[t]he mere fact that a 
public employee exposes individual wrongdoing or government misdeeds when making 
a regular as opposed to a special report does not, by itself, result in the denial of First 
Amendment protection” (p. 11). As such, Reinhart determined that the full Connick 
balancing test should be applied to Ceballos’ right as a public employee to speak as a 
concerned citizen.  
 The court applied the two-step Pickering/Connick balance test to weigh 
Ceballos’ speech, a memo, against the “government’s interests in promoting workplace 
efficiency and avoiding workplace disruption” (p. 8). Reinhart stated that the burden of 
proof was on the employer and that “the decisive question [was] whether the employee 





even if Ceballos’ memo proved to be erroneous, court precedence protected the right of 
public employee speech. He concluded that “the individual defendants [had] not meet 
their burden under Pickering because they [had offered] no explanation as to how 
Ceballos’s memorandum to his supervisors resulted in inefficiency or office disruption” 
(p. 12) and held that “Ceballos’ speech addressed a matter of public concern and his 
interest in the speech outweighed the defendants’ administrative interests” (p. 12).  
 Circuit Judge O’Scannlain in his dissenting opinion disagreed with the majority. 
He argued that, “Ceballos had no personal stake (other than in doing his job well), and 
no cognizable First Amendment interest, in the speech for which he now seeks 
protection” (p. 19). He reasoned,  
when public employees speak in the course of carrying out their routine, required 
employment obligations, they have no personal interest in the content of that 
speech that gives rise to a First Amendment right [and that] their speech is, in 
actuality, the State’s. (p. 19)  
He added,  
employee speech solicits the protection of the First Amendment only when it 
also results from the employee’s decision to express his or her personal 
opinions--that is, those views he or she holds as a citizen and not as a public 
employee. The First Amendment, in short, does not protect public employees’ 
routine and required speech on behalf of the government. (p. 22) 
O’Scannlain dissented that Ceballos had no First Amendment right to his speech and, 
therefore, was not entitled to protection.  
Amicus brief. The American Association of University professors (AAUP) 
discussed the First Amendment in relation to role of the faculty as public employees to 
speak on matters of public concern and the amendment’s special concern for faculty 




the court of appeals decision that Ceballos’ “speech was fully protected by the First 
Amendment, addressing as it did a matter of public concern, no less because it occurred 
within the workplace and related to issues within respondent’s assigned area of 
responsibility as a prosecutor” (American Association of University Professors, 2005, p. 
8). Amici reiterated “the dangers of infringing upon such highly sensitive areas as 
freedom of speech…and freedom of communication of ideas, particularly in the 
academic community” (p. 13). Amici added that the courts  
have never suggested that First Amendment protection for professorial 
expression diminishes with proximity to the core of a teacher’s or scholar’s 
assigned tasks. [When] some courts have been less inclined to grant protection to 
speech unrelated to the academic setting and the campus community, [the] 
Pickering-Connick principles fully encompass, and accord First Amendment 
protection to, professorial speech – without regard to the relationship between 
that speech and a scholar’s academic discipline or assigned area of curricular 
responsibility. (p. 18) 
Amici warned that any dilution of these standards “would introduce a perverse 
irony [where] First Amendment academic freedom would extend only to those public 
statements on which faculty members were least well informed [with only] statements 
clearly beyond academic expertise [being] considered matters of public concern” (p. 24). 
As such, amici concluded that any rule making none job-related speech by public 
employees constitutionally unprotected “could undermine the First Amendment 
protections traditionally afforded faculty speech and ignore the special sensitivity this 
Court has paid in applying the First Amendment to colleges and universities” (p. 26). 
The AAUP requested the court to uphold the lower court’s decision.   
U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court discussed First Amendment speech 




concern versus his employer’s right to control his speech because it was made pursuant 
to his job responsibilities. Inherent throughout Justice Kennedy’s analysis was a 
discussion of the dichotomy between the employee’s responsibility as a citizen to 
uncover wrong doing versus the employer’s right to control speech that affects their 
operations. 
In the majority opinion, Kennedy recognized public employee speech rights. He 
stated that (a) “public employees do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by 
reason of their employment” (Garcetti, 2005, p. 9) (b) “the First Amendment protects a 
public employee’s right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing 
matters of public concern” (p. 9) and (c) “the First Amendment limits the ability of a 
public employer to leverage the employment relationship to restrict, incidentally or 
intentionally, the liberties employees enjoy in their capacities as private citizens” (p. 10). 
He added that, “while the First Amendment invests public employees with certain rights, 
it does not empower them to constitutionalize the employee grievance” (p. 11). As such, 
he stated that, “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, 
the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the 
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline” (p. 11). 
Because Ceballos’ memo was created as part of his official job duties, the court held that 
Ceballos acted within his role as a public employee and had no claim for protection from 




Justices Souter and Breyer disagreed. Justice Souter dissented stating that 
“[o]pen speech by a private citizen on a matter of public importance lies at the heart of 
expression subject to protection by the First Amendment” (p. 14). He added that 
[t]his significant, albeit qualified, protection of public employees who irritate the 
government is understood to flow from the First Amendment, in part, because a 
government paycheck does nothing to eliminate the value to an individual of 
speaking on public matters, and there is no good reason for categorically 
discounting a speaker’s interest in commenting on a matter of public concern just 
because the government employs him. (p. 14) 
He included the special concerns of the First Amendment to protect the academic 
freedom of faculty, reiterating the minority opinion in Grutter that, 
[t]his ostensible domain beyond the pale of the First Amendment is spacious 
enough to include even the teaching of a public university professor, and I have 
to hope that today’s majority does not mean to imperil First Amendment 
protection of academic freedom in public colleges and universities, whose 
teachers necessarily speak and write “pursuant to official duties.” (p. 18) 
In addition, Breyer wrote that public employee speech such as the Ceballos’ memo 
warrants protection when it  
both (1) involves a matter of public concern and also (2) takes place in the course 
of ordinary job-related duties [and] it does so only in the presence of augmented 
need for constitutional protection and diminished risk of undue judicial 
interference with governmental management of the public’s affairs. (pp. 22-23) 
He added that these conditions had been satisfied and that the balancing test was 
appropriate. But, the majority of the court held that public employers are within their 
rights to control their employee’s speech when it is determined to be part of their job 





 Speech as a public employee versus private citizen. The third most prevalent 
theme was speech as a public employee versus private citizen. The theme focused on the 
difference between a public employee’s rights to speak freely as a citizen and the public 
employer’s right to curtail employee speech that interrupts the efficiency of their 
operations. Sixty references were coded from the cases and brief with 1, 7, 8, and 44 in 
the district court, court of appeals, amicus brief, and Supreme Court respectively. Based 
on a matrix coding query of all themes and reference coding bands within the opinions 
and brief, the theme overlapped the expression pursuant to official job duties, First 
Amendment, employer’s right to control speech, and matters of public concern themes 
34, 26, 20, and 20 times respectively. These themes dominated the discussion of the 
speech as a public employee versus private citizen theme. Table 5.7 provides the results 
of individual queries of each opinion and brief. The analysis includes examples showing 
how these five themes relate to the speech as a public employee versus private citizen 
theme. 
Table 5.7 
Matrix Coding of Five Prevalent Themes That Overlap the Speech as a Public Employee 













Expression pursuant to official job 
duties 1 2 6 25 34 
First Amendment 0 7 2 17 26 
Employer’s right to control speech 0 0 3 17 20 
Matter of public concern 1 3 2 14 20 




District Court for the Central District of California. The district court discussed 
the theme in reference to the federal court’s reluctance to interfere when employee 
speech is not a matter of public concern. Based on the court cases referenced by the 
defendants, Judge Matz recognized that  
federal courts have held that speech engaged is not merely as a concerned citizen 
but within the scope of the plaintiff’s employment does not address a matter of 
public concern, even if the incident that triggered the speech may itself be a 
matter of public concern. (Garcetti, 2002, p. 5) 
As such, the district court held that Ceballos’ speech was not protected. 
 Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The court of appeals discussed the 
conflict between Ceballos’ speech as a public employee versus a private citizen within 
the context of whether it was a matter of public concern or an aggrieved employee 
disputing an employer’s decision. In his majority opinion, Circuit Judge Reinhart 
reminded the court that “[a]lthough public employees do not relinquish their right to free 
speech by virtue of their employment, neither do they enjoy absolute First Amendment 
rights” (Garcetti, 2004, p. 7). He contextualized the differences in the two types of 
speech stating, 
[s]peech that concerns issues about which information is needed or appropriate to 
enable the members of society to make informed decisions about the operation of 
their government merits the highest degree of first amendment protection. In 
contrast, speech that deals with individual personnel disputes and grievances and 
that would be of no relevance to the public’s evaluation of the performance of 





In concurring with the majority’s holding, Judge O’Scannlain added that “the implicit 
premise underlying the First Amendment’s hostility toward viewpoint-driven rules 
abridging the freedom of speech is that such constraints impermissibly infringe upon 
individuals’ freedom of choice to express their personal opinions or to otherwise 
express themselves” (p. 19). He added that  
Connick teaches that although speech uttered by public employees must address 
an issue of public import in order to come within the protective shelter of the 
First Amendment, satisfaction of such a virtually necessary condition is not by 
itself sufficient to trigger constitutional constraints on governmental action. 
Instead, employee speech solicits the protection of the First Amendment only 
when it also results from the employee’s decision to express his or her personal 
opinions--that is, those views he or she holds as a citizen and not as a public 
employee. The First Amendment, in short, does not protect public employees’ 
routine and required speech on behalf of the government. (p. 22) 
The court did not rule on whether Ceballos’ speech was protected as the lower court 
focused on the defendant’s right to 11th Amendment immunity. Instead the court 
remanded the case for further proceedings. 
Amicus brief. Amici focused on the right of a faculty member as a public 
employee to speak freely on topics that are within his or her profession and are a matter 
of public concern. Amici provided two reasons for supporting the court of appeals 
decision. First, amici argued that not upholding the decision would “depart radically 
from the unanimous consensus of the federal courts of appeals, all of which have been 
consistent with the judgment of the Ninth Circuit in this case” (American Association of 
University Professors, 2005, p. 6). Amici added that “First Amendment protection on the 
speech of public employees that deals with matters of public concern…has never 




speaker’s position or assigned responsibilities” (p. 6). Second, amici expressed their 
concern that  
lessening First Amendment protection for job-related public employee speech 
would threaten academic freedom [adding that much] potentially controversial 
expression by university professors relates to the subject matter of the speaker’s 
academic expertise, and could thus be deemed unprotected under a diminished 
and distorted concept of “public concern.” (American Association of University 
Professors, 2005, p. 7)   
Amici agreed with the court of appeals holding that Ceballos’ speech was protected by 
the First Amendment as it was consistent with the Supreme “Court’s judgment in 
Connick…which set forth the criteria that have since been applied to distinguish 
between protected speech ‘as a citizen upon matters of public concern’ and unprotected 
speech ‘as an employee upon matters only of personal interest’” (p. 8). As such, amici 
urged the court to “reaffirm its commitments to the current concept of ‘matters of public 
concern’ in regard to the speech of public employees and to its longstanding recognition 
of academic freedom as a ‘special concern’ of the First Amendment” (p. 1) and to 
uphold the court of appeal’s decision. 
U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court discussed Ceballos’ speech in relation 
to being part of his official job duties and the government’s right as his employer to 
control and restrict that speech even when it addressed a matter of public concern. In his 
majority opinion, Justice Kennedy stated, 
[the] Court has made clear that public employees do not surrender all their First 
Amendment rights by reason of their employment [and that] the First 
Amendment protects a public employee’s right, in certain circumstances, to 






Kennedy added that, “[w]hen a citizen enters government service, the citizen by 
necessity must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom [but the g]overnment 
employers, like private employers, need a significant degree of control over their 
employees’ words and actions” (p. 10) in order to maintain efficient operations. 
Kennedy concluded that the Ceballos’ memo was written pursuant to his job duties and 
that his employer had the right to control his speech. He added that “[r]estricting speech 
that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not 
infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen” (p. 11), 
recognizing that this restriction does not prevent him or her from participating in public 
debate as a citizen. Kennedy left amici’s academic freedom concerns for another court to 
decide stating that the Supreme Court “need not, and for that reason do not, decide 
whether the analysis [conducted] today would apply in the same manner to a case 
involving speech related to scholarship or teaching” (p. 12) focusing only on the 
government’s need to control speech as a method of maintaining efficiency. As such, the 
majority concluded “that when public employees make statements pursuant to their 
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment 
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer 
discipline” (p. 14). The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision and 
remanded the case for further proceedings. 
 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens disagreed with Kennedy’s narrow 
interpretation of the First Amendment. To the question of whether the First Amendment 




employee’s official duties, he responded, “sometimes, not never” (p. 13). Stevens 
argued,  
[the] notion that there is a categorical difference between speaking as a citizen 
and speaking in the course of one’s employment is quite wrong [and that], it 
seems perverse to fashion a new rule that provides employees with an incentive 
to voice their concerns publicly before talking frankly to their superiors. (p. 14) 
Justice Souter joined Stevens in dissent contending that public employees are obligated 
to speak out on matters of public concern and that the government must protect such 
speech when  
[the] private and public interests in addressing official wrongdoing and threats to 
health and safety can outweigh the government’s stake in the efficient 
implementation of policy, and when they do public employees who speak on 
these matters in the course of their duties should be eligible to claim First 
Amendment protection. (p. 14) 
Souter added that “the very idea of categorically separating the citizen’s interest from 
the employee’s interest ignores the fact that…these citizen servants are the ones whose 
civic interest rises highest when they speak pursuant to their duties, and these are exactly 
the ones government employers most want to attract” (p. 15). Steven and Souter were 
joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer in their dissent from the majority’s decision.   
 Matters of public concern. The fourth most prevalent theme is matters of public 
concern. The theme is the first step of the Pickering-Connick balance test and was 
referenced in all cases and briefs. It focused on Ceballos’s right as a public employee to 
speak on issues that are a public concern to private citizens such as government 
corruption or inefficiencies. The 58 references were coded from the cases and brief with 
5, 17, 12, and 24 in the district court, court of appeals, amicus brief, and Supreme Court 




within the opinions and brief, the theme coding overlapped the First Amendment, 
expression pursuant to official job duties, speech as a public employee versus private 
citizen, and employer’s right to efficient operations theme coding 33, 20, 20, and 10 
times respectively. Table 5.8 provides the results of individual queries of each opinion 
and brief. The analysis includes examples of how these four themes relate to the matters 
of public concern theme. 
Table 5.8 















First Amendment 4 12 8 9 33 
Expression pursuant to official job duties 2 4 8 6 20 
Speech as a public employee versus 
private citizen 
1 3 2 14 20 
Employer’s right to efficient operation 1 5 0 4 10 
  
District Court for the Central District of California. The district court discussed 
the theme in the context of the Pickering/Connick balancing test. Judge Matz stated that 
“the court [must] test the reasons for restriction against First Amendment standards [and, 
in] doing so, the court… must weigh the interests of the employee in commenting on 
matters of public concern with the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it performs” (Garcetti, 2002, p. 4). He added, “the court 
must give government employers ‘wide discretion and control over the management of 




though Ceballos’ speech was a matter of public concern, it was not a matter for the 
federal courts to decide. Referencing Connick, Matz stated,  
when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern 
but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the 
most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which 
to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly 
in reaction to the employee’s behavior. (p. 5) 
Matz stated,  
[d]espite the intrinsic and important public interest in excluding perjured 
evidence from court proceedings, however, the mere significance of that issue 
does not establish that Ceballos’s views addressed an issue of public concern for 
purposes of the First Amendment, because (as defendants argue) he wrote it as 
part of his job. (p. 5) 
 
As such, he determined that Ceballos’ speech was not protected, but because the 
defendants were granted summary judgment based on the Eleventh Amendment, all of 
Caballos’ speech claims were dismissed. 
 Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The court of appeals discussed 
Ceballos’s speech from the perspective of the public employee’s job duties and the 
employer’s right to maintain efficient operations.  Circuit Judge Reinhart established,  
the right of public employees to speak freely on matters of public concern is 
important to the orderly functioning of the democratic process, because public 
employees, by virtue of their access to information and experience regarding the 
operations, conduct, and policies of government agencies and officials, ‘are 
positioned uniquely to contribute to the debate on matters of public concern’. 
Stripping them of that right when they report wrongdoing or other significant 
matters to their supervisors would seriously undermine our ability to maintain the 
integrity of our governmental operations. (Garcetti, 2005, p. 9) 
Rienhart argued that, “[r]egardless of the forum in which a government worker makes 




public concerns that merit careful assessment and justify full application of the Connick 
principles” (p. 11). Even if Ceballos’ speech is found to be false, Reinhart reminded that, 
to encourage public employees to speak out on matters of public concern, [the 
court has found that,] while false statements are not deserving, in themselves, of 
constitutional protection, erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and…it 
must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ 
that they ‘need…to survive.’ (p. 12) 
While the defendants contend that Ceballo’s speech was disruptive, Reinhart found that 
his “speech addressed a matter of public concern and his interest in the speech 
outweighed the defendants’ administrative interests” (p. 12). As such, Reinhart held that 
Ceballos’ speech was protected by the First Amendment. 
Amicus brief. Amici discussed the effect that reversing the court of appeal’s 
decision would have on university faculty if government employers were allowed to 
restrict employee speech that is part of their job duties. Their concern was that 
“lessening First Amendment protection for job-related public employee speech would 
threaten academic freedom [and leave] controversial expression by university professors 
[on] subject matter of the speaker’s academic expertise…unprotected under a 
diminished and distorted concept of ‘public concern’” (American Association of 
University Professors, 2005, p. 7). Amici argued that “any suggestion that matters of 
public concern may not encompass job-related expression of professors would 
undermine the special protections the Court has given academic freedom for the past 50 





consequences of such a retreat could be truly frightening not only for the 
academic freedom of outspoken professors, but equally for students and for the 
larger society that now benefits from the First Amendment protection that 
scholars enjoy to speak publicly within their areas of expertise. (p. 24) 
 
The irony would be that, 
First Amendment academic freedom would extend only to those public 
statements on which faculty members were least well informed–matters that fell 
totally outside the fields in which they study and teach. Only those statements 
clearly beyond academic expertise would be considered matters of public 
concern. (p. 24)  
As such, amici urged the Supreme Court to uphold the court of appeals decision and be 
sensitive to how their decision affects public universities and the First Amendment’s 
special concerns for academic freedom. 
U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court focused on Ceballos’ right as a public 
employee and citizen to speak on matters of public concern and the government 
employer’s right to control speech in order to maintain efficient operations. First and 
foremost, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that  
the Court has made clear that public employees do not surrender all their First 
Amendment rights by reason of their employment [and that] the First 
Amendment protects a public employee’s right, in certain circumstances, to 
speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern. (Garcetti, 2006, p. 9) 
He stated, as “long as employees are speaking as citizens about matters of public 
concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary for their 
employers to operate efficiently and effectively” (p. 10). He clarified these speech 
restrictions by stating,  
an employee speaking as a citizen…with a citizen’s interest, is protected from 
reprisal unless the statements are too damaging to the government’s capacity to 




thought to flow from the statements. Entitlement to protection is thus not 
absolute. (p. 14)  
While Kennedy recognized that “open speech by a private citizen on a matter of public 
importance lies at the heart of expression subject to protection by the First Amendment” 
(p. 14), he also stated that “[g]overnment employees are often in the best position to 
know what ails the agencies for which they work” (p. 14) and that the “interest at stake 
is as much the public’s interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the employee’s 
own right to disseminate it” (p. 16). As such the majority reversed the court of appeals 
decision and added a preliminary part to the Pickering-Connick test to determine 
whether an employee is speaking as a private citizen or a public employee as part of 
their job official duties. 
Summary 
 In Garcetti (2007), the Supreme Court ruled that when public employees make 
statements pursuant to their official duties, their speech is not protected by the First 
Amendment and they could be disciplined by their employer even if they are speaking 
on an issue of public concern (Levinson, 2007). The Garcetti decision added a 
preliminary step to the Pickering balancing test. “The first step determines whether the 
employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern” (Griffin, 2007, p. 153). The 
second step invokes the Pickering test “to determine whether the employer had a reason 
to treat the public employee differently from a member of the general public” (p. 153).  
The two-part Garcetti test created a measure for employee speech and provided 




Griffin comments that this “test eliminates judicial balancing and replaces it with 
definite boundaries that are clear to both the employee and employer” (p. 54).  
 The question of whether Garcetti affects teaching and scholarship was raised by 
Justice Souter who expressed the hope that the majority decision “does not imperil the 
First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public colleges and universities” 
(DelFattore, 2011, para. 7). The court responded with the “Garcetti reservation” 
recognizing that the court’s analysis did not apply in the same manner to a case 
involving speech related to academic scholarship and classroom instruction (DelFattorre, 
2011). The Garcetti decision created uncertainties for faculty when they speak as 
department chairs or committee members on non-academic issues. These rulings could 
result in faculty refraining from actively participating in decision-making and remaining 





Chapter Six: Schrier v. University of Colorado 
Background 
 In May 2003, the Plaintiff, Dr. Robert Schrier M.D., filed a civil action in the 
Colorado District Court against the University of Colorado System (UCS) and three 
employees, “President Elizabeth Hoffman, Dean Richard D. Krugman, M.D., and 
Chancellor James H. Shore, M.D., in their official capacities” (Schrier, 2005, p. 5). The 
lawsuit alleged that the Plaintiff was terminated as Chair of the Department of Medicine 
at the UC Health Sciences Center in retaliation for speaking publicly against the move of 
the University’s Medical School in Denver to a new location in Aurora, CO. During the 
case hearings, the Plaintiff conceded that he had “been an active participant in that 
debate since the initial announcement of the move proposal” (p. 5). His concerns as 
chair of the department and a tenured faculty member focused on “the fiscal implications 
of the move and his view that the move would disrupt integrated programs within the 
School of Medicine” (p. 6). The move had been discussed since the mid-1990s and was 
approved by the Board of Regents in 1998. 
 Dr. Schrier was removed as Chair of the Department of Medicine by Dean 
Krugman on October 10, 2002. Health Science Center faculty were not consulted about 
Dr. Schrier’s removal because the University maintained that “department chairs within 
the School of Medicine serve at the will of the Dean [and that the removal] did not 
constitute a disciplinary action” (p. 6). “Dr. Schrier retained his tenured appointment as 
faculty member and full professor of medicine within the University and currently draws 




to file a lawsuit in the District Court for the County and City of Denver for reinstatement 
as department chair. 
Court Actions 
The Schrier case began in the District Court for the City and County of Colorado 
in October 2003 and ended in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit on October 
2005. The district court denied Shrier’s injunctive claim relief for his removal as 
department head and found no textual basis in the Constitution for Shrier’s constitutional 
right to academic freedom claim (Schrier, 2002). The court of appeals affirmed and 
stated, 
that the right to academic freedom is not “a subset of the First Amendment, 
separate and distinct from the fundamental right of free speech [and refusing] to 
endorse any suggestion that speech in an academic setting concerning the 
operations of a university enjoys greater constitutional protection than does 
political speech in the public forum.” (Schrier, 2005, pp. 22-23)  
The decision discounted the cases such as Sweezy (1957), Keyishian (1967), Bakke 
(1978), Ewing (1985) in which academic freedom was recognized as a “special concern” 
of the First Amendment and provided public universities with the control over role-
based faculty speech in order to maintain efficient operations. 
 District Court for the City and County of Colorado. On February 19, 2003, 
the U.S. District Court of Colorado, with the consent of both parties, granted UCS’s 
motion to move the case to the Federal court for a hearing along with the 





 Federal District Court. On May 19, 2003, Magistrate Judge Borland heard the 
motion to consolidate Schrier’s preliminary and permanent injunctions (Schrier, 2005).  
In order to be entitled to…a preliminary injunction…, the moving party must 
establish that: (1) [he or she] will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction 
issues; (2) the threatened injury…outweighs whatever damage the proposed 
injunction may cause the opposing party; (3) the injunction, if issued, would not 
be adverse to the public interest; and (4) there is a substantial likelihood [of 
success] on the merits. (p. 7) 
On June 12 2003, Borland denied Schrier’s requested motion “citing the existence of 
issues of fact to be tried by a jury and stating that no further 
recommendation…concerning [his] right to a permanent injunction is possible or 
appropriate” (p. 1). 
 Amicus Brief. In December 2003, the AAUP filed an amicus brief with the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The AAUP requested that the 
“court reverse the holding of the district court that the appellant, Dr. Robert W. Schrier, 
does not have a First Amendment right to academic freedom” (American Association of 
University Professors, 2003, p. 2). The AAUP disagreed with the decision of the District 
Court that, 
Dr. Schrier’s status as a university professor who serves as a department chair 
entitled him to no rights distinctive from those of any other public employee 
violated his academic freedom…is in direct conflict with controlling authority 
that recognizes academic freedom as a “special concern” of the First 
Amendment. (p. 3) 
The AAUP requested that the Court recognize Dr. Schrier’s right to academic freedom 
and, at a minimum, “reject the District Court’s decision that no First Amendment right 




 The AAUP disputed the district court statement that “academic freedom is not a 
‘subset of the First Amendment, separate and distinct from the fundamental right of free 
speech’” (p. 4) and argued,  
[they] did not examine Dr. Schrier’s speech to determine the extent to which his 
statements reflected his academic views and thus would fall within his First 
Amendment right to academic freedom, as opposed to actually obstructing the 
operations of the University, which would be beyond the protection of the First 
Amendment. (p. 4) 
Defending Dr. Schrier’s academic speech rights, the AAUP cited the Supreme Court’s 
recognition, in Sweezy (1957), of the faculty’s right to academic freedom and political 
expression and warned that imposing “any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in 
our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation [and endanger] such 
highly sensitive areas as freedom of speech…and freedom of communication of ideas, 
particularly in the academic community” (p. 5).  
 The AAUP argued that the Supreme Court provided higher education institutions 
with the right to make internal academic decisions as the courts have minimal expertise 
in this area. In support, the AAUP quoted the Keyishian (1967) court’s opinion that the 
Supreme Court “could not conceive of any circumstance wherein a state interest would 
justify infringement of rights in these fields” (p. 5) and the Ewing (1985) court’s 
recognition that “academic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited 
exchange of ideas among teachers and students, but also, and somewhat inconsistently, 
on autonomous decision making by the academy itself” (p. 7). The AAUP included the 





accorded a ‘degree of deference’ to educators’ academic decisions, reiterating 
that given the important purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms 
of speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities 
occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition. (p. 5)   
They also reaffirmed their commitment to the “important purpose of public education 
and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university 
environment, again declaring that universities occupy a special niche in our 
constitutional tradition” (p. 8). 
 The AAUP reiterated that academic freedom is not an absolute right. They stated 
that, “professors are properly enjoined from introducing into their teaching controversial 
matter that has no relation to their subject” (p. 12). Even with these restrictions, the 
courts have recognized that, “to abridge [and] prevail over academic freedom, the 
interests of government must be strong and the extent of the intrusion carefully limited” 
(p. 13). The AAUP contended that the district court refused to examine Dr. Schrier’s 
testimony “to determine the extent to which his statements were a reflection of his 
academic and professional views” (p. 14) but instead allowed the University of Colorado 
to curtail his academic freedom by not recognizing academic freedom as a special 
concern of the First Amendment. As such, the AAUP urged the federal court to join  
the Supreme Court and a long line of appellate court precedent, including this 
Court’s own, [in reaffirming] the distinctive First Amendment right to academic 
freedom [and rejecting] the district court’s holding that no right to academic 
freedom exists under the First Amendment. (p. 15) 
 
 U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit. In October 2005, Schrier filed an 





reversed based on three theories (Schrier, 2005). He claimed, 
(1) the application of a heightened standard to his preliminary injunction motion 
constitutes reversible error; (2) the conclusion that the University’s interest in 
suppressing his speech outweighed his First Amendment rights was contrary to 
the balancing test established in [Pickering (1968)]; and (3) the court’s sua 
sponte invocation of Eleventh Amendment immunity to bar his breach of 
contract claim was spurious and should be reversed. (p. 6) 
Circuit Judge Seymour addressed each argument separately. 
Preliminary injunction standard. The court reviewed the standard used by the 
district court to deny Schrier’s preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. To 
succeed, he must prove in succession that 
(1) [he or she] will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction issues;  
(2) the threatened injury…outweighs whatever damage the proposed 
injunction may cause the opposing party;  
(3) the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest; and 
(4) there is a substantial likelihood [of success] on the merits. (p. 7) 
To reverse the district court’s decision on this claim, “the state must show that the 
district court committed an error of law [caused] by applying the wrong standard…or 
committed clear error in its factual findings” (p. 7). Schrier conceded that the district 
court judge had articulated these factors to him. 
 As the purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve each party’s position 
until a trial on the merits can be held, the court’s decision must not require strict 
supervision by the state (Schrier, 2005). Such disfavored preliminary injunctions include 
“(1) preliminary injunctions that alter the status quo; (2) mandatory preliminary 
injunctions; and (3) preliminary injunctions that afford the movant all the relief that it 
could recover at the conclusion of a full trial on the merits” (p. 8). The district court 




status quo and require mandatory supervision. On appeal, Schrier contended that his 
reinstatement would preserve the status quo and be prohibitory not mandatory to 
implement which would not require him to “show that the [four preliminary injunction] 
factors [weighed] heavily and compellingly in his favor” (p. 9). The defendants argued, 
“reinstatement would place the court in position where it may have to provide 
supervision, and…be disruptive and detrimental to the essential functioning of 
University business” (p. 10).  
 First, Seymour determined that the district court erred in its determination that 
Schrier’s reinstatement would disturb the status quo. Seymour stated that the point of 
status quo, “in the instant case, [is] the last peaceable uncontested status existing 
between the parties before the dispute developed” (p. 10). That point was on October 9, 
2002 when Schrier held the department chair position. Seymour concluded that Schrier’s 
reinstatement would maintain, not disrupt the status quo, thus reversing the Magistrate 
Judge’s decision (Schrier, 2005). 
 Next, Seymour reviewed whether the preliminary injunction was prohibitive or 
mandatory. Schrier contended  
that the injunction he seeks is prohibitory rather than mandatory because it 
“requires the University to do nothing more than continue to do something it was 
already doing during the last uncontested period preceding the injunction, i.e., 
permitting Dr. Schrier to retain his Chairmanship until the litigation is resolved 
on the merits. (p. 11) 
Seymour characterized the injunction for reinstatement as mandatory and disfavorable as 
it would require the university to act in a certain manner and place “the court in position 




that “the magistrate judge’s application of the heavily and compelling standard was, as it 
turns out, erroneous” (p. 13). 
 Lastly, Seymour noted that recent cases in the 10th Circuit had altered the 
application of injunctive relief. “The requirement that a movant requesting a disfavored 
injunction must make a showing that the traditional four factors weigh heavily and 
compellingly in his favor is no longer the law of the circuit” (p. 14). He determined that 
the district court’s application of the invalid standard was an abuse of discretion even 
though the Magistrate Judge was unaware of the change. The court of appeal’s task was 
to decide “whether the [district court’s] application of the inappropriate standard 
warrant[ed] a remand” (p. 14). Seymour determined that “if…Schrier, regardless of the 
standard employed, failed to establish the required preliminary injunction factors, then 
the magistrate judge’s erroneous application of the “heavily and compelling” standard is 
of no legal consequence” (p. 14). “Because the court determined [that] Schrier failed to 
establish irreparable injury or substantial likelihood of success on the merits, it deemed 
it unnecessary to address the preliminary injunction test’s remaining prongs” (p. 15). 
Seymour continued with a review of Schrier’s second claim, First Amendment rights 
violations.   
 First Amendment claims. Schrier claimed that the university “violated his First 
Amendment right of free speech and his rights to academic freedom by terminating his 
chairmanship in retaliation for public statements he made concerning the Health 
Sciences Center’s move to Fitzsimons” (Schrier, 2005, p. 15). The district court ruled, 




that his First Amendment claims would succeed or that he had suffered “irreparable 
injury sufficient to satisfy the preliminary injunction test” (p. 15).   
To establish, a likelihood of success, Schrier had to prove that the employer 
violated his or her protected speech using the four-prong Pickering test. The test requires 
the court to 
[f]irst,…determine whether the employee’s speech involves a matter of public 
concern. If so, [the court] then balance[s] the employee’s interest in commenting 
upon matters of public concern against the interest of the State, as an employer, 
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees. Third, if the balance tips in favor of the employee, the employee then 
must show that the speech was a substantial factor or a motivating factor in the 
detrimental employment decision. Fourth, if the plaintiff establishes that speech 
was such a factor, the employer may demonstrate that it would have taken the 
same action against the employee even in the absence of the protected speech. (p. 
16) 
If Schrier’s speech concerning the Fitzsimmons campus could not be characterized as 
speech of a public concern, the test fails and the court does not need to review the 
university’s decision to discharge him.  
To determine whether the speech was a matter of public concern, the Connick 
(1983) court extended the Pickering test and instructed that “[w]hether an employee’s 
speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, 
and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record” (p. 16). Seymour 
determined that Schrier’s speech concerning the use of public funds and the impact on 
patient care, education, and research resulting from the relocation of the campus, 
“affect[ed] the basic functions and missions of the university [and therefore] 
constitute[ed] speech on matters of public concern. Schrier satisfied the first prong of the 




Schrier argued that the university needed to provide evidence of “actual 
disruption as a result of his speech in order to prevail in the second Pickering prong” (p. 
19). The defendants contended  
that Dr. Schrier’s speech regarding the move did not cease, but rather he spoke 
out against and did everything he could to undermine the move from the date the 
possibility of the move was first discussed until he was removed as department 
chair. (p. 21) 
Testimony by the dean and 12 faculty members provided evidence that “Schrier’s 
protected speech impaired harmony among coworkers, detrimentally impacted close 
working relationships within the school of medicine, impaired his performance as 
department chair, and interfered with the university’s ability to implement the move to 
Fitzsimons” (p. 21). Seymour determine that it was reasonable to conclude that Schrier’s 
“speech was having a detrimental impact on his performance and the university’s 
operations” (p. 22). 
The court of appeals also addressed Schrier’s claim stating, “that [the] 
defendants violated his right to academic freedom, a right he contended is afforded 
special constitutional significance” (p. 22). The district court rejected his claim that the 
right to academic freedom is not  
a subset of the First Amendment, separate and distinct from the fundamental 
right of free speech [and refused] to endorse any suggestion that speech in an 
academic setting concerning the operations of a university enjoys greater 
constitutional protection than does political speech in the public forum. (pp. 22-
23) 
While the court of appeals recognized academic freedom as a special concern of the 
First Amendment, they agreed “with the magistrate judge that an independent right to 




attendant right of free expression” (p. 23). Seymour stated that “Schrier’s argument 
impl[ied] that professors possess a special constitutional right of academic freedom not 
enjoyed by other governmental employees” (p. 23). Seymour declined “to construe the 
First Amendment in a manner that would promote such inequality among similarly 
situated citizens” (p. 23). He concluded that Schrier had “failed to meet his burden of 
demonstrating a substantial likelihood of success on his First Amendment claims under 
any standard applicable to preliminary injunctions” (p. 24)  
Irreparable injury. The court of appeals reviewed Schrier’s claim that the 
defendants violated his free speech and academic freedom rights, which constitute[ed] 
irreparable damage (Schrier, 2005) caused by his “loss of prestige, standing or 
reputation” (p. 25). Seymour cited Heideman (2001) which stated that, “[t]o constitute 
irreparable harm, an injury must be certain, great, actual and not theoretical” (p. 25) and 
that it “is of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief to 
prevent irreparable harm” (p. 26). Seymour concluded that the district court “did not 
abuse its discretion in determining that, without the preliminary injunction, Schrier  
would not suffer irreparable harm” (p. 26) and “affirm[ed] the denial of Dr. Schrier’s 
requested injunction as to his First Amendment claims” (p. 28).  
Breach of contract claims. Finally, the court of appeals reviewed Schrier’s 
contention de novo that the district court erred in dismissing his state law claim based on 
the university’s right to Eleventh Amendment immunity as a state institution (Schrier, 
2005). Schrier “request[ed] a remand for further consideration as to whether a 




claim” (p. 28). He argued and the court of appeals agreed that, based on the Supreme 
Court in Lapides (2002), the university waived its Eleventh Amendment right when it 
“voluntarily removed the instant action from state to federal court” (p. 28). Seymour 
agreed but denied the request to remand the contact claim because the “record 
establish[ed] that Dr. Schrier claim[ed] no injury resulting from the defendants’ alleged 
breach of his employment contract that [was] distinct and severable from the injury he 
claim[ed] resulted from the university’s alleged First Amendment violations” (p. 30). 
Seymour stated that, “in evaluating the magistrate judge’s denial of a preliminary 
injunction with regard to Dr. Schrier’s free speech and academic freedom claims, [the 
court] concluded that he suffered no irreparable injury” (p. 30). Based on Schrier’s 
failure to establish irreparable damage, Seymour concluded that “Schrier could not 
prevail on his breach of contract claim in the preliminary injunction stage” (pp. 30-31) 
and affirmed the district court’s order “denying Dr. Schrier’s request for a preliminary 
injunction” (p. 31). 
 District Court of Colorado. On November 30, 2005, the district court reviewed 
the case pursuant to the university’s motion for judgment concerning Schrier’s request 
for a permanent injunction and their unopposed motion for extension of time to file a 
reply (Schrier, 2005). Previously, Judge Boland had denied Schrier’s request for a 
preliminary injunction but left unresolved the request for the permanent injunction 
“pending resolution of certain factual disputes at trial under a ‘clearly erroneous or 
contrary to law standard’” (p. 2). In turn, “the defendants immediately moved [the 




court could award a permanent injunction if “the plaintiff [succeeded] on merit and only 
upon a showing of irreparable injury that would occur in the future” (p. 2). The court of 
appeals found that Schier could not succeed on merit or show irreparable injury, which 
resulted in Seymour denying Schrier’s request for preliminary injunction. “Because the 
resolution of issues involving the preliminary injunction are not necessarily dispositive 
of the request for permanent injunction, the Court found that the lower court did not err 
in recommending that the resolution of the permanent injunction be deferred” (p. 2). As 
such, the district court denied the defendant’s motions for judgment and extension of 
time.  
On December 22, 2006, the district court filed an order of impending settlement. 
Judge Krieger was advised that the parties had reached a settlement of all claims. The 
judge ordered that the civil trial scheduled for January 22, 2007 would not be continued 
(Schrier, 2006). The terms of the settlement released both parties of all claims with the 
University of Colorado agreeing to “pay $300,000 to Schrier to partially reimburse him 
for attorney’s fees [and] fund a sepsis-related acute renal failure research grant…for 
$250,000 a year for three years, beginning Jan. 1, 2007, and ending Dec. 31, 2009” 
(Glasscock, 2007, p. 1). “The settlement also required [the Dean of School of Medicine] 
to write a letter of apology (p. 1).  
Analysis 
 The Schrier case began in the district court in October 2003 and ended in the 
court of appeals for the 10th Circuit on October 2005 (48 months). The analysis of the 




with 12, 65, and 108 coded references respectively, for a total of 185 coded references. 
The themes, the corresponding number of coded references in each court opinion, and 
the total references for each theme are provided in Table 6.1. The themes are sorted by 
the Totals by Theme column from largest to smallest to illustrate a hierarchy of the most 
significant themes discussed across the court opinions and brief. 
Table 6.1 










First Amendment 0 27 16 43 
Academic freedom 0 30 5 35 
Preliminary, mandatory, permanent 
injunction 
8 1 25 34 
Irreparable damage-harm 4 0 14 18 
Speech as a public employee 0 6 11 17 
Disruption of university operations 0 1 11 12 
Status quo 0 0 11 11 
Matter of public concern 0 0 6 6 
Reinstatement to the University 0 0 6 6 
Immunity of public official 0 0 3 3 
Totals by court or brief 12 65 108 185 
To validate the theme ranking, the researcher developed two queries to determine 
the most frequently used words in all of the opinions and brief. The usage of each word 
was reviewed and assigned to each of the above themes. The first query scanned word 
frequency across all the court opinions to identify the 50 most prevalent, three or more 
letter keywords. Each keyword’s contextual usage in each court opinion was analyzed to 
determine whether the individual keyword was significant or required one or more 




keywords utilized the theme title or words within the title and were added to the list of 
keywords or phrases. The keywords and two or more word phrases were aligned with 
each theme and used in a second text search query across all the opinions to determine 
the number of references in each court opinion and compared to the theme coding 
hierarchy to validate them. 
Of the original 50 keywords queried, 30 remained relevant to the analysis and 20 
were dropped due to irrelevance, vagueness, or lack specificity. Five of the remaining 
keywords were used individually or combined with NVivo search wildcards (~, *) to 
reduce redundancy. Twenty-five were combined into phrases consisting of two or more 
keywords. Each keyword and phrase was aligned with one of the 10 themes and used in 
the second word search query to count the number of times the words or phrases were 
referenced in each opinion. Each occurrence in each opinion was reviewed to eliminate 
redundancy and duplication of reference counts. Where redundancy was found, the 
query was refined and rerun. The query results were tabulated by court opinion and 







Keywords and Phrases Totaled Theme and Court Cases or Brief and Sorted by Theme 









Academic freedom Academic freedom, 
Keyishian, protected speech, 
special concern 








success on merit, injunctive 
relief, standard, disfavor* 
20 4 69 93 
First amendment First amendment, right to 
free speech, constitutional 
0 44 24 68 
Irreparable damage-
harm 
Irreparable harm, irreparable 
injury 
2 0 24 26 
Public concern Public concern, public 
interest, Pickering 
0 0 23 23 
Status quo Status quo 0 0 22 22 




0 1 17 18 
Speech as a public 
employee 
Public employee, university 
professor, department chair 




Negative impact, interest of 
employer, university’s 
interest, disrupt* 
0 1 14 15 
Reinstatement to 
the University 
Reinstat* 0 0 9 9 
The theme rankings in Table 6.1 and 6.2 were compared to validate the hierarchy 
of the themes and identify anomalies. As indicated in the tables, the four most prevalent 
themes in descending order were First Amendment, academic freedom, preliminary, 
mandatory, permanent injunction, and irreparable damage-harm. To determine the linear 
relationship between each of these themes, a Pearson correlation coefficient of word 




the First Amendment and academic freedom themes (0.96865) and the preliminary, 
mandatory, permanent injunction and irreparable damage-harm themes (0.83195).  
Table 6.3 












First Amendment 1.00000 0.96865 0.63081 0.63081 
Academic freedom 0.96865 1.00000 0.55715 0.64768 
Preliminary, mandatory, 
permanent injunction 0.63081 0.55715 1.00000 0.83195 
Irreparable damage-harm 0.74335 0.64768 0.83195 1.00000 
These themes are discussed based on the order provided in Table 6.4. Figure 6.1 presents 
a line graph of Table 6.4’s coded references in order to illustrate the prevalence of each 
theme as it proceeded through the court system. 
Table 6.4 








First Amendment 0 27 16 43 
Academic Freedom 0 30 5 35 
Preliminary, Mandatory, Permanent Injunction 8 1 25 34 
Irreparable Damage-Harm 4 0 14 18 






Figure 6.1. Four Most Prevalent Themes Based on Coded References  
 First Amendment. The dominant theme was First Amendment. The theme 
concentrated on Schrier’s right to speak freely as a faculty member and administrator 
against the relocation of the university’s medical college. Forty-three references were 
coded from the opinions and brief with 0, 27, and 16 in the district court, amicus brief, 
and court of appeals respectively. Based on a matrix coding query of all themes and 
reference coding bands within the opinions and brief, the theme overlapped the 
academic freedom, speech as a public employee, irreparable damage, and disruption of 
university operations themes 29, 16, 6, and 6 times respectively. Table 6.5 provides the 
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each court opinion and brief showing how these four themes relate to the First 
Amendment theme. 
Table 6.5 










Academic freedom 0 24 5 29 
Speech as a public employee 0 9 7 16 
Disruption of university operations 0 1 5 6 
Preliminary, mandatory, permanent injunction 0 1 5 6 
  
District court. The district court did not discuss Schrier’s First Amendment 
rights, but did discuss Shrier’s request to combine their hearing on his motions for 
preliminary and permanent injunctions. The court determined that Schrier could not 
succeed based on the merit of his case and the motion was denied.  
Amicus brief. Amici focused on the court’s continued support of academic 
freedom as a special concern of the First Amendment. They requested that the court of 
appeals “acknowledge Schrier’s right to academic freedom [and urged them] to reject 
the district court’s holding that no First Amendment right to academic freedom exists” 
(American Association of University Professors, 2003, p. 3). Amici reiterated the district 
court’s statement that “academic freedom is not a subset of the First Amendment, 
separate and distinct from the fundamental right of free speech” (p. 4). Amici argued 
that the statement ignored holdings by the Supreme Court in Sweezy (1957), Shelton 
(1960), Keyesian (1967), Bakke (1978), Ewing (1985), and, most recently, Grutter 




expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment, 
universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition” (p. 3) and those made 
by this court of appeals. Amici acknowledged that academic freedom is not absolute. 
They argued that the district court  
did not examine Dr. Schrier’s actual comments on the relocation of the 
University’s medical school and hospital to determine the extent to which his 
statements were a reflection of his academic and professional views as opposed 
to a purely administrative refusal to execute a task properly assigned to him in 
his role as department chair. Instead, the court failed even to recognize that 
academic freedom is a special concern of the First Amendment. (p. 14) 
In conclusion, Amici requested the court of appeals to reject the district court’s “holding 
that no right to academic freedom exists under the First Amendment” (p. 14) irrespective 
of their decision concerning Schrier’s injunctive relief.  
Court of appeals. The court of appeals discussed Shrier’s First Amendment 
rights in the context of his termination as department chair for his public speech against 
the relocation of the university’s Health Sciences Center and the disruption caused to 
university operations by that speech. Judge Seymour used the 4-prong test in Pickering 
to determine whether Schrier’s speech was protected as a matter of public concern 
(Schrier, 2005). He added that, “[if his] commentary regarding the Fitzsimons move 
cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is 
unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for [his] discharge” (p. 16). Seymour agreed 
with the lower court’s finding that his speech addressed a matter of public concern 
stating that “Schrier’s speech addressing the use of public funds and regarding the 




[fell] well within the rubric of matters of public concern” (p. 18). As such, he satisfied 
the first prong of the Pickering test. 
The second prong of the test required the court to weigh “the interest of a public 
employee in commenting on such matters [against] the interest of the employer in 
promoting the efficiency of its services” (p. 18). To satisfy the second prong, the 
university had to demonstrate actual disruption of operations as a result of Schrier’s 
speech. Previous testimony showed that Schrier “spoke out against and did everything 
he could to undermine the move from the date the possibility of the move was first 
discussed until he was removed as department chair” (p. 20).  
The record [provided] evidence to support the determination that Dr. Schrier’s 
protected speech impaired harmony among coworkers, detrimentally impacted 
close working relationships within the School of Medicine, impaired his 
performance as department chair, and interfered with the University’s ability to 
implement the move to Fitzsimons. (p. 21) 
Seymour stated that, “[u]nder these circumstances, it was reasonable for the University 
to conclude that…Schrier’s speech, including the manner in which he expressed himself 
to others, was having a negative impact both on his performance and on the University’s 
operations” (p. 22). As such, Schrier did not pass the second prong of the test. 
 Finally, Shrier claimed that the “university violated his right to academic 
freedom, a right he contended is afforded special constitutional significance” (p. 22). 
Seymour stated that, “the court expressly refused to endorse any suggestion that speech 
in an academic setting concerning the operations of a university enjoys greater 
constitutional protection than does political speech in the public forum” (pp. 22-23). He 




right of academic freedom not enjoyed by other governmental employees” (p. 24) which 
creates an inequity among citizens. He held that Schrier had failed to provide substantial 
evidence that he could succeed on his request for a preliminary injunction and upheld 
the lower court decision on Schrier’s First Amendment claims. 
 Academic freedom. The second most prevalent theme was academic freedom. 
As was true with the First Amendment theme, academic freedom concentrated on 
Schrier’s right to speak freely as a faculty member and public employee on university 
matters. Thirty-five references were coded from the opinions and brief with 0, 30, and 5 
in the district court, amicus brief, and court of appeals respectively. Based on a matrix 
coding query of all themes and reference coding bands within the opinions and brief, the 
theme overlapped the academic freedom, irreparable damage, preliminary, mandatory, 
permanent injunction, and disruption of university operations themes 29, 3, 3, and 2 
times respectively. Table 6.6 provides the results of the query for each opinion and brief. 
The analysis includes examples from each court opinion and brief showing how these 
four themes relate to the academic freedom theme. 
Table 6.6 










First Amendment 0 24 5 29 
Speech as a public employee 0 10 2 12 
Irreparable damage-harm 0 0 3 3 





District court. The district court did not discuss Schrier’s academic freedom, but 
did discuss Shrier’s request to combine the hearing on his motions for preliminary and 
permanent injunctions.  
Amicus brief. Amici focused on Schier’s role as a faculty member and 
department chair to speak on issues related to his department. Amici’s concern related 
specifically to the district court’s determination that “Schrier’s status as a university 
professor who serve[d] as a department chair entitled him to no rights distinctive from 
those of any other public employee” (American Association of University Professors, 
2003, p. 3). Amici added that, because Schrier’s comments were not examined “to 
determine the extent to which his statements reflected his academic views” (p. 4) as 
opposed to his administrative views as department chair, the district court held that he 
did “not have a First Amendment right to academic freedom” (p. 2). While “the right to 
academic freedom is not an absolute right any more than freedom of speech is itself an 
exclusive value prized literally above all else” (p. 11), amici stated that “the courts have 
still required the government to satisfy a high standard before it may abridge the 
academic freedom of a professor or university” (p. 13). As such, amici requested “that 
the Court reject the district court’s holding that no right to academic freedom exists 
under the First Amendment” (p. 15) and uphold the court’s recognition of academic 
freedom as a special concern of the First Amendment.  
Court of appeals. The court of appeals discussed Schrier’s academic freedom in 
relation to his public statements as a faculty member and department chair. Schrier 




is afforded ‘special constitutional significance’” (p. 22) and retaliated by dismissing him 
from his department chair position. Judge Seymour restated the district court’s refusal 
“to endorse any suggestion that speech in an academic setting concerning the operations 
of a university enjoys greater constitutional protection than…political speech in the 
public forum” (pp. 22-23). He agreed, stating that, “an independent right to academic 
freedom does not arise under the First Amendment without reference to the attendant 
right of free expression” (p. 23). He added that, “Schrier’s argument implies that 
professors possess a special constitutional right of academic freedom not enjoyed by 
other governmental employees [and declined] to construe the First Amendment in a 
manner that would promote such inequality among similarly situated citizen” (p. 24). As 
such, he upheld the lower court’s findings and rejected Schrier’s request for a 
preliminary injunction due to his failure to demonstrate success on his First Amendment 
and academic freedom claim. 
Preliminary, mandatory, permanent injunction. The third most prevalent theme 
was preliminary, mandatory, permanent injunction. Preliminary, mandatory, permanent 
injunction focused on Schrier’s motion to be reinstated to his department chair position 
by court order temporarily until the court made a decision. Thirty-three references were 
coded from the opinions and brief with 8, 0, and 25 in the district court, amicus brief, 
and court of appeals respectively. Based on a matrix coding query of all themes and 
reference coding bands within the opinions and brief, the theme overlapped the 
irreparable damage, status quo, First Amendment, and reinstatement to the University 




each opinion and brief. The analysis includes examples from each court opinion and 
brief showing how these four themes relate to the preliminary, mandatory, permanent 
injunction theme. 
Table 6.7 
Matrix Coding of Four Prevalent Themes That Overlap the Preliminary, Mandatory, 










Irreparable Damage-Harm 2 0 6 8 
Status Quo 0 0 7 7 
First Amendment 0 0 5 5 
Reinstatement to the University 0 0 4 4 
 
District court. The district court reviewed Schrier’s motion for preliminary 
injunctive relief. Judge Krieger instructed Judge Borland to consolidate Shrier’s motion 
with the proceeding for a permanent injunction. Borland denied Shier’s motion “citing 
the existence of issues of fact to be tried by a jury and stating that no further 
recommendation concerning [Shrier’s] right to a permanent injunction is possible or 
appropriate” (Schrier, 2005, p. 1). Kreiger ordered that the proceeding be deferred 
pending consideration by a jury. 
Amicus brief. Amici focused on academic freedom and the First Amendment. 
Amici discussed Shrier’s injunctions in closing only to say that they left it to the trial 
courts to determine based on the factual record (American Association of University 




Court of appeals. Judge Seymour stated that, “the limited purpose of a 
preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a 
trial on the merits can be held” (Schrier, 2005, p. 8). Seymour provided the four factors 
of the heavy and compelling standard that Shrier must satisfy in order to be successful. 
(1) [he or she] will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction issues; (2) the 
threatened injury…outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may 
cause the opposing party; (3) the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to 
the public interest; and (4) there is a substantial likelihood [of success] on the 
merits. (p. 7) 
Because the preliminary injunction enforced by the court could be considered 
disfavorable, Seymour listed the three types as “(1) preliminary injunctions that alter the 
status quo; (2) mandatory preliminary injunctions; and (3) preliminary injunctions that 
afford the movant all the relief that it could recover at the conclusion of a full trial on the 
merits” (p. 9) and described each.  
The university argued that any injunction to reinstate Schrier would be disruptive 
and “place the court in a position where it may have to provide supervision” (p. 10). To 
answer the university’s argument, Seymour had to determine whether “Schrier’s 
requested reinstatement as Chair disturb[ed] the status quo and/or [was] mandatory, or 
merely preserve[d] the status quo and [was] prohibitory” (p. 10). He added that to 
determine “the status quo for preliminary injunctions, this court look[ed] to the reality of 
the existing status and relationship between the parties and not solely to the parties’ legal 
rights” (p. 10). Seymour agreed with the lower court’s conclusions and found (a) that 
Shrier’s request sought “to preserve rather than disrupt the status quo” (p. 11), (b) that 




supervision” (p. 12), (c) that the “relief sought here was properly characterized as 
mandatory and, therefore, disfavored [and (d) that the lower court’s] application of the 
heavily and compelling standard was, as it turns out, erroneous” (p. 13) as they are no 
longer recognized by the tenth circuit. As such, Seymour evaluated Shrier’s request on 
its merits to determine whether the case should be remanded based his irreparable injury 
claims. 
After review, Seymour determined that the claims would not succeed on their 
merits. To be successful, the irreparable harm or injury “must be certain, great, actual 
and not theoretical” (p. 25). Seymour stated that Schrier “failed to [provide evidence 
that] he suffered irreparable injury as a result of defendants’ actions [and] to demonstrate 
the requisite likelihood of success on his free speech and academic freedom claims” (p. 
24). Without the ability to find irreparable harm, Seymour affirmed the lower court’s 
decision and denied Schrier’s request for preliminary injunction. 
 Irreparable harm. The irreparable harm theme focused on Schrier’s claim of 
injury resulting from his dismissal as a department chair and the effect it had on his 
reputation and credibility as a faculty member at the university. Eighteen references 
were coded from the opinions and brief with 4, 0, and 14 in the district court, amicus 
brief, and court of appeals respectively. Based on a matrix coding query of all themes 
and reference coding bands within the opinions and brief, the theme overlapped the 
preliminary, mandatory, permanent injunction, First Amendment, and academic freedom 




each opinion and brief. The analysis includes examples from each court opinion and 
brief showing how these four themes relate to the academic freedom theme. 
Table 6.8 










Preliminary, Mandatory, Permanent Injunction 2 0 6 8 
First Amendment 0 0 6 6 
Academic Freedom 0 0 3 3 
 
District court. The district court reviewed Schrier’s motion for preliminary 
injunctive relief in the context of the irreparable harm that he suffered. Judge Krieger 
found that Shrier “fail[ed] to show irreparable injury, in the sense that his removal as 
Chair during the time it will take to litigate this case would have an irreparable effect” 
(Schrier, 2005, p. 1).  Kreiger ordered the proceeding to be deferred pending 
consideration by a jury. 
Amicus brief. Amici did not discuss the irreparable harm Schrier claimed that he 
had suffered. 
Court of appeals. The court of appeals reviewed Schrier’s claim within the scope 
of his motion for preliminary injunction as injunctive relief. Schrier argued that “he 
suffered irreparable injury through the loss of academic prestige, standing, or reputation” 
(Schrier, 2005, p. 25) from the dismissal. Judge Seymour reiterated that the lower court 
“concluded Dr. Schrier failed to show he suffered irreparable injury as a result of 




to constitute irreparable harm, an injury must be certain, great, actual and not 
theoretical [and that] Schier must show that the injury complained of is of such 
imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief to prevent 
irreparable harm. (pp. 25-26) 
Seymour found that “Shrier made no attempt to apprise this court of any evidence in the 
record showing actual or significant risk of loss of prestige, academic reputation or 
professional opportunities” (p. 27). As such, Seymour concluded that Schrier had 
suffered no irreparable damage or injury. 
Summary 
 Dr. Schrier was unsuccessful in receiving any type of injunctive relief for his 
First Amendment, breach of contract, or irreparable harm claims. In denying his claims, 
the court stated, “Schrier’s argument implie[d] that professors possess a special 
constitutional right of academic freedom not enjoyed by other governmental employees” 
(Schrier, 2005, p. 13). As such, the court “declin[ed] to construe the First Amendment in 
a manner that would promote…inequality among similarly situated citizens (p. 13). As 
courts have been reluctant to interfere with academic and professional decisions, the 
ruling affirmed the university’s right to control and discipline faculty for their speech 
when it is found to be disruptive to the university’s operations. As faculty are expected 
to serve on committees and contribute to their department to gain tenure, the ruling 
could have the unanticipated effect of silencing discussion on university issues and 
chilling faculty speech. 
On January 9, 2007, Schrier reached a settlement with prejudice with the 
University of Colorado. In the 2007, the university faculty newspaper, the Silver and 




Under the terms of the settlement, CU will pay $300,000 to Schrier to partially 
reimburse him for attorney’s fees he has incurred. The School of Medicine also 
will fund a sepsis-related acute renal failure research grant, previously funded by 
the National Institutes of Health, for $250,000 a year for three years, beginning 
Jan. 1, 2007, and ending Dec. 31, 2009. Each year, $50,000 of those grant funds 
will go to support Schrier’s salary. If Schrier’s employment ends before the grant 
term is up, the school will continue to fund the grant as long as the division can 
find another faculty member willing to serve as the principal investigator and to 
continue the research at its existing level for the remainder of the three years, 
according to the settlement. (p. 1) 
Under the settlement agreement, Schrier’s base salary compensation will be set 
at the standard base for incoming professors (currently approximately $94,000). 
However, his salary will be guaranteed by CU through Dec. 31, 2010, at 
$328,364 a year, according to the agreement. After that, Schrier’s compensation 
will consist of his base pay, plus whatever additional moneys are appropriate, 
based on the level of grants and other funding Schrier generates. (p. 1) 
The settlement agreement also required Krugman to issue a public letter of apology. The 
letter, dated Jan. 8 and signed by Krugman, stated that “the litigation between the 
University of Colorado and Dr. Robert Schrier surrounding his termination as chairman 
of the department of medicine has been settled” (p. 1). As of 2012, Dr. Robert Schrier is 






Chapter Seven: Hong v. Grant 
Background 
The University of California at Irvine (UCI) is a public research university and 
academic institution. UCI is part of the University of California System and “receives 
public funding from the state of California to support its core mission of teaching, 
research and public service” (Hong, 2007, p. 3). The university system utilizes a shared 
governance structure that includes the Board of Regents, University President, and 
faculty “in a wide array of academic, administrative and personnel functions including 
departmental governance, the approval of course content and manner of instruction, 
appointment and promotion of faculty, and faculty and student discipline” (p. 3). 
Through the Academic Senate, the faculty advises the university on each of these 
functions and plays an essential role in the system’s shared governance process. 
Dr. Juan Hong was hired in 1987 and is currently a full professor in the 
Department of Chemical and Biochemical Engineering and Material Science at the 
University of California at Irvine (UCI). As a UCI faculty member, Hong was expected 
to participate in shared governance through “a peer-review process that evaluates faculty 
members seeking appointment and promotion within his department” (pp. 3-4). Hong 
stated  
that it is his obligation and responsibility as a faculty member to meaningfully 
review a candidate’s file and provide candid and honest feedback [and] that, 
when voting against a candidate’s appointment or promotion, he is expected to 
submit a brief memorandum of dissent describing the rationale behind his 





He contended that his participation in the shared governance process and his questioning 
of departmental decisions, which included faculty promotions, faculty merit increases, 
the staffing of sections with transient lecturers, and the extension “of an informal offer 
prior to full faculty approval” (p. 5) resulted in his merit increase being denied and his 
Constitutional free speech rights being violated. 
In 2002, Hong participated in a peer review of Professor Ying Chang. “While 
Professor Chang’s file was under review, Mr. Hong learned of a rumor that Professor 
Chang failed to disclose a financial conflict of interest when she first sought 
appointment at UCI in May 2001” (p. 4). Hong contended that Chang improperly 
acquired a grant from UC-SMART, a research grant program operated by the University 
of California at Berkeley, for $400,000. Hong believed that, because her “husband’s 
company allegedly donated $200,000 in equipment, qualifying Professor Chang for a 
$200,000 matching grant from UC-SMART” (p. 4), the grant was not earned through 
accepted channels of competition. Hong provided this information to the review 
committee and asked for permission from the Chair of the Department of Chemical 
Engineering and Materials Science to do further investigation. After investigation, Hong 
asked the dean for the status of Chang’s review and was told the she had resigned. 
Despite her resignation, Hong drafted a letter of dissent to Chang’s initial review and 
asked that it be “included in Professor Chang’s file and sought to have it forwarded to 





In March 2003, Hong questioned the department’s use of lecturers to teach six of 
eight Materials department sections in the spring class schedule as opposed to using 
tenured faculty. He “was concerned that departmental resources were used to pay 
lecturers despite the availability of capable, salaried professors [and] felt it was the 
department’s obligation to its students to staff courses with experienced faculty, rather 
than younger, transient lecturers” (p. 4). After investigation, Dean Grant reported that 
his office would be paying the lecturers salaries and that he would be reviewing the use 
of lecturers with each department in the future. Hong followed up with two more 
“requests for information about the lecturer assignments, citing abnormalities in 
staffing” (p. 5). 
 In October 2003, Hong participated in the review of “Professor Farghalli 
Mohammed’s application for an accelerated merit increase” (p. 5). Hong contended that, 
“Professor Mohammed improperly included two non-UCI PhD students in his list of 
doctoral candidates under supervision and that [he] improperly listed two academic 
papers presented at conferences” (p. 5). He reported to the committee that Mohammed’s 
“disingenuous presentation of academic credentials raised legitimate concerns about his 
integrity” (p. 5). Even though Hong voted against the application, Mohammed was 
approved and he in turn sent an email to departmental faculty thanking them for their 
support. In response, “Hong charged that Mr. Grant, Vice Provost for Academic 
Personnel, Herbert Killackey, and unnamed persons in the Dean’s office improperly 
manipulated Professor Mohammed’s review process and that further investigation was 




 Finally, in March 2004, Department Chair Grant announced “that Dr. Regina 
Ragan had accepted an informal offer of employment as an Assistant Professor, and that 
a full vote on her appointment would occur at an upcoming faculty meeting” (p. 5). 
Hong contended that the appointment prior to faculty approval violated “faculty right [in 
the] self-governance process to determine ‘who can teach, who can do creative research, 
[and] who can serve in the community and university’” (p. 5). Hong charged Grant and 
the Engineering School Dean Nicolaos Alexopoulo had made an improper offer of 
employment to Ragan and “urged Executive Vice Chancellor Michael R. Gottfredsen to 
investigate” (p. 5). 
 In 2003, Hong was scheduled for a routine merit increase but requested a one-
year deferral and applied in September 2004. His application listed no extramural 
research grants received, his peer-reviewed publications rated ‘average’ and ‘minimal,’ 
and he did not list any achievements under ‘Professional Recognition and Activity,’ 
‘Honors, Awards, Election,’ ‘Contracts, Grants or Fellowships,’ ‘Other Professional 
Service,’ or under a number of other categories” (p. 5). In January 2005, the faculty 
committee denied his merit increase citing that “his research activities [were] not at the 
level commensurate with the rank of Full Professor, Step IV” (p. 5). “Hong’s merit 
increase application was reviewed and evaluated by a number of UCI administrators 
including Mr. Alexopoulos, Associate Dean William Schmitendorf, Chair of the 
Academic Senate Counsel on Academic Personnel John Hemminger, and [Executive 
Vice Chancellor Michael R.] Gottfredsen” (pp. 5-6). In March 2005, Gottfredsen 




Alexopoulos work with Hong to develop a remediation plan and that Hong’s teaching 
load be increased “in light of his decreased scholarly contributions” (p. 6). In response to 
Grottfredsen’s memorandum, Hong asserted that he was a victim of illegal retaliation for 
his criticisms of departmental practices. 
After receiving no response from Grottfredsen, Hong filed a complaint with the 
university. He claimed 
whistleblower retaliation complaint with Assistant Executive Vice Chancellor 
Michael Arias on November 1, 2005. The complaint was ultimately rejected 
because [Hong’s] merit action was initiated and completed in March 2005, well 
before the April 2005 whistleblower complaint on April 25, 2005. (p. 6)  
Arias also determined that there was ample evidence to support Grottfedsen’s 
recommendation. In response, Hong “filed the instant action pro se in the United States 
District Court for the Central District of California on February 8, 2006 alleging he was 
the victim of illegal retaliation for exercising his rights under the First Amendment to 
speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern” (p. 6). 
The Defendants in the case are UCI administrators, Deans, and department 
heads. They include  
Stanley Grant, Chemical Engineering and Materials Department Chair; William 
Schmitendorf, Associate Dean of the School of Engineering; Nicolaos 
Alexopoulos, Dean of the School of Engineering; John Hemminger, Chair of the 
Academic Senate Council on Academic Personnel; Herbert P. Killackey, Vice 
Provost for Academic Personnel; and, Michael R. Gottfredsen, Provost and 
Executive Vice Chancellor of UCI. (p. 3)  
They contended that Hong’s statements were not protected speech under the First 




Amendment provided immunity to public institutions, the Board of Regents and Dr. 
Grottfredsen and barred the awarding of damages to the Plaintiff (Hong, 2007). 
Court Opinions and Brief 
 The Hong case began in the U.S. district court in September 2007 and ended in 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in November 2010. Hong claimed that his 
First Amendment rights had been violated. In using the Garcetti/Pickering analysis, the 
court found that Hong spoke pursuant to his job responsibilities and that the university 
had a right to control his speech even if it was on “matter of public concern.” The court 
stated,  
restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional 
responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed 
as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what 
the employer itself has commissioned or created. (Hong, 2007, p. 7)  
Adding,  
anything less than unfettered employer control over speech within an employee’s 
official duties would displace managerial discretion for judicial supervision, 
requiring permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of governmental 
operations. (p. 7) 
The district court granted the university’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. On appeal, the court affirmed the district 
court’s decision and found that, because the university was “entitled to immunity from 
Hong’s claims, [they need not proceed to the merits of [Hong’s] First Amendment 
argument” (Hong, 2010, p. 2). Hong’s appeal to the Supreme Court of California was 




 District Court for the Central District of California. On February 8, 2006, Dr. 
Hong “filed the instant action pro se in the United States District Court for the Central 
District of California alleging he was the victim of illegal retaliation for exercising his 
rights under the First Amendment to speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern” 
(Hong, 2007, p. 5). The Defendants denied violating Dr. Hong’s rights as they claimed 
that his speech was not protected and moved for summary judgment on the grounds of 
the Eleventh Amendment. U.S. District Judge Cormac J. Carney wrote the opinion of the 
court. 
 Judge Carney reviewed Hong’s free speech rights based on the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos. In Ceballos, the Supreme Court held that the 
memoranda prepared by the supervising district attorney were “not protected by the First 
Amendment as they were prepared pursuant to his official job duties, not as a private 
citizen” (p. 6). The court stated, 
Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional 
responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed 
as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what 
the employer itself has commissioned or created. (p. 6) 
The court added,  
Allowing anything less than unfettered employer control over speech within an 
employee’s official duties would "displace managerial discretion for judicial 
supervision," requiring "permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of 
governmental operations. (p. 6) 
As such, Carney began his analysis stating that “[p]ublic employees do not enjoy the 
same First Amendment freedoms as do private citizens” (Hong, 2007, p. 6). Carney 




that would be plainly unconstitutional if applied to the public at large” (p. 6). He 
asserted that the employer’s right to restrict employee speech was based not only on the 
employee’s job description, which defined official job duties but also “on any activity 
within an employee’s uncontested employment responsibilities” (p. 6). These included 
any activities that enhanced or affected the employee’s ability to perform his or her job. 
“Internal complaints about the employer’s supervisory failures or workplace 
mismanagement [were] consistent with the type of activities the employee [was] 
professionally obligated to perform” (p. 6) and, therefore, part of his or her official job 
duties. 
To decide whether his speech was protected, Carney reviewed each of Hong’s 
four incidents “regarding faculty performance reviews, departmental staffing, and 
faculty hiring” (p. 8) to determine if his statements and communications were made 
"pursuant to his official duties [and responsibilities] as a UCI faculty member” (p. 7). As 
a faculty member, Carney stated that Hong’s duties were “not limited to classroom 
instruction and professional research [but] include[d] a wide range of academic, 
administrative and personnel functions in accordance with UCI’s self- governance 
principle” ( p. 7) to which he was expected to provide feedback. In each of the four 
incidents, Carney found that Hong’s statements “were made pursuant to his official job 
duties as a faculty member and, therefore, do deserve First Amendment protection” (p. 
7). Carney determined that UCI’s regulation of his speech as an employee did not 




Finally, Carney reviewed Hong’s comments in the context of whether they were 
made as a matter of public concern and protected by the First Amendment. Hong argued 
that his comments deserved protection because they “exposed government waste and 
mismanagement” (p. 7). Based on Connick, “[i]f employee statements cannot fairly be 
considered as relating to any matter of political, social or other concern to the 
community, the statements are not constitutionally protected speech” (p. 8). Carney 
determined that Hong’s communications and statements were internal departmental 
complaints and not a matter of public concern or protected (Hong, 2007). While Hong 
argued that the inner workings of the university are a public interest, Carney contended 
that the university had not been implicated for matters of public concern such as 
malfeasance, corruption, or fraud. Absent these implications, Carney concluded that the 
federal courts were ill-equipped to handle the “endless judicial supervision of the 
decisions university administrators must make on a daily basis to ensure the efficient and 
effective management of their institution [as they] oversee these purely institutional 
decisions” (p. 9). The court added “that it was not qualified to second guess the wisdom 
of the university’s practices and that it was required to allow university administrators 
wide latitude in managing the university’s affairs in order to accomplish the university’s 
educational and research mission” (p. 3).   
Based on the Garcetti standard, the court found that Hong’s communication and 
speech concerning hiring, tenure, promotion, and merit were made by a public employee 
as part of his official duties and not as a private citizen. The court also found that these 




held that the Hong’s speech was not protected and granted summary judgment to the 
Defendants. 
 Amicus brief. On March 17, 2008, the Thomas Jefferson Center for the 
Protection of Free expression and the American Association of University Professors 
(AAUP) filed an Amicus Curiae brief with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit. Amici argued that the district court “misconceived the nature of university 
scholarship and the roles and responsibilities of those who educate the vast majority 
of this nation’s college students” (The Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of 
Free Expression, 2008, p. 4). Amici added that,  
[t]o equate faculty participation in matters of shared university governance 
with routine tasks that a conventional government employee “was employed 
to do,” as District Court clearly did in this case, disregards the clear import of a 
half century of constitutional judgment recognizing First Amendment protection 
of academic freedom. (p. 4) 
Amici concluded that using the Garcetti standard for university professors would 
“threaten [the] principles of academic freedom and free expression within the 
university” (p. 4). Amici requested that the district court’s decision be reversed because 
(a) the district court misapplied Garcetti when they “classif[ied] classroom instruction 
and professional research as official duties” (p. 5) and (b) the district court disregarded 
and undermined the basic principles of academic freedom when they “misconceived the 
nature of shared governance and its relationship to academic freedom in denying First 
Amendment protection to [Hong’s] speech” (p. 5). Amici continued with a discussion of 




 First, amici noted that the Supreme Court in Garcetti ruled that public employees 
no longer have First Amendment protections for statements made as part of their official 
job duties. Concerning faculty, Justice Kennedy’s reservation and concerns in his 
dissenting opinion in Garcetti noted that, “there is some argument that expression 
related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional 
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by the Court’s customary 
employee speech jurisprudence” (p. 5). In response, the Garcetti majority stated that “we 
need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct today 
would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or 
teaching” (p. 6). Amici argued that the expression made by Hong concerning “the 
qualifications of two faculty members and the excessive reliance of part-time staff [were 
directly] related to academic scholarship and classroom instruction” (p. 6) and, 
therefore, fell completely within the scope of Kennedy’s exception. As such, amici 
determined that the lower court failed “to recognize not only the unique nature of 
academic speech but also the connection between Hong’s criticisms and the [UCI’s] 
academic mission” (p. 7). 
 Amici added that the lower court ignored the premise upon which Kennedy’s 
exception existed. The court stated, “that internal complaints and supervisory 
mismanagement are within an employee’s official duties and not subject to First 
Amendment protections” (p. 8). Amici rebutted that Garcetti’s “concept of official 
duties that a public employee has been employed to do has no bearing on the role of a 




discretion and autonomy that find no parallel elsewhere in the public service” (p. 9). In 
doing so, amici concluded that the court failed to recognize the unique nature of 
academia and the faculty’s active role in university life.  
 Second, amici argued that the district court’s ruling disregarded and undermined 
the basic principles of academic freedom by ignoring the judicial deference provided to 
faculty “on matters that are committed to professional judgment and expertise” (p. 16). 
Amici stated that 
[t]he speech of university professors merits a special degree of protection not 
only to facilitate uninhibited pursuit of truth and advancement of knowledge but 
equally to encourage scholars to speak candidly and fearlessly as they convey 
sometimes unwelcome can unsettling truths to government and citizens.  (p. 16) 
If the District Court’s standard were to apply broadly to academic freedom, it 
would provide First Amendment protection only for statements that fall so far 
beyond the speakers field of expertise as to be valueless to the general public, 
lawmakers, and others who depend upon scholarly guidance and counsel. (p. 18)  
As such, amici asked the court of appeals to affirm the indivisibility of institutional 
governance and academic freedom and recognize that the lower court erred in equating 
classroom instruction and professional research with the official duties of a government 
employee. 
 Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit. The court of appeals reviewed the district 
court’s decision to grant summary judgment to the university. Judge O’Scannlain 
determined that, “[u]nder the Eleventh Amendment, the State of California and its 
official arms [UCI and its regents] are immune from suit [and] in their individual 
capacities are entitled to qualified immunity” (Hong, 2010, p. 2). Having ruled, 




the question of whether faculty speech such as Hong’s is protected under the First 
Amendment for consideration in another case” (p. 3) and affirmed the district court’s 
decision to grant summary judgment to the university. 
Analysis 
 The Hong case began in the district court in September 2007 and ended in the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit on November 2010 (39 months). The analysis 
of the district court opinion, amicus brief, and court of appeals opinion identified eight 
themes with 96, 119, and 6 coded references respectively for a total of 221 coded 
references. The themes, the corresponding number of coded references in each court 
opinion, and the total references for each theme are provided in Table 7.1. The themes 
are sorted by the total column from largest to smallest to illustrate a hierarchy of the 
most significant themes discussed across the court opinions and brief. 
Table 7.1 










Expression pursuant to official job duties 38 46 0 84 
Shared governance 14 18 0 32 
First Amendment 11 18 1 30 
Employer’s right to control speech 15 11 0 26 
Matter of public concern 9 8 0 17 
Academic freedom 2 16 0 18 
Immunity of public official 3 0 4 7 
Retaliation 4 2 1 7 




To validate the theme ranking, the researcher developed two queries to determine 
the most frequently used words in all the opinions and brief. The usage of each word 
was reviewed and assigned to each of the above themes. The first query scanned word 
frequency across all the court opinions to identify the 50 most prevalent, three or more 
letter keywords. Each keyword’s contextual usage in each court opinion was analyzed to 
determine whether the individual keyword was significant or required one or more 
adjacent words from the opinions to improve meaning. Themes with no applicable 
keywords utilized the theme title or words within the title and were added to the list of 
keywords or phrases. The keywords and two or more word phrases were aligned with 
each theme and used in a second text search query across all the opinions to determine 
the number of references in each court opinion and compared to the theme coding 
hierarchy to validate them. 
Of the original 50 keywords queried, 18 remained relevant to the analysis and 32 
were dropped due to irrelevance, vagueness, or lack of specificity. Six of the remaining 
keywords were used individually or combined with NVivo search wildcards (~, *) to 
reduce redundancy. Twelve were combined into phrases consisting of two of more 
keywords. Each keyword and phrase was aligned with one of the eight themes and used 
in the second word search query to count the number of times the words or phrases were 
referenced in each opinion. Each occurrence in each opinion was reviewed to eliminate 
redundancy and duplicity of reference counts. Where redundancy was found, the query 




descending order by total number of references for each theme. The results are provided 
in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2 
Keywords and Phrases Totaled Theme and Court Cases or Brief and Sorted by Theme 
















official duties, job duties, 
internal 
93 34 2 129 
First Amendment First Amendment, free 
speech, protected speech 
40 24 3 67 
Employer’s right to 
control employee 
speech 
Employer control, not 
protected, unprotected, 
Ceballos, Connick 
36 9 1 46 
Shared Governance Governance 13 23 0 36 




13 3 15 31 
Academic freedom Academic freedom 0 30 0 30 
Matter of public 
concern 
Public concern, public 
interest, Pickering 




Negative impact, interest of 
employer, university’s 
interest, disrupt* 
0 1 14 15 
Retaliation Retaliat*, adverse 10 1 1 12 
The theme rankings in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 were compared to validate the 
hierarchy of the themes and identify anomalies. As indicate in the tables, the four most 
prevalent themes were: expression pursuant to official duty and responsibilities, First 
Amendment, employer’s right to control employee speech, and shared governance. To 
determine the linear relationship between each of these themes, a Pearson correlation 
coefficient of word similarity was calculated as shown in Table 7.3. The highest 




governance themes (0.93046) and the expression pursuant to official job duties and 
employer’s right to control speech themes (0.88315).  
Table 7.3 











right to control 
speech 
Expression pursuant to official job 
duties 
1.00000 0.93046 0.87320 0.88315 
Shared governance 0.93046 1.00000 0.77851 0.74663 
First Amendment 0.87320 0.77851 1.00000 0.86964 
Employer’s right to control speech 0.88315 0.74663 0.86964 1.00000 
These themes are discussed based on the order provided in Table 7.4. Figure 7.1 presents 
a line graph of the coded references in Table 7.4, in order to illustrate each theme’s 
prevalence as it proceeded through the court system. 
Table 7.4 










Expression pursuant to official job 
duties 38 46 0 84 
Shared governance 14 18 0 32 
First Amendment 11 18 1 30 





Figure 7.1. Four Most Prevalent Themes Based on Coded References 
 Expression pursuant to official job duties. The dominant theme was 
expression pursuant to official job duties, and concentrated on Hong’s right to speak 
within his duties as a faculty member on issues related to faculty hiring, promotion, and 
staffing practices without fear of discipline by university administrators. Eighty-four 
references were coded from the opinions and brief with 38, 46, and 0 in the district 
court, amicus brief, and court of appeals respectively. Based on a matrix coding query of 
all themes and reference coding bands within the opinions and brief, the theme 































Expression pursuant to official job duties Shared governance 




and academic freedom themes 29, 24, 18, and 15 times respectively. Table 7.5 provides 
the results of the query for each opinion and brief. The analysis includes examples from 
each court opinion and brief showing how these four themes relate to the expression 
pursuant to official job duties theme. 
Table 7.5 
Matrix Coding of the Four Prevalent Themes That Overlap the Expression Pursuant to 










First Amendment 12 17 0 29 
Shared governance 8 16 0 24 
Employer’s right to control speech 9 9 0 18 
Academic freedom 2 13 0 15 
  
District court. The district court discussed Hong’s expression within the context 
of the university’s right to monitor and regulate public employee speech when it is part 
of his or her job responsibilities. Hong argued that, 
his First Amendment right to free speech was violated when he was denied a 
merit salary increase because of his critical statements regarding the hiring and 
promotion of other UCI professors as well as the use of lecturers to teach courses 
at the University. [The University denied] Hong’s criticisms had anything to do 
with the decision to deny his merit salary increase and, in any event, contend that 
his criticisms were not protected speech under the First Amendment. (Hong, 
20007, p. 3)  
In response, District Judge Carney stated that “public employees do not enjoy the same 
First Amendment freedoms as do private citizens [and that] a government employer may 
impose speech restrictions upon its employees that would be plainly unconstitutional if 




decision in [Garcetti], a public employer is extended unfettered discretion to regulate 
employee speech that it has commissioned or created” (p. 7) as part of their job duties or 
professional responsibilities “so long as its need for those restrictions is not outweighed 
by the interest of the employee in speaking as a private citizen on matters of public 
concern” (p. 6). To weigh Hong’s right to unfettered speech, Carney applied the Garcetti 
standard to review Hong’s statements to determine whether they were made within the 
context of his job responsibilities.  
Carney started with a review of the policies and procedures and their 
expectations of faculty at the University of California System and UCI. He found that  
a faculty member’s official duties are not limited to classroom instruction and 
professional research [which] include[d] a wide range of academic, 
administrative and personnel functions in accordance with UCI’s self- 
governance principle (providing for faculty involvement in departmental 
governance, the approval of course content and manner of instruction, 
appointment and promotion of faculty, and faculty and student discipline). (p. 8) 
These findings provided a basis for reviewing each of Hong’s four statements and his 
allegations of First Amendment violations and retaliation by the university for his 
speech as a faculty member.   
 After a review, Carney found that all of Hong’s statements concerning peer 
review, department staffing, supervisor mismanagement, and process were made within 
the jurisdiction of his job responsibilities and not by a private citizen on a matter of 
public concern. Carney stated that,  
[the] [f]our statements, which Mr. Hong alleges served as the basis for UCI’s 
illegal retaliation, were made pursuant to his official duties as a faculty member 
and therefore do not deserve First Amendment protection. UCI is entitled to 
unfettered discretion when it restricts statements an employee makes on the job 




speech does not strip Mr. Hong of any liberties he enjoys as a private citizen. (p. 
11) 
Carney added that the “[c]ourt is not qualified to second guess the wisdom of UCI’s 
practices in this regard and it must allow University administrators wide latitude in 
managing its affairs if UCI is to accomplish its very important educational and research 
mission” (p. 3). As such, Carney rejected Hong’s allegations and ruled in favor of the 
university.  
Amicus brief. Amici reviewed Hong’s speech as protected based on the Supreme 
Court’s special concern for academic freedom under the First Amendment. They 
contended that “the [district court] fundamentally misconceived the nature of university 
scholarship and the roles and responsibilities of [faculty]” (The Thomas Jefferson Center 
for the Protection of Free Expression, 2009, p. 4) and added that “any attempt to apply 
the Garcetti standard to state university professors…would severely threaten basic 
principles of academic freedom and free expression within the university community” 
(p. 4). Amici discussed the court’s application of Garcetti and its effect on academic 
freedom and shared governance at public universities. 
Amici reviewed the Supreme Court’s cautions in applying Garcetti in an 
academic environment. They reminded the Court that the Garcetti 
“majority…recognized that we need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the 
analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech 
related to scholarship or teaching” (p. 6). Amici argued that Hong’s statements reflected 
both his responsibilities as a UCI faculty member and his academic experience and 




the court erred, in failing to recognize not only the unique nature of academic 
speech, but also the connection between the criticism for which Professor Hong 
was punished and the academic mission.  The court’s assumption that “a faculty 
member’s official duties” include “classroom instruction and professional 
research” for the purpose of post-Garcetti First Amendment protection (or lack 
thereof) is simply incorrect in light of Justice Kennedy’s reservation of the issue 
of  ‘speech related to scholarship or teaching’ [and UCI policy]. (p. 7)   
Based on these reservations, amici concluded that “Garcetti’s core concept of official 
responsibilities that a public employee has been employed to do simply has no bearing 
upon the role of a state university teacher and scholar” (p. 9). Amici added,  
[i]f every such activity were deemed an unprotected “official duty” simply 
because it fell within the very broad range of professorial prerogatives, the scope 
of Garcetti’s curb on First Amendment protection would be far broader for 
professors than even for the general run of government workers. (p. 13) 
It would mean that the courts “would provide First Amendment protection only for 
statements that fall so far beyond the speaker’s field of expertise as to be valueless to the 
general public, lawmakers, and others who depend upon scholarly guidance and 
counsel” (p. 18). As such, amici urged the court of appeals to “recognize that the District 
Court…erred by suggesting that classroom instruction and professional research are 
within the category of official duties left unprotected by the First Amendment after the 
[Garcetti] decision” (p. 19) and reverse the judgment of the lower court. 
Court of appeals. The court of appeals did not discuss Hong’s expression 
pursuant to his job duties. Judges O’Scannlain, Gould, and Ikuta ruled only on the 
University’s motion for summary judgment.  
 Shared Governance. The shared governance theme focused on Hong’s 
responsibilities as a University of California faculty member to be directly involved in 




Thirty-two references were coded from the opinions and brief with 14, 18, and 0 in the 
district court, amicus brief, and court of appeals respectively. Based on a matrix coding 
query of all themes and reference coding bands within the opinions and brief, the theme 
overlapped the expression pursuant to official job duties, academic freedom, and First 
Amendment themes 24, 8, and 7 times respectively. Table 7.6 provides the results of the 
query for each opinion and brief. The analysis includes examples from the opinions and 
brief showing how these four themes relate to the shared governance theme. 
Table 7.6 











Expression pursuant to official job duties 8 16 0 24 
Academic Freedom 1 7 0 8 
First Amendment  2 5 0 7 
  
District court. The district court reviewed and discussed Hong’s role and use of 
the university’s shared governance system to critique hiring, promotion, and staffing 
within his department. Hong believed that it was the faculty’s  
right [in the] self governance process to determine who can teach, who can do 
creative research, [and] who can serve in the community and university [and that 
p]articipation in the governance of the University including appointment and 
promotion of faculty [was the] professional right of faculty (p. 5).   
Judge Carney agreed, stating that based on UCI’s self- governance principle, the 
university “allow[ed] for expansive faculty involvement in the interworkings of the 




exercise that authority” (p. 8). As Hong was expected to be involved in the operation of 
the university and decision of his department via the governance structure, Carney ruled 
that his participation was part of his job duties as a faculty member and, as determined in 
Garcetti, Hong’s speech was not protected.  
Amicus brief. Amici discussed shared governance as a fundamental 
responsibility of all UCI faculty, which the district court’s decision ignored. In applying 
Garcetti, Amici argued that the district court “erred in classifying classroom instruction 
and professional research as official duties…but also…misconceived the nature of 
shared governance and its relationship to academic freedom” (The Thomas Jefferson 
Center for the Protection of Free Expression, 2009, p. 5). Citing Justice Kennedy’s 
reservation in Garcetti to the issue of speech related to scholarship or teaching, amici 
stated that the district court’s  
extension of that erroneous reasoning to speech relating to shared governance - 
that is, to the “feedback, advice and criticism about his department’s 
administration and operation [provided] from his perspective as a tenured, 
experienced professor–is, therefore, erroneous as well.” (p. 8) 
They added that “a faculty member is entitled to speak publicly about and to take 
active part in virtually every facet of university life, and that crucial entitlement is vitally 
connected to the faculty member’s exercise of academic freedom” (p. 12), especially “at 
a university that values participation in [the] shared governance of the campus” (p. 14).  
Amici concluded that “it is impossible to decouple speech related to shared governance 
from speech directly related to the core academic mission that was set aside by the Court 
in Garcetti” (p. 17) and, therefore, “illustrates…the degree to which that ruling 




amici asked the court of appeals “to affirm the indivisibility of speech related to 
institutional governance and academic freedom” (p. 19) and reverse the district court’s 
ruling on Hong’s unprotected speech.  
Court of appeals. The court of appeals did not discuss Hong’s responsibility in 
the university’s shared governance. Judges O’Scannlain, Gould, and Ikuta ruled only on 
the university’s motion for summary judgment. 
 First Amendment. The First Amendment theme focused on Hong’s right to 
protected free speech as a faculty member and public employee. Thirty references were 
coded from the opinions and brief with 12, 17, and 1 in the district court, amicus brief, 
and court of appeals respectively. Based on a matrix coding query of all themes and 
reference coding bands within the opinions and brief, the theme overlapped the 
expression pursuant to official job duties, employer’s right to control speech, shared 
governance, matter of public concern, and academic freedom themes 28, 12, 7, 6, and 6 
times respectively. Table 7.7 provides the results of the query for each opinion and brief. 
The analysis includes examples from each court opinion and brief showing how these 
















Expression pursuant to official job duties 12 17 0 29 
Employer’s right to control speech 8 4 0 12 
Shared governance 2 5 0 7 
Matter of public concern 3 3 0 6 
Academic freedom 0 6 0 6 
  
District court. As discussed earlier, the district court stated, from Connick, that 
“public employees do not enjoy the same First Amendment freedoms as do private 
citizens [and, from Pickering, that] a government employer may impose speech 
restrictions upon its employees that would be plainly unconstitutional if applied to the 
public at large” (Hong, 2007, p. 6). After review of Hong’s statements, Judge Carney 
determined that he did “not deserve First Amendment protection [and that] UCI [was] 
entitled to unfettered discretion when it restricts statements an employee makes on the 
job and according to his professional responsibilities” (p. 9). Carney added,  
the Court has great difficulty in viewing Mr. Hong’s comments as a matter of 
such public concern that protection under the First Amendment is deserved [and 
that his statements were] more properly characterized as internal administrative 
disputes which have little or no relevance to the community as a whole. (p. 9)  
As such, Carney denied Hong’s statements of protection under the First Amendment. 
Amicus brief. Amici reiterated the district court’s error in applying Garcetti to 
Hong’s statements. Amici argued that the district court’s 
assumption that “a faculty member’s official duties” include “classroom 
instruction and professional research” for the purpose of post-Garcetti  First 




Kennedy’s reservation of the issue of  “speech related to scholarship or 
teaching.” Thus, the very premise for the District Court’s denial of First 
Amendment protection to Professor Hong’s speech relating to other academic 
functions was fatally flawed. (The Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of 
Free Expression, 2009, p. 7) 
Amici stated, 
[c]entral to the District Court’s rejection of [Hong’s] First Amendment claims 
was the premise that any activity in which [he] was entitled to participate as a 
faculty member became, for that reason alone, one of his “official duties,” about 
which he was accordingly not free to speak with impunity–no matter how 
potentially beneficial to public interest might be his unwelcome comments. Such 
an equation gravely misconceives the very nature of a professor’s role in the 
academic community. (p. 12) 
Adding,  
[i]f every such activity were deemed an unprotected “official duty” simply 
because it fell within the very broad range of professorial prerogatives, the scope 
of Garcetti’s curb on First Amendment protection would be far broader for 
professors than even for the general run of government workers. (p. 13) 
If the District Court’s standard were to apply broadly to academic speech, it 
would provide First Amendment protection only for statements that fall so far 
beyond the speaker’s field of expertise as to be valueless to the general public, 
lawmakers, and others who depend upon scholarly guidance and counsel. (p. 18) 
Amici urged the court of appeals to reverse the district court’s ruling. 
Court of appeals. The court of appeals did not discuss Hong’s First Amendment 
rights. As occurred in Garcetti, Judges O’Scannlain, Gould, and Ikuta left “the question 
of whether faculty speech such as Hong’s is protected under the First Amendment for 
consideration in another case” (p. 3). They ruled only on the University’s motion for 
summary judgment. 
 Employer’s right to control speech. The employer’s right to control speech 




coincide with his role as a faculty member and public employee. Twenty-six references 
were coded from the opinions and brief with 15, 11, and 0 in the district court, amicus 
brief, and court of appeals respectively. Based on a matrix coding query of all themes 
and reference coding bands within the opinions and brief, the theme overlapped the 
expression pursuant to official job duties, First Amendment, academic freedom, matter 
of public concern, and academic freedom themes 19, 12, 7, 3, and 3 times respectively. 
Table 7.8 provides the results of the query for each opinion and brief. The analysis 
includes examples from each court opinion and brief showing how these four themes 
relate to the employer’s right to control speech theme. 
Table 7.8 
Matrix Coding of the Three Prevalent Themes That Overlap the Employer’s Right to 










Expression pursuant to official job duties 10 9 0 19 
First Amendment  8 4 0 12 
Academic Freedom 1 2 0 3 
Matter of Public Concern 3 0 0 3 
  
District court. The district court discussed the fact that “a government employer 
may impose speech restrictions upon its employees “that would be plainly 
unconstitutional if applied to the public at large” (Hong, 2010, p. 6). Citing Connick, 
Judge Carney stated,  
 [the] government may set restrictions upon employee speech so long as its need 
for those restrictions is not outweighed by the interest of the employee in 




under the common sense realization that government offices could not function if 
every employment decision became a constitutional matter. (p. 6) 
Citing Garcetti, Carney added,  
restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional 
responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed 
as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what 
the employer itself has commissioned or created. (p. 7)  
He continued, “allowing anything less than unfettered employer control over speech 
within an employee’s official duties would displace managerial discretion for judicial 
supervision, requiring permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of governmental 
operations” (p. 7). He determined that all of Hong’s statements were commissioned by 
the university as part of his job duties and that the university had the right to control his 
speech. 
Amicus brief. Amici discussed the district court’s application of Garcetti to 
Hong. Amici cited “Garcetti’s central premise is that, for the general run of public 
employees, a distinction of constitutional stature can be drawn between statements that 
are made ‘as a citizen’ and those that are uttered ‘pursuant to official responsibilities’” 
(The Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression, 2009, p. 4). They 
added that “Garcetti’s core concept of ‘official responsibilities’ that a public employee 
has been “employed to do” simply has no bearing upon the role of a state university 
teacher and scholar” (p. 9) and that the “actual duties of state university professors 
implicate…a broad range of discretion and autonomy that find no parallel elsewhere in 





public universities…routinely encourage faculty members to critique institutional 
operations in a myriad of ways, though the final decision on most issues rests 
with an administrator, the Board of Regents, or a similar decision-maker. 
[Therefore, it] would be particularly unproductive, and counter to the notion of a 
functioning, collegial academic workplace, for the university then to be able to 
punish faculty when they perform as invited. (p. 15) 
Based on Justice Kennedy’s reservation for “expression related to academic scholarship 
or classroom instruction” (p. 5), amici urged the court of appeals to reconsider the 
district court’s application of Garcetti to Hong and to reverse the judgment.  
Court of appeals. The court of appeals did not discuss the University’s right to 
control Hong’s speech. Judges O’Scannlain, Gould, and Ikuta ruled only on the 
University’s motion for summary judgment. 
Summary 
In affirming the district court’s decision to grant university summary judgment, 
the court of appeals also affirmed the university’s right to control public employee 
speech that is made pursuant to their official job responsibilities. With Hong, faculty 
speech at public universities whether it is inside or outside of the classroom or on 
governance committees can be considered a work that is “commission and created” (p. 
6) by the university which can be controlled and regulated by the employer. The district 
court recognized that an “employee’s official duties are construed broadly to include 
those activities that an employee undertakes in a professional capacity to further the 
employer’s objectives” (p. 7). As courts have done previously, the district court added 
their reluctance to being involved in the control of public employee speech citing 
Garcetti that “[a]llowing anything less than unfettered employer control over speech 




supervision,’ requiring ‘permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of governmental 
operations” (p. 7). These statements not only equated the job duties of public university 
faculty with those of a public employee, they also created, as amici stated,  
a directly inverse correlation between the potential value to society of a scholar’s 
public statements and the degree of constitutional protection for those statements 
[which] cannot be what Justice Kennedy intended when he expressly recognized 
in Garcetti the uniqueness of faculty speech and of the university community. 
(Schrier, 2008, p. 19) 
In response, the court of appeals left “the question of whether faculty speech such as 
Hong’s is protected under the First Amendment for consideration in another case” 
(Schrier, 2010, p. 3) and did not reverse the district court’s decision to grant the 
university summary judgment and immunity from lawsuit. As of July 2012, Dr. Juan 
Hong remains a professor at the University of California Irvine but has not been 





Chapter Eight: Churchill v. The University of Colorado at Boulder 
Background 
 Soon after September 11, 2001, Ward Churchill, chair of the Ethics Studies 
department and a professor in American Indian studies at the University of Colorado at 
Boulder (UC), published an essay titled On the Justice of Roosting Chickens, on an 
obscure website (AAUP, December 2010). Churchill argued that U.S. foreign policy had 
provoked the attacks on the World Trade Center and suggested that the people working 
in the financial services companies in the Twin Towers were complicit. He labeled these 
people as a “technocratic corps at the very heart of America’s global financial empire” 
and called them “little Eichmanns” (2005, “Meet the Terrorists”, para. 7), a reference to 
the mastermind of the holocaust, Adolf Eichmann. He contended that, “the hijackers 
were not cowards as they had manifested the courage of their convictions” (para. 8). Just 
prior to his lecture at Hamilton College in February 3, 2005, a student found the essay 
and published it in the student newspaper. The essay was subsequently published five 
days later by the Syracuse Post-Standard newspaper (Schrecker, 2010). The controversy 
soon spread outside of Hamilton when Fox news talk show host, Bill O’Reilly, 
“claim[ed] that Churchill should be arrested for sedition and calling on all of his viewers 
to demand that Hamilton cancel Churchill’s appearance” (p. 3). The speed of the media 
provoked an enormous amount of attention at Hamilton College, which resulted in 
President Joan Hinde Stewart cancelling Churchill’s lecture for safety and security 




  On February 1, 2005, Colorado Governor Bill Owens wrote a letter to the 
University demanding Churchill’s resignation. The letter was followed by a unanimous 
resolution in the Colorado legislature demanding that Churchill be fired. In response, 
Churchill relinquished his position as chair of the Ethics Studies department but not his 
tenured faculty position (Schrecker, 2010). University of Colorado at Boulder President 
Elizabeth Hoffman “invoked the McCarty era as she cited the threat to academic 
freedom that Churchill’s case might pose” (p. 4). Three days later Governor Owens and 
University of Colorado Board of Regents forced Hoffman to resign for refusal to fire 
Churchill and replaced her with former Colorado Senator Hank Brown who was an early 
supporter of the ACTA and an entrenched member of the GOP conservative 
establishment (Schrecker, 2010). 
 On February 5, 2003, the Board of Regents convened a special meeting to 
discuss Churchill. The review was conducted in order answer two question. 
(1) Does Professor Churchill’s conduct, including his speech, provide any 
grounds for dismissal for cause…? (2) If so, is this conduct or speech protected 
by the First Amendment against University action? (p. 10)  
 After a month-long investigation Dr. Philip DiStefano, UC Chancellor, reported to the 
Board that Churchill’s comments were repugnant but protected by the First Amendment. 
The report concluded that  
[a]llegations have been made that Professor Churchill has engaged in research 
misconduct; specifically, that he has engaged in plagiarism, misuse of others’ 





These allegations have sufficient merit to warrant referral to the [UC] at Boulder 
Standing Committee on Research Misconduct for further inquiry in accordance 
with prescribed procedures…If the Committee determines that Professor 
Churchill engaged in research misconduct, the Committee is to make 
recommendations regarding dismissal or other disciplinary action. 
Also referred to the Committee is the question of whether Churchill committed 
research misconduct by misrepresenting himself to be American Indian to gain 
credibility, authority, and an audience by using an Indian voice for his scholarly 
writings and speeches. (University of Colorado at Boulder, n.d., “Summary of 
the Chancellor’s Review and Decisions,” para. 3-5)  
In June 2006, the five-member Standing Committee on Research Misconduct issued 
their report on the seven allegations of academic misconduct against Professor Ward 
Churchill that were presented to them. The committee unanimously found that Churchill 
had falsified, fabricated, plagiarized, and failed to comply with established standards 
regarding author names on publications, and had seriously deviated from accepted 
practices in reporting his results (University of Colorado at Boulder, 2006, p. 94). The 
committee acknowledged “the role [that] some media outlets and certain public figures 
[have had] in stirring up public animosity toward Churchill and the University of 
Colorado” (p. 100), that “[m]embers of the press have acquired considerable power to 
advance or harm scholarly reputations” and that “changes in communication can have 
particular impact when an accusation of academic wrongdoing becomes a matter of 
public interest” (p. 101). The committee condemned the University for mismanaging “its 
affairs in a way that lent support to its critics [as well as] some elected officials for 
exploiting the legitimate concerns of their constituents and [transforming] them into an 





was split as to what action was appropriate with two committee members recommending 
suspension for two years, two recommending suspension for five years and one 
recommending immediate dismissal (p. 104). “Soon after [the report was filed], 
Chancellor DiStefano issued Churchill a Notice of Intent to Dismiss which [Churchill] 
immediately appealed to the Privilege and Tenure Committee of the faculty Senate” 
(AAUP, 2010, Ward Churchill v. The University of Colorado, para. 2). 
 In May 2006, one month prior to the committee’s final report, the American 
Council of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA) published the report “How Many Ward 
Churchills?” citing examples of curricula, courses, and syllabi at 47 colleges and 
universities where, ACTA stated, “professors are using their classrooms to push political 
agendas in the name of teaching students to think critically” (p. 3) and “to explore how 
widespread the “Ward Churchill phenomenon really is” (p. 2). The report incorporated 
American Association of University Professors (AAUP), American Council on 
Education (ACE), and American Association Colleges and Universities principles and 
statements to compare accepted academic practices with the academy’s politically 
correct teaching methods and to emphasis the rights of professors over those of students 
(p. 35). ACTA concluded the report with a call to elected official, trustees, 
administrators, alumni, parents, students, and citizens to hold higher educational 
institutions accountable for their hiring of radical faculty and their abuses of academic 
freedom privileges (p. 37). What affect the report had on Churchill’s case is unknown 




politically progressive academy” (p. 22) and “how-to guides for budding activists” (p. 
13).   
 Soon after the Standing Committee on Research Misconduct’s report was issued, 
Churchill appealed to the Privilege and Tenure Committee for dismissal of all charges 
against him on two procedural grounds. First, Churchill questioned 
the “whole investigation’s legitimacy as it was a selective enforcement precipitated by 
his constitutionally protected political writing about 9/11 and [second], the investigating 
committee’s behavior as it had violated his right to due process” (Schrecker, 2010, p. 
17). On April 11, 2007, the committee concluded that Churchill had engaged in 
academic misconduct with three members recommending suspension for 2 years and 
two for dismissal. The committee recognized that if it had not been “for his exercise of 
his First Amendment rights, Professor Churchill would not have been subjected to the 
Research Misconduct and Enforcement Process or have received the Notice of Intent for 
dismissal presently at issue” (p. 17). With ambivalence, the committee concluded the 
faculty’s role in the investigation and turned it over to the Board of Regents and 
President Hank Brown, the new UC Boulder president, for final action. 
 Brown wasted no time in recommending dismissal to the Board of Regents. He 
argued that “the University cannot disregard allegations of serious research 
misconduct…simply because the allegations were made against a professor whose 
comments have attracted a high degree of public attention” (p. 19). In a letter dated 





the prohibition against research misconduct extends to all faculty members, 
irrespective of their academic disciplines or political views. Were it otherwise, 
the University could not maintain the integrity of the scholarly enterprise. Brown 
concluded his letter to the Regents by saying that Churchill deserved to be fired 
because the research misconduct charges on which he was found guilty were 
“severe,” “deliberate” and that “Professor Churchill’s misconduct seriously 
impacts the University’s academic reputation and the reputations of its faculty”. 
(Jaschik, 2007, para. 7) 
 At their July 24, 2007 meeting, the Board voted eight to one to accept the president’s 
recommendation and dismiss Churchill from his tenured faculty position for engaging 
“in repeated and deliberate misconduct that fell below standards of professional 
integrity” (p. 19).  
 In all official statements and press releases, the president and the Regents 
reiterated that Churchill had every right as a citizen to his “controversial political views” 
and that they were not punishing him for his “little Eichmanns” statement. They 
emphasized that their “decisions were guided by the findings of three faculty committees 
made up of more than 20 tenured faculty members from [UC] and other universities 
which unanimously determined that Professor Churchill had engaged in acts of research 
misconduct” (Schrecker, 2010, p. 19). The statements not only emphasized the use of 
due process to remove a tenured faculty member and the right of the institution to 
academic freedom, but also provided distance to the president and the Board from the 
issue of Churchill’s right to extramural speech as an academic. Soon after his 
termination, Churchill filed a lawsuit against the University of Colorado at Boulder and 





Court Opinions and Briefs 
 The Churchill case was filed in District Court of the City and County of Denver, 
Colorado in July 2007. The Supreme Court of Colorado agreed to hear his case in June 
2012 and, as of August 2012, Churchill awaits their decision. The district trial jury found 
that the University would not have been investigated Churchill if he had not exercised 
his First Amendment speech rights by publishing the essay. They awarded Churchill a 
nominal amount of one dollar and returned the case to the district trial court for 
consideration of his request for reinstatement. Presiding district court Judge Naves 
denied his request and moved to the University’s motion of quasi-judicial immunity. 
Naves granted the motion “because the [investigation and review] process…shared 
enough of the features of the traditional judicial process that, for purposes of immunity, 
it was functionally equivalent to the judicial process” (Churchill, 2010, p. 8). On appeal, 
the court affirmed the trial court’s findings and found that the University’s investigation 
did not violate Churchill’s First Amendment rights or constitute an adverse employment 
action.  A detailed review of each opinion and brief are discussed. 
 District Court of the City and County of Denver. In March 2009, Ward 
Churchill filed a lawsuit against the University of Colorado at Boulder and the Board of 
Regents for violating his First Amendment rights and asked for relief for terminating 
him from his professorship. Churchill requested “the Court [to] order his reinstatement 
of employment to his former position of fully tenured professor at the University of 
Colorado, and to provide such further equitable relief as is necessary to vindicate his 




interests of time and costs, both parties agreed that the University would waive its right 
to claim Eleventh Amendment immunity in exchange for the right “to assert any 
defenses that would be available to individual Regents” (p. 4) after the jury considered 
Churchill’s First Amendment claims. The court proceeded with the first phase of the 
jury trial.  
Motion of judgment as a matter of law. On April 2, 2009, after a 4-week trial, 
the jury found that Churchill’s First Amendment rights had been violated (Schrecker, 
2010). Specifically, the jury held that 
[his] protected speech–his writings about September 11–had been a substantial 
and motivating factor for the Board of Regent’s decision to dismiss him from his 
tenured position and that the Regents would not have voted to dismiss him in 
absence of his protected speech. (AAUP, 2010, Ward Churchill v. The University 
of Colorado, para. 4) 
The jury “awarded Professor Churchill economic damages in the amount of one dollar, 
and noneconomic damages in the amount of zero (0) dollars (p. 27) recognizing his 
claim that “this wasn’t about money” (Schrecker, 2010, p. 20) but rather his 
reinstatement to the University. But, the trial court ruled  
against reinstatement because it would undermine the University’s ability to 
define the standards of scholarship and concluded that on the basis of the 
evidence adduced at trial regarding Churchill’s hostility toward the University, 
reinstatement was not likely to result in a “productive and amicable working 
relationship” between the University and Churchill. (Churchill, 2010, p. 11) 
As specified in the trial management order, the court moved to the next phase of the 
process, the defendant’s motion of quasi-judicial immunity on Churchill’s second claim 




 On April 17, 2009, Naves reviewed the defendant’s motion for quasi-judicial 
immunity. As stated in Butz (1978), this immunity is relevant “when a governmental 
body [such as the Regents] applies preexisting legal standards or policy considerations 
to present or past facts presented to the governmental body” (Churchill, 2009, p. 14), 
“applies when proceedings are conducted by a trier of facts insulated by political 
influence” (p. 15), “appropriate where a party is entitled to present his case by oral or 
documentary evidence” (p. 16), and “appropriate where the transcript of testimony and 
exhibits together with the pleadings constitute the exclusive record for decision” (p. 16). 
As such, “the parties are entitled to know the findings and conclusions on all issues of 
fact, law or discretion presented on the record [and] the decision is subject to further 
judicial review” (p. 16). The court examined the University’s request based on these 
criteria. 
 The court determined that the University of Colorado and the Board of Regents 
acted as a quasi-judicial body and were, therefore, immune as a matter of law. Naves 
established that 
the Colorado Constitution created the University of Colorado as a state 
institution of higher education [whose] Board of Regents, as a constitutional 
body that is not part of the legislative or executive branches, occupies a unique 
position in Colorado’s governmental structure [that is vested with] the power to 
enact laws for the government of the University [which include] the grounds and 
process for dismissing a tenured member of the University’s faculty. (pp. 4-5)  
He added that these grounds and processes were enacted by the board in the Laws of the 





 Naves justified his decision to characterize Colorado’s Board of Regents “as a 
quasi-judicial capacity and entitled to immunity from litigation for the decision reached 
after granting Mr. Churchill extensive due process” (Schmidt, 2009, para. 19) “because 
the process employed shared enough of the features of the traditional judicial process 
that, for purposes of immunity, it was functionally equivalent to the judicial process” 
(Churchill, 2010).  He recognized that  
the protection essential to judicial independence would be entirely swept away if 
a lawsuit against judges could proceed upon the premise that the acts of the judge 
were done with partiality, or maliciously, or corruptly [and] prevents judges from 
being subject to intimidation as they perform their functions. (p. 9)  
He cited a 10th Circuit case in which the court extended quasi-judicial immunity to a 
school board in a dismissal case stating that, “where an official applies preexisting legal 
standards or policy considerations to present or past facts presented to the governmental 
body, then one can say with reasonable certainty that the governmental body is acting in 
a quasi-judicial capacity”  (Churchill, 2010, p. 11). Naves added that Board of Regents 
included the full panalopy of rights required in judicial proceedings including:  
(1) the right to notice of charges; (2) the right to request a hearing before a 
faculty committee; (3) the right to challenge the participation of a member of the 
faculty committee; (4) the requirement that the University prove that grounds for 
dismissal exist by clear and convincing evidence; (5) the requirement that the 
University transcribe the hearing; (6) the right to representation by counsel; (7) 
the right to examine each University witness; (8) the right to present witnesses; 
(9) the right to present oral and written closing arguments; (10) the right to 
respond to the faculty committee’s findings; (11) the right to request a hearing 
before the Board of Regents; (12) the requirement that the Board of Regents 
consider only the evidence in the record; (13) the requirement that the Board of 
Regents take final action in a public meeting; and (14) the right of judicial 





As such, Naves granted quasi-judicial immunity as a matter of law to the University of 
Colorado and the Board of Regents on Churchill’s relief claim and vacated the trial 
jury’s verdict.  
Motion for reinstatement of employment. Judge Naves approached Churchill’s 
reinstatement to the University of Colorado in three ways to determine if it was the 
appropriate remedy. Naves’ analysis considered the following findings of the trial jury: 
(a) it had determination that professor Churchill suffered no actual damages, (b) 
reinstatement would likely result in undue interference in the academic process, (c) the 
relationship between the parties was irreparably damaged, and (d) reinstatement would 
impose harm upon others (Churchill, 2009). Each topic of concern was reviewed by the 
Court in the context of federal law as the claim fell under federal statute. 
 First, Naves reviewed the trial court’s decision to award nominal damages to 
Churchill. Previously, the trial court found that Churchill “had not proven any losses or 
injuries through the date of the trial” (p. 31) and, therefore, awarded nominal damages of 
one dollar, instead of reinstatement in recognition of violation of his constitutional 
rights. He determined that the district court could not ignore the trial court’s findings or 
decisions stating that “if I am required to enter an order that is consistent with the jury’s 
findings, I cannot order a remedy that disregards the jury’s implicit finding that 
Professor Churchill has suffered no actual damages that an award of reinstatement 
would prospectively remedy” (p. 31). As such, he found no reason to override the jury’s 




 Second, Naves reviewed the jury’s verdict based on whether “reinstatement was 
appropriate where it would result in undue interference in the academic process” (p. 32).  
He provided the University’s Administrative Policy Statement on Misconduct in 
Research and Authorship, which prohibited “fabrication, falsification, plagiarism, and 
other forms of misappropriation of ideas, or additional practices that seriously deviate 
from those that are commonly accepted in the research community for proposing, 
conducting or reporting research” (p. 32). He added that the University operates under a 
“shared governance [structure] where the faculty takes the lead in decisions concerning 
selection of faculty, educational policy related to teaching, curriculum, research, 
academic ethics, and other academic matters” (p. 32) As noted in the trial exhibits, the 
University’s Standing Committee of Research Misconduct which operated under rules 
approved by the faculty investigated Churchill’s research, determined that he had 
engaged in research misconduct, and recommended his dismissal. In turn, Churchill 
appealed the decision to the Faculty Senate Privilege and Tenure Committee, which also 
determined that Churchill had engaged in research misconduct but was inconclusive on 
the appropriate sanction. In response, the Board of Regents decided to dismiss him based 
on the evidence and process followed. 
 Naves concluded that, “reinstating Professor Churchill would entangle the 
judiciary excessively in matters that are more appropriate for academic professionals” 
(p. 36). He understood “the concern, expressed in the statement of the present and 
former Chairs of the Arts and Sciences Council, that an order restoring Churchill to full 




faculty control over standards of performance and membership” (p. 35) and gave 
“considerable weight to the United States Supreme Court’s recognition to the “profound 
importance [of] restrained judicial review of the substance of academic decisions” (p. 
36). Based on the above considerations, he found that reinstatement would result in 
undue interference in the academic process and was not the appropriate remedy.   
 Third, Naves reviewed the appropriateness of reinstatement based on the 
irreparable damage between Churchill and the University. He relied on Churchill’s 
statements demonstrating hostility toward the University, which, as reported, included: 
(1) Professor Churchill’s post-verdict reference to the University as having 
“degenerated to a not very glorified vo-tec, a trade school”; (2) Professor 
Churchill’s reported post-verdict reference to the University’s administration and 
witnesses as “the string of unprincipled liars the University called to the 
stand…”; (3) Professor Churchill’s statement that “A random group of homeless 
people under a bridge would be far more intellectually sound and principled than 
anything I’ve encountered at the University so far.”; and (4) Professor 
Churchill’s reference to the faculty as the “ostrich factory,” presumably with 
their heads buried in the sand. (pp. 36-37) 
He also noted that Churchill had filed complaints against the members of the Privilege 
and Tenure Committee as well as “a research complaint against a professor of the law 
school for a strategic reason related to his lawsuit” (p. 38). As such, he concluded that 
Churchill’s relationship with the University had been irreparably damaged and that his 
reinstatement to the University had a minor chance of success for becoming a productive 




 Finally, Naves reviewed Churchill’s reinstatement based on the harm that it  
might impose on others. He recognized that  
reinstatement [would] create the perception in the broader academic community 
that the Department of Ethnic Studies tolerates research misconduct [and that] 
this perception [would] make it more difficult for the Department of Ethnic 
Studies to attract and retain new faculty members [as well as] hinder students 
graduating from the Department of Ethnic Studies in their efforts to obtain 
placement in graduate programs. (p. 39) 
He noted the former chair of the Arts and Science Council’s concerns that  
any external action to return Churchill to the faculty [would] inevitably weaken 
the capacity of University of Colorado faculty to hold errant or dishonest 
colleagues to account in future cases of academic misconduct and make it far 
more difficult to hold students to high standards of honesty in research and 
writing. (p. 39) 
He found no evidence “that reinstatement is necessary to prevent a ‘chilling effect’ on 
the University of Colorado’s campus” (p. 39). As such, he determined that the benefits 
did not outweigh the harm and denied Churchill’s motion for reinstatement.  
 After denying reinstatement, Naves considered whether front pay was an 
alternative remedy. As he was bound by the trial jury’s finding that Churchill suffered 
no actual damages, he denied front pay. On July 7, 2009, he ordered that Churchill’s 
motion for reinstatement to employment at the University be denied for all the above 
reasons. 
 Amicus brief to court of appeals. On February 19, 2010, the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU), American Association of University Professors (AAUP), and 
the National Coalition Against Censorship filed an amicus curiae brief with the Court of 
Appeals for the State of Colorado. Amici argued that “the trial court’s decision 




University of Colorado System, [that] the trial court erred in granting quasi-judicial 
immunity from damages and barring injunctive relief, [and, that] the trial court abused 
its discretion in holding that Churchill was not entitled to reinstatement (American Civil 
Liberties Union et. al., 2009, p. ii). Amici submitted these arguments to the court of 
appeals and urged them to reverse the trial court’s findings and decisions. 
Trial court’s decision destroyed the First Amendment protection for University 
of Colorado professors. Amici argued that the trial court’s decision rendered University 
faculty unprotected when engaging in lawful speech. Amici reminded the court that the 
Supreme Court recognized faculty speech, “such as the essay at issue in this case, [as] a 
special concern of the First Amendment” (p. 8) and that “teachers and students must 
always remain free to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; 
otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die” (p. 9). Amici reasoned,  
the trial court’s decision effectively means that regardless of the deep 
commitment to academic freedom, a professor cannot ever recover on a claim for 
unconstitutional termination based on the First Amendment, no matter how 
egregious or unconstitutional the termination because the Board of Regents…is 
absolutely immune from liability for damages and injunctive relief is not an 
available remedy…The court also held that…a professor would still not be 
entitled to reinstatement if…the professor has some hard feeling and choice 
words for those who unconstitutionally terminated him or her in the first place.  
(pp. 10-11) 
They added that this was not the intention of the Supreme Court to deny a remedy for 
violations of a faculty member’s federally protected civil rights and should not be the 
intention of this court and concluded that a remedy should be available to a professor 




 Trial court erred in granting quasi-judicial immunity. Amici argued that the 
trial court erred for two reasons. First, “the trial court failed to recognize Supreme Court 
case law making clear that absolute immunity is a limited defense available only in rare 
circumstances” (p. 12) and should be recognized only in narrow circumstances. Second, 
they “ignored Supreme Court case law emphasizing that the quasi-judicial officers who 
are granted this rare form of absolute immunity are neutral and independent” (p. 14). 
Amici discussed the granting of quasi-judicial immunity as a subset of absolute 
immunity and trial court’s interpretation of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 
1996. 
 First, amici argued that absolute immunity should be granted on rare occasions 
“because such immunity has the grave consequence of precluding remedies for 
constitutional violations” (p. 13). In granting absolute immunity, the trial court 
“shield[ed] the Board of Regents from liability for their unconstitutional actions” (p. 13). 
While other forms of immunity could have been granted, amici stated that their decision 
to grant absolute immunity was not supported by any public interest rationale, public 
policy, or common law tradition and was therefore erroneous.  
 Second, amici addressed the trial court’s error of granting immunity to the Board 
of Regents as they are not a neutral and independent body. Amici stated that, “quasi-
judicial immunity is warranted when the overriding need to protect the independence 
and impartiality of entities working in judicial capacities outweighs the risk of 
unconstitutional behavior” (p. 14). Because the Regents are “Churchill’s employer with 




there is nothing to protect, and the importance of providing a remedy for 
unconstitutional conduct prevails over the need for absolute immunity” (pp. 14-15). As 
University administrators, their loyalty rested with the institution. While protections 
provide by qualified immunity can insulate them from damages, amici concluded that 
the Regents should not be entitled to the “rare and sweeping defense of absolute 
immunity” (p. 20). 
Trial court abused its discretion. Amici argued that Churchill is entitled to 
reinstatement as a remedy to the violation of his First Amendment rights as a matter of 
law and that the trial court’s decision that Churchill was not entitled, was flawed. 
Because the trial court “found that the University was motived to terminate Churchill 
because of his speech…and that, despite the University’s claims about Churchill’s 
academic misconduct, Churchill would not have been terminated but for his speech” (p. 
20), amici stated that “it is the historic purpose of equity to secure complete 
justice…where protected rights have been invaded [and] that courts will be alert to 
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief” (p. 21). Amici argued in favor 
of reinstatement as a constitutional remedy and an error in the trial court’s decision-
making.  
 First, amici argued that “reinstatement [was] the preferred and presumptive 
remedy” (p. 22) when an employee has been wrongfully and unconstitutional 
terminated. “This is especially true in First Amendment cases where reinstatement is to 
be awarded absent exceptional circumstances” (p. 22) and it can “make victims of 




rewards an employer for its wrongful and unconstitutional conduct, as it enables the 
employer to accomplish exactly what the Constitution forbids–terminating an employee 
for unconstitutional reasons” (p. 24). To deter employers from violating employee’s 
constitutional rights, amici concluded that reinstatement is the appropriate remedy.  
 Second, amici argued that, “the trial court’s reason[s] for denying reinstatement 
[were] insufficient to overcome the presumption that reinstatement [was] the appropriate 
remedy” (p. 25). The trial court based its decision on three reasons, which were (a) that, 
because the jury awarded only nominal…instead of significant monetary damages, 
reinstating [Churchill] would be contrary to the jury’s findings and…case law” (p. 25); 
(b) that the faculty committee determined that Churchill had engaged in academic 
misconduct and, therefore, should be denied reinstatement; and (c) that “the relationship 
between the University and Churchill was too fractured by the litigation [for him] to be 
reinstated to his faculty position” (p. 33). Amici reasoned that the trial court’s 
justifications were inconsistent with the principle that all wrongs deserve an equitable 
remedy. Amici disagreed with the trial court’s holding and discussed, in detail, each 
reason. 
 Amici argued that the awarding of a nominal amount, instead of a monetary 
value, “does not mean that Churchill’s rights were not significantly violated or that 
Churchill did not...suffer any harm deserving a remedy” (p. 25). The trial courts 
awarding of nominal damages were important as a declaration that a legal wrong was 




monetary amount to Churchill’s rights violations should have been decided separately. 
Amici reasoned that the 
jury’s decision not to award monetary relief simply [meant that they] did not 
want to award him significant monetary relief [not that] they believed that he was 
not harmed or wronged by the University for his protected speech, not that he 
should not be reinstated. (p. 26) 
They added that, “by focusing solely on the amount of the damages awarded…, the trial 
court overlooked the critical role played by equitable remedies in our judicial system, 
especially when constitutional violations occur” (p. 28). For these reasons, amici 
concluded that the trial court had abused this discretion. 
 Next, amici argued that the University’s faculty committee decision to terminate 
Churchill for academic misconduct should not have influenced the trial court’s decision 
to deny reinstatement. “Because the jury rejected the University’s claim that Churchill 
was fired for academic [reasons, amici asserted] that it was improper for the trial court 
subsequently to conclude that reinstatement should nevertheless be denied for that very 
reason” (p. 30). Adding, “the trial court’s focus on the faculty committee’s scholarship 
determination was based in the court’s attempt to defer to the University and to avoid 
interfering with the academic process” (p. 31). Noting the Supreme Court observation in 
Ewing (1985), amici stated, “when judges are asked to review the substance of a 
genuinely academic decision…they should show great respect for faculty’s professional 
judgment” (p. 32). They concluded that the decision to terminate based on academic 
misconduct was an academic decision and should be handled by the University. 
Therefore, the trial court should not be the body to deny reinstatement but instead should 




 Finally, amici argued that the trial court erred in denying Churchill’s 
reinstatement based on the animosity between him and the University. Amici cited 
Sweezy (1957) in observing, “conflict is not unknown in the University setting given 
inherent autonomy to tenured professors and the academic freedom they enjoy” (p. 34). 
As such, while “disagreement or conflict might be sufficient grounds for denying 
reinstatement in certain workplaces…that is not at all the case in the University setting” 
(p. 35) and not the case here. While conflict is a unique quality of the University setting, 
amici reminded that the working relationship between a faculty member and the 
University’s administrators and Regents does not require daily interaction and would 
likely not “impair the daily operation of the University as they [would never] see or 
interact with each other…while performing their regular duties” (p. 37). In failing to 
recognized this unique relationship and denying reinstatement, the trial court allowed 
“universit[ies] to be able to fire its professors with impunity and with no risk that the 
professor would be reinstated” (p. 38) even if they prevailed in court on their claims for 
violations of their constitutional rights. As such, amici concluded that the trial court 
abused its discretion by denying Churchill’s reinstatement and requested the court of 
appeals to reverse the trial court’s order and to reinstate Churchill to his University 
professor position.  
 Court of Appeals of the City and County of Denver. On November 24, 2010, 
the court of appeals ruled on Churchill’s case against the University of Colorado. 




(1) directing a verdict in favor of the University of Colorado and its Board of 
Regents and dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [civil action for deprivation of 
constitutional rights] claim that the University’s investigation of his academic 
works constituted an adverse employment action; (2) holding as a matter of law 
that the University was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, vacating the jury’s 
verdict, and entering judgment in favor of the University on his section 1983 
claim that the University violated his First Amendment rights when it dismissed 
him; and (3) denying his motion for reinstatement, or alternatively, money 
damages. (Churchill v. University of Colorado at Boulder, 2010, p. 1) 
Judge Graham wrote the opinion of the Court and addressed the trial court’s awarding of 
immunity to the University first and the adverse employment actions claims second. 
Quasi-judicial immunity. Churchill argued, “the trial court improvidently 
granted the University and the Regents quasi-judicial immunity [because they had] 
failed to satisfy four specific conditions of immunity” (p. 12). The four conditions were 
that the Regents were not an independent body of hearing officers; that the 
Regents evinced bias which barred them from considering his discipline; that 
there is no adequate means of reviewing the Regents’ decision; and that quasi-
judicial immunity was not available as a defense. (p. 12) 
Graham addressed each condition separately starting with a discussion of the aspects and 
the criteria of absolute and quasi-judicial immunity and the University’s right to use of 
them as their defense. 
 Absolute and quasi-judicial immunity provide public officials who act in a 
judicial capacity with protections from lawsuits. Graham stated, “absolute immunity 
provides judges and prosecutors with [protections from lawsuit and] a complete defense 
[in order] to preserve their independent decision-making and to prevent undue deflection 
of attention from public duties” (p. 13). These protections are available to University 
executives, administrators, governmental agents, and public servants such as the Regents 




courts [and they] reach their decision by applying preexisting legal standards or policy 
considerations to present and past facts” (p. 14). Governmental bodies that function 
within these guidelines are acting in a quasi-judicial capacity and are immune based on a 
“matter of law.” 
 Graham rejected Churchill’s claim that the court erred in granting immunity 
based on the six conditions of immunity defined in Cleavinger (1985) and mentioned in 
Butz (Churchill, 2010). He stated that the conditions for determining absolute immunity 
are 
(a) the need to assure that the individual can perform his functions without 
harassment or intimidation; (b) the presence of safeguards that reduce the need 
for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct; 
(c) insulation from political influence; (d) the importance of precedent; (e) the 
adversary nature of the process; and (f) the correctability of error on appeal. (p. 
16) 
He rejected Churchill’s argument as he perceived “nothing in Cleavinger that requires 
the strict application of the Butz factors [as a litmus test] in determining whether a board 
or governmental body should be granted absolute immunity” (p. 17). Instead he applied 
the decisions made by the Colorado Supreme Court in Cherry Hill (1988). In this case, 
the Court explained the “essence of quasi-judicial actions and three defining factors 
which must exist in order for a tribunal to act in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity” (p. 
17). These factors are that   
(1) a state or local law requiring that the governmental body give adequate notice 
before acting on the matter; (2) a state or local law requiring the governmental 
body to conduct a public hearing, pursuant to notice, at which concerned citizens 
may be heard and present evidence; and (3) a state or local law requiring the 
governmental body to make a determination based upon an application of legal 




As such, Graham found that the board was  
empowered by the Colorado Constitution and statute to enact laws governing the 
University, [employed] strict guidelines under laws promulgated by them, 
afforded adequate notice of public hearings, and invoked an adversary process in 
which Churchill was represented by counsel and permitted to introduce evidence, 
examine witnesses, and make argument.  (p. 19) 
He concluded that the University’s policies and procedures “shared enough of the 
features of a traditional judicial process that, for the purposes of immunity, it was 
functionally equivalent to a judicial process” (p. 18). He perceived no issue in the 
University’s use of immunity as a defense and found no error in the trial court’s decision 
to grant quasi-judicial immunity to the University of Colorado and their Board of 
Regents. 
 Next, Graham returned to the first condition for quasi-judicial immunity, which 
is that the process must assure the independence of the reviewing officials. “Churchill 
contend[ed] that the Regents were not an independent, professional body of hearing 
officers and that the Regents lacked political independence” (p. 22) because they were 
elected officials and susceptible to political pressures to make decisions that protect the 
University. He reiterated that the Regents are “empowered to enact laws for the 
government of the University” (p. 22) which included procedures to terminate faulty. He 
added that they “are not part of the executive or legislative branches [of the State of 
Colorado], which assures that they can conduct their functions without harassment or 
intimidation” (p. 23). Because the dismissal process included “a multi-step review which 
provided independent investigation and evaluation by peers, independent faculty 




extensive procedural safeguards for the Regents to act impartially. As such, he 
concluded the Regent’s policies and University’s procedures satisfied the factors 
identified in Cherry Hill (1988) and agreed with the trial court’s analysis that the process 
used resembled a judicial process. 
 The next condition reviewed considered the Regent’s immunity based on their 
ability to arbitrate and make decisions in an un-biased manner. Churchill contended, 
“that the Regents evidenced bias against him, indicating that they were not impartial 
arbiters and…ought not be cloaked by immunity” (p. 29). He added, “that, if [they] had 
been judges, they would have been required to recuse themselves under one or more of 
the Canons of Judicial Conduct” (p. 29). Judge Graham disagreed stating that quasi-
judicial immunity provided a “protection essential to independence and discretion by the 
University and the Regents would be gone if they were subject to the intimidation of a 
lawsuit seeking to undo every decision to terminate a faculty member” (p. 31). He added 
that 
[d]ecisions to discipline professors who do not meet standards of integrity or 
scholarship will no doubt be unpopular and disputed. But such self-policing does  
not indicate bias and it ought not subject faculty and the Regents to liability for 
enforcement. Otherwise academic freedom would not be preserved. Thus, even 
against claims of bias, a judge or an official performing quasi-judicial functions 
can be immune from suit. (p. 32) 
In reviewing the evidence submitted by Churchill, Graham found no support for 
Churchill’s contention that the unpopular decisions made by the Regents were biased. 
He reiterated the court’s reluctance to be involved in academic decisions adding that just 




not demonstrate bias against a noncompliant faculty so much as it demonstrates a bias in 
favor of compliance with the rules of academia” (pp. 35-36) and concluded that the 
Regents had not exhibited bias in their decisions. 
 The third and final condition Churchill cited, as a requirement to satisfy quasi-
judicial immunity, was there must be a means to review the Regents’ decisions. He 
“contend[ed] that the process employed by the University and the Regents [were not] 
subject to adequate appellate review” (p. 36) for their bias and lack of independence and 
that this limited his ability to challenge the University’s defense of immunity. Graham 
stated he was  
unaware of any Colorado decision which requires full appellate review of quasi-
judicial action [and that the] district court’s review [was] limited to a 
determination of whether the body or officer exceeded its jurisdiction or abused 
its discretion based on the evidence in the record” (p. 36) 
He found no “standing for the proposition that a governmental body may not be afforded 
quasi-judicial immunity if its actions are only reviewable for an abuse of discretion” (p. 
38). As such, he rejected Churchill’s contention that the defense of quasi-judicial 
immunity was not available and concluded that the policies and procedures used by the  
University and the Regents were equivalent to a judicial process. 
Equitable relief. Graham reviewed Churchill’s claim that the University’s quasi-
judicial immunity did not apply to his request for equitable remedies such as 
reinstatement and front-pay. Section 1983, amended in 1996, “bars injunctive relief 
“against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial 
capacity…unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was 




or demonstrated that declaratory relief was not available, Graham rejected his equitable 
relief claim and upheld the “trial court’s conclusion that quasi-judicial immunity barred 
Churchill’s claims for reinstatement and front pay” (p. 43).  
Adverse employment action. Churchill claimed “the trial court erred in entering 
a direct verdict on his…First Amendment claim” (p. 44) and “that his First Amendment 
rights were violated because his exercise of free speech caused the investigation [which] 
was retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights” (p. 48). Judge Graham’s 
analysis included a determination of what constituted an adverse employment action and 
how the University’s investigation can be considered retaliation when Churchill 
exercised his free speech rights.   
 To date, courts have ruled that investigations alone are not adverse and that, “to 
be considered adverse, the action taken must be sufficiently punitive or involve a change 
in employment to a new position” (p. 45) or “in the terms or conditions of employment” 
(p. 46). The action is not considered adverse if the employee received the same pay and 
continued to be employed, as was the case with Churchill. But, as the Supreme Court 
has determined, context does matter and “the real social impact of workplace behavior 
often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and 
relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the 
physical acts performed” (p. 47). Graham analyzed Churchill’s speech to determine if it 
caused the investigation and resulted in his termination. 
 First Amendment retaliation claims are analyzed using the Garcetti-Pickering 




Churchill bore the burden of establishing and showing cause “that [his] constitutionally 
protected speech was a substantial motivating factor in [his] employer’s decision to 
adversely alter [his] conditions of employment” (p. 49). Graham responded that 
Churchill continued to be paid his normal salary, lecture, and speak openly and observed 
that the cases cited in Churchill’s argument “were not well taken” (p. 52) as they 
involved investigations that resulted in other wrongful actions by the employer. These 
actions included “transfers to new duties, unwarranted assignment of blame, reprimands 
concerning a false accusation, and failure to promote” (pp. 51-52). He recalled “cases 
from the Tenth Circuit [indicating] that action more significant than investigation alone 
is necessary to constitute adverse employment action” (p. 52) as well as “other federal 
circuits that have concluded that an employer must be permitted to investigate the 
potential misconduct of its employee without the fear of the investigation being 
interpreted as an adverse employment action” (p. 53). Graham determined that the 
University’s investigation of Churchill’s writings was not an adverse employment 
action, caused damage, or had a chilling effect on his or other faculty speech. Graham 
closed by affirming the trial court’s findings that the University had quasi-judicial 
immunity and that the University’s investigation did not constituted an adverse 
employment action. 
   Amicus Brief to Supreme Court of Colorado. On September 12 2011, the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the ACLU of Colorado (amici) submitted 
an amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado detailing their 




the appellate court’s holding that the University’s investigation could not 
constitute retaliation for Churchill’s speech conflict[ed] with both the prevailing 
law and the First Amendment’s broad protection of academic and expressive 
freedom (p. 10) 
Amici contented that upholding their decision would “vastly expand quasi-judicial 
immunity to public employers in a manner that is both inconsistent with current law and 
[would] undermine the enforcement of important Constitutional rights” (p. 25) as well as 
add “a wide range of administrative, non-judicial actors to the narrow category of 
‘judicial officers’ who are not subject to injunctive relief” (p. 32). Amici discussed the 
appellate court’s holdings as they related to the protection of Churchill’s First 
Amendment rights and the provisions and accountability proved by the Civil Rights Act 
and U.S. Code 42 Section 1983, Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights. 
University’s investigation could not constituted retaliation for Churchill’s 
speech. Amici reiterated the Supreme Court’s recognition of academic freedom as a 
“special concern of the First Amendment” and the need to protect academic speech at 
universities. The University’s “aggressive and hostile response” toward Churchill’s 
scholarly freedom and the court’s rejection of his retaliatory claim threatens to 
undermine these basic freedoms without legal recourse. Amici provided three arguments 
outlining the court’s application of First Amendment protections to Title VII’s adverse 
employment standard, the impact of the employer’s retaliatory conduct on employee 
speech, and Churchill’s right to a jury trial for his adverse employment outcome.   
 First, amici argued, “the standard for establishing a First Amendment retaliation 
in public employee speech cases is, and should be, broader than the standard for proving 




“narrow and categorical approach [to determine whether] the investigation conducted 
under the auspices of the Regents was an adverse employment action [resulting] in 
material or tangible change in the terms of [his] contract” (p. 12), leaving the burden of 
proof on the employee. Instead, amici argued,  
based on the Supreme Court’s framework, government retaliation against a 
person for engaging in free speech should be evaluated by whether the 
government’s response would deter or chill a person of ordinary firmness from 
engaging in the protected speech in the future. (p. 13) 
Amici recapped that the Tenth Circuit applied these standards in multiple cases and 
“recently suggested that the chilling-effect standard should govern cases in which public 
employees assert that they have suffered retaliation for speech protected by the First 
Amendment” (p. 15). In evaluating the retaliation suffered in this case, amici found the 
court interpreted adverse employment action narrowly using the Title VII’s substantive 
provisions, which “forbid an employer from discriminating against an employee in 
hiring, firing, and the compensation, terms, and conditions of employment, or privileges 
of employment” (p. 17). Instead, amici argued that the court should have applied Title 
VII’s anti-retaliation provisions which contains no reference to this language and “is not 
limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment 
[which is also] true under First Amendment retaliation doctrine in the context of public 
employment” (p. 18). While courts have argued that a broader chilling-effect test would 
result in a legal claim for “any trivial or de minimis government action” (pp. 18-19) 
toward public employees, amici disagreed and stated that the test would not result in 
“limitless First Amendment litigation…because it restricts actionable violations of the 




a reasonable public employee from engaging in speech” (p.19). As such, they concluded 
that the standard used by the court inappropriately contextualized the employer’s 
retaliation based on a material change in employment rather than its long-term effect on 
employee speech.  
 Second, amici argued that “First Amendment retaliation claims ought to focus on 
the impact that the employer’s retaliatory conduct has on speech rather than on whether 
that conduct fits the category of adverse employment action” (p. 19). They stated that 
“the proper First Amendment inquiry should focus not on which category of formal 
employment action the government’s conduct fits, but on the impact the retaliatory 
conduct has on an employee’s willingness to speak” (p. 20). Amici added that adverse 
employment actions can result in “burden[ing] faculty members in ways that could deter 
them from…engaging in the type of expression that prompted the University to impose 
these types of burdens” (p. 21). An investigation was one type of adverse action, which 
could lead to free speech being chilled or a faculty member being driven to resign.    
 Third, amici argued that “the determination of whether the University’s conduct 
could have violated the First Amendment is a fact- and case-specific inquiry that should 
be determined by the jury where there is sufficient evidence to support the plaintiff’s 
claim” (p. 22). Amici reiterated the trial jury’s conclusion “that the University fired 
Churchill because of his protected speech (p. 23) and stated that 
it is hardly a stretch to infer that it might have found the same evidence to 
support a finding that the University’s conduct in launching a full-scale 
investigation of Churchill was also retaliatory–that is, that it would have deterred 
a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in future speech and was motivated 




Amici found that there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the investigation was 
retaliatory and that the “retaliatory investigation would have chilled the speech of a 
person of ordinary firmness” (p. 24). As such, amici concluded, “the trial court’s direct 
verdict was in error and conflicts with prevailing law” (p. 25). 
Court of appeals decision expands quasi-judicial immunity. Amici argued that 
the Court’s granting of absolute judicial immunity to the Regents was inconsistent with 
law and “severely undermines the effectiveness of Section 1983 as a tool for enforcing 
constitutional remedies” (p. 25). Amici contended that (a) “the Regents are not entitled 
to common law absolute immunity from damages because they functioned in this case 
not as quasi-judicial officers, but as an employer” (p. 26), and (b) “extending absolute 
immunity to the Regents would create a perverse incentive for all public employers to 
restructure their employment decision-making processes by creating judicial boards to 
fire employees, thus undermining the enforcement of a wide range of Constitutional 
rights” (p. 30).   
 First, amici contended that the Regents were not employing a quasi-judicial 
function that entitled them as public officials to absolute immunity. While courts have 
“extended such immunity to a narrow category of officials who are not judges” (p. 26), 
amici stated that it should be used sparingly and that “officials who seek exemption from 
personal liability have the burden of showing that such an exemption is justified by 
overriding considerations of public policy” (p. 26), and that it should be extended to “a 
narrow group of officials who are not judges, but who carry out functions that are 




was not the case with the Regents as (a) they functioned under Colorado state law as the 
employer of University faculty…with the authority to hire and terminate employees” (p. 
28), and (b) they did not function as a neutral adjudicative body as they authorized the 
investigation and commented publicly before and during the dispute. Even as 
Churchill’s employer, amici concluded that absolute immunity should be removed 
because the Regents are protected by qualified immunity in “their individual capacities 
which is highly protective of official discretion” (p. 29) and, also, indemnified under 
state law as public officials which allows them to make decisions and perform their 
official duties without fear of reprisal.  
 Second, amici contended that, “if the Supreme Court upholds the appellate 
court’s decision conferring absolute common law immunity on the Regents from suits 
for damages, there will be enormous ramifications in a vast range of public employment 
settings” (p. 30). Amici argued that conferring absolute immunity and making these 
public officials immune from lawsuit would negate a public employee’s ability to sue 
their employer for “engaging in egregious, intentional violations of the constitutional 
rights” (p. 30) and “transform the employee termination processes from an 
administrative functions into quasi-judicial ones” (p. 30). Amici warned that this type of 
transformation would allow universities to use their quasi-judicial actions to “undermine 
enforcement in any case where a public employer is accused of unconstitutional 
discrimination [and] preclude public employees from pursuing any number of statutory 
discrimination claims” (p. 31). For these reasons, amici held that the Regent should be 




Adding administrators not the intent of Section 1983. Section 1983, amended in 
1996, states, “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken 
in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable” (p. 32). This 
language was added to protect judges from damages, not administrators, or in this case, 
Regents. While some courts have applied these standards for public officials who act in 
a quasi-judicial manner, amici argued that the Regents are not entitled to, nor require 
this protection. Amici stated that the Regents are not entitled because they “are not 
actually or functionally ‘judicial officers’ within the meaning of Section 1983 [but 
rather] Ward Churchill’s employer” and not required because, as Regents, they are 
protected by state law and not “exposed to any liability for damages or attorneys’ fees in 
this case, even should Churchill prevail on all counts” (p. 35). Finally, amici argued that 
the trial court’s inclusion of the Regents as judicial officers “within the meaning of 
Section 1983 [was] troubling because it substantially dilute[d] an important piece of the 
nation’s constitutional remedies scheme” (p. 35). Amici added that the intent of this 
scheme was to allow the court to find an alternative relief when one type of remedy is 
barred for policy reasons” (p. 36), thus “deterring unconstitutional conduct and 
providing a recourse and remedy for injured parties” (p. 36). Amici resolved that, “if the 
appellate court’s holding is upheld, Ward Churchill will have suffered an unequivocal 
violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech, but will be left without any 
recourse, either in the form of damages or in the form of reinstatement” (pp. 36-37).  As 




case…remanded to the trial court” (p. 37). Amici respectfully submitted the amicus brief 
to the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado on September 12, 2011. 
 Supreme Court of Colorado. On May 31, 2011, the Supreme Court for 
Colorado granted Churchill’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review his case 
(Churchill, 2011). The issues that the Court agreed to review included, 
1. Whether the granting of quasi-judicial immunity to the Regents of the 
University of Colorado for their termination of a tenured professor comports with 
federal law for actions brought under [Section] 1983. 
2. Whether the denial of equitable remedies for termination in violation of the 
First Amendment undermines the purposes of [Section] 1983. 
3. Whether a public University’s investigation of a tenured professor’s work 
product can constitute an adverse employment action for the purposes of a First 
Amendment claim brought under [Section] 1983 when, as a result of the 
investigation, the tenured professor also experiences adverse employment action. 
(Churchill, 2012, p. 15) 
Judge Bender delivered the opinion of the court and the analysis of the issues. 
Quasi and absolute immunity. The court found that the Regents and the 
University administrators had quasi-judicial immunity due to the practices and policies 
followed throughout their investigation. Bender established that “the Supreme Court has 
recognized that public officials, in their individual capacities, may be immune from suits 
seeking compensatory damages under two distinct common law doctrines of immunity: 
qualified immunity and absolute immunity” (p. 20). Defining each, Bender stated, 
[q]ualified immunity applies to a public official’s conduct when she takes a 
discretionary action that a reasonable person would not know violates a clearly 
established constitutional right of the plaintiff [while] absolute immunity protects 
a public official’s conduct that violates a plaintiff’s constitutional rights even if 




Adding, “the doctrine of absolute immunity has…been extended to provide immunity 
for the quasi-judicial decision-making powers that the legislature or Constitution vests in 
certain administrative officials” (p. 21). This form of immunity provides a “public 
official with complete and total immunity from suit, irrespective of how egregious or 
unlawful the action may have been” (p. 23). Bender stated that this  
logic has been extended in some instances to provide absolute immunity to other 
public officials tasked with quasi-judicial decision-making 
responsibilities…because, as the Supreme Court has concluded, some quasi-
judicial actions are so similar in function to that of the judiciary that the threat of 
liability for those actions implicates the…the need to preserve the neutrality of 
such functions and to protect the officials carrying them out from the constant 
threat of frivolous litigation for merely doing the job that society has collectively 
asked them to do. (p. 24)   
To determine if the Regents acted in a quasi-judicial manner, the Supreme Court defined 
all factors that must be satisfied as follows: 
(a) the need to assure that the individual can perform his functions without 
harassment or intimidation; (b) the presence of safeguards that reduce the need 
for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct; 
(c) insulation from political influence; (d) the importance of precedent; (e) the 
adversary nature of the process; and (f) the correctability of error on appeal. (p. 
25)   
After a reviewing each factor, Bender concluded that the Regents acted in a judicial 
manner and, therefore, granted quasi-judicial immunity. 
 Equitable relief. Bender addressed Churchill’s claim that he was entitled to 
equitable relief in the form of “reinstatement and front pay under Section 1983, given 
the jury’s finding that his employment was terminated in retaliation for his controversial 
essay” (Churchill, 2012, p. 38). In his claim, Churchill asserted, “that even if the 




judicial absolute immunity, the trial court erred by failing to consider his claim for 
prospective injunctive relief” (p. 39). Citing Simmons, he added, the court “held that 
equitable remedies for Section 1983 violations could be enforced against quasi-judicial 
officers, irrespective of any common law quasi-judicial absolute immunity from suits 
seeking monetary damages” (pp. 39-40). In response, the University referenced Pelletier 
(2008) which “reject[ed] this reading and [held] that quasi-judicial officers are included 
within Section1983’s exemption for judicial officers from suits in equity” (p. 40). 
Instead of arguing federal court precedent, Bender turned to the trial court’s decision.  
 The trial court denied Churchill’s claim of equitable relief and award him 
nominal damages in the amount of $1. The trial court’s ruling held that  
Churchill’s request for equitable remedies was not justified given the 
combination of Churchill’s academic dishonesty, the strained relationship 
between the employer and employee, the jury verdict of one dollar in 
compensatory damages, and his failure to mitigate his alleged damages. (p. 40) 
Bender reviewed the trial court’s ruling to determine if they had erred and if their “denial 
of both front pay and reinstatement [was] an abuse of discretion” (p. 41).  
 To begin his analysis, Bender recognized that “the [trial] jury verdict by necessary 
implication reflects the resolution of a common factual issue…the [trial] court may not 
ignore that determination” (p. 41). The trail court’s decision to deny reinstatement was based 
on their finding  
that the relationship between Churchill and the University was marred by an absence 
of mutual trust and thus was irretrievably broken[,] that forcing the University to 
reinstate Churchill would result in a substantial distraction that would negatively 
impact the University’s core mission to educate its students and advance academic 
and scientific research[,] that ordering Churchill’s reinstatement would impair the 
University’s ability to ensure that its faculty maintained rigorous levels of academic 




tarnish the reputation of the institution generally and the Ethnic Studies Department 
specifically. (pp. 42-43) 
Concerning front pay, Bender added that it  
was inappropriate because Churchill failed to show that he had made any attempt to 
mitigate his lost salary during the period between the termination of his tenured 
employment and the initiation of the present suit, and the jury determined that he 
suffered nominal damages of one dollar. (p. 43) 
As such, Bender found that the trial court had not erred or abused its discretion in denying 
Churchill’s reinstatement and front pay claims and “affirmed the denial of Churchill’s 
request for equitable relief” (p. 43). 
Bad faith investigation claim. Finally, Bender reviewed Churchill’ claim “that 
the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s directed verdict in favor of the 
Regents on his bad faith investigation claim…because it found that the investigation did 
not constitute an adverse employment action” (p. 44). He based his claim on two factors. 
First, Churchill argue[d] that the Regents’ investigation constituted an adverse 
employment action.  Second, he contend[ed] that the investigation claim is not 
duplicative of his termination claim, and thus, the Regents’ potential immunity from 
the termination claim cannot subsume a separate analysis of immunity on his 
investigation claim. (p. 44) 
 In order to address these factors, Bender first needed to consider “the threshold issue 
of immunity before considering whether the investigation constituted an adverse 
employment action” (p. 44) and began with the “question of whether the Regents [were] 
entitled to the protection of qualified immunity for their decision to investigate Churchill’s 
academic integrity (p. 45). Bender recognized that the standard of  
qualified immunity balances [on] two important interests—the need to hold public 
officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield 
officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties 




To evaluate these interests, 
[t]he Supreme Court has established a two-pronged inquiry to determine whether a 
public official’s action is entitled to qualified immunity. Under the first prong, we 
view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and look to see whether the 
allegedly wrongful conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right or law. The 
second prong requires us to determine whether that statutory or constitutional right 
or law was “clearly established” in the context in which the claim arose. That is, 
“whether it would be clear to a reasonable [public official] that his conduct was 
unlawful in the situation he confronted. (p. 46)  
After review, Bender concluded, “that a reasonable public official would not know that the 
initiation of an employment investigation in response to protected speech would be 
unlawful, (p. 48) and therefore, the second prong of the test cannot be met. As such, Bender 
found that the trail court “did not err in granting the Regents’ motion for a directed verdict 
on Churchill’s bad faith investigation claim” (p. 49) and denied all of Churchill’s claims. 
Analysis 
 The Churchill case was filed in the District Court of the City and County of 
Denver, Colorado in July 2007 and decided by the Supreme Court of Colorado on 
September 10, 2012. The analysis of the opinions and briefs of the district court, amicus 
brief to the court of appeals, court of appeals, amicus brief to the Supreme Court of 
Colorado, and the Supreme Court of Colorado identified 10 themes with 118, 110, 132, 
108 and 65 coded references respectively for a total of 533 coded references. The 
themes, the corresponding number of coded references in each court opinion, and the 
total references for each theme are provided in Table 8.1. The themes are sorted by the 
total column from largest to smallest to illustrate a hierarchy of the most significant 
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8 7 17 32 2 66 
Reinstatement to 
the University 




3 10 28 4 6 51 
Equitable relief - 
nominal damages 
11 12 5 6 11 45 






13 8 1 0 2 24 
Academic freedom 1 8 6 3 1 19 
Professional 
integrity 
8 3 0 0 0 11 
Totals of opinions 
and briefs 
118 110 132 108 65 533 
 In order to validate the theme ranking, the researcher developed two queries to 
determine the most frequently used words in all the opinions and briefs. The usage of 
each word was reviewed and assigned to each of the above themes. The first query 
scanned word frequency across all the court opinions to identify the 50 most prevalent 
three or more letter keywords. Each keyword’s contextual usage in each court opinion 





one or more adjacent words from the opinions or briefs to improve meaning. Themes 
with no applicable keywords utilized the theme title or words within the title. These 
were added to the list of keywords or phrases. These keywords and two or more word 
phrases were aligned with each theme and used in a second text search query across all 
the opinions to determine the number of references in each court opinion and brief and 
compared to the theme coding hierarchy to validate them. 
Of the original 50 keywords queried, 25 remained relevant to the analysis and 25 
were dropped due to irrelevance, vagueness, or lack specificity. Nine of the remaining 
keywords were used individually or combined with NVivo search wildcards (~, *) to 
reduce redundancy. In addition, 10 words were defined and applied to themes that had 
no keywords found in the query. Fourteen phrases consisting of keywords and adjacent 
words in the opinions or theme titles were also identified. Each keyword and phrase was 
aligned with one of the 10 themes and used in the second word search query to count the 
number of times the words or phrases were referenced in each opinion and brief. Each 
occurrence in each opinion was reviewed to eliminate redundancy. Where redundancy 
was found, the query was refined and rerun. The query results were tabulated by court 
opinion and brief and sorted in descending order by the total number of references for 





Keywords and Phrases Totaled Theme and Court Cases or Brief and Sorted by Theme 
















Immunity of Public 
Officials 
Quasi, qualified immunity, absolute 
immunity, immune, matter of law, public 
official, Section 1983 
71 65 86 75 220 517 
Adverse 
employment action 
Retaliat*, adverse, investigation, 
dismissal 
40 6 172 147 109 474 
First Amendment First Amendment, constitutional, 
protected speech, free speech 
21 58 43 104 57 283 
Reinstatement to 
the University 
Reinstat*, remedy 85 120 18 16 29 268 
Professional 
Integrity 
Integrity, misconduct 27 11 40 8 41 127 
Equitable relief - 
nominal damages 
Equitable relief, injunctive relief, 
nominal damages 










Irrepar*, hostil*, trust, relationship 13 17 2 1 10 43 
Chilling Effect Chill* 1 2 8 19 3 33 
Academic Freedom Academic freedom, special concern 1 9 4 2 0 16 
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The theme rankings in Table 8.1 and 8.2 were compared to validate the hierarchy of the 
themes and identify anomalies. As indicated in the tables, the four most prevalent 
themes were immunity of public officials, First Amendment, adverse employment 
action, and reinstatement to the University. To determine the linear relationship between 
each of these themes, a Pearson correlation coefficient of word similarity was calculated 
as shown in Table 8.3. The highest correlations were between the First Amendment and 
adverse employment action themes (0.89357) and the First Amendment and 
reinstatement to the University themes (0.80651). 
Table 8.3 












Immunity of public officials 1.00000 0.71270 0.68663 0.64188 
First Amendment 0.71270 1.00000 0.80651 0.89357 
Reinstatement to the 
University 
0.68663 0.80651 1.00000 0.70240 
Adverse employment action 0.64188 0.89357 0.70240 1.00000 
 The prevalent themes are discussed based on the order provided in Table 8.4. A 




















Immunity of public officials 48 19 41 21 33 162 
First Amendment 8 16 25 25 4 78 
Adverse employment action 8 7 17 32 2 66 







Figure 8.1. Four Most Prevalent Themes Based on Coded References 
 Immunity of public officials. The immunity of public officials was the most 
prevalent theme. The theme focused on the University and the board of Regents’ right to 
immunity based on federal and state law and their role as a quasi-judicial body when 
enforcing University policy and procedures. One hundred and sixty-two references were 
coded from the opinions and briefs with 48, 19, 41, 21, and 33 in the district court, 


























District Court Amicus Brief 
to Court of 
Appeals 
















Immunity of public officials First Amendment 




of Colorado, and the Supreme Court of Colorado respectively. Based on a matrix coding 
query of all themes and reference coding bands within the opinions and briefs, the theme 
overlapped the neutrality of the University’s decision-making, equitable relief-nominal 
damages, reinstatement to the University, and adverse employment action themes 16, 8, 
5, and 4 times respectively. Table 8.5 provides the results of the query for each opinion 
and brief. The analysis includes examples from each court opinion and brief showing 









Amicus Brief to 
Court of Appeals 
Court of 
Appeals 






Neutrality of University’s decision-
making 
3 6 5 1 1 16 
Equitable relief - nominal damages 0 2 0 0 6 8 
Reinstatement to the University 0 3 2 0 0 5 





District court. The district court considered the University’s motion for 
immunity “on the ground[s] that it is barred [them from lawsuit] by the doctrine of 
quasi-judicial immunity” (Churchill, 2009, p. 2). To alleviate legal costs and expedite 
the case, the University agreed to  
waive its immunity to claims for damages under the Eleventh Amendment to the 
United States Constitution to permit the same recovery from the University that 
might otherwise be had against any of its officials or employees acting in their 
official or individual capacities, reserving to the University the ability to present 
the same defenses that would have been applicable to any of its officials or 
employees acting in their official or individual capacities. (p. 4) 
In doing so, the University could use quasi-immunity as a defense and eliminate the 
multiple lawsuits that would have occurred if Churchill sued the University and each 
Regent separately. 
 Judge Naves reiterated the Supreme Court’s recognition of immunity for public 
officials in Butz stating, “[w]hen government officials make judgments that are 
‘functionally comparable’ to those of judges, quasi-judicial immunity creates an absolute 
bar to liability” (p. 9) and that this type of “immunity exists not because of an official’s 
particular location within the Government but because of the special nature of [his or 
her] responsibilities” (p. 9). Quoting Widder, he added that, “where an official applies 
preexisting legal standards or policy considerations to present or past facts presented to 
the governmental body, then one can say with reasonable certainty that the governmental 
body is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity” (p. 11). These standards, policies, and 
proceedings included those required to discipline and terminate faculty. 
 In reviewing the University’s process, Naves found that the “[r]egents performed 




Churchill’s case and terminated his employment” (p. 14). On review, he determined that 
the 
decision occurred with sufficient procedural protections for the Court to grant 
quasi-judicial immunity, including: (1) the right to notice of charges; (2) the right 
to request a hearing before a faculty committee; (3) the right to challenge the 
participation of a member of the faculty committee; (4) the requirement that the 
University prove that grounds for dismissal exist by clear and convincing 
evidence; (5) the requirement that the University transcribe the hearing; (6) the 
right to representation by counsel; (7) the right to examine each University 
witness; (8) the right to present witnesses; (9) the right to present oral and written 
closing arguments; (10) the right to respond to the faculty committee’s findings; 
(11) the right to request a hearing before the Board of Regents; (12) the 
requirement that the Board of Regents consider only the evidence in the record; 
(13) the requirement that the Board of Regents take final action in a public 
meeting; and (14) the right of judicial review of the Board of Regents’ decision. 
(p. 18) 
As such, Naves found that the Regents satisfied the criteria for performing their judicial 
role. 
While Churchill argued, “the University is not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity 
because the University waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity” (p. 18), Naves 
disagreed, asserting that each type of immunity is different. He stated that “quasi-
judicial immunity examines the type of action giving rise to the claim [and that,] if the 
government official performs a judicial action, he is immune from liability, even if he 
cannot claim Eleventh Amendment immunity” (p. 18). In turn, Churchill rebutted that 
“quasi-judicial immunity should not apply because the Regents are elected into office 
and subject to political pressure” (p. 19). Naves disagreed, stating that the “proper focus 
is upon the function that the governmental official performs, not the means by which he 




nature” (p. 20). As such, Naves granted quasi-judicial immunity as a matter of law to the 
University and Regents. 
Amicus brief to court of appeals. Amici contended that the trial court erred in (a) 
granting quasi-judicial immunity to the University and Regents and (b) barring 
injunctive relief against them in the face of the jury’s decision that Churchill’s First 
Amendment rights had been violated. Amici reiterated Butz stating that “[t]he trial court 
ignored Supreme Court case law emphasizing the limited availability of absolute 
immunity and the importance of neutrality and independence in decision makers 
entitled to this quasi-judicial immunity” (ACLU, 2010, p. 2). Amici argued that “the 
Regents were far from neutral or independent, as they represent[ed] the University, 
Churchill’s employer” (p. 15) and were “never separated from their roles as 
administrators of the University who generally supervise[d] the University, exercise[d]  
exclusive  control  over its funds and appropriations, and appointed faculty members” 
(pp. 15-16). Amici cautioned that upholding the district court’s decision  
effectively mean[t] that regardless of the deep commitment to academic 
freedom, a professor [could] not ever recover on [an injunctive relief] claim 
for unconstitutional termination based on the First Amendment, no matter 
how egregious or unconstitutional the termination, because the Board of 
Regents, the entity with the ultimate authority to terminate professors, is 
absolutely immune from liability for damages and injunctive relief is not 
available. (p. 10) 
In Colorado, the decision would deny “the availability of a remedy to over 8,000 
professors in the University of Colorado System who could otherwise be terminated 




immunity [was] not appropriate in such circumstances where individuals are not 
professional hearing officers, but [rather] officials...temporarily diverted from their 
usual duties...under obvious pressure to resolve a disciplinary dispute in favor of the 
institution” (p. 16). As such, amici concluded that the Regents should not be entitled 
to absolute immunity. 
Court of appeals. The court of appeals reviewed Churchill’s motion that the 
district court erred in granting quasi-judicial immunity to the University and the 
Regents. Churchill contended  
that the University and the Regents failed to satisfy four specific conditions of 
immunity: that the Regents were not an independent body of hearing officers; 
that the Regents evinced bias which barred them from considering his 
discipline; that there is no adequate means of reviewing the Regents’ 
decision; and that quasi-judicial immunity was not available as a defense. 
(Churchill, 2010, p. 11) 
In de novo, Judge Graham rejected Churchill’s motion and discussed the process 
followed by the Regents and each contention individually. 
 Graham determined that the Regent’s process “incorporate[d] many of the 
characteristics of the judicial process” (p. 19). He stated that the “entire process 
employed by the Regents followed strict guidelines under laws promulgated by them, 
afforded adequate notice of public hearings, and invoked an adversary process in 
which Churchill was represented by counsel and permitted to introduce evidence, 
examine witnesses, and make argument” (p. 19). He added that “the nature of the 
decision reached by the University and its Regents, and the process by which that 




warrant absolute immunity from liability” (pp. 21-22). The process provided the 
following. 
• [An] investigation of the allegations of Churchill’s research misconduct 
and the dismissal process involved twenty-five faculty members (six 
Inquiry Committee members, five Investigative Committee members, nine 
SCRM members, and five P&T Committee members);  
• Dismissal was only determined upon proof of cause, including clear and 
convincing evidence of “conduct which [fell] below minimum standards 
of professional integrity.” 
• Churchill received written notification of the intent to dismiss and was 
granted the right to contest it with the aid of counsel.  
• Churchill exercised his right to request that specific P&T Committee 
members be excluded.  
• Churchill exercised his right to be represented by counsel at various stages 
of the proceedings. 
• Churchill was granted the right to have fellow faculty members sit as the 
members of the P&T Committee.  
• Churchill exercised his right to cross-examine witnesses.  
• Churchill presented witnesses, including expert witnesses.  
• Churchill was granted the right to present opening statements.  
• Churchill exercised his right to present both oral and written closing 
arguments.  
• The University was required to demonstrate grounds for Churchill’s 
dismissal by clear and convincing evidence.  
• Churchill had the benefit of a written report prepared by the P&T 
Committee which contained findings of fact, conclusions, and 
recommendations.  
• Churchill exercised his right to object to the P&T Committee’s findings 
and recommendations.  
• Churchill had the right to file a written report with the Board of Regents 
regarding the University President’s recommendation for dismissal.  
• Churchill demanded and was granted under the Laws a hearing before the 
Board of Regents in which he was represented by counsel who presented 





• The Board of Regents’ decision was limited to the record of the case and 
the transcript of the proceedings before the P&T Committee. (Here, 
Churchill was afforded both a transcribed record and a video record of 
proceedings.);  
• The Board of Regents was required to take action on the President’s 
recommendation in a public meeting. (pp. 26-28) 
 
As the University followed policies and procedures that resembled a judicial process, 
Graham found no error in the district court’s justification for applying quasi-
immunity in this case.  
 Next, Graham reviewed Churchill’s contentions that the Regents were not 
independent and, therefore, biased against him. Graham stated,  
[d]ecisions to discipline professors who do not meet standards of integrity or 
scholarship will no doubt be unpopular and disputed [but that] such self-
policing does not indicate bias and it ought not subject faculty and the 
Regents to liability for enforcement. (p. 32) 
He argued, “[t]he only way to preserve academic freedom is to keep claims of 
academic error out of the legal maw [and] even against claims of bias, a judge or an 
official performing quasi-judicial functions can be immune from suit” (p. 32). As 
such, he rejected Churchill’s claims. 
 Finally, Graham reviewed Churchill’s contention that there was no adequate 
way for appeal as the district court’s granting of quasi-judicial immunity 
circumvented his availability of a defense. Graham rejected the claim stating,  
Churchill ignore[d] his own stipulation that as part of the trial process, the 
University would be entitled to claim the defense of quasi-judicial immunity 
in exchange for dismissal of individuals and the ability of the University to 




Graham upheld the district courts holding of quasi-judicial immunity for the 
University and Regents.  
Amicus brief to the Supreme Court of Colorado. Amici, the ACLU, argued that 
the court’s broadening of quasi-judicial immunity “unjustifiably leaves public 
employees who suffer any constitutional violations without any remedy and completely 
insulates a vast range of administrative officials from legal accountability” (ACLU, 
2011, p. 2). Amici acknowledged that “traditional judges are absolutely immune from 
damages claims for constitutional violations [which has been] extended…to a narrow 
category of officials who are not judges, but who carry out functions that are closely 
analogous to the conventional judicial process” (pp. 26-27). But, amici warned, “[t]his 
does not mean…that all executive or administrative officials can cloak themselves with 
the protection of absolute immunity simply by characterizing their work as judicial” (p. 
27). In this case, amici contended, “the Board of Regents [were] at all times functioning 
as an employer, not a neutral quasi-judicial body” (p. 27). Amici argued that if the 
decision is upheld, “public employers across the state [would] have a compelling 
incentive to artificially transform their employment termination processes, which have 
historically been understood as administrative functions, into quasi-judicial ones” (p. 
30). Additionally, amici stated, “[t]his restructuring of the public employment process 
[would] affect not only free speech cases such as this one, but all other constitutional 
claims where an employee assert[ed] that his or her public employer engaged in 
unconstitutional discrimination” (p. 31). Without the ability to hold officials 




the courts and “preclude [other] public employees from pursuing any number of 
statutory discrimination claims” (p. 31). Amici concluded their brief stating that quasi-
judicial immunity “was intended to protect state judges, not administrative officials like 
the members of the University’s Board of Regents [and that the] limitations on equitable 
relief should be read to apply only to defendants who are traditional judicial officers, 
such as justices, judges and magistrates” (p. 33). As such, amici asked that the Supreme 
Court of Colorado to reverse the court of appeals’ decision and remand the case for trial. 
Supreme Court of Colorado. The Supreme Court held that that the Regents were 
entitled to absolute immunity and that Churchill’s “bad-faith investigation [was] barred 
by qualified immunity as the Regents’ investigation into Churchill’s academic record 
does not implicate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right or law” 
(Churchill, 2012, p. 1). Chief Justice Bender stated that the “Supreme Court has 
recognized that public officials, in their individual capacities, may be immune from suits 
seeking compensatory damages under two distinct common law doctrines of immunity: 
qualified immunity and absolute immunity” (p. 20). Each type of immunity protects 
public officials from liability when they act in their official capacities.  
Qualified immunity applies to a public official’s conduct when [he or she takes] 
a discretionary action that a reasonable person would not know violates a clearly 
established constitutional right of the plaintiff. [A]bsolute immunity protects a 
public official’s conduct that violates a plaintiff’s constitutional rights even if 
that conduct was malicious [and] is available to a narrower class of public 
officials, those whose special functions or constitutional status requires complete 





Bender added that, “[u]nder Supreme Court precedent, neither absolute nor qualified 
immunity applies to Section 1983 [civil rights] actions where plaintiffs seek equitable 
relief” (p. 22). Bender reviewed Churchill’s claims that the court erred in granting this 
immunity to the University and Regents separately.  
 Bender found that the Regents were entitled to “absolute immunity because their 
role as quasi-judicial public officials was functionally comparable to the role of a judge” 
(p. 23). He recognized the Supreme Court’s caution in applying the doctrine stating that 
it has been applied “sparingly [in] those exceptional situations where it is demonstrated 
that absolute immunity is essential for the conduct of the public business” (p. 23) and 
where “decisions…might be compromised if subjected to the constant threat of 
retaliatory litigation” (p. 24). He contended, “[a]lthough not categorically protected by 
absolute immunity in the same way that judges and prosecutors are, officials [such as the 
Regents] engaged in quasi-judicial decision-making [or actions] may be absolutely 
shielded from liability for acts that are ‘functionally comparable’ to that of a judge” (p. 
25). To determine if the Regents have immunity based on their quasi-judicial actions, the 
Supreme Court in Cleavinger (1985) enumerated a list of 6 factors. 
(a) [T]he need to assure that the individual can perform his functions without 
harassment or intimidation; (b) the presence of safeguards that reduce the need 
for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct; 
(c) insulation from political influence; (d) the importance of precedent; (e) the 
adversary nature of the process; and (f) the correctability of error on appeal. (p. 
25) 
Bender concluded, “Churchill’s argument that [the lower court’s] holding that 
the Regents were entitled to absolute immunity from Section 1983 liability grant[ed] 




[was] incorrect” (p. 36) and that their “termination of Churchill was a quasi-judicial act 
[which] entitled [them] to protection by absolute immunity” (p. 37). He stated 
Congress’s 1996 amendment to Section 1983 did not, however, clarify whether 
the exemption from suits seeking equitable relief against judicial officers extends 
to include quasi-judicial officers in the same manner that judicial absolute 
immunity has been extended to include certain quasi-judicial actions. (p. 39) 
In reviewing the precedent provided by the University, he found that the Regents acted 
in a quasi-judicial manner, are included in the Section 1983 exemption and, therefore, 
immune. 
 Next, Bender reviewed Churchill’s claim that the Regents should not be provided 
qualified immunity.  
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, a public official is shielded from 
liability only when the conduct in question constitutes an activity that a 
reasonable person would not know is in violation of a “clearly established” 
federal statutory or constitutional right or law (p. 45) 
To determine whether the Regents have qualified immunity, Bender applied the 
Supreme Court’s two-prong inquiry in Saucer (2001). The first examined 
the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and look[s] to see whether the 
allegedly wrongful conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right or law [and 
the] second…requires [the court] to determine whether that statutory or 
constitutional right or law was ‘clearly established’ in the context in which the 
claim arose.  (p. 46) 
As Churchill’s claim addressed a clearly established constitutional law, Bender skipped 
the first prong and moved on to the second. Bender recognized, 
 [t]he Supreme Court has not articulated a standard for determining whether a 
particular type of employment action allegedly taken in retaliation for free 
speech implicates a clearly established statutory or constitutional right or law in 




Lacking clear guidance, Bender stated, “a reasonable public official would not know that 
the initiation of an employment investigation in response to protected speech would be 
unlawful” (p. 48). Given the uncertainty in the case law, he found that the Regents are 
shielded by the doctrine of qualified immunity. 
 First Amendment. The First Amendment theme focused on the Churchill’s right 
to protected free speech and the University’s violation of his protected right, which 
resulted in his termination. Seventy-four references were coded from the opinions and 
briefs with 8, 16, 25, 25, and 4 in the district court opinion, amicus curiae brief to the 
court of appeals, court of appeals opinion, amicus brief to the Supreme Court of 
Colorado, and Supreme Court of Colorado opinion respectively. Based on a matrix 
coding query of all themes and reference coding bands within the opinions and briefs, 
the theme overlapped the adverse employment action, chilling effect, reinstatement to 
the University, and equitable relief - nominal damages themes 29, 10, 7, and 6 times 
respectively. Table 8.6 provides the results of the query for each opinion and brief. The 
analysis includes examples from each court opinion and brief showing how these four 










Amicus Brief to 
Court of Appeals 
Court of 
Appeals 






Adverse employment action 3 4 5 17 0 29 
Chilling effect 1 0 0 8 1 10 
Reinstatement to the University 1 6 0 0 0 7 
Equitable relief - nominal damages 2 3 1 0 0 6 
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District court. The district court reviewed Churchill’s case in two parts. The first 
was a trial by jury to determine if his constitutional rights had been violated and, if so, 
damages awarded and the second a review by the district court Judge Naves to 
determine equitable relief. Naves instructed the trial jury to consider all the reasons for 
Churchill’s termination in their deliberations. In their verdict, the jury found “that a 
majority of the members of the Board used Professor Churchill’s protected speech as a 
motivating factor in their decision to terminate his employment” (p. 26) and “that the 
University failed to demonstrate that Professor Churchill would have been terminated in 
the absence of his protected speech” (p. 27). The jury was also instructed by Naves that, 
if they did not find any damages, they could award Churchill one dollar for nominal 
damages, which they did. 
Next, Naves reviewed Churchill’s request for equitable relief including 
reinstatement for the jury’s finding that his constitutional rights were violated. Naves 
started by stating that he is “bound by the jury’s implicit finding that Professor Churchill 
has suffered ‘no actual damages’ as a result of the constitutional violation” (p. 29). 
Referencing the Supreme Court’s decision in Memphis Community School District, 
Nave acknowledged that “[n]ominal damages, and not damages based upon some 
indefinable ‘value’ of infringed rights, are the appropriate means of ‘vindicating’ rights 
whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury” (p. 29) which the Tenth 
Circuit  has also followed. With no finding on actual damages, Naves considered 





In deciding to reinstate, Naves weighed “the potential harms of reinstatement 
against the potential benefits of reinstatement [against] whether denying reinstatement 
[would] effectively prevent Professor Churchill from exercising his First Amendment 
rights” (p. 39). Naves referenced retaliatory statements made by Churchill demonstrating 
“a miniscule possibility that his return to the University [would] be amicable and 
productive” (p. 38). Because “Churchill continues to publish articles, write books, give 
paid invited lectures at other institutions, and even give lectures on the University of 
Colorado campus” (p. 40), he determined that nothing was preventing him from 
exercising his free speech or would cause “a ‘chilling effect’ on the University of 
Colorado’s campus” (p. 40). Naves concluded that the harm of reinstatement outweighed 
the benefits. 
Amicus brief to court of appeals. Amici, the AAUP, urged the court of appeals 
to reverse the district court’s decision in order “to preserve the protections of the First 
Amendment for University professors and to ensure that the University of Colorado and 
other universities cannot violate the constitutional rights of University professors with 
impunity” (ACLU, 2010, p. 4). Amici argued that the trial jury’s decision “that 
Churchill’s First Amendment rights were violated [and the court’s ruling] that Churchill 
was not entitled to a remedy for the violation of these rights” (p. 10) would have a 
detrimental effect on faculty speech rights. These decisions mean that 
regardless of the deep commitment to academic freedom, a professor cannot ever 
recover on a…claim for unconstitutional  termination based on the First 
Amendment, no matter how egregious or unconstitutional  the termination, 
because the Board of Regents–the entity with the ultimate authority to terminate 




Making matters worse, the court also held that even if reinstatement were an 
available remedy, a professor would still not be entitled to reinstatement if, as is 
to be expected in the vast majority of such situations, the professor…has some 
hard feelings and choice words for those who unconstitutionally terminated him 
or her in the first place. (pp. 10-11) 
Amici stated that “the trial court should have awarded…a remedy for this legal wrong if 
it truly wanted to comply with the jury’s verdict that Churchill’s First Amendment rights 
were violated” (p. 26) and that “[t]he jury’s decision not to award monetary relief…does 
not mean that they believed that he was not harmed or wronged by the University’s 
decision to terminate him for his protected speech, or that he should not be reinstated” 
(p. 26). As such, amici concluded Churchill deserved a remedy for the violation his 
constitutional rights–reinstatement to the University. 
Court of appeals. The court of appeals reviewed Churchill’s claims “that the 
investigation and termination (1) were unlawful adverse employment actions in violation 
of his rights…and (2) were in retaliation of his exercise of First Amendment rights 
[adding that] the Regents were always going to fire him” (pp. 8-9). Judge Graham 
repeated the decision of the trial jury that 
the Board of Regents of the University of Colorado use[d] [Churchill’s] 
protected speech activity as a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to 
discharge [him] from employment,…that the termination harmed Churchill, 
[and] that the University and the Regents had not shown by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Churchill would have been dismissed for reasons other than his 
exercise of free speech. (p. 9) 
To determine if Churchill’s rights were violated, Graham stated that an adverse 
employment action must have occurred and that the retaliation for that action must be 




Churchill’s claim that his speech resulted in the University’s investigation which he 
claimed was adverse employment action. 
 Based on other circuit court decisions, Graham established that “an employer 
must be permitted to investigate the potential misconduct of its employee without the 
fear of the investigation being interpreted as an adverse employment action” (p. 53). He 
stated that, “[w]ithout this ability…, a public employer would be left without recourse 
and would lose its greater leeway in its dealings with citizen employees” (p. 54). While 
Churchill claims that the investigation “chilled his right to free speech and [therefore] 
constituted an adverse action,” Graham argued that “the standard is not whether his 
speech was chilled; it is whether the University’s actions would ‘deter a reasonable 
person from exercising his…First Amendment rights’” (p. 54). As Churchill’s 
termination was due to his research misconduct and not his 9/11 essay, Graham found 
that “[t]he University’s investigation of Churchill’s research misconduct…did not 
constitute an adverse employment action for purposes of his First Amendment claim [or 
cause] a chilling effect on Churchill’s speech and the speech of some faculty members” 
(p. 56). As such, Graham concluded that the termination of Churchill was not the result 
of any First Amendment violations by the University. 
Amicus brief to the Supreme Court of Colorado. Amici claimed, by granting 
quasi-judicial immunity, “[t]he appellate court’s decision requiring an employee to show 
an ‘adverse employment action’ unduly narrows the scope of constitutional protection 
for all public employees who suffer retaliation for engaging in protected speech on 




would “severely diminish the ability of employees to establish First Amendment claims 
when they are punished for their speech through retaliatory employer conduct that does 
not neatly fall into pre-defined categories of adverse employment actions” (p. 12). They 
added that,  
[i]n a broad range of contexts, the Supreme Court has established that the 
fundamental determination of when the First Amendment has been infringed in 
cases where the government retaliates against a person for engaging in protected 
speech is whether the government’s conduct would likely deter or chill a speaker 
from engaging in such speech in the future. (p. 13) 
Amici stated that “several circuits have concluded that the Supreme Court’s precedents 
command the application of this chilling effect standard to public employee speech 
cases” (p. 13) but that “the decisions of these circuits send a dangerous message to 
government employers that they may penalize those who exercise their First 
Amendment rights provided their retaliatory conduct falls short of a ‘material change’ in 
the terms or conditions of employment” (p. 16). Amici added that “[t]he proper First 
Amendment inquiry should focus not on which category of formal employment action 
the government’s conduct fits, but on the impact the retaliatory conduct has on an 
employee’s willingness to speak” (p. 20). This conduct included the investigation of a 
public employee by the public employer. Amici warned that any 
[f]ailure to recognize that an extensive investigation can be actionable retaliation 
will lead to the under-deterrence of First Amendment violations by public 
employers. First, a public employer that wishes to fire an employee because of 
his speech might invoke an investigation as a form of harassment and use it to 
drive the employee to resign. Alternatively, the employer may use the 
investigation of an employee whom there is no basis to fire in order to search for 
some sort of information on which they could base a legitimate termination 
decision, even though this is simply a pretext for the actual reason the employer 




Upholding this court’s decision could leave public employees without the ability to 
speak freely on issues of public concern and give employers unfettered control over 
employee speech.  
Amici found that the only way to safeguard public employees from retaliation is 
to review each case within its context and separately. “By directing a verdict on the 
retaliatory investigation claim, the trial court…foreclosed the jury’s opportunity to 
consider all the facts in the context of Churchill’s case, thus undermining the very 
context-specific inquiry that the law demands” (p. 23). They argued that,  
[i]f any case could sustain a claim that an investigation constituted retaliation, it 
is this one [because] there is ample evidence in the record from which a 
reasonable jury could conclude that the investigation itself was launched in 
retaliation for Churchill’s past speech and there was more than sufficient 
evidence upon which a jury could have found that the retaliatory investigation 
would have chilled the speech of a person of “ordinary firmness.” (p. 24) 
As such, amici concluded that Churchill’s speech resulted in retaliation in the form of 
an investigation which did not consider all the facts and that the case should be 
remanded for trial. 
Supreme Court of Colorado. The Supreme Court discussed Churchill’s First 
Amendment violation claim in the context of the Regent’s immunity from lawsuit for 
their retaliatory investigation of his scholarly work resulting from his post 9/11 essay. 
Chief Justice Bender recognized that “Section 1983 frequently provid[ed] redress in the 
employment context for plaintiffs injured by a public official’s retaliation for the 
plaintiff’s protected free speech” (Churchill, 2012, p. 20). To grant Churchill’s claim, 




capacity was adversarial and violated a constitutional right. The action must be one that 
“a reasonable person would not know violates a clearly established constitutional right” 
(p. 20). Upon review, Bender determined 
[a]lthough [the court is] mindful that a full-fledged, years-long investigation into 
a professor’s academic record taken in bad faith could chill the continued 
exercise of free speech, we conclude that the federal case law in this area is too 
unsettled to defeat the Regents’ claim of qualified immunity. (p. 48) 
Lacking guidance, Bender found that “a reasonable public official would not know that 
the initiation of an employment investigation in response to protected speech would be 
unlawful” (p. 48). As such, he denied Churchill’s First Amendment claims. 
 Adverse employment action. The third most prevalent theme was adverse 
employment action. The theme focused on the University’s investigation of Churchill as 
a method of retaliating against him for engaging in speech protected under the First 
Amendment. Sixty-six references were coded from the opinions and briefs with 8, 7, 17, 
32, and 2 in the district court opinion, amicus brief to the court of appeals, court of 
appeals opinion, amicus brief to the Supreme Court of Colorado, and Supreme Court of 
Colorado opinion respectively. Based on a matrix coding query of all themes and 
reference coding bands within the opinions and briefs, the theme overlapped the First 
Amendment, chilling effect, immunity of public officials, employer-employee 
relationship irreparably damaged, and equitable relief - nominal damages themes 29, 13, 
4, 3, and 3 times respectively. Table 8.7 provides the results of the query for each 
opinion and brief. The analysis includes examples from each court opinion and brief 



























First Amendment 3 4 5 17 0 29 
Chilling effect 1 0 0 12 0 13 
Immunity of public 
officials 




2 1 0 0 0 3 
Equitable relief - 
nominal damages 
1 0 2 0 0 3 
 
District court. Judge Naves reviewed the instructions given to the trial jury 
during their proceedings and their decisions. The jury was instructed, “that it did not 
have to find that the protected speech activities were the only reason [the University] 
acted against” (Churchill, 2009, pp. 26-27). The jury 
could award damages for any noneconomic losses or injuries that…Churchill has 
had to the present time, including physical and mental pain and suffering, 
inconvenience, emotional distress, loss of reputation, and impairment of quality 
of life, as well as any economic losses or injuries which plaintiff has had to the 
present time. (p. 27)  
The jury found “that the University failed to demonstrate that Professor Churchill would 
have been terminated in the absence of his protected speech” (p. 27), and awarded him 




 Naves reviewed the trial jury’s decision to determine whether Churchill’s 
dismissal was an appropriate action. Naves argued that, if Churchill was reinstated, 
“there [was] a substantial likelihood that there would be future disputes about the 
propriety of [his] academic conduct, as well as the Department of Ethnic Studies’ ability 
to evaluate the probity and veracity of his scholarship” (p. 34). He added that “[t]hose 
disputes would necessarily raise the question of whether the University has retaliated” 
(p. 34) and result in more lawsuits. Citing Churchill’s complaints and comments against 
the University and the investigative committees, Naves argued that “[t]here is only a 
miniscule possibility that his return to the University will be amicable and productive” 
(p. 37) and that there is no evidence that Churchill’s dismissal would not result in “a 
‘chilling effect’ on the University of Colorado’s campus” (p. 40). Naves upheld the trial 
jury’s decision and denied Churchill’s reinstatement. 
Amicus brief to court of appeals. Amici stated that the district court’s decision 
to grant immunity to the University and not reinstate Churchill was at odds with the First 
Amendment (ACLU, 2010). Amici contended that “the Regents [were] not entitled to 
the rare and sweeping defense of absolute immunity that would otherwise insulate them 
from monetary liability for their unconstitutional conduct” (p. 20). Amici argued that the 
court’s award of nominal damages to Churchill did “not mean that they believed that he 
was not harmed or wronged by the University’s decision to terminate him for his 
protected speech, or that he should not be reinstated” (p. 26). It meant that the jury found 
no monetary damages in the evidence. Amici added that upholding the Regent’s 




would still not be entitled to reinstatement if…the professor has some hard feelings and 
choice words for those who unconstitutionally terminated him or her in the first place” 
(p. 11). Amici stated that overturning this decision “is the only result consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent and with ensuring the availability of a remedy to the over 
8,000 professors in the University of Colorado system who could otherwise be 
terminated unconstitutionally without recourse” (p. 20). As such, amici claimed that the 
court abused its’ discretion and the decision should be reversed. 
Court of appeals. Judge Graham discussed adverse employment action based on 
court precedent. For an employment action to be considered adverse, Graham stated, “it 
must materially alter the terms or conditions of employment” (Churchill, 2010, p. 45). 
These include actions such as “discharges, demotions, refusals to hire, refusals to 
promote, and reprimands” (p. 46). Applicable to this case, is that the “Courts have 
concluded that investigations alone are not adverse employment actions” (p. 45). 
Graham added that, “[w]here one has the same pay and continues to work, the action is 
not adverse” (p. 46). These factors provided the basis for Graham’s decisions in this 
case. 
 Churchill claimed that the University’s investigation was an adverse employment 
action, which resulted in his termination. As this was a First Amendment claim, Graham 
utilized the Pickering test as modified by Garcetti in 2006. In his analysis, Graham 
determined that “Churchill [had] not establish[ed] that the University’s investigation 
constituted an adverse employment action” (p. 50). He noted that, throughout, 




position as professor with tenure[,] taught classes[,] and was permitted to speak openly 
in public” (p. 50). He recognized that “[o]ther federal circuits that have concluded that 
an employer must be permitted to investigate the potential misconduct of its employee 
without the fear of the investigation being interpreted as an adverse employment action” 
(p. 53). He added that, “without this ability to investigate, a public employer would be 
left without recourse and would lose its greater leeway in its dealings with citizen 
employees” (p. 54). While Churchill contended that employer investigations would chill 
speech on campus, Graham determined that there was no evidence provided to conclude, 
“the University’s actions would deter a reasonable person from exercising his…First 
Amendment rights” (p. 54) and, therefore, cause “a chilling effect on Churchill’s speech 
and the speech of some faculty members” (p. 56). As such, Graham found that Churchill 
“failed to prove that the University’s investigation constituted an adverse employment 
action” (p. 64) and upheld the trial court’s decisions. 
Amicus brief to Supreme Court of Colorado. Amici contended that the 
University’s investigation of Churchill’s publications was retaliation for his post 9/11 
essay, “When the Chickens Come Home to Roost” and that this retaliation resulted in 
the adverse employment action taken against him, dismissal. While “[t]he trial court 
held, as a matter of law, that the University’s conduct in launching a full-scale 
investigation of Churchill could not constitute First Amendment retaliation” (ACLU, 
2011, p. 11), amici rebutted that “there was more than sufficient evidence, read in the 
light most favorable to Churchill, from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the 




11). They reasoned (a) that the standards for defining First Amendment retaliation and 
adverse employment action under Title VII should be broader for public employees and 
(b) that claims based on these standards should “focus on the impact that the employer’s 
retaliatory conduct has on [employee] speech rather than on whether the conduct fits the 
category of adverse employment action” (p. 19). Amici discussed each. 
 First, the brief stated that the court of appeals took “a narrow and categorical 
approach to defining what conduct constitutes retaliation [which] require[d] a 
determination that the investigation conducted under the auspices of the Regents was an 
adverse employment action” (p. 12). For the courts of appeals, adverse employment 
actions were defined narrowly as “the material or tangible changes in the terms or 
condition of employment change” (p. 12). Amici argued that this definition ignored 
Supreme Court precedent concerning the non-tangible, long-term chilling-effects of 
“whether the government’s response would deter or chill a person of ordinary firmness 
from engaging in the protected speech in the future” (p. 13). The brief added that “the 
application of the chilling-effect standard to public employee speech cases” (p. 14) had 
been cited in some Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit cases. Other courts continued with 
a narrower standard based on “the standard for establishing unlawful employment 
discrimination in claims brought under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act” (p. 16). 
Citing Levinson, amici reiterated,   
the decisions of these circuits send a dangerous message to government 
employers that they may penalize those who exercise their First Amendment 
rights provided their retaliatory conduct falls short of a ‘material change’ in the 




Amici argued that these standards would allow a “public employer [to] engage in a wide 
range of harassing conduct that does not change the terms or conditions of employment, 
but which may well chill or deter an employee from engaging in protected speech” (p. 
17). To determine whether an employer has retaliated against an employee, amici stated 
that there should be a method for determining the non-tangible impact that the 
employer’s retaliatory conduct has on First Amendment speech. 
  Next, amici contended that the court of appeals “ignored the fact that employer 
conduct can sharply deter an employee from engaging in speech even without formally 
changing the terms or conditions of his employment” (p. 19). Instead, the court should 
have focused “on the impact the retaliatory conduct has on an employee’s willingness to 
speak” (p. 20). Amici argued that,  
a full scale, multi-year investigation that requires the employee to spend 
substantial time responding to allegations, meeting with legal counsel, testifying, 
and otherwise appearing at various hearings, can have a substantial impact on 
that employee’s ability to function in his job [and] may nonetheless deter any 
reasonable employee from engaging in protected speech in the future. Numerous 
federal courts have recognized that an employer’s investigation of an employee 
is a form of retaliation that can be part of a targeted employee’s valid First 
Amendment claim. (p. 20)  
As such, amici concluded that “[f]ailure to recognize that an extensive investigation can 
be actionable retaliation [would] lead to the under-deterrence of First Amendment 
violations by public employers” (p. 22). Therefore, the courts must broaden their view of 
what constitutes an adverse employment action in order to protect public employees’ 
First Amendment rights.  
Supreme Court of Colorado. The Supreme Court discussed whether the 




2012). Bender reminded the court that “[t]here is disagreement about whether an alleged 
bad faith employment investigation, absent a punitive change in employment status, is 
adverse and actionable under Section 1983” (p. 47) of the Civil Rights Act. Bender 
reiterated the “uncertainty inherent in this body of federal case law as to whether an 
allegedly retaliatory employment investigation is actionable under Section 1983” (p. 48) 
and concluded that “a reasonable public official would not know that the initiation of an 
employment investigation in response to protected speech would be unlawful” (p. 48). 
He found that the investigation did not fit the definition of an adverse employment 
action and upheld the court of appeal’s decision to grant “the Regents motion for direct 
verdict on Churchill’s bad faith investigation claim” (p. 49).  
 Reinstatement to the University. The reinstatement to the University theme 
focused on the court’s refusal to reinstate Churchill to his position as a professor at the 
University of Colorado. Fifty-two references were coded from the opinions and briefs 
with 15, 26, 5, 1, and 5 in the district court opinion, amicus brief to the court of appeals, 
court of appeals opinion, amicus brief to the Supreme Court of Colorado, and Supreme 
Court of Colorado opinion respectively. Based on a matrix coding query of all themes 
and reference coding bands within the opinions and briefs, the theme overlapped the 
employer-employee relationship irreparably damaged, equitable relief–nominal 
damages, First Amendment, and immunity of public officials themes 13, 10, 7, and 5 
times respectively. Table 8.8 provides the results of the query for each opinion and brief. 
The analysis includes examples from each court opinion and brief showing how these 
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4 7 1 0 1 13 
Equitable relief - 
nominal damages 
4 4 0 1 1 10 
First Amendment 1 6 0 0 0 7 
Immunity of public 
officials 
0 3 2 0 0 5 
 
District court. The district court reviewed Churchill’s request for reinstatement 
“to his former position of fully tenured professor at the University of Colorado, and to 
provide such further equitable relief as is necessary to vindicate his rights under the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution” (Churchill, 2009, p. 2). Judge Naves 
reviewed the request as a matter of federal law because Churchill’s claims stem from 
violation of federal statute. Based on these laws, Naves established that “[t]he Tenth 
Circuit…has found that a trial court has ‘considerable discretion’ in formulating 
remedies, one of which is reinstatement [and that] the award of equitable relief by way 
of reinstatement rests in the discretion of the trial court” (p. 28). He iterated the trial 
court’s determination that Churchill had not incurred any monetary damages, “losses, or 
injuries through the trial date” (p. 31) and that nominal damages in the amount of one 




enter an order that is consistent with the jury’s findings, [he] cannot order a remedy that 
disregard[s] the jury’s implicit finding that…Churchill has suffered no actual damages 
that an award of reinstatement would prospectively remedy” (p. 31). He concluded, 
“[n]ominal damages…are the appropriate means of ‘vindicating’ rights whose 
deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury” ( p. 31) and, based on the trial court’s 
verdict denied Churchill’s motion for reinstatement. 
Next, Naves considered whether he would have ordered reinstatement in the 
absence of the trial court’s verdict. He acknowledged the Supreme Court’s 
determination in Bakke and Sweezy, “that the four essential freedoms of a University are 
to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it 
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study” (p. 34). He added that, “the 
University of Colorado’s ability to define the standards of academic conduct is a 
decision that properly resides in bodies like [the] Standing Committees on Research 
Misconduct and the P&T Committee, not in the courts” (p. 35). Even if reinstatement 
were an option, Naves concluded that interfering in the University’s disciplinary 
decisions “would entangle the judiciary excessively in matters that are more appropriate 
for academic professionals” (p. 36). As such, he reaffirmed the trial court’s decision to 
deny reinstatement as equitable relief. 
Amicus brief to court of appeals. In not deciding to reinstate Churchill, amici 
claimed that the trial court had abused their discretion (ACLU, 2010). Given the trial 
court’s verdict that the University violated Churchill’s First Amendment rights, amici 




can truly make a wronged employee whole” (p. 23) and “because a denial of 
reinstatement to a prevailing plaintiff essentially rewards an employer for its wrongful 
and unconstitutional conduct, as it enables the employer to accomplish exactly what the 
Constitution forbids, terminating an employee for unconstitutional  reasons” (p. 24). 
Amici added, “[w]ithout explanation, the trial court fail[ed] to even mention these 
fundamental principles of equity [and, in doing so] abused its discretion in denying 
reinstatement” (p. 25). Accordingly, the brief continued with a discussion of the factors 
for denying Churchill’s reinstatement based on the court’s abuse. 
First, the brief discussed the trial court’s awarding of nominal damages in place 
of reinstatement. Amici argued,  
[t]he trial court’s  denial of reinstatement [was] principally based on its belief 
that because the jury awarded only nominal damages to Churchill instead of 
significant monetary damages, reinstating him to his faculty position would be 
contrary to the jury’s findings and contrary to the caselaw.  (p. 25) 
On the contrary, amici added, 
[the] decision not to award monetary relief simply mean[t] that the jury 
decided…that they did not want to award him significant monetary relief. [It did] 
not mean that they believed that he was not harmed or wronged by the 
University’s decision to terminate him for his protected speech, or that he should 
not be reinstated. (p. 26) 
Amici contended that the courts overlooked the purpose of equitable relief as a way of 
preventing “government officials…from continuing to commit similar constitutional 





 Second, amici argued that Churchill’s academic misconduct “should not have 
played a role in the trial court’s decision to deny reinstatement” (p. 29). Amici 
established that, 
because the jury rejected the University’s  claim that Churchill was fired for his 
academic misconduct, it was improper for the trial court subsequently to 
conclude that reinstatement should nevertheless be denied for that very reason. 
That conclusion enables the University effectively to dismiss Churchill for the 
academic misconduct even though the jury had already decided he was not 
terminated for that. (p. 30) 
This anomaly exemplified the court’s inherent reluctance to interfere in University 
decisions that they think are better handled by academic professionals. Amici added, “if 
the trial court wanted to defer to the committee’s academic judgment rather than 
disagree with it…the court should have reinstated Churchill, not denied reinstatement” 
(p. 32). Following constitutional doctrines and principles, amici concluded that the trial 
court should not have interfered in the decision to reinstate Churchill but, instead, 
deferred it to “legitimate faculty decision–mak[ers] in the academic sphere” (p. 33). 
Finally, amici contended that the court should not have used Churchill’s 
relationship with the University as grounds for denying reinstatement. Amici argued, 
[a]lthough damaged relationships can be grounds for denying reinstatement  in 
certain circumstances, that principle does not apply in the context of a University 
setting where a professor has been unconstitutionally  terminated, absent 
extraordinary circumstances  not present in this case. (p. 33) 
The brief added that, “while disagreements or conflict might be sufficient grounds for 
denying reinstatement in certain workplaces where everyone is supposed to get along, 
[it] is not at all the case in the University setting” (p. 35). If it were, “a University 




professor might be reinstated, no matter how unconstitutional its actions might be” 
(p. 38). As such, amici concluded that “the trial courts failure to abide by these 
principles was [another] abuse of discretion” (p. 40) and that the court of appeals should 
reinstate Churchill to his position. 
Court of appeals. Judge Graham discussed Churchill’s contention that immunity 
did not apply to equitable remedies such as reinstatement and “that neither the 
University nor the Regents were immune from his request for reinstatement and front 
pay” (Churchill, 2010, p. 40). Graham disagreed citing a 1996 amendment to the section 
1983 that barred “injunctive relief against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken 
in such officer’s judicial capacity…unless a declaratory decree was violated or 
declaratory relief was unavailable” (p. 41). As Churchill did not claim a declaratory 
decree violation, Graham was unable to consider this option. In addition, he determined 
that the trial court’s denial of “Churchill’s claim for reinstatement or front pay fell 
within the trial court’s considerable discretion to fashion equitable remedies [and 
perceived] nothing…that demonstrated an abuse of discretion” (p. 43). Graham 
concluded that he found no error in the trial court’s decisions. 
Amicus brief to Supreme Court of Colorado. Amici focused on the University’s 
violation of Churchill’s First amendment rights and their use of immunity to shield them 
from equitable relief including reinstatement and front pay. Amici argued that upholding 
the court of appeals’ decision would result in “an unequivocal violation of [Churchill’s] 
First Amendment right to freedom of speech [and leave him] without any recourse, 




As such, amici requested that the Supreme Court reverse the decision and remand the 
case to trial.  
Supreme Court of Colorado. The Supreme Court reviewed Churchill’s claim 
that “the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that he was not entitled to the 
equitable remedies of reinstatement and front pay” (Churchill, 2012, p. 1). Bender stated 
that the “award of equitable relief by way of reinstatement rests in the discretion of the 
trial court [and begins with a] review [of] the trial court’s denial of both front pay and 
reinstatement for an abuse of discretion (pp. 40-41). In that review, Bender added, the 
court does “not look to see whether we agree with the trial court [but instead whether], 
the trial court’s decision to ensure that it was based on credible evidence and that it did 
not exceed the bounds of the rationally available choices” (p. 41). Bender found, 
[t]he trial court reasoned that forcing the University to reinstate Churchill would 
result in a substantial distraction that would negatively impact the University’s 
core mission to educate its students and advance academic and scientific research 
[and] that this made it especially likely that reinstatement would only serve to 
risk further instances of academic misconduct. (p. 42) 
Bender concluded that the trial court’s “analysis appear[ed] well–reasoned and [was] 
supported by both credible evidence and analogous federal case law” (p. 43). As such, 
he denied Churchill’s claim that the trial court abused their discretion. 
Summary 
 Churchill claimed that his First Amendment rights were violated due to the 
University’s retaliatory investigation of his publications. The investigation resulted in 
his termination for professional misconduct, which Churchill argued was an adverse 




They concluded that the University’s investigation would not have occurred absent 
Churchill’s 9/11 essay and that “a majority of the members of the Board used Professor 
Churchill’s protected speech as a motivating factor in their decision to terminate his 
employment” (Churchill, 2009, p. 27). In defense, the University filed for absolute 
immunity as they had acted as a judicial body. In addition, the University claimed that it 
was empowered by the state to make employment decisions and that the policies and 
procedures followed throughout Churchill’s proceedings were judicial in form. The 
district court granted immunity and the court of appeals upheld the ruling. These actions, 
Churchill claimed, left him and other faculty with no way of defending their First 
Amendment rights and to obtain equitable relief in the form of reinstatement and front 
pay. 
 Based on the above analysis, two distinct and separate defenses were used by 
Churchill and the University. Churchill and amici’s defenses were based on defining the 
University’s investigation as retaliatory under the First Amendment and, therefore, an 
adverse employment action. Because the court was not willing to broaden the definition 
of an adverse employment action to include non-tangible damages such as reputation 
and stature, Churchill failed to have the district court’s decision reversed. The court held 
that Churchill had suffered no tangible loss and that he was not investigated and 
terminated for his free speech but rather for his professional misconduct.  
 The University’s defense was that the Regents were empowered, under Colorado 
state law, with the authority to govern the University which included making academic 




First Amendment violation or retaliation. Because the state allocated this authority and 
approved the University’s policies, they claimed absolute immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment from lawsuits, which negated Churchill’s ability to sue for monetary 
damages. The court reasoned that absolute immunity for officials acting in a quasi-
judicial manner was warranted because “the University [including the Regents] and its 
employees in their official capacities are immune from suit under the doctrine of state 
sovereign immunity” (Churchill, 2012, pp. 16-17) based on the Eleventh Amendment, 
and because the Regent’s “role as quasi-judicial public officials was functionally 
comparable to the role of a judge” (p. 23). As such, the district court ruled and the court 
of appeals upheld that the University acted in a judicial manner and was immune. 
 Addressing the second defense, the court of appeals held that an investigation 
does not constitute an adverse employment action. The court stated that “[o]ther federal 
circuits…have concluded that an employer must be permitted to investigate the potential 
misconduct of its employee without the fear of the investigation being interpreted as an 
adverse employment action” (Churchill, 2010, p. 53). The court considered only the 
monetary damages and changes in employment status resulting from the investigation 
and not the chilling-effects that an investigation would have on the public employee. 
Because Churchill remained employed, taught classes, published, and spoke at events 
throughout the investigation, the court found that he had not suffered any damages and 
was not adversely affected during the termination process. 
The Supreme Court reviewed the lower court’s decision and Churchill’s adverse 




to…qualified immunity for their decision to investigate Churchill’s academic integrity” 
(Churchill, 2012, p. 45). Churchill’s adverse employment action claim would be 
considered second. The court began by citing (a) the lack of “a standard for determining 
whether a particular type of employment action allegedly taken in retaliation for free 
speech implicates a clearly established statutory or constitutional right or law” 
(Churchill, 2012, p. 46) and (b) the “doctrine of qualified immunity” (p. 48) which 
“balances two important interests–the need to hold public officials accountable when 
they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, 
distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably” (p. 45). The court 
concluded that “the federal case law in this area is too unsettled to defeat the Regents’ 
claim of qualified immunity [and] that a reasonable public official would not know that 
the initiation of an employment investigation in response to protected speech would be 
unlawful” (p. 48). Based on their immunity, the Supreme Court did not consider whether 
the Regents’ investigation was an adverse employment action and rejected his request 
for reinstatement. On September 10, 2012, one day before the 11th anniversary of the 
9/11 attacks, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s decision that the district court 
did not err in “granting the Regents’ motion for a directed verdict on Churchill’s bad 
faith investigation claim” (p. 49) and denied Churchill’s right to seek equitable relief.  
Phillip DiStefano, Chancellor of the University of Colorado at Boulder, David 
Lane, Churchill’s lawyer, and Cary Nelson, the past president of the American 
Association of University Professors, each provided immediate feedback on the 




the Colorado Supreme Court [decision] upholds the high standards of academic 
integrity practiced every day by our faculty, and helps us to ensure the quality of 
instruction for all our students. It is vital that what is published and what is 
taught in the classroom be based on research and scholarship grounded in honest, 
accepted and time-tested methods. This was always what was at stake in this case 
for the University, and the winners today are our faculty and students. (Jaschik, 
2012, para. 13) 
Churchill’s lawyer rebutted cautioning, “the decision emboldens government officials to 
violate the First Amendment with impunity knowing that they cannot be sued for their 
disregard for the rights of citizens [and] diminishes freedom of speech for all of us” 
(para. 12). Adding to the comments, Cary Nelson argued that,  
 [i]n affirming the astonishing idea that a University’s senior administrators and 
Board of Regents possess quasi-judicial immunity from legal redress once a 
quasi-judicial campus review has taken place, [the Supreme Court] empower[ed] 
administrators to appoint biased review committees chosen to produce a 
preordained result and then stand protected by the courts. (para. 17) 
He added, 
the Colorado administrators and Regents displayed precisely the opposite of 
judicial neutrality. They urged that Churchill be fired even before campus 
reviews had taken place. The Colorado court has lent its authority and approval 
to a corrupt process and a politically motivated result. Its decision will inevitably 
be cited in cases in other states. The threat to academic freedom is substantial. 
(para. 17) 
On December 10, 2012, Churchill’s lawyers filed a brief petitioning the U.S. 
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The lawyers “argued that he was the victim of 
‘bad faith investigations, undertaken in retaliation for speech protected by the First 
Amendment.’” (Jaschik, 2013, para. 10) and “that the investigation into his speech was 
intended to produce a facially acceptable reason for firing him and, thus, constituted a 




The termination of a tenured professor’s employment is certainly likely to 
provoke retaliatory lawsuits. Yet, in contrast to other settings, preventing 
intimidation and retaliatory lawsuits is especially important in decisions 
involving academic misconduct in higher education. This court has recognized 
that “the four essential freedoms” of a university are “to determine for itself on 
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, 
and who may be admitted to study.” Consequently, these academic decisions 
receive a particular degree of deference not accorded to other government 
officials, and this court has cautioned, “When judges are asked to review the 
substance of a genuinely academic decision... they should show great respect for 
the faculty’s professional judgment.” (para. 13) 
The university added 
that failure to “defer to academic judgment” on questions of academic 
misconduct would make it impossible for faculty panels to act without fear of 
constant litigation [and] that “a genuinely academic decision” by the faculty must 
receive deference in order to protect academic freedom. (Kruth, 2013, para. 6) 
On April 1, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Churchill’s petition “to hear his 
appeals and [his] lawyers acknowledged that this was the end of the line” (para. 1). FIRE 
concluded that “it is a loss for free speech that Ward Churchill has run out of legal 
options and that the Colorado Supreme Court has set such a dangerous precedent for 
future cases of retaliation against professors in Colorado” (para. 7). After five years of 





Chapter Nine: Adams v. University of North Carolina – Wilmington 
Background 
 Dr. Michael S. Adams was hired by the University of North Carolina in 
Wilmington (UNCW) in 1993 as an assistant professor of criminology (Adams, 2010). 
Until 2000, “Adams was an atheist with liberal political beliefs” (p. 3), at which time he 
became a Christian and political conservative. During his initial employment, he earned 
numerous awards and accolades which included “strong teaching evaluations, an 
impressive collection of publications, outstanding peer reviews, an exemplary record of 
service to the department, UNCW, and the community [and] two Faculty Member of the 
Year awards” (p. 3), which resulted in his promotion with tenure to associate professor.  
He was recognized as one of the university’s best instructors (Adams, 2010). 
 In 2001, Dr. Adams and UNCW faculty and students engaged in a number of 
confrontational email exchanges. The first exchange resulted from “the questioning of 
candidates for employment regarding their political preferences, and faculty members’ 
airing anti-religious sentiments during the interview process” (pp. 3-4). Adams 
questioned the “propriety of basing hiring decisions on political orientation” (p. 4).  
In the second exchange, Adams confronted a student for “blaming the September 
11 attacks on U.S. foreign policy…calling the student’s email ‘bigoted, unintelligent, 
and immature,’ but noting that the Constitution protected her writing, just as it protected 
his response” (p. 4). The student responded by filing a complaint, “alleging that 
plaintiff’s email message, using university computing facilities and services, intended to 




UNCW personnel policies” (p. 4). The student demanded an investigation and access to 
the Adams emails to determine other exchanges Adams had regarding her email. UNCW 
rejected his two subsequent requests stating that “the university’s position that the 
emails were personal and thus not subject to the student’s public records request” (p. 5) 
and that the “decision of the University is final” (p. 5). After the student’s forth request, 
UNCW general counsel “request[ed] that the information technology department attempt 
to retrieve and examine messages sent by plaintiff on the dates in question [but still] did 
not turn any emails over to the student, deeming them private correspondence and not 
public records” (pp. 5-6). No further requests were submitted by the student. 
In May 2002, Adams “published a column criticizing UNCW and the department 
for alleged religious intolerance” (p. 6) and, in September 2003, wrote “a column for the 
website Townhall.com…focused on the cultural and ideological climate on university 
campuses, including issues of academic freedom, constitutional abuses, discrimination, 
race, gender, homosexual conduct, feminism, Islamic extremism, and morality” (p. 6). 
The columns resulted in complaints from administrators, faculty, and potential donors 
citing their “lack of intellectual rigor, likened it to talk show rhetoric, and voiced their 
hope that the column and the controversy would quietly go away” (p. 7).  Dr. Cecil 
Willis, the department chair at the time, asked Adams to “not discuss his online column 
at work as it upset the department’s secretary” (p. 7). The secretary continued to read the 
columns and complained to the UNCW general counsel (Adams, 2010). Between 2001 




An interim department chair, Dr. Diane Levy, was appointed in summer 2004. 
She met with Adams to voice “her concerns that his writings contained mean-spirited 
personal attacks directed toward the department secretary, claiming that they were 
hurting department collegiality” (p. 7) but Levy never demanded Adams to change his 
writing style or stop writing his column. Adams “defended his right to write what he 
wanted” (p. 7) and declined to meet with Levy, the department chair, and secretary to 
mediate the problem.  
In 2005, Levy completed Adams’ 2004 evaluation. The evaluation “cataloged his 
work in [the areas of] teaching, advising, research, and service” (p. 8). Levy’s feedback 
stated that Adams “appeared to have slowed his productivity as his efforts are directed 
elsewhere” (p. 9). She “encouraged Adams to participate more in department affairs and 
suggested that to be successful he will need to increase his productivity in scholarship 
and publication in peer-reviewed academic outlets” (p. 9). Dr. Levy was replaced as 
department chair in August 2005 by Dr. Kimberly Cook.  
Adams’ columns continued to generate controversy in the department with two 
incidents occurring in 2005 and 2006. In 2005, Adams responded in his column to a 
letter from the Orlando Chapter of the National Organization of Women (NOW) stating 
that they were “‘detached from reality’; ‘stupid enough to think they can achieve 
political equality by killing their off springs’; ‘irrational and hopelessly caught up in the 
past’; and should change their name from NOW to ‘Totally Hysterical Emotional 




description at the end. The column and comments were brought to the attention of 
UNCW. 
The second incident occurred when the group Gender Mutiny Collective wrote to 
the Dean and Cook concerning Adams’ transphobic essays. The group was concerned 
that he “would pass on his transphobic attitude to his law enforcement students, thus 
perpetuating transphobia and transphobic violence” (p. 10). The Dean responded that 
there had been no student complaints of the issue and “support[ed] the notion that 
plaintiff’s discussion of transgender issues in his class, if it occurred, would fall within 
the ambit of academic freedom” (p. 11). UNCW considered the issue closed.  
In 2006, Adams applied for promotion to full professor. To be promoted, 
applicants must demonstrate excellence in four areas which include (1) teaching as 
reflected “in teaching performance and content and in teaching activities outside the 
classroom” (p. 12), (2) research and artistic achievement as demonstrated by a “tangible 
record of professionally-reviewed substantial contribution to one’s discipline” (p. 12), 
(3) service promotion which was defined as formal and informal professional activities 
on behalf of the faculty member’s department, college, university, profession and the 
community at large" (pp. 12-13), and (4) scholarship and professional development that 
served to enhance “the faculty member’s professional competence that reflected in the 
growth and improvement” of the previous three areas” (p. 13). Cook was required to 
make a decision in collaboration with faculty to recommend or deny promotion. 
Cook solicited written comments from the faculty concerning Adams’ 




had decreased since tenure, and…lamented the fact that all but one of plaintiff’s refereed 
publications were co-authored [and that] peer-reviewed articles had not been published 
in the best or most estimable journals” (pp. 15-16). The reviewer had “difficulty 
recognizing [Adams] as a scholar in his field because he had not developed a national 
reputation in sociology, criminology, or criminal justice” (p. 16). Another reviewer 
indicated that his teaching was strong but that his research and service were weak noting 
that “he had been advised in previous years to be a more active university participant, 
but must have chosen to decline this activity” (p. 17). Two reviewers supported Adams 
promotion. One cited Adam’s “consistently excellent teaching performance and tangible 
record of research, citing four articles since 1998 and another forthcoming” (p. 18). The 
second stated that Adams had “fulfilled the bare minimum of what is required at the 
professor rank at UNCW [but] called [Adams] research ‘sporadic’ and indicated that the 
record of [his] publications was bolstered by joint authorship” (p. 18). The last reviewer 
did not indicate that he would support the promotion. He commented that Adams 
“credentials made a somewhat weak case for promotion, and…indicated he would feel 
more comfortable supporting [Adams] if he were to shore up his research a bit and 
convince me a little more of his pedagogical skills” (p. 19). Cook circulated the criteria 
for promotion to all the reviewers, summarized each reviewer’s comments, and called a 
meeting to discuss the findings.  
In the September 14, 2006 meeting of the department’s senior faculty, Adams’ 
promotion was not recommended by a 7-2 vote (Adams, 2010). Cook, the department 




Arts and Sciences and, within four days, prepared the memo to be sent to Adams on 
September 21, 2006. Adams requested the vote count to determine how close he had 
come to being promoted, which Cook declined to provide (Adams, 2010). In a memo, 
Cook reminded Adams of the criteria for promotion to full professor and explained that 
(1) the “overriding concern regarding [his] record to date [was] in the area of 
scholarly research productivity…[and that it] did not demonstrate a 
cumulative tangible pattern of expertise in his discipline” (p. 23),  
(2) his “record since his last promotion did not demonstrate a cumulative 
tangible pattern of expertise in the discipline, teaching…did not meet the 
promotion standard of ‘distinguished accomplishment’” (p. 23), and 
(3) his “record of service to the department, college, university and 
profession was insufficient for promotion” (p. 23).  
Cook concluded that, “the ‘overwhelming consensus’ of the senior faculty was that 
promotion was unwarranted” (p. 23). As a result, Dr. Adams filed suit against UNCW in 
2007 “alleging that UNCW retaliated against him for his Christian and politically 
conservative speech by denying his application for promotion to full professor and by 
subjecting him to intrusive investigations” (p. 2). He claimed violations of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Adams, 2010). 
Court Opinions and Brief 
 The Adams case began in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North 
Carolina Southern District in March 2010 and ended in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 




burden-shifting analysis in McDonnell Douglas (1973) and his First Amendment claim 
using the Garcetti/Pickering analysis in Garcetti (2006). The appellate court upheld the 
district court’s religious discrimination decision to grant summary judgment immunity 
to the university. It remanded the district court’s First Amendment decision and analysis 
for further review stating, 
[a]pplying Garcetti to the academic work of a public university faculty member 
under the facts of this case could place beyond the reach of First Amendment 
protection many forms of public speech or service a professor engaged in during 
his employment[,] would not appear to be what Garcetti intended, [and is not] 
consistent with our long-standing recognition that no individual loses his ability 
to speak as a private citizen by virtue of public employment. (Adams, 2011, p. 
25) 
Each opinion and brief is discussed to provide a detailed overview of content of the case.  
 District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. In 2007, Dr. Adams 
received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC and filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court 
against the University of North Carolina in Wilmington (UNCW) and 16 defendants. 
The defendants included:  
UNCW’s Chancellor, Rosemary DePaolo; twelve members of UNCW’s Board 
of Trustees; Dr. David Cordle, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences; Dr. 
Diane Levy, the former interim Chair of the Department of Sociology and 
Criminal Justice; and the department’s current chair, Dr. Kimberly Cook. (p. 2)  
 
Dr. Adams alleged that the “defendants retaliated against him for his Christian and 
politically conservative speech by denying his application for promotion to full professor 
and by subjecting him to intrusive investigations” (p. 2).  He sought  
declarative relief and monetary damages, alleging (1) religious discrimination in 
violation of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964…; (2) viewpoint 
discrimination and retaliation for protected speech in violation…of the First 
Amendment; and (3) denial of equal protection of the laws in violation…of the 




Monetary damage and Title VII claims were dismissed by the court as the defendants 
were acting in their official and individual capacities as public servants. Defendants 
moved for summary judgment on all other claims (Adams, 2010). The court reviewed 
Adams’ allegation of Title VII religious discrimination, First Amendment violations of 
protected speech, and denial of equal protection of the law. 
 Prior to discussing each allegation, the court noted the “great trepidation” of the 
federal court in reviewing university tenure and promotion decisions and reluctance “to 
interfere with the ‘subjective and scholarly judgments’ made in reaching those 
decisions” (Adams, 2010, p. 26). As such, the court “limited [itself] to deciding whether 
the appointment or promotion was denied because of a discriminatory reason” (p. 26). 
Each concern was addressed separately. 
Title VII religious discrimination. Religious discrimination under Title VII 
required indirect or direct evidence demonstrating that Adams had been treated 
differently based on his beliefs (Adams, 2010). Adams provided evidence from meetings 
and writings in which he discussed his conversion to Christianity. After a review of the 
evidence, the court found no evidence that would satisfy the “law’s requirement of 
evidence of conduct or statements that both reflect directly the alleged discriminatory 
attitude and that bear directly on the contested employment decision” (p. 27). The court 
added that, without evidence, Adams could still prove discrimination based on the 
“three-prong burden shifting analysis” which has four parts. The analysis required 




(1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he applied for but was denied the 
promotion in question, (3) he was qualified for the promotion, and (4) he was 
rejected for the promotion under circumstances giving rise to an inference of 
unlawful discrimination. (p. 27) 
The court held that Adams satisfied the first three requirements but not the fourth. 
 Under the fourth part, Adams failed to prove that he had been denied promotion 
based on his religious beliefs. Adams asserted that “he was the only religious 
conservative in the department, but the court stated that his “political views [were] not at 
issue in his Title VII claim, and he forecast[ed] no evidence that he [was] the 
department’s only Christian” (p. 29) or that UNCW “based any of their decision on 
religious views or beliefs” (p. 30). The court held that, “as with [his] direct evidence 
argument, there [was] nothing beyond conjecture to support this inference, and [he was] 
therefore unable to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination” (p. 30).  
Adams asserted that he had satisfied all criteria for promotion and that his 
records resembled that of other faculty. In response, the court referred to the federal 
court’s position in Jimenez (1995), acknowledging their “resistance to interfere with the 
‘subjective and scholarly judgments’ involved in professorial employment decisions” (p. 
31) or “to second-guess determinations like these, which deal entirely with the scholarly 
merit of professors’ publications” (p. 32). Finding no evidence of discrimination, the 
court denied Adams’ Title VII claim. 
First Amendment claims. To prove a First Amendment claim, Adams had to 
satisfy the “three-prong test” in McVey (1998) and restated in Ridpath (2006).  
First, the public employee must have spoken as a citizen, not as an employee 
on a matter of public concern. Second, the employee’s interest in the expression 




efficient services to the public. Third, there must have been a sufficient causal 
nexus between the protected speech and the retaliatory employment. (p. 33) 
To satisfy the first prong, Adams had to prove that he spoke on a matter of public 
concern and, if so, spoke as a citizen or a public employee. 
 In Garcetti (2006), the federal court held “that, when a public employee 
makes a statement pursuant to his official duties, he does not speak as a citizen” (p. 
34) and, therefore, is not protected by the First Amendment. As such, the court 
“focus[ed] not on the content of the speech but on the role the speaker occupied when he 
said it” (p. 34). Because Adams included his religious and conservative publications 
and presentations in the application materials submitted to UNCW for his 
promotion, the court determined that they were part of his professional duties 
within the “context of his promotion evaluation” (p 35). Choosing not to review 
these materials would have placed UNCW in the position of  
either neglecting the employee requests and refuse to look at material, fueling 
allegations of free speech violations grounded in the refusal; or consider the 
material, knowing that doing so will open them up, in the event of an adverse 
outcome, to claims of free speech violations for basing denials on protected 
speech. (p. 35) 
The court held that Adams could not meet the first-prong requirements of the 
McVey test and reviewed Adams’ allegation of retaliatory employment actions. 
 Adams claimed retaliation based on UNCW’s “intrusive investigation” of 
his emails and alleged workplace terrorism, the defendant’s “support for the 
addition of collegiality to the promotion criteria” (p. 36), and the defendant’s 
investigation into the claim that he “was passing on his transphobic views to his 




the promotion process and that Garcetti (2006) did not apply. The court found that 
Adams failed “to forecast evidence sufficient to withstand summary judgment on 
the McVey test’s requirement of a causal nexus between the speech and any of the 
alleged retaliatory employment actions” (p. 36). As Adams could not satisfy the 
requirement of the McVey test, the court granted summary judgment to the 
defendants on all First Amendment speech claims (Adams, 2010). 
Equal Protection claim. Adams alleged that his speech and religious beliefs 
caused him to be treated “differently than similar situated professors” (p. 38).  
To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that 
he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated 
and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful 
discrimination. (p. 38) 
The court found that they had no evidence of Adams being treated differently and 
reiterated “their reluctance to interfere with the subjective and scholarly judgments 
involved in tenure and promotion decisions” (p. 38). The district court granted summary 
judgment to the defendants on this and all claims and, on March 15, 2010, closed the 
case. 
 Amicus brief. On July 2 2010, the American Association of University 
Professors (AAUP), the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), and the 
Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Speech filed an Amicus Brief in 
support of Dr. Adams’ academic freedom with the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of North Carolina (AAUP, 2010). Amici sought to show that the District 
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina incorrectly applied Garcetti…to this 




no First Amendment protection when speaking pursuant to their official capacities” (p. 
5) but reserved the application to faculty speech for another court to decide. Amici 
believed that the Garcetti court’s reservation in applying their decision to faculty speech 
negated the district court’s ability to apply Garcetti in this case. Instead, the district 
court should have recognized that “academic speech under the First Amendment is 
neither governed…nor susceptible to the ‘official duties’ analysis reflected in Garcetti” 
(p. 6) and relied on over 50 years of court decisions recognizing “the vital role that 
academic speech by college and university professors plays in our society and the First 
Amendment interest in that speech” (p. 6). Amici warned that the court’s use of 
summary judgment on “Adams’ First Amendment claims sets a dangerous precedent by 
prematurely judging the matter” (p. 6) and, therefore, requested that the appellate court 
hold that faculty promotion materials be guarded by the First Amendment and that the 
case be remanded to the lower courts for trial.  
Misapplication of Garcetti (2006). The district court utilized the three-prong 
McVey test to determine whether Adams was protected. The first prong of the test, 
determining if the employee spoke as a citizen or a public employee, included the 
Garcetti “official duties” analysis, which required a determination as to whether the 
speech in question was part of employee’s official duties or job responsibilities. In their 
analysis, the district court determined that Adams’ faculty promotion materials were 
“expressions made within his professional duties” (p. 9), that he “spoke as an employee, 
not as a citizen, and that his speech therefore lacked First Amendment protection under 




Amici argued that the district court prematurely resolved the Garcetti (2006) 
reservation concerning academic speech. Their decision meant, that “a university could 
constitutionally penalize a faculty member not just for [their] extramural speech but for 
the content of all of her scholarly work” (p. 13). Amici stated that this decision rendered 
“faculty members at public universities vulnerable to retaliation for the content of their 
speech, to the ultimate detriment of the public’s interest in debate, discovery, and 
innovation” (p. 14). Amici added that, “if allowed to stand, [the decision] would 
therefore create a chilling environment in which professors and students, unsure of the 
status of their communication, would be unable or unwilling to freely discuss and debate 
vital academic issues” (p. 15). Amici argued that the district court “erred in using the 
‘official duties’ analysis in Garcetti (2006) to analyze First Amendment protections for 
academic speech and granting summary judgment in favor of the university” (p. 17) and 
that the court of appeals should remand the case back to the lower court for further 
analysis.  
Threats to academic freedom. Amici argued that, based on Garcetti (2006), the 
district court’s granting of summary judgment to UNCW undermined “some of the basic 
principles of academic freedom valued in American jurisprudence” (p. 15). Amici 
stated, “much of the controlling language of Garcetti implicitly recognizes the profound 
differences between academic speech by professors and other public employees, 
something which the court below declined to do” (p. 22). “Holding that university 
professors are not entitled to First Amendment protection for speech made pursuant to 




21). While amici endorsed the district court’s “recognition of the critical role that faculty 
peer review plays in hiring and promotion decisions, and laud the court for its deference 
to properly-constituted faculty bodies” (p. 23), they “urged [the appellate] court to 
recognize the Supreme Court’s exception for academic speech, and to remand this case 
to the court below for a proper analysis of the unusually complicated facts in light of 
precedent” (p. 24) and remand the case back to the district court.  
 District Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. On January 26, 2011, Dr. 
Adams appealed the lower court’s summary judgment ruling to the court of appeals. 
“Adams argu[ed] the grant of summary judgment to the Defendants on each of these 
claims was erroneous either because material facts were in dispute or the district court 
made substantive errors of law in analyzing the claims” (Adams, 2010, p. 8). The court 
of appeals reviewed the lower court’s decision de novo with Chief Judge Traxler writing 
the opinion of the court. 
Prior to his analysis, Traxler reiterated the court’s reluctance to review academic 
employment decisions. Traxler reiterated the Supreme Court’s belief that,  
if a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the multitude of 
personnel decisions that are made daily by public agencies, far less is it suited to 
evaluate the substance of the multitude of academic decisions that are made daily 
by faculty members of public educational institutions--decisions that require an 
expert evaluation of cumulative information and [are] not readily adapted to the 
procedural tools of judicial or administrative decision making. (p. 9) 
and this court’s belief that, 
[u]niversity employment cases have always created a decisional dilemma for the 
courts. Unsure how to evaluate the requirements for appointment, reappointment 
and tenure, and reluctant to interfere with the subjective and scholarly judgments 
which are involved, the courts have refused to impose their judgment as to 




appointment or promotion. Rather, the courts review has been narrowly directed 
as to whether the appointment or promotion was denied because of a 
discriminatory reason. (p. 8) 
With these reservations, Traxler analyzed Adam’s three claims of (a) religious 
discrimination, (b) viewpoint discrimination and retaliation for protected expression, and 
(c) denial of equal protection. 
Religious discrimination. Adams alleged that the university violated his Title 
VII protection against religious discrimination by an employer. He contended he was 
subject “to numerous, intrusive, and harassing investigations, asking him to terminate 
his First Amendment activities, and refusing to promote him to full professor because of 
his outspoken Christian and conservative beliefs” (p. 8). The district court ruled that  
Adams “failed to produce any record evidence that reflected a discriminatory attitude 
which bore directly on the contested employment decision [or] to establish a material 
factual dispute under the [four-prong] burden-shifting analysis” (pp. 8-9) of McDonnell-
Douglas (1973). On appeal to this court, Adams contended that “senior faculty’s 
comments about his publications [provided] direct evidence that he was denied a 
promotion based on those views [and that he] was the only professor with his credentials 
to be denied a promotion to full professor in the past twenty-five years” (p. 9) as indirect 
evidence. 
Upon review, the court of appeals denied Adam’s discrimination claim. First, 
Judge Traxler held that Adams failed to provide direct and indirect evidence that he was 
treated differently based on his religion. Second, Traxler held that the district court did 




of the test, that his promotion “was rejected under circumstances giving rise to an 
inference of unlawful discrimination” (p. 9). While Adams argued the he was the only 
“religious conservative in the department” (p. 10), he provided no direct evidence of 
religious discrimination or that he is “the Department’s only Christian” (p. 10). Traxler 
asserted that all evidence was based on conjecture and that there needed to be evidence 
that ties the denial of the promotion to the discriminatory action of the Defendants. As 
such, the court found “no error in the district court’s determination that the record lacked 
evidence to support Adams’ allegations of religious discrimination [and affirmed] the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Defendants” (p. 10). 
First Amendment viewpoint discrimination claim. Adams argued that the lower 
Court erred in granting summary judgment on his viewpoint discrimination and 
retaliation claim. Traxler reiterated the rights afforded each citizen by the First 
Amendment. He stated that “the First Amendment protects not only the affirmative right 
to speak, but also the right to be free from retaliation by a public official for the exercise 
of that right” (p. 10) and utilized established First Amendment principles and case law in 
Pickering (1968), Connick (1983), McVey (1995), and Garcetti (2006) to guide the 
analysis of Adams’ claim.  
In Pickering and Connick, “the Supreme Court analyzed the competing interests 
at play between the public employee, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 
concern and the government, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees” (p. 10). The Supreme Court defined the 




regulate employee speech in the interest of maintaining an efficient and effective work 
place. As Adams claimed retaliation, the district court utilized a variance of the 
Pickering/Connick balance test created by the Fourth Circuit in McVey (1995) to 
determine whether the employee’s speech and retaliation are directly related. The 
resulting three-prong McVey test used by the district court evaluated: 
(1) whether the public employee was speaking as a citizen upon a matter of 
public concern or as an employee about a matter of personal interest; (2) whether 
the employee’s interest in speaking upon the matter of public concern 
outweighed the government’s interest in providing effective and efficient 
services to the public; and (3) whether the employee’s speech was a substantial 
factor in the employee’s [adverse employment] decision. (p. 11) 
The district court only considered the material evidence on the first prong of the McVey 
test and granted summary judgment without reviewing the remainder of the material 
evidence submitted by Adams on the second and third prongs. As such, the court of 
appeals only reviewed the evidence and decision based on the first McVey prong (Adams 
v. UNCW, 2011).  
In their review, the district court also applied the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Garcetti (2006). In that decision, the Supreme Court ruled “that when a public employee 
makes a statement pursuant to his ‘official duties,’ he does not ‘speak as a citizen [and 
that the court] must focus not on the content of the speech but on the role the speaker 
occupied” (p. 11) when the speech was made. “Garcetti provided an additional 
component to the McVey test and the Pickering-Connick analysis traditionally applied in 
assessing whether the First Amendment protects a public employee’s speech” (p. 14). 





Judge Traxler determined that the district court had misread Garcetti and, 
therefore, had erred in granting summary judgment to the University of North Carolina 
at Wilmington. He stated, “Adams’ speech, which the Defendants agreed was protected 
First Amendment speech when initially given, was converted into unprotected speech 
based on factors that came into play only after the protected speech was made” (p. 11). 
He determined that the lower court ignored the role that Adams occupied at the time the 
speech or writings were made and found no evidence in Garcetti to support the 
conversion of protected to unprotected speech over time. He stated, “the district court’s 
conclusion that Adams’ speech was converted from protected to unprotected speech to 
be error as a matter of law” (p. 12). He found that “[n]othing about listing the speech on 
Adams’ promotion application changed Adams’ status when he spoke or the content of 
the speech when made” (p. 11). “Applying Garcetti to the academic work of a public 
university faculty member under the facts of this case could place beyond the reach of 
First Amendment protection many forms of public speech or service a professor engaged 
in during his employment” (p. 13). He concluded that the district court erred in applying 
Garcetti to the academic work of a public university faculty member by ignoring the 
Supreme Court’s reservation requiring additional constitutional interests when public 
college and university “teachers…speak and write pursuant to…[their] official duties” 
(p. 13). 
Instead of using McVey (1995) and Garcetti (2006), Traxler determined that 
Adams’ speech should be evaluated based on the Pickering/Connick balancing test to 




(Adams v UNCW, 2011).  As referenced in Pickering (1968), "speech involves a matter 
of public concern when it involves an issue of social, political, or other interest to a 
community [and makes irrelevant] the place where the speech occurs” (p. 13). He stated 
that “using the Pickering-Connick analysis as opposed to Garcetti is equally–if not 
more–valid in the public university setting” (p. 12). After evaluation, Traxler concluded 
that Adams’ speech was made as a citizen on a matter of public concern as his “columns 
addressed topics such as academic freedom, civil rights, campus culture, sex, feminism, 
abortion, homosexuality, religion, and morality” (p. 13). As such, the court held that, 
“under the Pickering-Adams analysis, Adams…satisfied the first McVey prong as a 
matter of law [and that] the district court…never addressed whether the second and third 
prongs of the McVey test [were] met in this case” (p. 14). The court remanded the case 
for further proceeding and added that the Defendants were not entitled to qualified 
immunity because they, as a reasonable person, should have known Adams’ was 
speaking as a citizen and his speech was protected (Adams v, UNCW, 2011). 
Equal Protection. Adams claimed that “the district court erred in granting the 
Defendants summary judgment on his Equal Protection claim” (p. 15). The court 
reviewed the lower Court’s decision and concluded  
that Adams’ evidence creates no issue of disputed fact that the Defendants’ 
decision to deny his promotion was the result of intentional or purposeful 
discrimination based on his religious beliefs, or that he was treated differently 
from others with whom he was similarly situated. (p. 15) 
Traxler found no error in the district court granting of summary judgment to the 
university on this claim. In conclusion, the court of appeals remanded Adams’ First 




summary judgment to the University of North Carolina at Wilmington on Adams’ 
religious discrimination and equal protection claims (Adams, 2011). 
Analysis 
The Adams case began in District Court for the Eastern District of North 
Carolina Southern District in March 2010 and ended in the Court of Appeals for the 4th 
Circuit in April 2011 (13 months). The analysis of the district court opinion, amicus 
brief and court of appeals opinion identified eight themes with 52, 69, and 116 coded 
references respectively for a total of 237 coded references. The themes, the 
corresponding number of coded references in each court opinion, and the total references 
for each theme are provided in Table 9.1. The themes are sorted by the total column 
from largest to smallest to illustrate a hierarchy of the most significant themes discussed 
across the court opinions and brief. 
Table 9.1 










Expression pursuant to official job duties 12 25 42 79 
Academic freedom 2 19 17 38 
First Amendment 2 18 14 34 
Religious discrimination 12 1 20 33 
Adverse employment action 6 0 17 23 
Immunity of public officials 9 1 3 13 
Court’s reluctance to review academic decisions 9 0 3 12 
Chilling effect 0 5 0 5 
Totals by court and brief 48 72 123 243 
To validate the theme ranking, the researcher developed two queries to determine 




was reviewed and assigned to each of the above themes. The first query scanned word 
frequency across all the court opinions to identify the 50 most prevalent, three or more 
letter keywords. Each keyword’s contextual usage in each court opinion was analyzed to 
determine whether the individual keyword was significant or required one or more 
adjacent words from the opinions to improve meaning. Themes with no applicable 
keywords utilized the theme title or words within the title. These were added to the list 
of keywords or phrases. These keywords and two or more word phrases were aligned 
with each theme and used in a second text search query across all the opinions to 
determine the number of references in each court opinion and brief and compared to the 
theme coding hierarchy to validate them. 
Of the original 50 keywords queried, 32 remained relevant to the analysis and 18 
were dropped due to irrelevance, vagueness, or lack of specificity. Six of the remaining 
keywords were used individually or combined with NVivo search wildcards (~, *) to 
reduce redundancy. In addition, 10 words were defined and applied to themes that had 
no keywords found in the query. Twenty-four phrases consisting of keywords and 
adjacent words in the opinions or theme titles were also identified.  Each keyword and 
phrase was aligned with one of the eight themes and used in the second word search 
query to count the number of times the words or phrases were referenced in each 
opinion. Each occurrence in each opinion was reviewed to eliminate redundancy and 
duplicity of reference counts. Where redundancy was found, the query was refined and 




descending order by the total number of references for each theme. The results are 
provided in Table 9.2. 
Table 9.2 
Keywords and Phrases Totaled Theme and Court Cases or Brief and Sorted by Theme 












official job duties 
Public employee, dut*, 





143 70 100 313 
Academic 
freedom 
Academic freedom, special 
concern, academic speech, 
academic expression, speech 
related to scholarship, academic 
scholarship, teaching 
39 52 36 127 
First Amendment  First Amendment, protected 
speech, speaking as a citizen, 
free speech, public concern, 
right* 




bigotry, intolerance, viewpoint 
retaliation, burden-shifting 
analysis, Fourteenth 
Amendment, Equal Protection 
31 4 40 75 
Immunity of 
public officials 
Summary judgment, matter of 
law, immun* 









Reluctan*, wary, second-guess 4 0 3 7 
Chilling effect Chill, silence 0 2 0 2 
The theme rankings in Table 9.1 and 9.2 were compared to validate the hierarchy 




themes were expression pursuant to official job duties, academic freedom, First 
Amendment, and religious discrimination. To determine the linear relationship between 
each of these themes, a Pearson correlation coefficient of word similarity was calculated 
as shown in Table 9.3. The highest correlations were between the expression pursuant to 
official job duties and academic freedom themes (0.91559) and the expression pursuant 
to official job duties and First Amendment themes (0.88969).  
Table 9.3 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients for the Prevalent Themes 
Theme 
Expression pursuant 







Expression pursuant to 
official job duties 
1.00000 0.91559 0.88969 0.70552 
Academic freedom 0.91559 1.00000 0.87904 0.61515 
First Amendment 0.88969 0.87904 1.00000 0.60027 
Religious 
discrimination 
0.70552 0.61515 0.60027 1.00000 
The prevalent themes are discussed based on the order provided in Table 9.4. A line 
graph of Table 9.4’s coded references by opinion and brief is provided in Figure 9.1. 
Table 9.4 










Expression pursuant to official job duties 12 25 42 79 
Academic freedom 2 19 17 38 
First Amendment 2 18 14 34 






Figure 9.1. Four Most Prevalent Themes Based on Coded References 
 Expression pursuant to official job duties. The dominant theme was 
expression pursuant to official job duties. The theme focused on whether the promotion 
file and materials that Adams submitted to the university are protected by the First 
Amendment and academic freedom or, based on the Garcetti analysis, unprotected as it 
was part of Adams’ official duties. Seventy-nine references were coded from the 
opinions and brief with 12, 25, and 42 in the district court, amicus curiae brief, and court 
of appeals respectively. Based on a matrix coding query of all themes and reference 
coding bands within the opinions and brief, the theme overlapped the academic freedom, 






































15, 9, and 8 times respectively. Table 9.5 provides the results of the query for each 
opinion and brief. The analysis includes examples from each court opinion and brief 
showing how these four themes relate to the expression pursuant to official job duties 
theme. 
Table 9.5 
Matrix Coding of the Four Prevalent Themes That Overlap the Expression Pursuant to 








Academic freedom 2 10 10 22 
First Amendment 1 7 7 15 
Adverse employment action 1 0 8 9 
Religious discrimination 2 0 6 8 
  
District court. The university motioned the district court for summary judgment, 
which required testing whether the university’s actions and retaliation against Adams 
violated his rights. To decide, the district court used the first-prong of the McVey test to 
determine whether Adams spoke on a “matter of public concern” and, if so, whether he 
was speaking as a citizen or an employee.  
In this case, [Adams’] retaliation claim is rooted in his columns, publications, and 
presentations, many of which criticized defendants, other UNCW administrators or 
staff, or the university as a whole, and others of which dealt with controversial 
material and reflected plaintiff’s conservative views. The novelty of this claim (and 
the entire case) comes from the fact that plaintiff included these materials in his 
application seeking promotion, thus forcing the very people he criticized to make 
professional judgments about this speech. (p. 33) 
The court stated that Adams’ “inclusion of the speech in his application for promotion 




made pursuant to his official duties” (p. 35). The district court was reminded of the 
federal court’s “reluctance…to interfere with the ‘subjective and scholarly judgments’ 
involved in tenure and promotion decisions” (p. 38) and of their “reticence and restraint 
in reviewing such decisions” (p. 26). As such, Adams could not satisfy the first prong of 
the McVey test and granted the university summary judgment. 
Amicus brief. Amici argued, “[t]he district court’s decision could destroy First 
Amendment protection for all speech made by university professors pursuant to what the 
court deems to be their official duties” (AAUP, 2010, p. 7). Based on McVey and 
Garcetti, amici repeated the district court’s position that, “when public employees make 
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens 
for First Amendment purposes and the constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline.” (p. 9) They added the district court’s 
determination that,  
because [Adams] included his online column and book in his application for 
promotion,…they were expressions made within his professional duties and were 
therefore created as an employee, not a citizen [which] trumped all earlier 
disclaimers by Adams and others that his included works were not related to his job. 
(p. 9) 
Amici contended that the district court erred, “when it disregarded the Supreme Court’s 
clear reservation [in Garcetti] of speech related to scholarship or teaching and instead 
applied the Court’s ‘official duties’ analysis to Adams’ speech” (p. 12). If the decision is 





just for [his or her] extramural speech but for the content of all of [his or her] scholarly 
work” (p. 13) and would leave “faculty members at public universities vulnerable to 
retaliation for the content of their speech, to the ultimate detriment of the public’s 
interest in debate, discovery, and innovation” (p. 14). This resolution would resolve the 
Supreme Court’s reservation in Garcetti and mean that faculty intramural and 
extramural speech is not protected. 
 Amici argued, “the district court confused the capacity in which [Adams] speech 
was created…with the purpose for which the speech was submitted…in holding that 
Adams’ inclusion of the speech in his application trumped all earlier acts or statements 
characterizing the speech” (p. 14). In doing so, the court “used different analyses of 
Adams’ role as ‘citizen’ or ‘employee’ to evaluate different allegedly retaliatory actions, 
making the categorization of Adams as ‘citizen’ or ‘employee’ dependent upon the 
university’s actions [and] the circumstances under which it is later read” (pp. 14-15). 
Amici contended, the decision would “create a chilling environment in which professors 
and students, unsure of the status of their communication, would be unable or unwilling 
to freely discuss and debate vital academic issues” (p. 15). Adding, “[t]his standard 
simply cannot apply to those who are responsible for fostering knowledge, exploration, 
and even dissent” (p. 16). Because “much of the controlling language of Garcetti 
implicitly recognize[d] the profound differences between academic speech by professors 
and other public employees” (p. 22), amici requested the court to recognize its error “in 




for academic speech and granting summary judgment in favor of the university” (p. 21) 
and remand the case to the district court for more analysis. 
Court of appeals. The court of appeals discussed whether the district court erred 
in granting summary judgment to the university based on the court’s finding that 
Adams’ expression was made as part of his official duties as a faculty member. 
Presiding Judge Agee found that the district court misread Garcetti. Agee stated,  
[the] district court’s decision rests on several fundamental errors including its 
holding that protected speech was converted into unprotected speech based on its 
use after the fact [and that] the district court applied Garcetti without 
acknowledging…the clear language in that opinion that casts doubt on whether the 
Garcetti analysis applies in the academic context of a public university. (p. 19) 
 Agee discussed each error and the effect of upholding the district court’s decision. 
 Agee argued that Adams’ role before and after his promotion application did not 
change and, therefore, the First Amendment protection of his writings and publications 
submitted with his promotion application should not have changed either. Agee stated, 
“nothing about listing the speech on Adams’ promotion application changed Adams’ 
status when he spoke or the content of the speech when made” (p. 21). He disagreed 
with the district court’s conclusion that universities would be in a “Catch-22” of  
either neglect[ing] employee requests and refus[ing] to look at material, fueling 
allegations of free speech violations grounded in the refusal; or consid[ing] the 
material, knowing that doing so will open them up, in the event of an adverse 
outcome, to claims of free speech violations for basing denials on protected speech. 
(p. 21) 
Agee rebutted, “[t]his bind is no different than the commonplace consideration of 
criteria that govern all university employment decisions” (p. 21). Accordingly, Agee 




 Agee argued that, based on the facts of the case, Garcetti should not apply “in the 
academic context of a public university” (p. 22). Reminding the court of Justice Souter’s 
dissenting opinion in Garcetti, Agee stated, “the plain language of Garcetti thus 
explicitly left open the question of whether its principles apply in the academic genre 
where issues of ‘scholarship or teaching’ are in play” (p. 23). He added, 
[a]ppying Garcetti to the academic work of a public university faculty member 
under the facts of this case could place beyond the reach of First Amendment 
protection many forms of public speech or service a professor engaged in during his 
employment. That would not appear to be what Garcetti intended, nor is it 
consistent with our long-standing recognition that no individual loses his ability to 
speak as a private citizen by virtue of public employment. (p. 24) 
Agee found that “Adams’ speech was not tied to any more specific or direct employee 
duty than the general concept that professors will engage in writing, public appearances, 
and service within their respective fields” (p. 25). For this reason, he concluded that 
there was insufficient evidence to show that Adams’ speech was tied to his official 
duties and remanded the case for further proceedings.  
 Academic freedom. The academic freedom theme focused on whether Adams’s 
academic freedom was violated when the university allegedly retaliated against him. 
Thirty-eight references were coded from the opinions and brief with 2, 19, and 17 in the 
district court, amicus curiae brief, and court of appeals respectively. Based on a matrix 
coding query of all themes and reference coding bands within the opinions and brief, the 
theme overlapped the expression pursuant to official job duties, First Amendment, 
court’s reluctance to review academic decisions, and chilling effect themes 22, 7, 3, and 




brief. The analysis includes examples from each court opinion and brief showing how 
these four themes relate to the academic freedom theme. 
Table 9.6 
Matrix Coding of the Four Prevalent Themes That Overlap the Academic Freedom 
Theme  





Expression pursuant to official job duties 2 10 10 22 
First Amendment 0 5 2 7 
Courts reluctance to review academic 
decisions 
1 0 2 3 
Chilling effect 0 2 0 2 
  
District court. The district court reiterated the federal court’s reluctance to be 
involved in an academic decision such as tenure. Based on Jimenez (1995) and Smith 
(1980), Judge Malcolm Howard stated, “[c]ourts do not sit as a ‘super personnel council’ 
to review these decisions…and they are reluctant to interfere with the ‘subjective and 
scholarly judgments’ made in reaching those decisions” (Adams, 2010, p. 26).  He 
continued that these decisions “must be left for evaluation by the professional, 
particularly since they often involve inquiry into aspects of arcane scholarship beyond 
the competence of individual judges” (p. 26). He, also, found that, if these decisions 
required the university to review Adams’ emails as part of their investigation, the 
university was within its discretion to do so. Finding that the university had done 
everything in their power to protect Adam’ speech rights, Howard determined that there 




of [his] and others’ email messages bore any relationship to his protected speech” (p. 36-
37). He awarded summary judgment to the university on Adams’ religious 
discrimination and First Amendment claims and entrusted academic decisions to the 
university.  
Amicus brief. Amici argued that the district court misapplied Garcetti and 
ignored the Supreme Court’s reservation concerning “the more complex question of 
protection of academic speech” (AAUP, 2010, p. 5). Amici argued, “[t]he illogical 
application of Garcetti to this case undermines some of the basic principles of academic 
freedom, a freedom that is ‘of transcendent value to all of us and not merely the teachers 
concerned’” (pp. 6-7). They stated, 
[t]he court’s decision, while mistakenly relying upon Garcetti, simultaneously 
suggested that all materials included in a promotion or tenure packet would be 
unprotected by the First Amendment. A university could constitutionally penalize a 
faculty member not just for [his or her] extramural speech but for the content of all 
of [his or her] scholarly work. (p. 13) 
Adding,  
[t]his approach has the potential to curb academic development by setting a 
precedent that protection for expression – whether spoken in an official capacity or 
in an unofficial capacity on matters of public concern – shifts depending upon the 
circumstances under which it is later read. (pp. 14-15) 
In taking this approach, the district court assumed “that academic expression is no 
different from any other public employee speech, without discussing the reasoning 
behind its logic” (p. 16). Amici contended that this approach “would strip away First 
Amendment protection for speech made by university professors “pursuant to their 




(p. 22). As such, amici asked the court to recognize the Supreme Court’s reservation in 
Garcetti and to remand the case for further analysis. 
Court of appeals. The court of appeals reviewed Adams claims within the 
context in which he spoke and the district court’s use of the Garcetti analysis. Judge 
Agee reiterated Ewing (1985) stating, “courts have been reluctant to trench on the 
prerogatives of state and local educational institutions [because of the courts’] 
responsibility to safeguard their academic freedom, a special concern of the First 
Amendment” (Adams, 2011, p. 12). He added that he was 
[u]nsure how to evaluate the requirements for appointment, reappointment and 
tenure, and reluctant to interfere with the subjective and scholarly judgments which 
are involved [as] the courts have refused to impose their judgment as to whether the 
aggrieved academician should have been awarded the desired appointment or 
promotion. (p. 12) 
Within this context, Agee analyzed the district court’s decision concerning Adams’ role 
when we spoke and his First Amendment rights to speak in that role.  
 Agee agreed with the district court that they had made their decision based on the 
correct precedent but argued that they had “ignored the role Adams occupied when he 
spoke” (p. 20). Agee stated,  
[i]in effect, the district court held that Adams’ speech in his columns, books, and 
commentaries, although undoubtedly protected speech when given, was somehow 
transformed into unprotected speech because…others read the same items from a 
different perspective long after Adams’ speech was uttered. (p. 20) 
While Garcetti specifically requires evaluation of the speaker’s role, Agee stated that 
there was “nothing about listing the speech on Adams’ promotion application [that] 
changed [his academic] status when he spoke or the content of the speech when made” 




 Agee stated that the court was “persuaded that Garcetti would not apply in the 
academic context of a public university…based on the clear reservation of the 
issue…and the aspect of scholarship and teaching reflected by Adams’ speech” (p. 22). 
Agee recognized that “[t]here may be instances in which a public university faculty 
member’s assigned duties include a specific role in declaring or administering university 
policy, as opposed to scholarship or teaching” (p. 24).  
But, [amici added], the scholarship and teaching in this case, Adams’ speech, was 
intended for and directed at a national or international audience on issues of public 
importance unrelated to any of Adams’ assigned teaching duties at UNCW or any 
other terms of his employment found in the record [which, as the university 
conceded, also was not] undertaken at the direction of UNCW, paid for by UNCW, 
or had any direct application to his UNCW duties. (p. 24) 
Applying the Garcetti analysis in this case, Agee concluded, was not what the Supreme 
Court intended and, if upheld, “could place beyond the reach of First Amendment 
protection many forms of public speech or service a professor engaged in during [his or 
her] employment” (p. 24). Agee concluded that the “thin thread [was] insufficient to 
render Adams’ speech ‘pursuant to [his] official duties’ as intended by Garcetti” (p. 25) 
and reversed the district court’s decision on Adams’ First Amendment claim.  
 First Amendment. This theme focused on Adams’ right to speak and write 
freely as a citizen and professor and to submit his scholarly works during the promotion 
process without the fear of retaliation. Thirty-four references were coded from the 
opinions and brief with 2, 18, and 14 in the district court, amicus curiae brief, and court 
of appeals respectively. Based on a matrix coding query of all themes and reference 
coding bands within the opinions and brief, the theme overlapped the expression 




effect themes 15, 7, 3, and 2 times respectively. Table 9.7 provides the results of the 
query for each opinion and brief. The analysis includes examples from each court 
opinion and brief showing how these four themes relate to the First Amendment theme. 
Table 9.7 








Expression pursuant to official job duties 1 7 7 15 
Academic freedom 0 5 2 7 
Religious discrimination 0 1 2 3 
Chilling effect 0 2 0 2 
  
District court. The district court reiterated Garcetti, stating, “the First 
Amendment does not shield the consequences of expressions employees make pursuant 
to their professional duties” (Adams, 2010, p. 34). Judge Howard determined that 
Adams’ “inclusion of his columns, publications, and presentations in his application for 
promotion [was] an implicit acknowledgement that they were expressions made 
pursuant to his professional duties [and] that he was acting as a faculty member when he 
said them” (p. 34).  He added that this “trumped all earlier actions and marked his 
speech, at least for promotion purposes, as made pursuant to his official duties” (p. 35). 
To think otherwise, he contended, 
would allow those in [Adams’] position to place employers in a double bind: either 
neglect employee requests and refuse to look at material, fueling allegations of free 
speech violations grounded in the refusal; or consider the material, knowing that 
doing so will open them up, in the event of an adverse outcome, to claims of free 




Based on Garcetti, Howard found that the materials submitted in Adams’ promotion and 
tenure application were part of his job responsibilities as a faculty member and not 
protected under the First Amendment. 
Amicus brief. Amici discussed the First Amendment within the context of the 
Supreme Court’s recognition of academic freedom as a special concern and reservation 
to apply Garcetti in the academic environment. Amici referenced Rodriguez (2010) 
stating,  
[t]he right to provoke, offend and shock lies at the core of the First Amendment. 
This is particularly so on college campuses. Intellectual advancement has 
traditionally progressed through discord and dissent, as a diversity of views ensures 
that ideas survive because they are correct, not because they are popular. Colleges 
and universities – sheltered from the currents of popular opinion by tradition, 
geography, tenure, and monetary endowments – have historically fostered that 
exchange. But that role in our society will not survive if certain points of view may 
be declared beyond the pale. (p. 20) 
Amici argued that the district court’s “holding that university professors are not entitled 
to First Amendment protection for speech made pursuant to their role as academics 
would silence the very speech for which they are recruited” (p. 21). Adding, 
[b]ecause of the critical role that the academic community plays in educating the 
public and expanding the scope of human knowledge, the boundaries around 
protected speech must be broad so as to not chill the public discourse. These critical 
First Amendment rights can be vindicated only through access to the courts. (p. 23) 
As such, amici requested the court to remand the case for analysis in light of “the 
reservation for academic speech articulated in the majority’s opinion in Garcetti” (p. 
24). 
Court of appeals. The court of appeals reviewed Adams’ claim that “the district 




retaliation and viewpoint discrimination claims” (Adams, 2011, p. 17). After review, 
Judge Agee found that the district court erred “in its conclusion that Adams’ speech, 
which the [university] agree[d] was protected First Amendment speech when initially 
given, was converted into unprotected speech based on factors that came into play only 
after the protected speech was made” (p. 20). He also did not “find any support in 
Garcetti, which focused on the nature of the employee’s speech at the time it was made” 
(p. 20) and, therefore, was not compelled to extend the Garcetti principles to the case. 
He stated that, 
[applying them] to the academic work of a public university faculty 
member…could place beyond the reach of First Amendment protection many forms 
of public speech or service a professor engages in during his employment [which is 
not] what Garcetti intended [or] consistent with our long-standing recognition that 
no individual loses his ability to speak as a private citizen by virtue of public 
employment. (p. 24) 
As such, Agee determined that the university’s  
arguments…rest[ed] on the same fallacy engaged by the district court, and 
focus[ed] not on the nature of Adams’ speech at the time it was made, but on his 
inclusion of those materials in the ‘private’ context of his promotion application. (p. 
26) 
 
He found that Adams spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern and his speech 
was, therefore, protected by the First Amendment. 
 Religious discrimination. The religious discrimination theme focused on the 
committee’s retaliation against Adams for his religious and political writings by denying 
his promotion (Adams, 2010). Thirty-three references were coded from the opinions and 
brief with 22, 1, and 20 in the district court, amicus curiae brief, and court of appeals 




within the opinions and brief, the theme overlapped the expression pursuant to official 
job duties, adverse employment action, First Amendment, immunity of public officials, 
and court’s reluctance to review academic decisions 8, 4, 3, 2, and 2 times respectively. 
Table 9.8 provides the results of the query for each opinion and brief. The analysis 
includes examples from each court opinion and brief showing how these four themes 
relate to the religious discrimination theme. 
Table 9.8 









Expression pursuant to official job duties 2 0 6 8 
Adverse employment action 0 0 4 4 
First Amendment 0 1 2 3 
Immunity of public officials 2 0 0 2 
Courts reluctance to review academic 
decisions 2 0 0 2 
  
District court. The district court reviewed Adams’ Title VII claim that the 
university “retaliated against him for his Christian and politically conservative speech by 
denying his application for promotion to full professor and by subjecting him to 
intrusive investigations” (Adams, 2010, p. 2). Judge Howard stated, “[t]o prove his Title 
VII claim, [Adams] must demonstrate that UNCW treated him differently than other 
employees because of his religious views or beliefs [and provide] evidence whose 
cumulative probative force supports a reasonable inference of discrimination” (p. 27). 




he spoke of his conversion to Christianity several times prior to his promotion 
application, including in columns and a book that he submitted as part of his 
promotion application. From this he surmise[ed] that the [university’s] 
consideration of these materials (at Adams’ behest) as part of his promotion 
application and the subsequent denial together constitute[ed] direct evidence of 
discrimination. (p. 27)  
Howard found that the evidence did “not satisfy the law’s requirement of evidence of 
conduct or statements that both reflect directly the alleged discriminatory attitude and 
that bear directly on the contested employment decision” (p. 27).  
 Lacking evidence, Howard conjectured that Adams could still prevail on his claim 
using the three-part burden-shifting analysis in McDonnell Douglas (1973). The analysis 
required: (a) Adams to establish “a prima facie case for religious discrimination” 
(Adams, 2010, p. 28); (b) the university to “proffer legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reasons for the [promotion] denial” (p. 30); and (c) Adams to “show that the 
[university’s] proffered reasons were merely pretext for unlawful religious 
discrimination” (p. 30). The first part of the analysis required Adams to satisfy four 
steps.  
 (1) he was a member of a protected group, (2) he applied for but was denied the 
promotion in question, (3) he was qualified for the promotion, and (4) he was 
rejected for the promotion under circumstances giving rise to an inference of 
unlawful discrimination. (p. 28) 
 
Howard found that Adams was a member of a protected group, denied promotion, and 
qualified as an associate professor to be promoted. On the fourth step, Adams argued, 
“he meets this criterion because he was the ‘only Christian conservative’ in the 
department” (p. 29). Howard found no evidence supporting Adams’ assertion or 




added, “there [was] nothing beyond conjecture to support this inference, and [Adams 
was] therefore unable to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination” (p. 30). 
Even if Adams were to satisfy the first and second part of the analysis, Howard added 
that his “claim bumps up against the federal courts’ resistance to interfere with the 
‘subjective and scholarly judgments’ involved in professorial employment decisions” (p. 
31). In conclusion, Howard granted summary judgment to the university on Adams’ 
Title VII claim.  
Amicus brief. Amici focused on Adams’ First Amendment claims and the effect 
upholding the district court’s decision would have on academic freedom and university 
speech. Amici referenced Adams’s Title VII claim in an opening statement but took no 
position on Adams’ religious discrimination claim. 
Court of appeals. Judge Agee agreed with the district court’s decision. He found 
that Adams “failed to set forth direct evidence of religious discrimination…and his 
arguments demand pure speculation” (Adams, 2011, p. 14). Agee also found that the 
“district court properly held that Adams failed to satisfy his burden for proving 
discrimination using the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas (1973). As 
such, Agee concluded that the district court did not err in “their determination that the 
record lacked evidence to support Adams’ allegations of religious discrimination” 







 While the university was granted summary judgment on Adams’ claims of religious 
discrimination and Equal Protection, the court of appeals remanded Adams’ First 
Amendment retaliation and viewpoint discrimination claim to the district court for 
further proceedings. The court of appeals reasoned, 
(1) the district court erred in concluding that his speech, which was protected 
speech when initially given, was converted into unprotected speech when he listed 
the speech on his promotion application, and (2) under the Pickering-Connick 
analysis, his speech was clearly that of a citizen speaking on a matter of public 
concern since his columns addressed topics such as academic freedom and civil 
rights. (Adams, 2011, p. 2) 
The court of appeals concluded that the district court’s misread Garcetti based on two 
overriding principles. First, the district court’s decision insinuated “that protected speech 
was converted into unprotected speech based on its use after the fact” (p. 19). The court 
of appeals found “no precedent for the phenomenon of converting protected speech” (p. 
20) or support in the Garcetti analysis that “changed Adams’ status when he spoke or 
the content of the speech when [it was] made” (p. 21). In examining the content of 
Adams’ speech without analyzing the context in which it was given, the court of appeals 
held that the district court erred as matter of law. 
 Second, the court of appeals reasoned that, “the district court applied Garcetti 
without acknowledging…the clear language in that opinion that casts doubt on whether 
the Garcetti analysis applies in the academic context of a public university” (p. 19). The 
court stated that “[t]he plain language of Garcetti…explicitly left open the question of 
whether its principles apply in the academic genre where issues of ‘scholarship or 




could place beyond the reach of First Amendment protection many forms of public 
speech or service a professor engag[es] in during [his or her] employment [which is 
not]consistent with our long-standing recognition that no individual loses his ability 
to speak as a private citizen by virtue of public employment. (p. 24) 
While the university contended that Adams’ speech was part of his official duties as a 
faculty member, the district court found that Adams’ “speech was not tied to any more 
specific or direct employee duty than the general concept that professors will engage in 
writing, public appearances, and service within their respective fields” (p. 25). Based on 
the Supreme Court reservation in Garcetti, the court of appeals held that its’ analysis 
should not be used to evaluate Adams’ speech. 
 The court of appeals instead used the Pickering/Connick balancing test. In using the 
test, the court of appeals found that Adams’ columns provided in his promotion 
application included “topics such as academic freedom, civil rights, campus culture, sex, 
feminism, abortion, homosexuality, religion, and morality,” (p. 26) and that his speech 
was made as a citizen on matters of public concern not as part of his official duties. The 
court of appeals’ recognition of the Supreme Court’s reservation in Garcetti and the role 
that faculty hold when they speak is significant as it provides protection for faculty’s 
academic freedom as well as guidance to universities when faculty speech as a citizen 
conflicts with their speech as an employee.  
 On September 6, 2011, the district court sent the university and Adams to 
mediation. The university responded stating that  
UNCW will, in good faith, participate in the routine settlement conference, 
which was ordered by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
North Carolina in Adams v. UNCW, in an effort to determine whether a mutually 





As of this writing, no information was found concerning a settlement, but Adams has 
received promotion to Associate Professor in the Sociology and Criminology department 





Chapter Ten: Summary of Cases 
 Chapter 10 summarizes the findings in the six court cases analyzed. The chapter 
presents the court case decisions and timelines and discusses the prevalent themes 
identified during the analysis of the six cases. The chapter concludes with a discussion 
of the findings. 
Case Timeline 
 The six cases for this study were argued and decided between 2000 and 2012 in 
the district and appellate courts, except for Grutter and Garcetti, which went to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. In Grutter, motions to combine the case with Gratz and to allow 
defendant intevenors were filed in the 6th circuit district and appellate courts starting in 
August 1998. The case was decided by the 6th circuit in March 2001 and the U.S. 
Supreme Court in June 2003. Similarly, Garcetti was decided in the 9th circuit district 
and appellate courts and in the U.S. Supreme Court in May 2006. The Churchill case 
was the most drawn out of the six cases lasting 70 months and filed in three 9th circuit 
courts including the district, appellate, and Colorado supreme courts as well as the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Adams was the shortest case lasting 16 months and filed in two courts in 
the 10th circuit. As indicated in Table 10.1, all cases were decided in favor of the 
government agency or public university but Adams. Adams received a partial decision 
and his case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The district court 
referred his case to mediation and it was settled out of court. A shepardized list of the six 
cases studied is provided below in the order that they were studied to show prior 




• Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001), reversed, 309 F.3d 
329 (6th Cir. 2001), affirmed, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
• Ceballos v. Garcetti, 2002 WL 34098285, No. CV-001-11-06-AHMAJWX, 
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2002), reversed, 361 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2004), reversed, 547 
U.S. 410 (2006). 
• Schrier v. Univ. of Colorado, 427 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2005).   
• Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2007), affirmed 403 Fed. Appx. 
236 (9th Cir. 2010). 
• Churchill v. Univ. of Colorado at Boulder, 293 P. 3d 16 (Colo. App. 2010), 
affirmed on other grounds, 285 P.3d 986 (Colo. 2012). 
• Adams v. Univ. of North Carolina, 640 F. 3d 550 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 233 (2010). 
Table 10.1 also provides the circuit courts in which the cases originated and indicates 






List of the six cases studied showing the circuit court in which the case originated, 
whether the case was heard by the Supreme Court, and who the court decided in favor of 
Cases District Court 
U.S. Supreme 
Court Decision 
Grutter v. Bollinger 6th Circuit Yes University of Michigan 
Garcetti v. Ceballos 9th Circuit Yes County district attorney’s 
office 
Schrier v. University of 
Colorado 
10th Circuit No University of Colorado 
Hong v. University of 
California 
9th Circuit No University of California 
Churchill v. University of 
Colorado 
10th Circuit Appealing University of Colorado 
Adams v. University of North 
Carolina at Wilmington 
4th Circuit No Mediated and settled 
Table10.2 depicts the timelines for each of the cases, the start and end dates of each 





Table 10.2  
Case timelines: 2000 to 2012  
Years Grutter Garcetti Schrier Hong Churchill Adams 
2000 August 1998 
     2001 
      2002 
 
January 
    2003 April-June 
 
May 
   2004 
      2005 
 
October 
    2006 
 
May December 
   2007 
   
September July 
 2008 
      2009 
      2010 





     
April 
2012     September  
2013     April  
Months in 
court 59 53 44 39 70 16 
Note. Table cells indicate the start and end months and year of each case. Red cells indicate that 
the case was in the district court system and blue in the Supreme Court. The start of the timeline 
coincides with the start of the study. 
Case Theme Analysis 
 Of the 35 themes coded in the six cases, 11 themes were coded in more than one 
case and identified as prevalent to the cross-case analysis. The remaining 24 themes 
were dropped from the analysis because they were coded in one case and only relevant 
to the discussion of that specific case. The 11 prevalent themes from the case analysis 
included the First Amendment, expression pursuant to official job duties, immunity of 
public officials, academic freedom, adverse employment action, matter of public 




reinstatement to university, employer’s right to efficient operations, and chilling effect. 
The 11 themes had 1,356 coded references, which are listed in Table 10.3. 
Table 10.3  
Prevalent Themes With the Cases Referenced and Total References Coded 
Prevalent Themes Cases Referenced 
Total Coded 
References 
First Amendment Garcetti, Schrier, Hong, Churchill, Adams 272 
Expression pursuant to official 
job duties 
Garcetti, Hong, Adams 254 
Immunity of public officials Grutter, Garcetti, Schrier, Hong, 
Churchill, Adams 
224 
Academic freedom Grutter, Garcetti, Schrier, Churchill, 
Adams 
155 
Adverse employment action Garcetti,Churchill, Adams 104 
Speech as a public employee 
versus private citizen 
Garcetti, Schrier 77 
Matter of public concern Garcetti, Schrier, Hong, 75 
Employer’s right to control 
speech 
Garcetti, Hong, 75 
Reinstatement to university Schrier, Churchill 58 
Employer’s right to efficient 
operations 
Garcetti, Schrier 32 
Chilling effect Churchill, Adams 30 
 As the cases were analyzed, the 11 themes were tracked in order to highlight the 
courts’ opinions and to identify trends across the timeline of the study. Figure 10.1 
illustrates the prominence of each theme from 2000 to 2012 as well as the date the courts 
made their final decision on each case. Noteworthy, is the increased importance of the 
speech as a public employee versus private citizen until Garcetti was decided, in 2006. 
Starting in 2006 and continuing to present, the importance of the expression pursuant to 
job duties theme is prominent. Also, starting in 2009, there was an increase in the 




courts’ reluctance to be involved in university business and academic decisions, their 
designation of faculty as public employees, and the universites’ ability to use these 
decisions to determine what academic speech is part of a faculty member’s job duties 
and what can be controlled in the name of maintaining efficient operations.  
 























First Amendment Expression pursuant to official job duties 
Immunity of public officials Academic freedom 
Adverse employment action Matter of public concern 
Speech as a public employee versus private citizen Employer's right to control speech 
Reinstatement to the university Employer's right to efficient operations 
Chilling effect 
Grutter - June 
2003 
Garcetti - May 
2006 
Schrier - Dec 2006 
Hong - Nov 
2010 
Adams - Apr 
2011 





To determine the strength of the linear relationship between each of these 
themes, a Pearson correlation coefficient (r) of word similarity was calculated. Table 
10.4 provides the prevalent themes with strong positive relationships (above r = 0.90).  
Table 10.4  
Pearson Correlation Coefficient of the Strongest Linear Relationships (r <= 0.90) 
Between the 11 Most Prevalent Themes in the Six Cases  




Expression pursuant to official job duties Employer’s right to control speech 0.95744 
Speech as a public employee versus 
private citizen 
First Amendment 0.95613 
First Amendment Expression pursuant to official job 
duties 
0.95586 
Speech as a public employee versus 
private citizen 
Employer’s right to control speech 0.95331 
Speech as a public employee versus 
private citizen 
Matter of public concern 0.95044 
First Amendment Academic freedom 0.94413 
First Amendment Employer’s right to control speech 0.94138 
Speech as a public employee versus 
private citizen 
Expression pursuant to official job 
duties 
0.93909 
Matter of public concern First Amendment 0.93439 
Matter of public concern Expression pursuant to official job 
duties 
0.92734 
Matter of public concern Employer’s right to control speech 0.92634 
Expression pursuant to official job duties Academic freedom 0.92460 
Matter of public concern Employer’s right to efficient 
operations 
0.91578 
Speech as a public employee versus 
private citizen 
Academic freedom 0.90439 
Chilling effect Adverse employment action 0.90143 
The correlations for themes between r > 0.80 and r < 0.00 are provided in Table 10.5. 




themes and the other prevalent themes was low (r > 0.80). No correlation (r = 0.00) 
existed between the immunity of public officials theme and any other prevalent themes 
demonstrating that the court’s willingness to discuss and consider immunity independent 
of other themes and factors in the cases.  
Table 10.5  
Pearson Correlation Coefficient for Weakest Linear Relationships  
(r > 0.80 and r < 0.00) Between the 11 Most Prevalent Themes in the Six Cases 
 
Theme A Theme B 
Pearson correlation 
coefficient 
Reinstatement to university Adverse employment action 0.79198 
Employers Right to Efficient 
Operations 
Chilling effect 0.78388 
Reinstatement to the university Academic freedom 0.78063 
Reinstatement to the university First Amendment 0.77894 
Reinstatement to the university Chilling effect 0.75756 
Reinstatement to the university Expression pursuant to official job 
duties 
0.74851 
Reinstatement to the university Employer’s right to control speech 0.71947 
Speech as a public employee 
versus private citizen 
Reinstatement to the university 0.71011 
Reinstatement to the university Matter of public concern 0.69021 
Reinstatement to the university Employer’s right to efficient 
operations 
0.68564 
  Analyzing the 11 prevalent themes from 2000 to 2012 contributes to answering 
the study’s research question: How have federal, state, and local events affected 
academic freedom since 2000? The six cases studied provide a chronology of the legal 
decisions made that affect academic speech on campuses. Each case will be discussed 
within the context of the prevalent themes in order to identify trends and to determine 




a stacked bar chart of the 11 prevalent themes and within each, the number of coded 
references in each case. Each case and the prominent themes are discussed to identify 
trends and the effect each court decision has had on the academic freedom since 2000. 
 






























Adams Churchill Garcetti 





To understand the courts’ and amicis’ focus, a bar chart is provided in Figure 
10.3. The chart illustrates the number of coded references of each opinion and brief in 
each of the 11 prevalent themes. Viewing the data in this manner provides a clear picture 
of the themes that each court discussed as the cases progressed through the courts from 
2000 to 2012.   
 


















District Court Amicus Brief - District Court of Appeals 
District Court of Appeals Amicus Brief - State Supreme Court 
State  Supreme Court Amicus Brief - U.S. Supreme Court 




 Grutter v. Bollinger.  Two of the 11 themes, academic freedom and immunity of 
public officials, were identified in Grutter. As illustrated in Figure 10.1, these themes 
were evident throughout the study. The importance of the case to the discussion is the 
Supreme Court’s post-2000 recognition of the university’s right to academic freedom. In 
upholding the university’s right to decide the make-up of the law school student body, 
the Supreme Court’s decision reaffirmed their support for institutional academic 
freedom and extended the university’s right to make broad academic decisions in order 
to further their interests. As such, the court provided a level of deference to the 
university, stating, 
the interest asserted by the Law School is no less strict for taking into account 
complex educational judgments in an area that lies primarily within the expertise 
of the university. Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a 
degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions, within constitutionally 
prescribed limits. (Grutter, 2003, p. 22) 
The significance of this decision provides subsequent cases with the ability to control 
academic decision including faculty speech. 
 The university’s use of immunity for public officials was evident in the district 
court as a first line of defense against lawsuits. The district court granted summary 
judgment to the defendant’s based on their right to individual qualified immunity under 
the Eleventh Amendment to prevent regents, presidents, and other defendants from 
being sued. The institution was denied immunity but the right to immunity at various 
levels was used in all the cases studied. 
 Garcetti v.Ceballos. The references coded in Garcetti included all the prevalent 




employee, matter of public concern, employer’s right to control speech, and employer’s 
right to efficient operations themes provided the majority of references coded. The First 
Amendment and expression pursuant to official job duties themes were infused within 
these major themes but were not the focus of the courts’ discussions. As court cases are 
events, these discussions provide legal insight to answer the research question, “[h]ow 
have these events changed the way universities and the faculty handle extramural speech 
when speaking both as a citizen and a public university employee?”  
Throughout the case, the Garcetti courts focused on whether public employee 
speech was protected under the First Amendment when it addressed a matter of public 
concern and whether public employers were bound by the First Amendment to allow 
their employees to exercise their free speech rights if it affects the efficiency of their 
operations. Even though, the circuit court ruled that the defendant’s speech was a matter 
of public concern, the Supreme Court recognized that speech made as part of the 
employee’s job responsibility was not protected or owned by the employee holding, 
[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the 
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the 
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline. 
(Garcetti, 2006, p. 11) 
The court holding did not restrict his rights as a private citizen to speak on matters of 
public concern but rather “reflects the exercise of employer control over what the 
employer itself has commissioned or created” (p. 11) in order to maintain the efficiency 
of their operations. The discretion to determine whether an employee speech is part of 
his or her job or disrupts the public employer’s ability to operate was left to the 




 While the case involved a public office, the court’s decision has implications on 
faculty intramural and extramural speech. In addition to teaching and research, faculty 
participate in university governance structures as members of committees, deans and 
department heads. These roles are part of their job duties and, based on Garcetti, places 
faculty in a vulnerable situation when serving in these capacities. Justice Souter warned 
of this quandary,  
This ostensible domain beyond the pale of the First Amendment is spacious 
enough to include even the teaching of a public university professor, and I have 
to hope that today’s majority does not mean to imperil First Amendment 
protection of academic freedom in public colleges and universities, whose 
teachers necessarily speak and write "pursuant to…official duties.” (p. 18) 
In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy side-stepped the issue with what became 
known as the Garcetti reservation stating, 
There is some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or 
classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are not 
fully accounted for by this Court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence. 
We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct 
today would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to 
scholarship or teaching. (p. 12) 
As such, the court left the decision of determining whether employee speech is public or 
private and within the university’s right to control for the district courts to decide at a 
later date. 
 Schrier v. the University of Colorado. The Schrier case dealt directly with a 
department chair removed for his intramural speech about the relocation of the 
university’s health science center to a new location. The case was decided six months 
after Garcetti and focused on the themes of academic freedom, speech as a private 




public concern. These themes are discussed in relation to Schrier’s role as a department 
chair rather than his role as a faculty member and the university’s right to control his 
speech.    
To determine if Schrier’s speech was protected, the appellate court used the 
Pickering balance test. While the court held that Schrier’s speech was a matter of public 
concern, they found that his speech was “having a negative impact both on his 
performance [as a chair person] and on the University’s operations” (Schrier, 2005, p. 
22) thus failing the second prong of the test. The court used the same logic to deny 
Schrier’s reinstatement concluding that it “would place the court in a position where it 
may have to provide supervision, and…would be disruptive and detrimental to the 
essential functioning of University business” (p. 8). The decision questions whether 
academic speech is protected when faculty serve as part-time adminsitrators and do not 
support the university’s decisions.  
In addition, the appellate court refused to recognize academic freedom as a 
special concern of the First Amendment. In denying Schrier’s claim that the university 
violated his academic freedom, the court stated, 
the right to academic freedom is not “a subset of the First Amendment, separate 
and distinct from the fundamental right of free speech.” In fact, the court 
expressly refused to endorse any suggestion that speech in an academic setting 
concerning the operations of a university enjoys greater constitutional protection 
than does political speech in the public forum.  (pp. 22-23) 
The statement implies that academic speech concerning the operations of a university is 
not protected and that faculty can be held accountable as public employees for their non-




professors possess a special constitutional right of academic freedom not enjoyed by 
other governmental employees” (p. 24). By equating speech by faculty serving in 
governance roles with that of public employees, the court’s decision enhanced the 
university’s right to control speech that disrupts or questions their academic decisions 
and their operations. 
 Hong v. the University of California at Irvine. After Garcetti and Schrier, the 
expression pursuant to job duties theme became prevalent. The Supreme Court had 
already decided that employee speech was not protected when their speech was 
determined to be part of his or her official duties. The Hong case is the first in the study 
that uses Garcetti to control faculty intramural speech. Referencing Garcetti, the court 
reiterated the employer’s right to regulate employee speech, 
Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional 
responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed 
as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what 
the employer itself has commissioned or created. Allowing anything less than 
unfettered employer control over speech within an employee’s official duties 
would "displace managerial discretion for judicial supervision," requiring 
"permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of governmental operations."  
(Hong, 2007, p. 7) 
Adding, 
an employee’s official duties are not narrowly defined, but instead encompass 
the full range of the employee’s professional responsibilities. While an 
employee’s job description is not dispositive of his official duties, any activity 
within an "employee’s uncontested employment responsibilities" is an official 
duty. (p. 7) 
As such, the court found that Hong’s official duties went beyond teaching and research 
to “include a wide range of academic, administrative, and personnel functions in 




His statements and criticisms concerning a faculty member’s mid-year review, a 
professor’s consideration for a merit increase, his department’s use of lecturers, and his 
department’s hiring process “were made pursuant to his official duties and, therefore, do 
not deserve First Amendment protection” (p. 9). The court also found that Hong’s 
statements were not a matter of public concern and should be “characterized as internal 
administrative disputes which have little or no relevance to the community as a whole” 
(p. 9). While the university required shared governance, they, and the courts were not 
tolerant or supportive of faculty providing input or criticizing their decisions. Amici 
contented,  
the speech of university professors merits a special degree of protection not only 
to facilitate an uninhibited pursuit of truth and advancement of knowledge, but 
equally to encourage scholars to speak candidly and fearlessly as they convey 
sometimes unwelcome or unsettling truths to government and citizens. (Hong, 
2008, p. 16) 
The court held that “UCI [was] entitled to unfettered discretion when it restricts 
statements an employee makes on the job and according to his professional 
responsibilities” (p. 9). As such, institutional academic freedom trumped faculty 
academic freedom. When faculty participate in shared governance and voice their 
opinions openly, their role as faculty members morph into being public employees and 
their speech can be considered a part of their official job duties, not protected, and open 
to disciplinary action. 
 Churchill v. the University of Colorado at Boulder. Churchill is significant in 
that the district trial jury determined that the university’s investigation of Churchill’s 




On the Justice of Roosting Chickens, concerning 9/11 and U.S. foreign policy. The jury 
found in favor of Churchill’s claim for relief based on First Amendment retaliation 
(Churchill, 2009) and “concluded that ‘the Board of Regents of the University of 
Colorado use[d] [Churchill’s] protected speech activity as a substantial or motivating 
factor in the decision to discharge [him] from employment,’ and that the termination 
harmed Churchill” (Churchill, 2010, p. 9). They awarded him nominal damages in the 
amount of $1. The jury’s decision affirmed that Churchill’s intramural speech was 
investigated due to his controversial extramural speech. The university immediately 
moved for a judgment on the grounds that they and the regents were barred from lawsuit 
by the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. The appellate court added, “the jury found 
that the University and the Regents had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence 
that Churchill would have been dismissed for reasons other than his exercise of free 
speech” (p. 10). The discussion of Churchill’s claims as opposed to the university’s right 
to immunity consumed the remainder of court opinions. 
 The immunity of public officials theme was prominent in the Churchill case and 
used by all the circuit courts to deny Churchill’s claims. While the university waived its 
right to Eleventh Amendment immunity, it argued that the regents were quasi-judicially 
immune based on their constitutional right to supervise and govern the operations of 
their institutions and that the disciplinary process which was based on predefined 
policies and procedures was followed throughout their investigation of Churchill. The 
district court clarified the definition of quasi-judicial immunity stating, “[w]hen a 




present or past facts presented to the governmental body, then one can say with 
reasonable certainty that the governmental body is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity” 
(Churchill, 2009, p. 14). The court determined that the regents and administration had 
acted in a judicial manner and satisfied all the necessary quasi-judicial requirements, 
which included: 
(1) the right to notice of charges; (2) the right to request a hearing before a 
faculty committee; (3) the right to challenge the participation of a member of the 
faculty committee; (4) the requirement that the University prove that grounds for 
dismissal exist by clear and convincing evidence; (5) the requirement that the 
University transcribe the hearing; (6) the right to representation by counsel; (7) 
the right to examine each University witness; (8) the right to present witnesses; 
(9) the right to present oral and written closing arguments; (10) the right to 
respond to the faculty committee’s findings; (11) the right to request a hearing 
before the Board of Regents; (12) the requirement that the Board of Regents 
consider only the evidence in the record; (13) the requirement that the Board of 
Regents take final action in a public meeting; and (14) the right of judicial 
review of the Board of Regents’ decision. (p. 18) 
The appellate court agreed with the district court’s findings that the regents and the 
university were immune, stating, 
the nature of the decision reached by the University and its Regents, and the 
process by which that decision was reached, shared enough characteristics with 
the judicial process to warrant absolute immunity from liability [and that they] 
perceive no error in the trial court’s analysis which looked to the nature and 
process of the University and the Regents’ activities in concluding that there was 
enough functional similarity between their actions and the judicial process to 
justify the application of quasi-judicial immunity. (Churchill, 2010, pp. 21-22) 
The Colorado Supreme Court agreed and concluded, “that the Regents are entitled to 
absolute immunity because their role as quasi-judicial public officials was functionally 
comparable to the role of a judge” (Churchill, 2012, p. 23). The court’s decision 
dismissed all of Churchill’s claims of harassment, political bias on the part of the 




his termination. The immunity defense was cited in each of the cases studied with the 
most coded references (162) in Churchill. As long as public universities have established 
policies, procedures, and processes when disciplining faculty and the regents and 
administration follow them, their quasi-judicial actions are legally protected under the 
doctrine of absolute immunity. The decision by the 10th Circuit Court system moved the 
balance of power in the university’s favor, allowing them to exert control over the 
actions of its faculty and retaliate against faculty for their extramural and intramural 
speech or, as this case shows, both. 
 Adams v. the University of North Carolina at Wilmington. As with Hong, the 
expression pursuant to official job duties was the most prevalent theme. The case 
provided the 4th Circuit Court’s interpretation of Garcetti, questioned the role of the 
faculty member as a public employee, and discussed the Supreme Courts reservation of 
applying the Garcetti decision to academic speech. 
The case revolved around the materials provided by Adams in his tenure and 
promotion package and whether his promotion was denied due to his religious 
viewpoints and conservative opinions. The university’s response to his allegations was 
that the materials provided in Adams’ tenure and promotion package were a part of his 
official duties as a faculty member. The district court agreed, concluding that Adams’ 
speech was not protected by the First Amendment because Adams’ "inclusion of the 
speech in his application for promotion trumped all earlier actions and marked his 




2011, p. 19) as held in Garcetti. The appellate court disagreed and addressed the 
application of Garcetti to the case stating,  
The district court’s decision rests on several fundamental errors including its 
holding that protected speech was converted into unprotected speech based on its 
use after the fact. In addition, the district court applied Garcetti without 
acknowledging, let alone addressing, the clear language in that opinion that casts 
doubt on whether the Garcetti analysis applies in the academic context of a 
public university. (p. 19)  
Applying Garcetti to the academic work of a public university faculty member 
under the facts of this case could place beyond the reach of First Amendment 
protection many forms of public speech or service a professor engaged in during 
his employment” (p. 19).  
The court added, that “the district court’s subsequent analysis ignores the role Adams 
occupied when he spoke [and,] although undoubtedly protected speech when given, was 
somehow transformed into unprotected speech” (p. 20). The court contended that, 
Adams’ speech was not tied to any more specific or direct employee duty than 
the general concept that professors will engage in writing, public appearances, 
and service within their respective fields. For all the reasons discussed above, 
that thin thread is insufficient to render Adams’ speech "pursuant to [his] official 
duties" as intended by Garcetti. (p. 25) 
The appellate court concluded that it was “not compelled by Garcetti to extend its 
principles to the case” and the district court had erred in their analysis. As such, they 
reversed “the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Adams’ First Amendment 
claims” (p. 29) and remanded the case for further consideration. 
 In recognizing the Garcetti reservation, the 4th Circuit Court held that faculty are 
not just public employees whose extramural and intramural speech are part of their 
official job duties. While the lower court considered the content and context of Adams’ 




member. The decision is important to the discussion of the faculty’s official duties as 
researchers who publish, teachers who deliberate a wide range of topics, some of which 
are controversial, and active participants in public university shared governance who are 
allowed to discuss their opinions without the fear of reprisal. The court’s remand was the 
only case in the study that was decided partially in favor of the faculty member and was 
a positive outcome for protecting faculty intramural and extramural speech. The 
university mediated the case and settled out of court. 
Case Findings 
 To report the case analysis findings, the study answers each of the four research 
questions. In answering the questions, the terms “events” and “case” are synonymous.  
The study considers the six cases to be events that are interrelated over the time period 
of the study. The questions and findings are discussed. 
 Effect of federal, state, and local events on academic freedom. The six cases 
exemplified how decisions made in the federal, state, and local courts affect academic 
speech. The first case studied chronologically, Grutter, provided a baseline for the 
university’s right to control academic decisions and environment. While Grutter focused 
on law school admissions standards, the Supreme Court’s ruling in favor of the 
university recognized the institutional academic freedom of the university. In subsequent 
cases such as Garcetii, Schrier, and Hong, institutional academic freedom was 
reinforced by the court’s decisions to uphold public employer’s right to control 
employee speech. The decision was buttressed by the reluctance of the court to interfere 




two themes, right to control speech and right to efficient operations, exemplified the 
court’s support for institutional academic freedom and the institution’s ability to silence 
public employee speech when it interferes with business decision. For universities, these 
actions have strengthened their control over the academic environment and weakened 
the ability of the faculty to speak freely on issues outside of the classroom.  
While Gutter was the precedent, Garcetti provided the definitions for what type 
of speech public employers have the right to control. In May 2006, the Garcetti Court 
modified the Pickering test by adding an initial step to determine whether an employee 
was speaking pursuant to his or her official job duties and whether the employee’s 
speech was protected or not. In the Hong and Adams cases, the faculty members served 
on college leadership or shared governance committees and, based on the 
Garcetti/Pickering analysis, their speech was categorized as coming from a public 
employee and, therefore, not protected by the First Amendment. This definition presents 
a quandary for faculty speech especially when they are required to participate in the 
decision-making and operations of his or her university. While the Garcetti court left the 
district courts to work out the details of its decision, the effect that it will have on 
academic freedom remains different in each of the circuits studied and dependent on 
whether universities are supportive of unfettered faculty speech regardless of their role. 
The September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center prompted the 
decision by the University of Colorado to initiate an investigation of Ward Churchill’s 
articles and research for academic misconduct. Published soon after the attacks, On the 




legislators and university regents calling for his termination. While the university found 
that the essay and his speech was protected by the First Amendment, they opened an 
investigation into Churchill’s other articles that he had published during his tenure at the 
University of Colorado. The investigation found evidence of research misconduct and he 
was terminated from his tenured position at the university. The case provided an 
example of how controversial extramural speech on a national event can trigger actions 
originating outside the university resulting in the termination of a tenured faculty 
member. While Churchill contended that the actions of the court would chill speech, no 
conclusive evidence was provided to validate that assertion.   
 Effect these events have on the way universities and faculty handle 
intramural speech. The Grutter and Garcetti decisions reaffirmed the institution’s right 
to govern internal academic decision-making and to control academic speech based on 
the role of the speaker. Two cases, Hong and Adams, provided insight into how courts 
applied the Garcetti standard to determine whether their intramural speech was made 
pursuant to the public employee’s official duties. In Hong, the district court found that 
his intramural speech as a department chair was a matter of public concern but ruled that 
it was not protected because it was part of his official job duties. The district and 
appellate courts ruled in favor of the university. In Adams, the district court found that 
his speech, which was provided in his tenure and promotion package, was made as part 
of his official job duties as a faculty member and not protected. On appeal, the court 
reversed the decision of the lower court, finding that they had ignored the Supreme 




misapplied the Garcetti analysis. In 2011, the court remanded the case for further 
analysis but it was settled out of court. These conflicting outcomes in two different 
circuits epitomize the issues facing faculty as public employees when the content of 
intramural speech becomes an issue with their university.  
The question of whether Garcetti applies to academic speech depends on the role 
faculty hold when they speak. Intramural classroom speech was not challenged in the 
cases researched. Non-classroom intramural speech, which the university decided was 
interfering with university operations, was an issue in the Schrier and Hong cases and 
the university reacted by exerting its right to control the speech. In these cases, both 
faculty members were removed from their leadership roles due to their adversarial 
speech against decisions made by their respective colleges. While they retained their 
tenured faculty positions, the university successfully defended their actions and right to 
control intramural speech in court.  
 Effect these events have on the way universities and the faculty handle 
extramural speech when speaking both as a citizen and a public university 
employee. The Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti, in 2006, was pivotal in 
determining whether the speech of public employees was protected by the First 
Amendment when their speech was part of their job duties. As illustrated in Figure 10.2, 
the court’s discussion from 2004 to 2008 was dominated by three interrelated themes: 
speech as a public employee versus private citizen; expression pursuant to official job 
duties; and employer’s right to control speech. Once the Garcetti court (2006) decided 




duties, the speech as a public employee versus private citizen theme had no references. 
Instead, the district courts focused on determining whether the context and content of the 
employee’s speech was made as part of his or her job duties and whether the institution 
had a right to control his or her speech. While the Supreme Court left the district courts 
with the task of deciding how the decision applies to universities, the focus of the court’s 
opinions clearly turned to discussions of whether faculty’s intramural and extramural 
speech can be consider part of their job duties and within the university’s right to 
control. 
 Effect these events have on faculty’s ability to defend their academic 
freedom. In all the cases researched, the immunity of public officials theme was 
referenced. Universities successfully defended immunity for their regents and senior 
administrators named in their lawsuits. Universities initiated their motions for immunity 
in the lower courts, which were upheld in all the higher courts. Immunity proved to be a 
valuable tool in reducing university’s exposure to lawsuits and the cost required to 
defend the university. 
A university’s ability to claim immunity can have adverse effects on academic 
freedom if faculty members are not allowed to defend their speech in court. Shortly after 
the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, Ward Churchill 
published an essay critical of U.S. foreign policy. The content of the essay was 
controversial. Legislators and university regents called for his termination. While the 
university found that the essay and his speech was protected by the First Amendment, 




his tenure at the University of Colorado. The investigation found evidence of plagiarism 
and he was terminated from the university. During the trial, the jury ruled that the 
university would not have investigated his publications had he not published the essay 
and awarded him a nominal amount of $1. In turn, the Colorado district, appellate, and 
Supreme Courts ruled that the university and its regents were immune from lawsuits and 
dismissed all of Churchill’s claims. The Churchill case exemplified how public 
institutions and universities can use immunity to dismiss claims against them and 
maintain control of academic speech without having to defend themselves against 
violations of protected speech. 
Summary 
 The six cases analyzed provided the basis for the court ruling when free speech 
by public employees and faculty interfered with the university’s political environment, 
operations, or right to make academic decisions. The courts ruled that public employee 
speech, when it is part of his or her job duties, was not protected by the First 
Amendment and that the employer has the right to discipline the employee for his or her 
speech. As a public employee, faculty who are promoted within their colleges or 
participate in shared governance must be aware at all times that the context and content 
of their speech can be held against them. In the six cases studied, the courts ruled in 
favor of the public employer or university and their right to control the employee’s 
speech. None of the briefs filed by the AAUP and ACLU were successful in changing or 
reversing these decisions. Further reducing the faculty’s ability to succeed in court is the 




the university as the focus of the lawsuit. All their motions for immunity were 
successful. The court’s ruling have placed the control of academic speech in the 
university’s hands and reduced the ability of faculty to defend themselves.  
The combined case analysis is used to provide a baseline for the second phase of 
the research, the interviews. The 35 themes identified in the six cases have been reduced 
to 11 themes. To provide continuity in the analysis, these 11 themes are recreated and 
used as the initial themes in the interview analysis in order to determine how these cases 





Chapter Eleven: Interviews 
The second phase of the study was one-on-one interviews of tenured or tenure-
track faculty from public universities throughout the U.S. The chapter provides a 
description of the sampling methodology, an overview of the sample demographics, and 
an analysis of the six prevalent themes coded from the interviews. To focus the analysis, 
four major sub-themes overlapping each prevalent theme are discussed.      
Sampling Methodology 
After Institutional Research Board (IRB) approval, the participant selection 
process entailed two sample selection methodologies; a stratified sampling method 
followed by a snowball sampling process. The initial stratified sample included 23 
public university faculty members who are currently active in their institution’s 
governance structure or were past faculty senate officers. The sample was selected based 
on a review of public university governance websites. Selected faculty members were 
emailed a description of the study and the consent form and asked if they would consent 
to be interviewed (see Appendices B, C, and D for the email invitation, description of 
the study, and consent form respectively). Faculty members who did not respond were 
sent one follow-up email. If no response was received, they were dropped from the 
sample. The stratified sample identified eight faculty members who agreed to be 
interviewed with eight declining, and seven not returning the first or second invitation.  
Next, to achieve the goal of interviewing 16 to 21 faculty members, a snowball 
sampling methodology was used. The participants in the stratified sample who declined 




faculty at public universities who might be willing to participate in the study. In 
addition, faculty members who agreed to be interviewed were asked to provide 
recommendations during the follow-up survey. This methodology yielded 26 additional 
potential participants: 11 agreed to be interviewed; 11 did not return the request; and 
four declined. Faculty who did not return the request were not contacted again and 
dropped from the sample. Nineteen faculty members were interviewed. The process 
required six months to complete. 
Participant Interview and Survey 
The faculty interviews were conducted on the phone or one-on-one, digitally 
audio recorded, and scheduled for 60 minutes in length. All recorded interviews were 
sent via secure file transfer protocol (SFTP) to a bonded transcription service, 
transcribed in full, and returned via encrypted email. The transcriptions were reviewed 
and emailed to participants who were asked to respond within 30 days with clarifications 
and corrections. This “phenomenological validity” test was used to correct errors and 
identify research bias between the researcher and the interviewees (Miles & Huberman, 
1994). Five participants responded within the allotted time with corrections. A non-
response by the participant was viewed as consent to continue with the transcription as it 
was presented.  
A tracking document was used to record the name of the participants, date 
interviewed, consent to waive confidentiality, length of interview, date transcribed, date 
transcription was sent to participant for review, and date the participant responded with 




participant who declined to be recorded agreed to answer the questions, which were 
recorded manually and transcribed by the researcher.  
The interviews averaged 52.2 minutes in length, with the shortest being 20 
minutes and longest 79 minutes. During the interview, participants were asked for their 
consent to be interviewed and whether they waived their confidentiality. Fourteen 
participants waived their confidentiality and were willing to be quoted by name within 
the study (see Appendix F for the list of participants who waived confidentiality). Four 
participants did not waive their confidentiality, requiring that they not be identified of 
identifiable. 
To focus the conversation on academic freedom since 2000, each participant was 
read background information and asked five questions in the following order. 
1. How have federal, state, and local events affected academic freedom at your 
institution since 2000? 
2. Is academic freedom a right or a privilege at your institution? What criteria 
does your institution use to evaluate faculty academic freedom when their 
speech as a public employee and private citizen converge and become an 
issue? 
3. In what ways do the faculty governance structures at your institution respond 
when challenges to faculty intramural and extramural speech occur? 
4. What effect does institutional academic freedom have on the faculty’s role in 




5. How have faculty at your institution altered their intramural and extramural 
speech since 2000? 
The broadness and open-endedness of the questions allowed for the introduction of 
follow-up questions with the intent of identifying prevalent themes and arguments in 
order to improve the analysis. All questions, participant reactions, and any interruptions 
or environmental changes were recorded in order to identify uncontrolled interferences 
and interviewer bias (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Three interruptions were recorded. 
Two were due to cell phone signal failure and one from background noise. Inaudible 
recording issues were noted by the transcriber in each transcription with a recording time 
stamp. Corrections were made during the participant transcript correction process or by 
listening to the recordings at slower speeds. 
After the interview, an anonymous post-interview survey was emailed to each 
participant (see Appendix E for participant survey and questionnaire). Participants had 
seven days from the date of the interview to respond. The survey collected general data 
such as region of country broken down by Supreme Court district, appointment track 
and type, generational age group, gender, ethnicity, whether they had participated in 
faculty governance at their institution since 2000, whether they had published on 
academic freedom, and a space for additional comments. All participants answered the 
survey and returned it within the allotted time. 
Demographics 
 The researcher contacted participants from each of the 11 Supreme Court 




they either declined or did not respond to the requests for interview. District 5 had the 
largest number of participants with seven interviews followed by districts 7, 6, 4, 1, 3, 
and 9. Table 11.1 provides a breakdown by district. 
Table 11.1  
Interviews by Supreme Court District  
Supreme Court District States Abbreviations Total 
1 ME, NH, MA RI 1 
2 CT, NY 0 
3 DE, PA, NJ 1 
4 MD, DC, WV, VA, NC, SC 2 
5 MS, LA, TX 7 
6 MI, OH, KY, TN 3 
7 WI, IL, IN 4 
8 ND, SD, NE, MN, IA, MO, AR 0 
9 WA, OR, CA, NV, AZ, ID, MT, HI, AK 1 
10 WY, UT, CO, NM, KS, OK 0 
11 AL, GA, FL 0 
 
The majority of the participants were White (17), male (16) and baby boomers 
(11). Fourteen of the Caucasians were male and three were female with three from the 
Silent Generation, 10 from the Baby Boom generation, and four from the Generation X. 
The remaining two participants were male, one African American from the Generation 
X generation and one Asian/Pacific Islander from the Baby Boom generation. The 
sampling methodology included a number of faculty members from the 
underrepresented ethnicities and genders, but they either declined or did not respond to 






Ethnicity, Gender, and Generation of Participants 









Generation Y  
Millennial 
(1983-2000) 
Caucasian 14 3 3 10 4 0 
Hispanic 0 0 0 0 0 0 
African American 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Asian and Pacific 
Islander 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Native American 
and Alaskan 
Native 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 16 3 3 11 5 0 
 The research survey also requested information concerning each participant’s 
appointment type and track. The majority of the participants (18) were tenured with one 
assistant professor, four associate professors, and 13 full professors. One participant was 
a tenure track associate professor. None of the participants were non-tenured faculty. 
Also, no faculty in the appointment type which included lecturer, clinical, and itinerant 
were interviewed. Table 11.3 provides the breakdown of the appointment type and track. 
Table 11.3 







professor Other  Total 
Tenured 1 4 13 0 18 
Tenure Track 1 0 0 0 1 
Non-tenure track 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 2 4 13 0 19 
The survey asked participants if they had participated in their college or 




they had participated, four as Faculty Senate chairs and six as members. All of the 18 
stated that they had served as a member or chaired governance committees at their 
institutions or nationally. These committees included their college or university’s 
Academic Freedom and Responsibilities, Promotion and Tenure, Professional Standards, 
University Academic Freedom Committee, Personnel Policies, Positive Action, 
Termination of Employment, and curriculum committees.  One participant was the 
current president of the AAUP. Their knowledge of academic freedom was exemplified 
by the final survey question, which asked if they had published on the subject of 
academic freedom. Eleven indicated they had published on the topic and 7 had not. 
In summary, the majority of the participants in the study were White males (14 
or 73.6%) from the baby boom generation (11 or 57.9%). They were tenured, full 
professors (13 or 68.4%) so they had a property right to their position and their contract 
provides them with academic freedom and speech protections. They were active 
participants in the governance structure and committees of their institution (17 or 89.5%) 
and had published on the topic of academic freedom (11 or 57.9%), indicating their 
knowledge of institutional policies, governance and faculty rights. Also, of the 19 
participants, 10 were professors in the colleges of liberal arts and humanities, three in 
schools of law, three in colleges of education, two in colleges of communications, and 
one in the college of business.   
Analysis 
The 19 participant interviews and surveys were conducted over a six month 




case analysis were used as the basis to initiate the interview coding. The themes included 
First Amendment, expression pursuant to official job duties, immunity of public 
officials, academic freedom, adverse employment action, matter of public concern, 
speech as a public versus private citizen, employer’s right to control speech, 
reinstatement to the university, employer’s right to efficient operations, and chilling 
effect. The interview coding process resulted in two of these themes (employer’s right to 
control speech, employer’s right to efficient operations) being combined and titled 
university’s control of academic speech and one (reinstatement to university) being 
dropped. Seven additional themes were added during the coding process for a total of 16 
interview themes. 
The 16 themes resulted in 980 coded references. The themes and the 
corresponding number of coded references are provided in Table 11.4. The themes are 
sorted by the total column from largest to smallest to illustrate a hierarchy of the most 






Coded References by Theme 
Themes Totals by Theme 
University control of academic speech 162 
Academic freedom - privilege or right 116 
Outside influence and restrictions on academic speech 108 
Faculty governance 104 
Chilling effect 99 
Academic freedom -intramural and extramural speech 75 
Lawfare 68 
First Amendment 52 
Speech as a public employee versus private citizen 42 
Expression pursuant to official duties 41 
Institutional academic freedom 38 
Adverse employment action 29 
Faculty activism on campus 23 
Faculty union - bargaining agreements 12 
Matter of public concern 7 
Immunity of public officials 2 
Total coded references 980 
To validate the theme ranking, the researcher developed two queries to determine 
the most frequently used words in all the interviews. Each word was analyzed to 
determine how it was used in order to categorize it with one of the above themes. The 
first query scanned word frequency across all the interviews to identify the 50 most 
prevalent, four or more letter keywords. Each keyword’s contextual usage in the 
interviews was analyzed to determine whether the individual keyword was significant or 
required one or more adjacent words to improve meaning and reduce redundancy. 
Themes with no applicable keywords utilized the theme title or words within the coded 
references and added to the list of keywords or phrases. These keywords and two or 





across all the interviews to determine the number of references in each interview for 
later comparison with the theme coding hierarchy in Table 11.4. 
Of the original 50 keywords queried, 42 remained relevant to the analysis and 
eight were dropped due to irrelevance, vagueness, or lack of specificity. Fifteen of the 
remaining keywords were used individually or combined with NVivo search wildcards 
(~, *) to reduce redundancy. In addition, 51 words were defined based on a review of the 
coded references in the themes and applied to themes that had no keywords found in the 
query. Fifty-two phrases consisting of keywords and adjacent words in the opinions or 
theme titles were also identified.  Each keyword and phrase was aligned with one of the 
16 themes and used in the second word search query to count the number of times the 
words or phrases were referenced in each interview. Each occurrence in each interview 
was reviewed to eliminate redundancy and duplicity of reference counts. Where 
redundancy was found, the query was refined and rerun. The query results were 
tabulated and sorted in descending order by the total number of references for each 






Keywords and Phrases Totaled and Sorted by Theme 
Themes Key words Totals by Theme 
Faculty governance Shared, faculty governance, faculty senate, committee, governance 
structure, co-governance, governance model, campus governance 
399 
Outside influence and 
restrictions on academic 
speech 
ACLU, AAUP, right-wing, legislator, court, political*, legal 
system, conservative, legislature, Horowitz, donors, newspaper, 
corporat*, republican coalition, 911, 9/11 
320 
University control of 
academic speech 
Power, control, university administration, main administration, 
crack down, provost, process, administrative structure, polic*, 
investigation 
313 
Academic freedom - 
intramural and 
extramural speech 
Intramural, extramural, in-class speech, on campus, off campus, 
controversial 
238 
Academic freedom - 
privilege or right 
Privileg*, individual right, it’s a right, not a right, right and 
responsibility, institutional right, not a private right, is a right 
192 
Chilling effect Chill*, silence, repress*, head down, heads down, subtle,  fear, 
reluctan*, guarded, harassed, radar, exclusion , oppress*, cauti*, 
alter*, censor* 
172 
First Amendment First Amendment, constitutional right, freedom of speech, freedom 
of expression, free speech, free expression 
160 
Lawfare  Lawfare, Patriot Act, speech codes, supreme court, district court, 
court case, Garcetti 
150 
Faculty activism on 
campus 
Against, activ*, solidarity, concerns, fight, challenge, speaking 




Terminat*, exigency, fire, retaliat*, adverse, discipline, deny, 
denied tenure 
127 
Faculty union - 
bargaining agreements 
Union, contracts, right to work 89 
Institutional academic 
freedom 
Institutional academic freedom, right of the institution, 
institution’s academic freedom, institutional right 
75 
Speech as a public 
employee versus private 
citizen 
Speech as an employee, speech as a citizen, citizen, role 69 
Expression pursuant to 
official duties 
Public employee, official duties, job duties, employment 59 
Matter of public 
concern 
Public good, public interest, trusted 7 
Immunity of public 
officials 
Summary judgment 2 
The theme rankings in Table 11.4 and 11.5 were compared to validate the 




prevalent themes were 1) university control of academic speech, 2) academic freedom – 
privilege or right, 3) outside influence and restriction on academic speech, 4) faculty 
governance, 5) chilling effect, and 6) academic freedom - intramural and extramural 
speech. To determine the strength of the linear relationship between each of these 
themes, a Pearson correlation coefficient (r) of word similarity was calculated. As shown 
in Table 11.6, all six prevalent themes had strong positive relationships, above r = 0.90, 
with the highest five correlations between the university control of academic speech and 
chilling effect themes (.97656), the university control of academic speech and outside 
influence and restriction on academic speech (0.97125), the chilling effect and academic 
freedom – intramural and extramural speech themes (0.96495), the university control of 
academic speech and faculty governance themes (0.96315), and the outside influence 






Pearson Correlation Coefficients for the Six Prevalent Themes 
Theme A Theme B 
Pearson correlation 
coefficient 
University control over the 
academic speech 
Chilling effect 0.97656 
University control over the 
academic speech 
Outside influence and restrictions on 
academic freedom 
0.97125 
Chilling effect Academic freedom - intramural and 
extramural speech 
0.96495 
University control over the 
academic speech 
Faculty governance structure 0.96315 
Outside influence and restrictions on 
academic freedom 
Chilling effect 0.95976 
University control over the 
academic speech 
Academic freedom - privilege or right 0.95838 
University control over the 
academic speech 
Academic freedom - intramural and 
extramural speech 
0.95435 
Outside influence and restrictions on 
academic freedom 
Faculty governance structure 0.94200 
Outside influence and restrictions on 
academic freedom 
Academic freedom - privilege or right 0.93848 
Chilling effect Academic freedom - privilege or right 0.93673 
Faculty governance structure Chilling effect 0.92792 
Outside influence and restrictions on 
academic freedom 
Academic freedom - intramural and 
extramural speech 
0.92567 
Academic freedom - privilege or 
right 
Academic freedom - intramural and 
extramural speech 
0.92320 
Faculty governance structure Academic freedom - intramural and 
extramural speech 
0.90655 
Faculty governance structure Academic freedom - privilege or right 0.90581 
The six prevalent themes are analyzed and discussed based on the order provided in 







Number of Coded References in Six Most Prevalent Themes 
Themes Total coded references by theme 
University control over the academic speech 162 
Academic freedom - privilege or right 116 
Outside influence and restrictions on academic speech 108 
Faculty governance 104 
Chilling effect 99 
Academic freedom -intramural and extramural speech 75 
 
 
Figure 11.1. Six Most Prevalent Themes Based on Coded References 
 University control of academic speech. The most prevalent theme is university 
control of academic speech, which focuses on the authority of the public university to 
regulate and their actions used to control faculty intramural and extramural speech. As 
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Outside influence and restrictions on 
academic speech 
Academic freedom - privilege or right 





control, university administration, main administration, crackdown, provost, process, 
administrative structure, police, policy, and investigation. These keyword and phrases 
were found in the theme’s coded references. Below are quotations from the interviews in 
which the participant indicated whether their university controlled academic speech. 
• Control over the academic freedom within the university would rest with the 
board of trustees. 
• Power and control shift in favor of the administration. 
• The administration has a great deal of power in terms of the resources of the 
institution. 
• The power of administrators has grown exponentially in the last generation. 
• This administration is the first one to really crack down. 
• Speech is controlled by an administrative directive. 
• Individual faculty members never really feel that empowered to go beyond 
their department. 
• Institutional control is pretty strong.  
As indicated by the quotations, participants indicated that their university wielded a high 
level of control over the academic speech and that control originated at the highest level 
of their university and increased over time.    
One hundred and sixty-two references were coded from the interviews. As Table 
11.6 indicates, the theme correlates positively with the other six prevalent themes; 
chilling effect (0.97667), outside influence and restrictions on academic freedom 
(0.97151), faculty governance structure (0.96264), academic freedom - privilege or right 
(0.95886), academic freedom – intramural and extramural speech (0.95571), and lawfare 




effect, faulty governance, academic freedom – privilege or right, and outside influence 
and restrictions on academic freedom themes 27, 27, 26, and 17 times respectively. The 
university control of academic speech and overlapping themes were strong positive 
relationships, above r = 0.90. Table 11.8 provides the results of the matrix query. The 
analysis provides examples from the interviews showing how these themes relate to the 
university control of academic speech theme. 
Table 11.8 
Matrix Coding of the Themes That Overlap the University Control of Academic Speech 
Theme 
Themes 




Faculty governance structure 27 0.97655 
Chilling effect 27 0.96313 
Academic freedom - privilege or right 26 0.95836 




Faculty governance structures. A public university’s ability to control faculty 
governance structures and be influenced by the faculty senate was discussed by 14 
participants. These participants agreed that, since 2000, the ultimate authority for 
academic decisions rests with the senior administration. As one participant stated, “the 
ultimate sovereignty rests with the president, the vice provost, the board of trustees [and] 
the administration in a lot of areas but there is a pathway and a procedure where they’re 





whether a university experiences full academic freedom, will depend very much 
on the role of the administration.  This is extremely important that, if the 
administration is supportive of academic freedom and is protective of academic 
freedom, then academic freedom has a chance and a lot of that will depend upon 
what the students and the faculty do in that environment.  But if the 
administration is not supportive of it, it’s going to be very difficult for faculty 
and students to actually enjoy academic freedom.  So, as idealistic as one can be 
about academic freedom as a right of the professor, one has to acknowledge how 
extremely important it is to have an administration that is supportive of that 
value. 
To engage the administration, Dr. Todd DeMitchell stated that the faculty governance 
structure at his institution provided “an excellent counter-weight for the 
faculty…through academic freedom, policy, and its expertise to push back and have a 
good dynamic tension between itself and the administration.”  But, Dr. Bashara 
Doumani stated, in the end, the university controls decision-making and the governance 
structure by  
executive fiat, by picking individuals from the faculty that they know will 
support their position and put them as head of these committees, or, most often, 
by deciding what resources to give or to withhold from certain initiatives.  That 
is how they shape the institution.  They control the budget. 
Dr. Joan Hemmingway reflected, 
we have had campus level and system level officials, since 2000, who really did 
not believe as strongly in the value of the faculty voice in governance and were 
more autocratic in their approach.  When they had to engage faculty, they did 
[but only] because they had too. You felt that faculty viewpoints were discounted 
[and] their communication was not as respectful. 
As such, the ultimate authority and control over the academic decisions rested with the 
administration. 
 All participants agreed that their faculty senates were advisory in nature and that 
their decisions were merely considered recommendations to the administration. While 




faculty members never really feel that empowered to kind of go beyond their 
department.” Doumani reasoned, while “senate committees are supposed to have a 
strong voice in the administration of the university, they make recommendations after 
long studies and they are either ignored or changed by the administration with no 
recourse.” Dr. Cary Nelson agreed, stating that faculty senates are “a body that expresses 
opinions [and are] an advisory body to the administration that retains all the final 
authority and exercises it, sometimes against the will of the senate.” As a member of a 
governance committee at the University of Texas at Austin (UT), Dr. Robert Jensen 
added that none of the UT faculty governance committees have any power.  
None of them have the ability to make decisions they [can] make stick. They are 
consulting committees [and] are advisory only. [Their] decisions have no force 
[and] are recommendations to the president.  So, when [the interviewer asked] 
has faculty governance been affected that implies there is faculty governance and 
I would argue there is no faculty governance at the University of Texas. 
Dr. Michael J. Smith agreed, stating that the faculty senate at his institution “has some 
formal roles in approving new programs and this and that, but its role in actual 
governance is largely consultative rather than legislative or dispositive in any serious 
way.” While faculty actively contributed to the governance of their institutions, 
participants agreed that decisions made by governance committees were not final and 
are considered recommendations by the administrations. 
Chilling effect. The chilling effect caused by universities’ control of the 
governance structure and the hiring of non-tenured faculty was identified by 9 
participants as a major factor chilling faculty speech. In his interview, Dr. Cary Nelson 




threat to academic freedom on campus has arisen out of the increasing reliance on hiring 
faculty members off the tenure track, either part-time or full-time contingent faculty.” 
Hemmingway provided her insight on the propagation of non-tenured faculty from the 
college perspective stating,  
people who are newly entering the positions and ask what is it that I can say; 
what is it that I should say, what are the restrictions on my speech; how can I get 
this issue done and not lose my job is sometimes what people will say; or how do 
I communicate about this and not get the chancellor or the provost or the 
president or the board or the legislature angry with what I’m about to say 
because it’s contentious. 
At the departmental level, Curry reflected that, 
some junior professors without tenure that teach things on post-colonialism, race, 
etc., are constantly being harassed.  They don’t feel protected because they don’t 
have tenure. It creates a situation, and they don’t know where the department’s 
going to come down on it, so they just don’t feel safe anymore making those 
topics available.  
Blackburn provided insight to the change which occurs when faculty move from being 
non-tenured to tenured. He reflected on situations at his institution in which “professors 
who have not been tenured remaining silent and who, upon obtaining tenure, have 
suddenly found a voice.”  He recalled a “woman who was not on the tenure track was 
silent…virtually silent. After obtaining tenure, she not only spoke out, but became a 
leader of a group that stood up for the rights of women.” Therefore, tenure provides 
safeguards that allow faculty to speak and participate in university business openly 
without fear of reprisal.   
But, to protect their future and avoid problems with the university, tenured and 
non-tenured faculty have also modified their classroom discussion and self-censored 




and said [that] they are not saying any controversial things until they receive tenure.” 
Even when tenured, he added,  
[t]his has been a fear of a lot of tenured faculty members [also]. We have had a 
few [instances] where people are complaining about their third-year reviews 
despite having an excellent publication record because it’s talking about race, 
racism, things of this sort. Some professors say, look I’m just not teaching X 
anymore because I don’t want to deal with the headache. 
Another participant stated. 
the university, aside from one instance, generally does not crack down on 
faculty’s free expression [but that is because], they don’t really know half, of 
what faculty are doing, so it’s just a matter of being a little careful.  I’ve 
really…become more careful in my classes.   
 
As such, faculty are guarded when topics are controversial or political.  
 Controls over faculty speech derive from internal pressures from both the 
administration and the students. Curry provided the example of a conservative student 
group at his institution that policed speech. He stated,  
Texas A&M [has] a very strong student movement with the Young Aggie 
Conservatives, that in many ways police what professors teach on the university 
campuses.  So there’s been a lot of roll back, not so much from actual statements 
by administrators or deans or faculty, but there’s been a lot of social and public 
pressure to watch what you say, not teach on things that could be perceived 
[such] as Marxist or anti-state or anti-government. 
Providing the administration’s view of faculty, Doumani equated the campus 
environment for faculty to that of a soldier in the army. He stated,  
[p]ublic universities are like the army and the army has a mission and it has its 
rules and people go into the army knowing what the mission and the rules are 
and they just can’t do or say whatever they want. And that the institution has a 




He added, “[t]hat’s a very chilling analogy.” For Jensen, these rules and regulations have 
created artificial barriers that faculty assume they cannot cross. Using a football analogy, 
he stated, 
if the point at which you are going to be punished for speech is at the 50 yard 
line. So you’re at the goal line and you’re figuring how far can I go before they’ll 
punish me? And let’s say that in reality you can go all the way to the 50 yard 
line. I think people internalize a much more stringent standard and they will 
estimate that they will be punished at the 25 yard line…So they’ll only go to the 
25 yard line. Even though, there’s another 25 yards they could go without even 
risking punishment. People are so nervous that they internalize that 25 yard line 
is the mark beyond which you cannot go. As a result, that becomes the defacto 
place where people stop, even though, they could go further.  
Nelson contented that these controls are threatening to the role of faculty and 
governance at universities nationwide. He stated, 
because of the corporate ideology, you can quibble until the corporation decides 
on what its policy is and you’re expected to snap your heels to and salute. You’re 
expected to sort of follow the corporate line.  That is more and more what I think 
administrators expect of their faculty.  Some faculty are resistant and other 
faculty think it’s better to keep their heads down. The fact that so many faculty 
have no job security obviously enhances the power of administrators to basically 
rely on faculty self-censorship to keep the faculty quiet. 
Dr. Timothy Sheill agreed adding that the universities “take action against people they 
feel either won’t fight back or aren’t in a position of enough influence or power.” 
Enforcing this opinion, Blackburn added, “the power conferred in university rule books 
and taken away from those who are in the classrooms and in the laboratories [who do 
not have] their rights protected by tenure.”  These factors contribute to the chilling effect 
university policies and controls have on academic speech. 
Academic freedom–privilege or right. Whether faculty academic speech is a 




and punish speech. Dr. Richard Fossey stated that academic freedom is a right and “not a 
privilege that the university can withdraw.” While Garcetti’s effect on academic speech 
has not yet been fully tested, he added,  
[the] case definitely strengthened the institution’s hands. Outside of clear 
academic speech, they’ve got a lot of power. If the professor’s involved in some 
sort of internal dispute over governance or finances or grants or things like that, 
the courts are going to be inclined to say, they’re speaking in their official 
capacity and they don’t have any First Amendment rights. 
Another interviewee agreed, stating, “many courts are arguing that academic freedom as 
a concept rooted in the First Amendment rests with the university, which is then free to 
regulate faculty utterances along the range of concern.” Doumani added,  
what we see right now is that the image that people have of the universities as 
these protected castles of free public inquiry, free critical inquiry in which people 
can really explore with their imagination without any preconditions or 
restrictions on what they can or cannot say or write or research [doesn’t] really 
exist much anymore.  
To coexist, universities and faculty must discuss the overlap between academic and 
employee speech, rewrite policies, and redefine expectations.  
 One institution dealt with the effect of Garcetti through changes to their policy 
on faculty speech. After evaluating recent district court decisions, Dr. Donald Downs 
went to [his] University Committee and told them about Garcetti.  The head of 
the University Committee …saw the concerns and… he said, let’s do something 
about this.  So we worked out a memo and made a proposed amendment to [the 
policy] that specifically provides protection for faculty members in questioning 
or criticizing or commenting on university policies, practices and procedures. 
The University of Minnesota had done this too. We were the two schools I know 
that did it.  We directly dealt with Garcetti and it passed the faculty senate 
unanimously. This is not an easy issue to address at institutions whose 





Doumani contended that resolving issues related to who controls academic speech is 
very much a work in progress in the sense that, what we see is a situation in 
which power has become much more concentrated in the hands of administrators 
and [that] many of them are no longer coming from the faculty.  You have 
people from the business world now who are running universities, who have no 
real understanding of the mission of the university, of the concerns of the faculty, 
or are not part of that culture.  Therefore, for them, this idea of academic 
freedom is strange.  
Compounding the issue is the concept that “the institutions that [these people] are 
running are still built in many ways according to a structure that has absorbed the idea of 
academic freedom as a privilege through peer review and self-governance.”  Rooted in 
the AAUP’s 1915 Declaration and 1940 Statement of Principles, these ideals continue to 
provide guidance to universities and faculty when faced with academic speech issues. 
But, as more executives and administrators are hired from the corporate or political 
world, the right to academic freedom has been raised to the institutional level and is 
granted downward as a privilege to faculty.   
Outside influence and restrictions on academic freedom. Universities are 
influenced by a number of outside entities that pressure board members and 
administrators to monitor and, in some cases, restrict academic speech on campus. Eight 
participants discussed entities including elected officials, politicians, corporations, and 
activist groups who influenced academic freedom at their university. Worth noting is 
that all the participants’ universities had boards that were either all or partially appointed 
by the Governor with additional membership elected by the board or on-campus 





 Pressures from politicians and government appointees were cited as the most 
prevalent influencers of academic speech on campus. At his institution, Curry 
recognized that the “Board of Regents seems to be very, sympathetic to that view, that 
people’s checks are funding the university and, to a large extent, decide what’s being 
taught at the university.” He suggested that “if you took a very general popular poll at 
Texas A&M, you’d see that…the faculty, in general, feel that the Board of Regents and 
the politics of the Governor very much control what’s done or implemented on the 
campus.” In support, Doumani stated, “the fight for some government 
funds…makes…administrations very eager not to create any kind of negative image 
about their university. Therefore, they are not willing to really stand up and defend their 
faculty.”  He warned that, “if taken at face value, it really will allow the politicians and 
university administrators to decide what can or cannot be said on campus.” But, this is 
not the only way influence from outside effects academic speech. 
 The use of budgets to control on-campus speech was referenced by Downs. This 
incident occurred at a University of Wisconsin extension campus and resulted from a 
forum, which used artwork to talk about labor. The exhibit “was all very politicized,” as 
Downs stated, and resulted in “members of the Republican Coalition in the legislature 
[calling for] the head of that department [to be fired and stating that] if you do this, we 
will cut your funding.” Adding, “budget issues are going to be key in the future in terms 
of these issues.”  
 Academic freedom–right or privilege. The academic freedom–right or 




focused on whether the participants felt that academic freedom was a right provide by 
the First Amendment or a privilege granted by the university. Follow-up questions 
considered whether a faculty member’s university privilege became a right under the 
First Amendment when the courts became involved. As Table 11.5 indicates, keywords 
and phrases identified in the interviews included privilege, individual right, it’s a right, 
not a right, right and responsibility, institutional right, not a private right, and is a right. 
These keyword and phrases were found in the theme’s coded references. Below are 
quotations from the interviews in which participant discussed academic freedom as right 
or privilege. 
• Now, it seems to be more of a privilege where controversial statements, 
political statements, ideological statements made by the professor that 
indirectly increase or enhance the education of the student, could be called 
into question. 
• It’s not just the privilege that can be withheld by the institution. 
• Tenured professors in flagship universities who have tried to protect 
themselves under the banner of academic freedom as a privilege are seen as 
out of touch really with the political economy of knowledge production in 
higher education these days. 
• We are a privileged guild of high-class people who really deserve this. 
• It’s a right.  I think we have the right to, express ourselves on controversial 
issues that pertain to our scholarship.   
• It’s a right.  I think the courts would uphold it as a First Amendment right 
similar to the First Amendment right of other public employees. 
• It is a right that is under some challenge. 
• It’s not a right in the sense that it’s guaranteed. 
• Universities have basically taken the position that academic freedom is an 




• It’s an institutional right which is the instrumental part of [academic 
freedom]. The instrumental application of academic freedom actually is 
through the faculty. 
As the quotations indicate, faculty believed that academic freedom is a right, but not a 
right that is guaranteed or defendable under the First Amendment and not one that 
allows faculty to speak on political or controversial issues. As such, academic freedom is 
an institutional right that faculty have through their affiliation with the university.  
One hundred and sixteen references were coded from the interviews and 79% of 
the participants stated that academic freedom was a right, 16% a privilege, and 5% were 
undecided. Based on a matrix coding query of all themes, the theme overlaps the 
university control over the academic speech (26), First Amendment (22), lawfare (22), 
and institutional academic freedom themes (15) times. The academic freedom–right or 
privilege and overlapping themes were strong positive relationships, above r = 0.90. 
Table 11.9 provides the results of the matrix query and correlations. The analysis 
provides examples from the interviews showing how these four themes relate to the 
academic freedom–right or privilege theme. 
Table 11.9 
Matrix Coding of the Themes That Overlap the Academic Freedom–Right or Privilege 
Theme 
Theme 




University control over the academic speech 26 0.94375 
First Amendment 22 0.94966 
Lawfare 22 0.94966 





University control over the academic speech. The participants referenced 
Garcetti as a decisive factor contributing to the increase in the university’s control of 
academic speech. One interviewee stated, “courts are arguing that academic freedom, as 
a concept rooted in the First Amendment, rests with the university which is then free to 
regulate faculty utterances along the range of concerns.” Fossey concurred stating, “the 
lower courts have been pretty clear that [academic freedom is] attached to the First 
Amendment but it’s not a free-floating constitutional right.” To survive, Blackburn 
contended, 
full academic freedom will depend very much on the role of the administration 
[and] the institution.  If the administration is supportive and protective of 
academic freedom, then academic freedom has a chance. But if the 
administration is not supportive, it’s going to be very difficult for faculty to 
actually enjoy academic freedom.  As idealistic as one can be about academic 
freedom as a right of the professor, one has to acknowledge how extremely 
important it is to have an administration that is supportive of that value.   
While it is not clear yet how Garcetti will be applied, Fossey warned, the “case 
definitely strengthened the institution’s hands [and] power.” As an example, he added, 
“if the professor is involved in some sort of internal dispute over governance or finances 
or grants, the courts are going to be inclined to say, they’re speaking in their official 
capacity and they don’t have any First Amendment rights.” Academic free speech has 
yet to be decided by the courts. 
Especially vulnerable to university control are non-tenured faculty. Blackburn 
argued that academic freedom is being challenged by the increased use of adjunct and 
part-time faculty. He stated, “tenure protects academic freedom [and the] decline in the 




[because non-tenured faculty] simply don’t have the same rights that tenure-track faculty 
members have.” Another participant agreed stating, “adjunct faculty instructors and 
lecturers have no protection.” The end result, Downs warned, is “diminish[ed] shared 
governance [and] academic freedom will give administrations more power and control 
[which] (a) they like and (b) makes it more economically efficient” for the university to 
operate. Dr. Neil Hutchins agreed stating, “the academic balance of power is slowly 
shifting [due to] multiple factors [and the shift is] more subtle [due to] the way that these 
things all interplay.”  
First Amendment. Cases such as Sweezy (1957) and Keyeshian (1967) 
recognized academic freedom as a special concern of the First Amendment. Faculty, 
especially tenured faculty, have interpreted the court’s concern to mean that their 
intramural and extramural speech is a right protected by the First Amendment. As the 
participants acknowledged, these rights are afforded to faculty by contractual 
agreements, which are administered by the institution, leaving absolute control over the 
academic speech with the institution. Hutchens acknowledged this situation, saying, “the 
power of tenure makes [faculty] feel comfortable and, if we’re talking in the faculty 
context, the ability to exercise those First Amendment rights tends to be tied to the 
contractual arrangements that undergird the faculty-employer relationship.” DeMitchell 
agreed that academic freedom is “a constitutionally based right [that is protected] 
through a collective bargaining agreement.” Deconstructing the relationship between the 




separate entity, it has academic freedom only through its association and affiliation with 
the work of the institution.”  Starting with Sweezy, he added, 
Frankfurter’s concurring opinion laid out the four elements of academic freedom 
of the institution.  He didn’t say that faculty members, individual faculty 
members, possessed the right to decide who will be taught, who’s admitted to 
study, and what the curriculum will be. In fact, the case is very strongly stated 
that individual faculty members have no right, no constitutional right to disregard 
the curriculum.  The curriculum is one that becomes the institutions…and the 
work of the institution cannot get done without the faculty members. 
Even though tenure and contractual agreements continue to provide job protection, court 
decisions are being reinterpreted to give public institutions more control over speech on 
campus.   
Court decisions such as Garcetti are reexamining whether academic speech is a 
protected right of the faculty or a privilege granted to faculty by the institution. While 
Fossey held that academic freedom was a right, he acknowledged, that “the lower courts 
have been pretty clear that it’s not a free-floating constitutional right.” Another 
participant agreed stating, “many courts are arguing that academic freedom as a concept 
rooted in the First Amendment rests with the university, which is free to regulate faculty 
utterances.” At his institution, Hutchens stated,  
when I tell [faculty that] there’s a lot of legal uncertainty about to what extent the 
First Amendment protects individual academic freedom, I find people are very 
surprised.  A lot of faculty and campuses still operate under this common 
assumption that the First Amendment really protects their speech.  They don’t 
realize that a lot of these issues are up in the air, legally. 
Usually, Doumani contended, faculty “don’t understand the version of academic 
freedom that operates in this country, [don’t find out until] they get in trouble and then 




When they go to court, they start crying First Amendment because it’s much 
easier to do it that way.  But, in so doing, they open themselves up precisely to 
the kinds of restrictions on the First Amendment that we see happening in this 
country. Especially with the passage of the Patriot Act, this very conservative 
Supreme Court, and the much more right wing political culture in this country 
since the 80s. So they’re jumping from the frying pan to the fire in some ways. 
Looking forward, Fossey doesn’t “think it’s clear yet how Garcetti is going to be applied 
to academic speech, but, anything that could be defined as something other than 
academic speech, well the university’s got a lot of power.” These decisions have been 
left to the district courts to decide. 
Lawfare. The term lawfare was introduced by Major General Charles Dunlap in 
2001 (Waters, 2011). Dunlap defined the term “as the use of law as a weapon of war, 
later clarifying that it involved ‘a strategy of using–or misusing–law as a substitute for 
traditional military means to achieve an operational objective" (Dunlap, 2009, p. 34). 
Waters argued that the term has “strayed considerably from its non-partisan ideological 
roots” (Waters, 2011, p. 329) stating, “political pundits have reshaped [Dunlap’s] first 
definition into…what Wouter Wemer calls ‘reflexive lawfare’: ‘the use of the term to 
discredit an opponent’s reliance on law and legal procedure,’ or ‘an instrument to 
discredit critics of the government’” (pp. 329-330). The use of lawfare to determine 
whether academic freedom is a right of the institution or the faculty continues to evolve 
as First Amendment cases are decided.  
Participants referenced lawfare within the context of the court decisions and laws 
affecting academic speech. Downs recognized that lawfare was “a real phenomenon 
occurring” today and that “there is no question that different sources are using the courts 




about how [these decisions] are being used against academic freedom.” Doumani 
argued, “the passage of the Patriot Act, the very conservative Supreme Court, and the 
much more right wing political culture in this country” are precisely the kinds of First 
Amendment restrictions being implemented today. DeMitchell added, 
I don’t believe as a faculty member that I am bereft of academic freedom. I think 
I have it. I, just, don’t think it is this thick, firm pillar upholding the roof over 
me. I think it tends to be more of a thin reed. It’s not one of the things that courts 
really strongly support. 
Adding, “the cases are moving more that way because the Supreme Court that dealt with 
Keynesian, Sweezy, and even Healy have basically turned down every opportunity to 
clearly define what the contours of this essential right are.” Dr. Robert O’Neil argued 
that it wasn’t until “Judge O’Scannlain’s dissenting opinion in Garcetti that there was 
ever a problem about day-job related speech and, of course, the majority, following 
Judge O’Scannlain, did to some extent undermine what we had all assumed” about 
faculty speech at all times being protected. Fossey agreed stating,  
[the] Garcetti case definitely strengthened the institution’s hands. Outside of 
clear academic speech, [universities have] a lot of power. If the professor is 
involved in some sort of internal dispute over governance or finances or grants, 
the courts are going to be inclined to say, they’re speaking in their official 
capacity and they don’t have any First Amendment rights. It’s not clear yet how 
Garcetti is going to be applied to academic speech, but, certainly anything that 
could be defined as something other than academic speech, the university’s got a 
lot of power. 
Nelson commented,  
despite Souter’s footnote, a number of District Courts have applied Garcetti to 
colleges and universities. While it looked for a while as if faculty speech might 
be protected, we’re not protected now. Of course, district court decisions are 
binding only in those federal districts, not in the country as a whole. I would not 
look with confidence about what the current Supreme Court would decide should 




Participants acknowledged that the recent legal decisions have challenged the Supreme 
Court’s recognition that academic freedom is a special concern of the First Amendment. 
These decisions have granted universities the right to control employee speech and 
reduced the ability of the faculty to defend their academic speech both on campus and in 
the courts.  
Institutional academic freedom. All participants agreed that institutions control 
academic freedom. The amount of academic freedom vested in the institution was 
discussed within the context of whether the institution had the right to control faculty 
speech. The institutional academic freedom theme was related to one research question 
asked during the interviews and addressed in the study. Specifically, what effect does 
institutional academic freedom have on the faculty’s role in the governance structure at 
your university? Nelson acknowledged that, “the institution has a responsibility to 
protect its integrity and to make certain that the function of giving unfettered advice to 
the public is sustained.” Maintaining this functionality, DeMitchell recognized, requires 
institutions to share speech rights with the faculty. He conceptualized that,  
the institution’s right of academic freedom is instrumentally met through having 
faculty members share academic freedom as well.  Without the institution having 
academic freedom, I do not believe the faculty would have it. The institution 
needs to have the faculty doing the work of faculty which supports its academic 
freedom, mission, and requirement. 
Blackburn added, 
The reality of, of whether a university experiences full academic freedom will 
depend very much on the role of the administration and the institution.  If the 
administration is supportive of academic freedom and protective of academic 
freedom, then academic freedom has a chance.  But, if the administration is not 
supportive, it’s going to be very difficult for faculty and students to actually 




To maintain a shared and supportive environment, both must realize each other’s role 
and dependencies. 
 Participants also recognized that past court decisions have been a major factor in 
supporting academic freedom as an institution’s right.  Referencing Sweezy, DeMitchell 
stated,  
Frankfurter’s concurring opinion laid out the four elements of academic freedom 
of the institution. He didn’t say that faculty members, individual faculty 
members, possessed the right to decide who will be taught, who’s admitted to 
study, what the curriculum will be. In fact, the case very strongly states that 
individual faculty members have no right. 
Another interviewee agreed, stating  
many courts are arguing that academic freedom as a concept rooted in the First 
Amendment rests with the university, which is then free to regulate faculty 
utterances along the range of concern…and, not with individual faculty 
members.  So, you’ve got to balance these two competing concepts.  Whether 
academic freedom is a right or a privilege doesn’t really define what legally will 
emerge. 
Doumani observed that many institutions have “given a lot of thought to this idea of 
First Amendment as the umbrella for academic freedom and taken the position that 
academic freedom is an institutional right not a private right.” As such they are rewriting 
and strengthening their academic freedom policies. He warned that “faculty better stick 
to the idea of [academic freedom as] a privilege because, if they go the First Amendment 
route, they are not going to stand a chance” in court.  
 Outside influence and restrictions on academic freedom. The outside 
influence and restrictions on academic freedom theme focused on the effect of outside, 
non-university influence that impinges or restricts faculty’s academic freedom. As Table 




AAUP, right-wing, legislator, court, political, legal system, conservative, legislature, 
Horowitz, donors, newspaper, corporate, republican coalition, and 9/11. These keywords 
and phrases were found in the theme’s coded references. Below are quotations from the 
interviews in which participants discussed the outside influences affecting academic 
freedom on their campuses. 
• When it comes to campus issues, the ACLU has not always been consistent. 
• The Right-Wing Talk Radio machine picked it up in Houston and there was 
a public outcry against my statement. 
• The Arizona State Legislature has introduced a bill that would require all 
educational institutions in the state, including state universities, to suspend 
or fire professors who say or do things that aren’t allowed on network TV. 
• The legislature passed a law requiring all faculty to post their syllabi on line 
so that the legislature and the public could look at any potentially scandalous 
content of the classes.  
• David Horowitz’s campaign against left wing professors was very effective 
in some ways.  He didn’t win in legislatures a lot but under the threat of the 
legislature passing a bill restricting speech, many universities would come 
up with their own codes of conduct so that it would be under the control of 
the university and not the legislature. 
• After 9/11 and since Garcetti, I do think that given the power of the regents 
and the legislature that people keep their head down. 
• It’s the corporations, the donors, and the fight for some government funds 
which makes faculty and administrations very eager not to create any 
negative image about their university. Therefore, they are not willing to 
really stand up and defend their faculty. 
• The administrations are much more concerned with pleasing corporate and 
private donors or certain politicians than they are about the quality of 
education, much less the freedom of their students and faculty. 
• The government does only so much right now in governing our lives.  The 




• You get a lot of money from a corporation and you can take on research 
projects that you could not fund on your own. That’s a good thing assuming 
various restraints on publication and so forth.  But, there are a lot of 
restraints corporations can put on you that are very destructive. 
As these quotations indicate, advocacy groups, corporations, donors, news sources, legal 
decisions, and governmental bodies influence what academic speech on campus is 
allowed and restricted. While not all are successful, the long-term effects can influence 
whether the university is willing to defend faculty when their speech becomes an issue. 
One hundred and eight references were coded from the interviews. Based on a 
matrix coding query of all themes, the theme overlaps the chilling effect (29), university 
control over the academic speech (27), academic freedom right or privilege (12), and 
academic freedom intramural and extramural speech (11) themes. The relation between 
outside influence and restrictions on academic freedom and university control over the 
academic freedom theme was discussed previously. Additional discussion would be 
redundant. The outside influence and restrictions on academic freedom and overlapping 
themes have strong positive relationships, above r = 0.90. Table 11.10 provides the 
results of the matrix query and correlations. The analysis provides examples from the 
interviews showing how these themes relate to the outside influence and restrictions on 






Matrix Coding of the Themes That Overlap the Outside Influence and Restrictions on 
Academic Freedom Theme 
Theme 




Chilling effect 19 0.95971 
University control over the academic speech 17 0.97653 
Academic freedom - privilege or right 12 0.93843 
Academic freedom - intramural and 
extramural speech 
11 0.92558 
Chilling effect. Seven participants discussed the chilling effect caused by outside 
influence from legislators, politicians, corporations, and advocacy groups, resulting in 
perceived or real restrictions on academic freedom. Hemmingway epitomized the 
environment faculty face today, stating,  
[faculty are asking] what is it that I can say; what is it that I should say; what are 
the restrictions on my speech; how can I get this issue done and not lose my job; 
how do I communicate about this and not get the chancellor or the provost or the 
president or the board or the legislature angry with what I’m about to say 
because it’s contentious or it flies in the face of what some political party or 
some official might believe to be the best course of action. 
Underlying these questions, were key words in the references such as subtle, head down, 
cautious, and fear that typified the chilling effect to which faculty are exposed. A 
number of participants discussed examples of methods used by outside entities to 
intimidate faculty and silence academic speech. These methods included the use of hate 
mail and public record requests, black lists, pressure to pass restrictive legislation, 
legislative budget cuts, and pressure from corporations.  
Email, websites, and open records requests for electronic information were 




attempting to defend a fellow faculty member from university censure, one participant 
acknowledged receiving hate mail, stating, “he and others started to get hate mail and so 
the backlash went well beyond the university administration but I think it was licensed 
by the university administration.” Curry discussed a conservative advocacy group’s use 
of the Internet at his institution and the pressure exerted on faculty stating,  
 [the group] seems to be the independent police who put people on their website. 
They have the leftist list and, despite people saying that these things don’t matter, 
you see these intimidation tactics [used on] faculty members who speak on issues 
get repercussions. They’re going to request your e-mails, people are going to 
question you, ask you about your syllabi, and put you on the Internet and on 
watch lists.  That’s a lot of pressure in terms of talking about how safe people 
feel in expressing their opinions or even their scholarly opinions given if, that’s 
the type of social and public lashing they’re going to get. 
Referencing an incident on his campus in which a faculty member became the focus of 
political challenge, Smith stated,  
while the university stood up for the faculty, we are warned that all our emails 
are subject to all regulations that govern public employees. People who, for 
example, do work on terrorism have to be very careful because somebody could, 
under the USA Patriot Act, just make an accusation and get your whole computer 
seized. So, the atmosphere has become one where people are more cautious. I 
don’t think it has stifled robust debate, but we are aware that we are not in a 
protected zone anymore. 
These quotes illustrate the fear that outside entities instill on faculty when tactics such as 
requests for electronic communication, the seizing of equipment, and the publishing 
online of information targeted at discrediting academic speech that are used to intimidate 
faculty.     
 Lawmaker’s influence over legislation and funding decisions were methods 




discussed the changing of the academic landscape caused by pressure from private 
advocacy groups to pass legislation, stating,   
attempts by private advocacy groups such as the David Horowitz group that 
passed the Students Bill of Rights, on the local and the state level as well as 
resolutions that are put before the state assemblies, create a very chilling 
environment for faculty. 
One participant discussed the ever-present issue and threat of  
knowing that you are being watched very closely by the legislature in the context 
of budget cuts, that they’re going to try to save money and that they would like 
nothing more than to turn the university into a vocational academy staffed 
entirely by at-will employees. So after 911 and since Garcetti, I do think that, 
given the power of the regents and the legislature, people keep their heads down. 
Downs provided an example of an incident at the University of Wisconsin extension 
campus, which resulted in legislator dissatisfaction and pressure being exerted to 
influence future behaviors. 
The UW Extension at Madison has a division that deals with art and wanted to 
put on a forum with art about the labor controversy and it became very 
politicized. As a result, there were members of the Republican Coalition in the 
legislature that called for the head of that department [chair] and said that, if you 
do have this forum, we will cut your funding.    
Smith referenced another example. 
I think there’s been not quite a chilling effect but some greater degree of caution 
here at Virginia.  Most recently having to do with the lawsuit brought by the 
attorney general against one of our former faculty members in environmental 
science who was allegedly involved in the so-called hockey stick trick of climate 
change, the attorney general sued him on a fraud statute, the university defended 
the professor, and it’s still going on because the state is appealing.  This 
happened because we have a local politician who is running against climate 
change and decided to take it out on this one professor.   
As such, public universities and faculty are aware of the tie between that faculty speech, 




 Finally, the corporatization of universities has influenced academic speech. 
Nelson stated that the “corporate university does not appreciate dissent on policy matters 
and faculty are increasingly self-censoring on policy matters and cautious and afraid 
about speaking out.” Referencing faculty who were working on British Petroleum 
funded grants after the Gulf oil spill, he stated, 
the most either amusing or incredible part of BP’s restrictions built into their 
contracts after the Gulf oil spill, was not just the restriction on publication but, 
that the same restrictions applied to giving an academic paper at a conference.  It 
applied to discussing your research with anybody. They couldn’t talk about what 
they were doing without the lawyers’ permission. I think most faculty members 
would find literally being gagged, more than a little distressing. 
He added, faculty are “expected to sort of follow the corporate line and, that’s more and 
more what I think administrators expect of their faculty. While some faculty are 
resistant, other faculty think it’s better to keep their heads down.” 
University control of academic speech. The relationship of the outside influence 
and restrictions on academic freedom and university control of academic freedom 
themes were discussed previously. The discussion is repeated for the reader’s 
convenience. 
 Universities are influenced by a number of outside entities that pressure board 
members and administrators to monitor and, in some cases, restrict academic speech on 
campus. Eight participants discussed entities including elected officials, politicians, 
corporations, and activist groups who influenced academic freedom at their university. 
Worth noting is that all the participants’ universities had boards that were either all or 




on-campus participation from business and industry, agricultural organizations, alumni, 
and student government. 
 Pressures from politicians and government appointees were cited as the most 
prevalent influencers of academic speech on campus. At his institution, Curry 
recognized that the “Board of Regents seems to be very, sympathetic to that view, that 
people’s checks are funding the university and, to a large extent, decide what’s being 
taught at the university.” He suggested that “if you took a very general popular poll at 
Texas A&M, you’d see that…the faculty, in general, feel that the Board of Regents and 
the politics of the Governor very much control what’s done or implemented on the 
campus.” In support, Doumani stated, “the fight for some government 
funds…makes…administrations very eager not to create any kind of negative image 
about their university. Therefore, they are not willing to really stand up and defend their 
faculty.” He warned that, “if taken at face value, it really will allow the politicians and 
university administrators to decide what can or cannot be said on campus.” But, this is 
not the only way influence from outside effects academic speech. 
 Downs referenced the use of budgets to control on-campus speech. This incident 
occurred at a University of Wisconsin extension campus and resulted from a forum, 
which used artwork to talk about labor. The exhibit “was all very politicized,” as Downs 
stated, and resulted in “members of the Republican Coalition in the legislature [calling 
for] the head of that department [to be fired and stating that] if you do this, we will cut 





Academic freedom–right or privilege. The influence that outside entities such as 
corporations and the courts have on academic freedom was discussed by eight of the 
participants. Doumani contended that universities are being run by people hired from the 
private sector who do not understand academic freedom. He observed that,   
the number of administrators, the salaries of administrators, and the power of 
administrators has grown exponentially in the last generation and they are no 
longer coming from the faculty. Now, you have people from the business world 
running universities who have no real understanding of the mission of the 
university, of the concerns of the faculty, and are not part of that culture.  For 
them, this idea of academic freedom is strange. 
Other participants recognized that legislators and court decisions were influencing the 
argument of whether academic freedom was a right or privilege. DeMitchell stated, “we 
have a very activist, very conservative legislature.” But, he added, “they’re not going 
after academic freedom, per se, and there hasn’t been any legislation that I can recall that 
would target a diminution of academic freedom.” Downs agreed stating, 
the academic freedom challenges during the heyday of so-called political 
correctness still happen. But it’s toned down a lot compared to what it used to be. 
There’s been a rise of more traditional threats, coming from the right and from 
outside. I think academic freedom is more accepted now on campus than it was 
15-20 years ago. Though it’s still embattled, it’s doing better than it was. 
Smith argued that it is not legislation but rather that the courts have the most influence 
over academic freedom. Disappointed, he stated,  
I’m not particularly optimistic about the courts protecting [academic freedom] as 
a right. Courts have never been all that consistent in their view of it.  What 
academic freedom is based on and how strong it is, is very much a case-by-case 
thing. There’s some very high-minded rhetoric you can find in some cases and in 




 Another participant added, “courts would say that it is a concept that rests with the 
institution itself and, not with individual faculty members. [Institutions need] to balance 
these two competing concepts” without sacrificing faculty academic freedom. 
Academic freedom–intramural and extramural speech. The theme focused on 
the effect non-university entities have on the intramural and extramural speech of 
faculty. These entities include public opinion, legislators who require transparency on 
materials used in the classroom, and conservative advocacy groups who monitor 
classroom speech. Jensen discussed his experiences with these entities and responded to 
their efforts to restrict his speech.  
On September 12, 2001, Jenson published an essay in the Houston Chronicle, 
Stop the Insanity Here, in which he critiqued the possibility of a military response to the 
9/11 attacks. As a result, he was chastised by the University of Texas at Austin’s 
President Larry Faulkner. It was the first time that he could remember that a university 
president “condemned him by name for his extramural political writing which does by 
nature of his position [as a Journalism faculty member] impact academic freedom.” In 
turn, he questioned the “appropriateness of the chief officer of the university to make 
comments in response to a public outcry that publicly humiliated or attempted to 
publicly humiliated and ridicule a faculty member” for his speech. While many of his 
colleagues supported his right to extramural speech, many remained quiet. 
Jensen’s thoughts on the Texas legislation requiring faculty to publish their 
syllabi and vitae online and conservative advocacy groups provided insight into the 




when the state law kicked in stating that we all have to put our syllabi and 
COV’s online, I was quite frankly shocked that faculty found this disturbing. I 
teach in the public university and if I’m not willing to put my syllabus in public I 
should quit and go home. I thought that outcry about putting syllabi online was 
really absurd. Number one I don’t think there was a principle that could be 
defended there and number two it made faculty look like a whiny self-indulgent 
crybabies. If you can’t defend your syllabus, you don’t have any business 
teaching. I thought that was totally over blown. 
On the issue of conservative advocacy groups monitoring his classes, he added, 
[i]f students want to come in and sit in my course even though they’re not 
enrolled that’s fine with me. If the conservative students to bust radical 
professors or whatever the group might be called wanted to station a permanent 
monitor in my classroom, I would invite. Why not? Again, if I can’t defend my 
teaching on intellectual grounds then I have no business being in the classroom. I 
continued to teach critical material and I teach it in ways that I think are 
pedagogically sound. 
In Mississippi, one participant cautioned, “we’ve got a fairly tightly structured 
constitutional board that is sensitive to a range of issues, including the ability of the 
faculty to speak freely.” Neither Jensen or the participant felt threatened by outside 
influences but both had contractual protections of their academic freedom based on their 
tenured position.  
 Faculty governance structure. The faculty governance structure theme related 
to two research questions asked during the interviews and addressed in the study. 
Specifically, 
§ In what ways do the faculty governance structures at your institution respond 
when challenges to faculty intramural and extramural speech occur? 
§ What effect does institutional academic freedom have on the faculty’s role in the 
governance structure at your university? 
The theme focused on the shared governance structures such as the faculty senate and 




academic policy, and hear concerns of the university. As Table 11.5 indicates, keywords 
and phrases identified in the interviews included shared, faculty governance, faculty 
senate, committee, governance structure, co-governance, governance model, and campus 
governance. These keyword and phrases were found in the theme’s coded references. 
Below are quotations from the interviews in which the participants discussed their 
governance structures and the influence that the framework has when academic 
decisions are made. 
• There’s one area where the faculty senate has complete governance and that is 
curriculum. 
• The faculty senate will weigh in on issues when they believe that academic 
freedom or shared governance is being implicated by actions or pronouncements 
on the part of the administration. 
• If we can diminish shared governance, if we can diminish academic freedom, 
that’s going to give the administrations more power and control and (a) they like 
that, and (b) it makes it more economically efficient maybe.   
• The faculty senate, when it wants to, has some power because we have shared 
governance.  Shared governance in Wisconsin is mandated by law.  It’s in our 
state statutes.   
• Because of the model of faculty governance, our faculty senate is an advisory 
body to administration, but it is well heard and often well-spoken. The institution 
or the administration recognizes the role of the faculty senate and embraces at 
various turns. 
• At the university, I would argue that our culture is strong with regard to 
academic freedom issues and the rights of the faculty, even though our faculty 
senate is an advisory body. 
• They’re just recommendations that the faculty council make to the president. The 
president takes them under advisement but they have no binding force. 
All but one participant stated that their faculty senate was an advisory committee that 




administrations usually accepted the faculty senate’s recommendations, they understood 
that the university controlled which recommendations would be accepted or rejected. 
One hundred and four references were coded from the interviews. Based on a 
matrix coding query of all themes, the theme overlaps the university control over the 
academic speech (27), academic freedom right or privilege (8), outside influence and 
restrictions on academic freedom (7), and faculty activism on campus (6) themes. The 
faculty governance structure and overlapping themes have strong positive relationships, 
above r = 0.90. Table 11.11 provides the results of the matrix query and correlations. 
The analysis provides examples from the interviews showing how these themes relate to 
the faculty governance structure theme. 
Table 11.11 
Matrix Coding of the Themes That Overlap the Faculty Governance Structure Theme 
Theme 




University control Over the academic 
speech 
27 0.96310 
Academic freedom - privilege or right 8 0.90569 
Outside influence and restrictions on 
academic freedom 
7 0.94190 




University control of academic speech. The relationship of the faculty 
governance structures and university control of academic freedom themes were 
discussed in the university control over the academic freedom theme previously. The 




A public university’s ability to control faculty governance structures and be 
influenced by the faculty senate was discussed by 14 participants. These participants 
agreed that, since 2000, the ultimate authority for academic decisions rests with the 
senior administration. As one interviewee stated, “the ultimate sovereignty rests with the 
president, the vice provost, the board of trustees [and] the administration in a lot of areas 
but there is a pathway and a procedure where they’re supposed to consider what the 
faculty senate has to say.” Blackburn added, 
whether a university experiences full academic freedom, will depend very much 
on the role of the administration. This is extremely important that, if the 
administration is supportive of academic freedom and is protective of academic 
freedom, then academic freedom has a chance and a lot of that will depend upon 
what the students and the faculty do in that environment. But if the 
administration is not supportive of it, it’s going to be very difficult for faculty 
and students to actually enjoy academic freedom. So, as idealistic as one can be 
about academic freedom as a right of the professor, one has to acknowledge how 
extremely important it is to have an administration that is supportive of that 
value. 
 To engage the administration, DeMitchell states that the faculty governance 
structure at his institution provided “an excellent counter-weight for the 
faculty…through academic freedom, policy, and its expertise to push back and have a 
good dynamic tension between itself and the administration.” But, Doumani states, in 
the end, the university controls decision-making and the governance structure  
either through executive fiat, by picking individuals from the faculty that they 
know will support their position and put them as head of these committees, or, 
most often, by deciding what resources to give or to withhold from certain 






we have had campus level and system level officials, since 2000, who really did 
not believe as strongly in the value of the faculty voice in governance and were 
more autocratic in their approach. When they had to engage faculty, they did [but 
only] because they had too. You felt that faculty viewpoints were discounted 
[and] their communication was not as respectful. 
As such, the ultimate authority and control over the academic decisions rested with the 
administration. 
 All participants agreed that their faculty senates were advisory in nature and that 
their decisions were merely considered recommendations to the administration. While 
the faculty senate members come from the faculty, Curry stated, “individual faculty 
members never really feel that empowered to kind of go beyond their department.” 
Doumani reasoned that, while “senate committees are supposed to have a strong voice in 
the administration of the university, they make recommendations after long studies and 
they are either ignored or changed by the administration with no recourse.” Nelson 
agreed stating that faculty senates are “a body that expresses opinions [and are] an 
advisory body to the administration that retains all the final authority and exercises it, 
sometimes against the will of the senate.” As a member of a governance committee at 
the University of Texas at Austin (UT), Jensen added that none of the UT faculty 
governance committees have any power.  
None of them have the ability to make decisions they [can] make stick. They are 
consulting committees [and] are advisory only. [Their] decisions have no force 
[and] are recommendations to the president.  So, when [the interviewer asked] 
has faculty governance been affected that implies there is faculty governance and 





Smith agreed, stating that the faculty senate at his institution “has some formal roles in 
approving new programs and this and that, but its role in actual governance is largely 
consultative rather than legislative or dispositive in any serious way.” While faculty 
actively contributed to the governance of their institutions, participants agreed that 
decisions made by governance committees were not final and considered 
recommendations by the administrations. 
Academic freedom–right or privilege. The ability of the faculty to use their 
university’s governance structure to support academic freedom was discussed by three 
participants. At the University of Wisconsin (UW), Downs reported a strong 
commitment for academic freedom, stating, “in the last 15 years, we’ve had a very 
successful academic freedom, free speech movement that I’m the head of right now 
since 2000.” He said that, when Garcetti was hand down, UW’s governance structure 
acted proactively to address it, adding,  
I went to the University Committee and I told them about Garcetti. The head of 
the University Committee was very concerned about academic freedom. He saw 
the concerns. I talked about some of the lower court cases since Garcetti and he 
said; let’s do something about this. So we worked out a memo and made a 
proposed amendment to the FP&P section that specifically provides protection 
for faculty members in questioning or criticizing or commenting on university 
policies, practices and procedures. We added the word “individual” to FP&P, 
Chapter 8, to try to emphasize that as well. So, we directly dealt with Garcetti 
and it passed the faculty senate unanimously. 
At his institution, Blackburn provided an example of the department’s ability to address 
and support faculty members’ academic freedom without involving the university’s 





I have heard of cases where a member of the committee stated that a company 
complained to the chair of her department about some research that a professor 
was doing. The chair of the department stood up for her and protected her 
academic freedom. 
He was not “aware of any cases that have become a major issue for the Committee on 
Academic Freedom and Responsibility. They are being handled by department chairs 
and deans in such a way that they have not garnered a lot of attention” by the committee. 
Outside influence and restrictions on academic freedom. Participants identified 
that much of the influence from outside of the university came from legislators, donors, 
and politicians. Five participants commented on their experiences. Doumnani catalyzed 
all these influences stating,  
there is definitely a sense among faculty and students that the foundations of 
public universities are being eroded by the fact that the states are not putting 
money into the system, by the fact that there are political restrictions being 
demanded under the banner of accountability of faculty and administrations, and 
by the fact that the administrations, themselves, are much more concerned with 
pleasing corporate or private donors or certain politicians than they are about the 
quality of education, much less the freedom of their students and faculty. 
 At his university, Curry commented on the pressure from the legislature to change the 
institution’s educational mission stating, 
Unfortunately, it’s one of those things where everybody complains that the 
Board of Regents and the Governor are trying to turn this into Rick Perry 
community college. That’s a constant saying by faculty members on campus.  
But in terms of what our governing body has done to gut the faculty senate, I’m 
not sure because I’ve only been here for three years. 
Another participant agreed stating, 
the governance structure is not at all democratic at the university. There is a 





president and regents can consider at will. The faculty council has passed 
resolutions in support of academic freedom in the past, but I know the 
administration is pressured from the outside. 
These influences were not the same at other universities.   
Downs provided an example to discuss his institution’s support of faculty 
academic freedom in the face of legislative and political pressure to silence a faculty 
member. In 2006, the University of Wisconsin at Madison was involved in a controversy 
caused by allowing Kevin Barrett, a part-time lecturer and 9/11 conspiracy theorist, to 
teach a course on Islam history and culture in which the war on terror would be 
discussed. The decision to allow the course to be taught resulted in condemnation by 
politicians and legislators (Ruethling, 2006). Commenting on the situation, Downs 
reported,  
his group, the Committee for Academic Freedom and Rights, met with the 
provost, who would have made the decision on what to do about Barrett’s class. 
We said, look, unless there is evidence that he’s done something beyond the pale 
in terms of academic freedom, he shouldn’t be terminated and he was not.  It was 
a very controversial case. My group wrote a piece that was on the university’s 
web page, defending the university’s decision. I got attacked from both sides on 
this thing all over because I also was on record for not agreeing with anything 
that Barrett believed. But, you had both democrats and republicans calling for 
him to be terminated.  
Working together, the administration and the university’s governance committee were 
able to support each other. 
Faculty activism on campus for academic freedom. Participants reported that 
faculty governance structures were ineffective in defending academic freedom due to a 





senate resulted in a delay in their ability to immediately react to academic freedom 
issues. Referencing an incident at his university, he stated,  
 [t]he situation that occurred last fall was all resolved within a couple of weeks.  
Our faculty senate only meets once a month and, I don’t think our faculty senate 
made an official statement because the issue had pretty much been taken care of 
by the time they would have put something together and made a statement. 
Instead, he added “a lot of people just directly sent emails to our chancellor expressing 
their concerns.” Even when issues are brought to the faculty senate, Smith stated, 
there aren’t searing debates on university issues on the floor of the senate. They 
tend to be rather polite affairs where we’re consulted about policies that have 
largely been decided on. So, there’s no tradition of strong faculty governance 
here, even within the schools or the university as a whole. The futility response is 
the more characteristic response among the faculty, in my view. 
He added, 
it’s a bit of a chicken and egg thing here, in the sense that you can try to get 
involved as a faculty member, but you’re really up against this long tradition of 
polite consultation followed by doing what they wanted to do in the first place. 
So, you often feel as though you are an extra in a very large production when 
you’re in the faculty senate. You’re assembled, you are given the illusion of 
consultation and then we play our part to a degree but it’s not the way I imagined 
a vital, self-governing institution should run. 
At his institution, Sheill added, “in regard to challenging administrative decisions or 
challenging administrators, a lot of that goes on in the hallways with people you feel 
safe with. There isn’t very much in a faculty senate meeting challenging or questioning 
of administration.” 
 Chilling effect. The chilling effect theme focused on the shared governance 
structures within the university in which faculty discuss academic issues, develop 
academic policy, and hear concerns from groups such as the faculty senate and tenure 




the interviews included chill, silence, repress, heads down, subtle, fear, reluctance, 
guarded, harassed, radar, exclusion, oppress, cautious, altered, and censor. These 
keyword and phrases were found in the theme’s coded references. Below are quotations 
from the interviews in which 15 participants discussed the influences that are chilling 
academic speech. 
• Public universities are just like the army. The army has a mission and rules 
and people go into the army knowing what the mission and the rules are. 
They just can’t do or say whatever they want. The institution has a right to 
regulate its faculty just like the army regulates its soldiers. That’s a very 
chilling analogy. 
• There’s going to be a natural chilling effect, which is somewhat just sort of 
called manners. Within bounds, that’s fine. The problem is when it goes 
further and the organized constituencies are willing to be offended too 
quickly. 
• I think there’s been not quite a chilling effect but some greater degree of 
caution here at Virginia.  
• The faculty role on governance is threatened because of the corporate 
ideology. In a corporation, you can quibble until the corporation decides on 
what its policy is. Then you’re expected to snap your heels to and salute.  
You’re expected to sort of follow the corporate line. That’s more and more 
what I think administrators expect of their faculty. Some faculty are resistant 
and other faculty think it’s better to keep their heads down. The fact that so 
many faculty have no job security obviously enhances the power of 
administrators to basically rely on faculty self-censorship to keep the faculty 
quiet. 
• I do think that given the power of the regents and the legislature that people 
keep their head down. 
• I would have to say that people have not altered their intramural and 
extramural speech. 
• Many people feel that the environment in the campus is not conducive to free 
speech. So, there’s a bit of concern and fear, especially among faculty that 
are not secure in their position. These are the contingent faculty instructors, 




where a lot of the real action is in this kind of opaque environment of self-
censorship. 
As the quotations highlight, participants stated that they were cautious about their speech 
and aware of the university’s ability to control it. They also recognized that tenure was 
an important factor in their ability to speak openly without repercussion and that faculty 
who were not tenured censored and chilled their speech.  
Ninety-nine references were coded from the interviews. Based on a matrix 
coding query of all themes, the theme overlaps the university control over the academic 
speech (27), outside influence and restrictions on academic freedom (19), academic 
freedom – intramural and extramural speech (10), and lawfare (8) themes. The chilling 
effect and overlapping themes have strong positive relationships, above r = 0.90. Table 
11.12 provides the results of the matrix query and correlations. The analysis shows how 
these themes relate to the chilling effect theme. 
Table 11.12 
Matrix Coding of the Themes That Overlap the Chilling Effect Theme 
Theme 




University control Over the academic 
speech 
27 0.97652 
Outside influence and restrictions on 
academic freedom 
19 0.95969 
Academic freedom - intramural and 
extramural speech 
10 0.96490 






University control over the academic speech. The relationship of the chilling 
effect and university control of academic freedom themes were discussed previously. 
The discussion is repeated for the reader’s convenience. 
The chilling effect caused by university’s control of the governance structure and 
the hiring of non-tenured faculty was identified by nine participants as a major factor 
chilling faculty speech. In his interview, Dr. Cary Nelson (part president of the AAUP) 
stated, “that over the last generation, the most pervasive threat to academic freedom on 
campus has arisen out of the increasing reliance on hiring faculty members off the tenure 
track, either part-time or full-time contingent faculty.” Dr. Joan Hemmingway provided 
her insight on the propagation of non-tenured faculty from the college perspective 
stating,  
people who are newly entering the positions and ask what is it that I can say; 
what is it that I should say, you know, what are the restrictions on my speech; 
how can I get this issue done and not lose my job is sometimes what people will 
say; or how do I communicate about this and not get the chancellor or the 
provost or the president or the board or the legislature angry with what I’m about 
to say because it’s contentious. 
At the departmental level, another participant, Curry reflected that, 
some junior professors without tenure that teach things on post-colonialism, race, 
etc., are constantly being harassed. They don’t feel protected because they don’t 
have tenure. It creates a situation, and they don’t know where the department’s 
going to come down on it, so they just don’t feel safe anymore making those 
topics available.  
Blackburn provided insight to the change which occurs when faculty move from being 
non-tenured to tenured. He reflected on situations at his institution in which “professors 
who have not been tenured remaining silent and who, upon obtaining tenure, have 




silent…virtually silent. After obtaining tenure, she not only spoke out, but became a 
leader of a group that stood up for the rights of women.” Therefore, tenure provides 
safeguards that allow faculty to speak and participate in university business openly 
without fear of reprisal.   
But, to protect their future and avoid problems with the university, tenured and 
non-tenured faculty have also modified their classroom discussion and self-censored 
themselves. Curry stated that non-tenured “people have…streamlined [their teaching] 
and said [that] they are not saying any controversial things until they receive tenure.” 
Even when tenured, he added,  
[t]his has been a fear of a lot of tenured faculty members [also]. We have had a 
few [instances] where people are complaining about their third-year reviews 
despite having an excellent publication record because it’s talking about race, 
racism, things of this sort. Some professors say, look I’m just not teaching X 
anymore because I don’t want to deal with the headache. 
Another participant stated that “the university, aside from that one instance, generally 
does not crack down on faculty’s free expression [but that is because], they don’t really 
know half, of what faculty are doing, so it’s just a matter of being a little careful. I’ve 
really…become more careful in my classes.” Faculty are still guarded when topics are or 
become controversial or political.  
 Controls on faculty speech derive from internal pressures from both the 
administration and the students. Curry provided the example of a conservative student 





Texas A&M [has] a very strong [conservative] student movement…that in many 
ways polices what professors teach on the university campuses. So there’s been a 
lot of roll back, not so much from actual statements by administrators or deans or 
faculty, but there’s been a lot of social and public pressure to watch what you 
say, not teach on things that could be perceived [such] as Marxist or anti-state or 
anti-government. 
Providing the administration’s view of faculty, Doumani equated faculty’s current 
campus environment to that of a soldier in the army. He stated,  
[p]ublic universities are like the army and the army has a mission and it has its 
rules and people go into the army knowing what the mission and the rules are 
and they just can’t do or say whatever they want.  And that the institution has a 
right to regulate its faculty just like the army regulates its soldiers. 
He added, “[t]hat’s a very chilling analogy.” For Jensen, these rules and regulations have 
created artificial barriers that faculty assume they cannot cross. Using a football analogy, 
he stated, 
if the point at which you are going to be punished for speech is at the 50-yard 
line. So you’re at the goal line and you’re figuring how far can I go before they’ll 
punish me? And let’s say that in reality you can go all the way to the 50-yard 
line. I think people internalize a much more stringent standard and they will 
estimate that they will be punish at the 25-yard line…So they’ll only go to the 
25-yard line. Even though, there’s another 25 yards they could go without even 
risking punishment. People are so nervous that they internalize that 25-yard line 
is the mark beyond which you cannot go. As a result, that becomes the defacto 
place where people stop, even though, they could go further.  
Nelson contented that these controls are threatening to the role of faculty and 
governance at universities nationwide. He stated, 
because of the corporate ideology, you can quibble until the corporation decides 
on what its policy is and you’re expected to snap your heels to and salute. You’re 
expected to sort of follow the corporate line. That is more and more what I think 
administrators expect of their faculty. Some faculty are resistant and other 
faculty think it’s better to keep their heads down. The fact that so many faculty 
have no job security obviously enhances the power of administrators to basically 




Sheill agreed adding that the universities “take action against people they feel either 
won’t fight back or aren’t in a position of enough influence or power.” Enforcing this 
opinion, Blackburn added, “the power conferred in university rule books and taken away 
from those who are in the classrooms and in the laboratories [who do not have] their 
rights protected by tenure.” These factors contribute to the chilling effect university 
policies and controls have on academic speech. 
Outside influence and restrictions in academic freedom. The relationship of the 
chilling effect and outside influence and restrictions in academic freedom themes were 
discussed previously. The discussion is repeated for the reader’s convenience. 
Seven participants discussed the chilling effect that was caused by outside 
influence from legislators, politicians, corporations, and advocacy groups, resulting in 
perceived or real restrictions on academic freedom. Hemmingway epitomized the 
environment faculty face today, stating, faculty are asking 
What is it that I can say? What is it that I should say? What are the restrictions on 
my speech? How can I get this issue done and not lose my job? How do I 
communicate about this and not get the chancellor or the provost or the president 
or the board or the legislature angry with what I’m about to say because it’s 
contentious or it flies in the face of what some political party or some official 
might believe to be the best course of action? 
Underlying these questions, were key words in the references such as subtle, head down, 
cautious, and fear that typified the chilling effect to which faculty are exposed. A 
number of participants discussed examples of methods used by outside entities to 
intimidate faculty and silence academic speech. These methods included the use of hate 
mail and public record requests, black lists, pressure to pass restrictive legislation, 




Email, websites, and open records requests for electronic information were 
referenced as sources that are or could be used to threaten and intimidate faculty. For 
attempting to defend a fellow faculty member from university censure, one participant 
acknowledged receiving hate mail stating, “he and others started to get hate mail and so 
the backlash went well beyond the university administration but I think it was licensed 
by the university administration.” Curry discussed a conservative advocacy group’s use 
of the Internet at his institution and the pressure exerted on faculty stating that the group 
seems to be the independent police who put [faculty] on their website. They have 
the leftist list and, despite people saying that these things don’t matter, you see 
these intimidation tactics [used on] faculty members who speak on issues get 
repercussions. 
Adding, 
they’re going to request your e-mails,…question you, ask you about your syllabi, 
and put you on the Internet and on watch lists.  That’s a lot of pressure in terms 
of talking about how safe people feel in expressing their opinions or even their 
scholarly opinions given if that’s the type of social and public lashing they’re 
going to get. 
Referencing an incident on his campus in which a faculty member became the focus of 
political challenge, Smith stated,  
while the university stood up for the faculty, we are warned that all our emails 
are subject to all regulations that govern public employees.  People who, for 
example, do work on terrorism have to be very careful because somebody could, 
under the USA Patriot Act, just make an accusation and get your whole computer 
seized.  So, the atmosphere has become one where people are more cautious. I 
don’t think it has stifled robust debate, but we are aware that we are not in a 





These quotes illustrate the fear that outside entities instill on faculty when tactics such as 
requests for electronic communication, the seizing of equipment, and the publishing 
online of information targeted at discrediting academic speech that are used to intimidate 
faculty.     
 Lawmaker’s influence over legislation and funding decisions were methods 
discussed for influencing change on campus and silencing academic speech. Doumani 
discussed the changing of the academic landscape caused by pressure from private 
advocacy groups to pass legislation, stating,   
attempts by private advocacy groups such as the David Horowitz group that 
passed the Students Bill of Rights, on the local and the state level as well as 
resolutions that are put before the state assemblies, create a very chilling 
environment for faculty. 
One participant discussed the ever-present issue of  
knowing that you are being watched very closely by the legislature in the context 
of budget cuts, that they’re going to try to save money and that they would like 
nothing more than to turn the university into a vocational academy staffed 
entirely by at-will employees, is always a threat. So after 911 and since Garcetti, 
I do think that, given the power of the regents and the legislature, people keep 
their heads down. 
Downs provided an example of an incident at the University of Wisconsin extension 
campus, which resulted in legislator dissatisfaction and pressure being exerted to 
influence future behaviors. 
The UW Extension at Madison has a division that deals with art and wanted to 
put on a forum with art about the labor controversy and it became very 
politicized. As a result, there were members of the Republican Coalition in the 
legislature that called for the head of that department [chair] and said that, if you 





Smith references another example. 
I think there’s been not quite a chilling effect but some greater degree of caution 
here at Virginia. Most recently having to do with the lawsuit brought by the 
attorney general against one of our former faculty members in environmental 
science who was allegedly involved in the so-called hockey stick trick of climate 
change, the attorney general sued him on a fraud statute, the university defended 
the professor, and it’s still going on because the state is appealing. This happened 
because we have a local politician who is running against climate change and 
decided to take it out on this one professor.   
As such, public universities and faculty are aware of the tie between that faculty speech, 
legislation, and funding. 
 Finally, the corporatization of universities has influenced academic speech. 
Nelson stated that the “corporate university does not appreciate dissent on policy matters 
and faculty are increasingly self-censoring on policy matters, cautious and afraid about 
speaking out.” Referencing faculty who were working on British Petroleum funded 
grants after the Gulf oil spill, he stated 
the most either amusing or incredible part of BP’s restrictions built into their 
contracts after the Gulf oil spill, was not just the restriction on publication but, 
that the same restrictions applied to giving an academic paper at a conference. It 
applied to your discussing your research with anybody. They couldn’t talk about 
what they were doing without the lawyers’ permission. I think most faculty 
members would find literally being gagged, more than a little distressing. 
He added, faculty are “expected to sort of follow the corporate line and, that’s more and 
more what I think administrators expect of their faculty. While some faculty are 
resistant, other faculty think it’s better to keep their heads down.” 
Academic freedom–intramural and extramural speech. The chilling of 





stemmed from faculty fear of being unemployed or singled out for their activities. From 
a political standpoint, Jensen contended, 
I don’t think that it has anything to do with political fallout of 9/11, questions 
about war and peace, or public speaking about controversial issues. I think the 
reason that there’s been a change is because of economic realities. There is an 
oversupply of faculty in almost every field. That oversupply is most dramatic in 
the traditional humanities and liberal arts, English, history, philosophy. An 
oversupply of labor and a contracting economic base for higher education. That 
equals fear and fear equals conformity. So, people are probably less willing to 
step out either in public or internal to the university and ask critical questions 
either about public policy or about the internal working of the university, not 
because of traditional repression or you know political suppression of people’s 
speech but because people are just afraid that during lean times, nobody’s safe. 
That includes not just untenured or contingent faculty but everybody, and it 
percolates up to tenured and full professors. 
   As a result, participants have curtailed their activities to reduce their exposure. One 
participant stated that “the climate really changed,” “faculty were worried,” and “the 
pressures of the faculty about academic freedom are subtle.” Adding,  
I have become more careful in my classes to make sure that I am including open 
perspectives and making formal changes to my methods of getting students 
involved so they hear a different voice, not just one. Many of us have become 
more careful and flexible in the classroom. I don’t think that’s necessarily 
horrible, but it is kind of a chilling climate thing. 
 To stay under the radar, Smith stated that he thought “there was an awareness that all 
our emails can be subpoenaed at any moment [which has resulted in] a greater degree of 
caution than what you would ideally like in an atmosphere of full academic freedom.” 
Lawfare. Doumani cited the use of laws and legislation to wage war on academic 
freedom as a way “to silence faculty and silence free speech.” Specifically, the Hong 





warning to their members. Nelson reflected,  
shortly after the Hong decision, the faculty senate at the University of California, 
Riverside issued a memo to all faculty members saying, in the light of the Hong 
decision, that you better watch yourself. You may want to hesitate or withhold 
comments on shared governance because you’re not protected anymore. I mean 
that was a pretty good warning sign that faculty members were vulnerable.  
He added that, “Garcetti is a decision that has yet to play itself out on campus in its full 
implications or consequences.”  
Control of both the student admission and curriculum management processes 
were also areas causing faculty to curtail their speech. One participant reflected on a 
visit from the university’s legal counsel that resulted from the topics that he had 
discussed with potential students. He stated, 
After Grutter, we breathed a heavy sigh of relief. But, it wasn’t long after that I 
got a visit from the Office of Legal Affairs at the university. They asked for a 
meeting with me, sat me down, and asked me how I was talking about the 
recruitment of minority students. I said that I believed that we could ask people 
what their race and ethnicity were, that we could consider those factors in our 
decision making, and that we could take into account historical exclusions, 
historical barriers in terms of standardized testing and so on. They’re like hold it, 
hold it, hold it, hold it. You cannot talk anything about history, can’t talk about 
redress, can’t talk about balancing out underrepresented group. You can only talk 
about diversity as the good that will come out of recruiting minority students. 
Concerning the control of the curriculum, Doumani discussed changes that have chilled 
speech nationally. He contended that,  
the push through of legislation on the federal, state, or local level, laws or 
resolutions is an attempt to control what and how international studies are done 
at the university through federally funded Title VI programs such as the Title VI 
Centers. That is an attempt to tell faculty that we want to make sure that what 





Smith cautioned that this also applied to faculty doing research, stating,  
people who work on terrorism have to be very careful because, under the USA 
Patriot Act, somebody can just make an accusation and get your whole computer 
seized.  So, I think that the atmosphere has become one in which people are just 
more cautious. 
One participant added, “the legal precedents are alarming at public institutions because 
to speak out against your employer is not protected.” These restrictions continue to shift 
the boundaries of academic speech and their rights as citizens. 
 Academic freedom–intramural and extramural speech. The academic 
freedom–intramural and extramural speech was one of the four research questions to be 
addressed in the study. The theme focused on the ways faculty governance structures 
respond when challenges to faculty intramural and extramural speech occur. As Table 
11.5 indicates, keywords and phrases identified in the interviews included intramural, 
extramural, in-class, on-campus, off-campus, and controversial speech. These keyword 
and phrases were found in the theme’s coded references. Below quotations from the 
interviews in which participants discussed what affected their intramural and extramural 
academic freedom. 
• A lot of faculty have this assumption that the First Amendment protects what 
happens in the classroom in an intramural or extramural sense. When I talk to 
a lot of faculty, they don’t really have a sense of the legal debate going on. 
• The faculty senate has never addressed an administrative challenge or 
decision regarding a faculty member’s extramural speech. 
• The only guarantee that the campus will hold a faculty member harmless for 
extramural speech or speech off the campus, is the notion that academic 





• If you publish your ass off, they don’t care what you do. They won’t care 
because you are bringing credit to the university. Publishing in your field, 
and establishing your reputation is really my strategy. Basically fly under the 
radar by being extra good at our jobs. 
• I think there has been a change but I don’t think it has anything to do with 
political fallout of 9/11 or questions about war and peace or public speaking 
about controversial issues. I think the reason there’s been a change is 
because of economic realities. 
• I think universities have the authority to require professors to stay on point, 
to teach the course that’s been assigned to them to teach, not to inject their 
religious views, not to curse gratuitously at their students, and not to sexually 
harass them. Professors who think that there are no constraints on them in the 
classroom, I don’t think that’s correct. 
• I teach whatever I want in the classroom and I have never had any concerns 
that this is too controversial a topic. 
• People are probably less willing to step out either in public or internal to the 
university and ask critical questions either about public policy or about the 
internal working of the university, not because of traditional repression or 
you know political suppression of people’s speech but because people are 
just afraid that during lean times, nobody’s safe. That includes not just 
untenured or contingent faculty but everybody and it percolates up to tenured 
and full professors. 
Participants recognized that the academic landscape had changed but did not attribute 
the change to any single event such as 9/11. Legal decisions such as Garcetti, economic 
issues resulting from reduced funding, and corporate research interests were the main 
factors influencing their extramural or intramural speech. Given all the participants were 
tenured, they stated that their speech had not been constrained or restricted by their 
institutions. 
Seventy-five references were coded from the interviews. Based on a matrix 
coding query of all themes, the theme overlaps the university control over the academic 




chilling effect (10 times), and lawfare (10 times) themes. The academic freedom–right 
or privilege and overlapping themes were strong positive relationships, above r = 0.90. 
Table 11.13 provides the results of the matrix query and correlations. The analysis 
demonstrations how these themes relate to the academic freedom – intramural and 
extramural speech theme. 
Table 11.13 
Matrix Coding of the Themes That Overlap the Academic Freedom–Intramural and 
Extramural Speech Theme 
Theme 




University control over the academic speech 14 0.95425 
Outside influence and restrictions on 
academic freedom 
11 0.92550 
Chilling effect 10 0.96487 




University control over the academic speech. The participants did not feel that 
their universities were controlling their intramural and extramural speech. At his 
institution, Jensen stated, 
there has been no pressure on the content of teaching. I felt none personally. 
There has been no comment from any supervisor and discussions about 
curriculum. Our department just went through a curriculum revision process and 
we talked very openly about what should or shouldn’t be taught and how it 
should be done and there was a lot of support voice for continuing to teach 
attentive critical thinking curriculum as often as possible. So, from the level of 
faculty colleagues to the university administration I have felt no pressure on my 





In contrast, another participant stated 
the pressures on the faculty about academic freedom are subtle. The university 
generally does not crack down on faculty’s free expression. But, they really don’t 
know half of what faculty are doing. So it’s a matter of being a little careful 
[because] here are tools of exclusion and oppression that can be used to inhibit 
the promotion of faculty.  
Agreeing, another interviewee added that his institution has “a robust culture…of 
academic freedom and the recognition of faculty speech rights. But, if the issue arose, 
I’m sure that the university would freely move toward addressing any questions that fall 
within an institutional perspective.” In general participants did not feel that their 
university was controlling or restricting their academic speech.  
Outside influence and restrictions on academic freedom. The relationship of the 
academic freedom–intramural and extramural speech and outside influence and 
restrictions on academic freedom themes were discussed previously. The discussion is 
repeated for the reader’s convenience. 
The theme focused on the effect non-university entities have on faculty’s 
intramural and extramural speech. These entities include public opinion, legislators who 
require transparency on materials used in the classroom, and conservative advocacy 
groups who monitor classroom speech. Jensen discussed his experiences with these 
entities and responded to their efforts to restrict his speech.  
On September 12, 2001, Jenson published an essay in the Houston Chronicle, 
Stop the Insanity Here in which he critiqued the possibility of a military response to the 





President Larry Faulkner. It was the first time that he could remember that a university 
president “condemned him by name for his extramural political writing which does by 
nature of his position [as a Journalism faculty member] impact academic freedom.” In 
turn, he questioned the “appropriateness of the chief officer of the university to make 
comments in response to a public outcry that publicly humiliated or attempted to 
publicly humiliated and ridicule a faculty member” for his speech. While many of his 
colleagues supported his right to extramural speech, many remained quiet. 
Jensen’s thoughts on the Texas legislation requiring faculty to publish their 
syllabi and vitae online and conservative advocacy groups provided insight into the 
faculty’s role as a public employee and professional. He stated, 
when the state law kicked in stating that we all have to put our syllabi and 
COV’s online, I was quite frankly shocked that faculty found this disturbing. I 
teach in the public university and if I’m not willing to put my syllabus in public I 
should quit and go home. I thought that outcry about putting syllabi online was 
really absurd. Number one I don’t think there was a principle that could be 
defended there and number two it made faculty look like a whiny self-indulgent 
crybabies. If you can’t defend your syllabus, you don’t have any business 
teaching. I thought that was totally over blown. 
On the issue of conservative advocacy groups monitoring his classes, he added, 
If students want to come in and sit in my course even though they’re not enrolled 
that’s fine with me. If the “conservative students to bust radical professors” or 
whatever the group might be called wanted to station a permanent monitor in my 
classroom, I would invite. Why not? Again, if I can’t defend my teaching on 
intellectual grounds then I have no business being in the classroom. I continued 
to teach critical material and I teach it in ways that I think are pedagogically 
sound. 
In Mississippi, another participant cautioned that, “we’ve got a fairly tightly structured 
constitutional board that is sensitive to a range of issues, including the ability of the 




Chilling effect. The relationship of academic freedom–intramural and extramural 
speech and chilling effect themes were discussed previously. The discussion is repeated 
for the reader’s convenience. 
The chilling of intramural and extramural speech was discussed by four of the 
participants. The reasons stemmed from faculty fear of being unemployed or singled out 
for their activities. From a political standpoint, Jensen contended, 
I don’t think that it has anything to do with political fallout of 9/11, questions 
about war and peace, or public speaking about controversial issues. I think the 
reason that there’s been a change is because of economic realities. There is an 
oversupply of faculty in almost every field. That oversupply is most dramatic in 
the traditional humanities and liberal arts, English, history, philosophy. An 
oversupply of labor and a contracting economic base for higher education. That 
equals to fear and fear equals conformity. So, people are probably less willing to 
step out either in public or internal to the university and ask critical questions 
either about public policy or about the internal working of the university, not 
because of traditional repression or you know political suppression of people’s 
speech but because people are just afraid that during lean times, nobody’s safe. 
That includes not just untenured or contingent faculty but everybody and it 
percolates up to tenured and full professors. 
   As a result, participants have curtailed their activities to reduce their exposure. One 
participant stated, that “the climate really changed,” “faculty were worried,” and “the 
pressures of the faculty about academic freedom are subtle.” Adding,  
I have become more careful in my classes to make sure that I am including open 
perspectives and making formal changes to my methods of getting students 
involved so they hear a different voice, not just one. Many of us have become 
more careful and flexible in the classroom. I don’t think that’s necessarily 
horrible, but it is kind of a chilling climate thing. 
 To stay under the radar, Smith stated that he thought “there was an awareness that all 
our emails can be subpoenaed at any moment [which has resulted in] a greater degree of 




Speech as a public employee versus private citizen. Five participants contributed 
to the discussion of the content and context in which faculty speech is made. The 
balance between speaking as a public employee versus private citizen since Garcetti, 
was summarized by Nelson who stated,   
what the court’s decision basically did was remove any First Amendment 
protection for shared governance speech at a public institution, with one 
qualification. If shared governance speech was normal, routine, expected, and 
part of your job description, you weren’t protected. If, however, the 
administration, your statutes or your faculty handbook take a position that 
government matters are the not the job for the faculty but rather the job of the 
administration, faculty members could comment on it but because they have no 
recognized expertise or responsibility for doing so, their comments are 
fundamentally irrelevant and they still have First Amendment protection rights.  
Kapus provided his thoughts on how he handles his public and private roles. 
In the classroom, I try to be as balanced as possible. I am sure that students can 
tell which side of an issue I support. Obviously, there are things I don’t bring up 
because I don’t think they’re worth talking about. 
 
In the public, I feel that it’s a different setting. It’s not an educational setting. I 
feel more freedom to present what I think is the correct view on something.  But, 
I wouldn’t feel inhibited in any way. If it’s something about a specific policy that 
the university has, I think you have to help the university be an effective 
organization so that what you say doesn’t undermine the university’s ability [to 
operate efficiently]. 
One participant provided his opinion on this role dichotomy stating, that, as a faculty 
member, “it’s very difficult to separate out one’s role as a citizen and one’s role as an 
employee at a university because our work is about work.” Given the court’s decisions, 
Nelson warned, “the only thing that will protect you from consequences within the 






The 19 participants in the study were representative of the population of full-time 
tenured professors. The majority of the participants were White males from the baby 
boom generation. As the sample selection process began by reviewing university 
governance websites for faculty to interview, the majority of the participants were active 
in their intuition’s governance structure and committees and have published on the topic 
of academic freedom. Also, of the 19 participants, 10 were professors in the colleges of 
liberal arts and humanities, three in schools of law school, three in the colleges of 
education, two in colleges of communications, and one in the college of business. To 
report the interview analysis findings, the study answers each of the four research 
questions to discuss the study’s findings. 
 Effect of federal, state, and local events on academic freedom. The theme, 
outside influences affecting academic freedom, focused on the external events effecting 
academic freedom at public universities since 2000. In the interviews, participants 
referenced events such September 11th, the rise of conservative advocacy groups on 
campuses, the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti and other cases, the use of laws to 
wage war (lawfare) on academic freedom, media coverage by television and 
newspapers, economic and legislative decisions reducing university budgets, and the 
influence of corporate research funding. All of these events have negatively influenced 
academic speech especially for non-tenured faculty. Participants reported that these 
events have caused both tenured and non-tenured faculty to censor their speech as public 




Participants discussed the relationship between specific events that have affected 
academic speech. In one example, participants discussed lawfare against academic 
freedom as a result of court and decisions and legislation. Downs stated that “there is no 
question that different sources are using the courts to restrict certain policy decisions on 
the war on terror…and that there is no question about how [these decisions] are being 
used against academic freedom.” In a second example there was the link between 9/11, 
legislative actions, conservativism, and court decisions. According to Doumani, after 
9/11, “the passage of the Patriot Act, the very conservative Supreme Court, and the 
much more right wing political culture in this country” had direct implications on faculty 
ability to speak openly on campuses. Two participants discussed the direct relationship 
between 9/11, a statewide newspaper, and the University of Texas at Austin 
administration’s repudiation of an editorial written by Robert Jensen. While the 
university recognized Jensen’s academic freedom, neither participant could remember a 
time when the president of a university “condemning a faculty member in public.” 
Jensen commented that, “if there were a 9/11 scale attack [today] and I started writing 
and organizing, my guess is that there’s a higher likelihood that I would be disciplined 
by the university up to an including being terminated.” These examples show the 
domino effect that outside events can have on universities and faculty’s academic 
speech.  
Offsetting these negative influences are organizations such as the American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP), American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 




discussed these organizations in the context of using them when institutional policies 
were being developed, academic speech was challenged, or tenured faculty were being 
terminated. Of the 16 faculty interviewed, four indicated that the AAUP, or FIRE had 
responded to actions against tenured faculty on their campuses. To reduce tensions in the 
post-Garcetti period, Nelson stated that the AAUP recommended that “faculty senates or 
other appropriate bodies push to have language guaranteeing shared governance without 
the possibility of retaliation built in to faculty handbooks or, where appropriate, into 
collective bargaining agreements.” He noted that about 20 universities had implemented 
this recommendation. Of the participant’s institutions, six had active AAUP chapters and 
13 did not (American Association of University Professors, 2011/2012).   
 Effect these events have on the way universities and faculty handle 
intramural speech. The academic freedom–intramural and extramural speech theme 
focused on the external events affecting academic speech at public universities. As was 
stated earlier, participants recognized that the academic landscape had changed but did 
not attribute the change to any single event. Two participants said that, due to outside 
influences resulting from news coverage and legislative pressures, they had changed the 
topics that they teach to “remain under the radar.” The remainder felt their speech had 
not been constrained or restricted by their intuitions. 
 Tenure was an important factor empowering faculty speech. Participants 
recognized that the hiring of non-tenured faculty increased university control over the 
academic speech and resulted in faculty censoring the topics that they teach and select 




did not actively participate in the university’s governance system until receiving tenure. 
The chilling effect caused by the practice of hiring part-time as oppose to full-time 
tenure track faculty provides public universities with a workforce that can be hired and 
fired at will, allowing administrators to control the topics discussed. Participants 
recognized this practice as an issue that will reduce the number of tenured faculty in the 
long term. 
 All but one participant, a professor at the University of Wisconsin, reported that 
their governance structures were advisory in nature and made recommendations to their 
institution’s senior administration for consideration. To address Garcetti, these faculty 
governance structures have worked with administrators to develop or modify 
institutional policies. At the University of Wisconsin, Downs stated the faculty senate 
“directly dealt with Garcetti.” They “proposed an amendment to their policy specifically 
provid[ing] protection for faculty members [who] question, criticize or comment on 
university policies, practices and procedures” and the senate and administration 
approved it. Another participant indicated that their university was just beginning to 
address the university’s right to control public employees’ speech. Not having strong 
shared governance was accepted by the participants as the norm. While participants 
claimed that their universities followed a majority of the faculty senate’s 
recommendations, only one reported that their faculty senate worked actively with the 
administration to address events affecting academic freedom. That institution utilized an 




academic speech occurred. Others relied on organizations such as the AAUP, ACLU, 
and FIRE for counsel when academic speech is challenged. 
Effect these events have on the way universities and the faculty handle 
extramural speech when speaking both as a citizen and a public university 
employee. The speech as a private citizen versus public employee theme addressed this 
research question. The Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti was identified as a major 
event affecting faculty extramural speech. While participants stated that the circuit 
courts still had not defined whether Garcetti applies to academic speech, all participants 
agreed that the control that universities have over the academic speech has increased 
since 2000 and that faculty are cautious when they exercise their right to speak. Nelson 
stated, “the only guarantee that the campus will hold a faculty member harmless for 
extramural speech, speech off the campus, is the notion that academic freedom is a right 
that is held by faculty members.” Jensen argued that the faculty’s commitment to the 
core values of teaching and learning were strong but tended toward stagnation. He 
reasoned,  
the university is populated by people up to an including the president who do 
share those values yet constantly are adopting themselves to the institutional 
realities which are shaped now only by values internal to the institution but those 
external that increasingly have to do with funding [from the state, donors, and 
corporations]. 
As such, Doumani adds, “university administrators have adopted a non-confrontational 
stance with these outside groups and elected often not to defend or to passively defend 




prestige of large research universities. Seventeen participants were tenured faculty at 
large research universities.  
As decisions in Grutter and Garcetti raised control over the academic freedom to 
the institutional level, extramural speech such as research and publications, which are 
part of a faculty member’s official duties may not be protected. While all the participants 
were tenured, they said that the faculty most vulnerable to discipline for their extramural 
speech are the part-time and non-tenured faculty. As all faculty interviewed were 
tenured, none indicated that they had curtailed their extramural speech.  
 Effect these events have on faculty’s ability to defend their academic 
freedom. Since 2000, the main defense of faculty to attacks on their academic freedom 
has been tenure. All participants claimed that tenure allowed them to publish, do 
research, and teach on the topics of their choice. The majority identified external events 
that were chilling academic speech, mainly for non-tenured faculty with one participant 
stating that he had modified his in-class topics in order to deal with external pressures on 
his university. The remainder continued to teach their topics without interference or 
adverse action by the university.  
All interviewees commented that their shared governance committees and 
structures are advisory and provide recommendations to their administrations, which can 
be vetoed. Jensen commented that the University of Texas faculty committees “have no 
power and that when [faculty] serve on them we provide the illusion of faculty 
governance to the administration [and justify their] concern for faculty input.” While a 




administrations, they recognized that the university’s ability to control academic speech 
has increased due to court decisions, economic vulnerabilities, the rise of 
conservativism, and the political and legislative pressures placed on university regents 
and administration to eliminate controversial speech by faculty. Contributing to the 
surge in control is the increase in part-time faculty and the decrease in number of 
tenured and tenured faculty at universities nationwide.      
Summary 
 Of the 16 themes identified during the coding, 11 were discussed, six as 
prevalent themes and five as themes that were highly correlated to the prevalent themes. 
These themes included lawfare, First Amendment, speech as a public employee versus 
private citizen, institutional academic freedom, and faculty activism on campus. Of all 
the themes discussed, four were the same or similar to the ones defined in the case 
analysis.   
 In all, the participants observed that universities control academic freedom and, 
therefore, control academic speech on campus. Many participants referenced the 
Garcetti decision and the influence that outside entities such as alumni, donors, 
corporations, and legislators have over funding and the selection of university regents 
and presidents as factors enhancing their control. While participants felt that universities 
do not actively restrict academic speech, they acknowledged that faculty were cautious 
of the topics taught and recognized that, since 2000, academic speech was being 
progressively chilled. To counter these effects, all participants reported that they had 




and provided decision in the form of recommendations to the upper levels on their 
institutions in all areas except the curriculum which faculty controlled. As such, 
participants reported that they understood the academic landscape in which they work 







 This chapter presents a summary of the study and major conclusions drawn from 
the data and findings presented in chapters four through 11. Included is a discussion of 
the implications of the study and the recommendation for further research.  
Summary of Study 
Since 2000, academic freedom faces the most serious challenges and setbacks 
since the McCarthy era (Doumani, 2006). The hasty passage of the USA Patriot Act in 
2001 and the subsequent efforts of well-funded and politically-connected advocacy 
groups have threatened the faculty’s academic right to free and open inquiry and 
research; to design curriculum and teach freely within their university or college 
disciplines; and to unfettered extramural utterance and action as citizens (AAUP, 2006). 
As the AAUP’s 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic 
Tenure infers, faculty in the social, political, and economic disciplines are the ones most 
likely to speak and express diverse opinions that have resulted in punitive actions by 
individuals and organizations internal and external to the university (AAUP, 2006). 
Their speech resulted in faculty in these disciplines being labeled as radical, unpatriotic, 
or subversive and legislators, courts, governing boards, alumni, students, and the media 
pressuring them to censor their behaviors or face the possibility of legal prosecution and 
dismissal. The emergence and development of the principles governing academic 
freedom resulted from long processes of interaction and discussion between the people 




provided the foundation for the current freedoms that faculty have to do research, teach, 
and publish without fear of reprisal.    
As occurred in previous eras, academic freedom since 2000 faces an uncertain 
future. Pressures from the same groups (conservative advocacy groups, legislators, 
courts, governing boards, alumni, students, and the media) are challenging academic 
speech and attempting to silence faculty. Since September 11, 2001 attacks on the World 
Trade Center, these activities have increased. Cole asserted that increased “attacks on 
professors…in the name of national security suggest that [academia] is headed toward 
another era of intolerance and repression” (2005, p. 5). Affirming these comments, 
Somers added, that “academic freedom of expression for faculty, staff, and students has 
become a casualty in the post-9/11 world” (n.d., p. 1) and concluded that “the mass 
psychology of wartime capitalizes upon citizens’ fear to allow for restricted freedoms” 
(p. 7). These comments suggest the need for continued research to understand the 
influences affecting faculty intramural and extramural speech rights. 
 Purpose statement. The purpose of this study was to examine the status of 
academic freedom and, more specifically, intramural and extramural speech at public 
universities in the U.S. in the post-2000 moment. Court opinions from benchmark First 
Amendment court cases decided since 2000 and interviews of public university faculty 
members were analyzed to determine the current academic freedom issues and trends 
that have evolved. The findings could be used to inform university and faculty 





 Research questions. The area of study is “Faculty Intramural and Extramural 
Speech” at public universities since 2000. This study answered the following research 
questions: 
1. How have federal, state, and local events affected academic freedom since 2000? 
2. How have these events changed the way universities and faculty handle 
intramural speech? 
3. How have these events changed the way universities and the faculty handle 
extramural speech when speaking both as a citizen and a public university 
employee? 
4. How have these events affected the faculty’s ability to defend their academic 
freedom since 2000? 
 Methodology. The mixed methods study is primarily qualitative. The mixed 
methods design was selected because it provided the researcher with the ability to 
approach a problem in a more holistic manner and to utilize results from one method to 
inform the results of another (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2004) both at the micro and macro 
levels of the study. As Onwuegbuzie and Leech inferred, conducting a mixed methods 
study “involves collecting, analyzing, and interpreting qualitative and quantitative data 
in a single study or in a series of studies that investigate the same underlying 
phenomenon” (2006, p. 474). 
 The sources of data included both qualitative (pre-selected free speech court 
opinions and briefs and interviews of public university faculty) and quantitative (surveys 




qualitative analysis of six Supreme Court, appellate court, and district court cases and 
corresponding amicus briefs pertinent to intramural and extramural faculty speech. The 
analysis uses quantitative analysis and data to validate, order, and structure the 
presentation of the prevalent themes throughout the study. The cases included Churchill 
(2010) for extramural speech, Schrier (2006), Garcetti (2006), Hong (2007), and Adams 
(2010) for faculty speech as employees, and Grutter (2003) for institutional academic 
freedom. Full transcripts of all court opinions and amicus briefs from professional 
academic organizations, were retrieved, dated, and filed in order to increase the 
descriptive validity of the data. The opinions and briefs were deconstructed and coded in 
a qualitative analysis software (NVivo) for further review, reduction, clustering, 
counting, patterning, matching, and theme identification. The coding and theme 
identification allowed the prevalent changes in the court’s reasoning and changing 
attitude toward academic speech rights to be identified. The analysis highlighted the 
themes, patterns, and issues and provided the basis for the second part of the qualitative 
phase, the faculty interviews. 
 The second stage of the qualitative analysis included 19 one-on-one interviews 
with faculty members from U.S. public universities. To achieve the goal, the process 
began by selecting a stratified sample of 23 professors from their university governance 
websites who had participated in their institution’s governance structure, published in 
the area of academic speech rights, or both. Selected faculty members were emailed a 
description of the study and the consent form and asked if they were willing to be 




study, and consent form). Faculty who did not respond were sent one follow-up email. If 
no response was received, they were dropped from the sample. The stratified sample 
identified eight faculty members who agreed to be interviewed with eight declining, and 
seven not responding to the invitation.  
 As some faculty declined to be interviewed, a “snowball” method of sampling 
was then implemented. “Snowball” sampling was selected because it provided an open-
ended socio-metric method that allowed the researcher to build the sample of 
interviewees and expand the list based on extended associations (Kadushin, 1968) and 
on the context and criteria specific to the study. In this methodology, the participants in 
the stratified sample who were interviewed and also those who declined were asked to 
provide recommendations of faculty at public universities who might be willing to 
participate in the study. This process yielded 26 additional potential participants of 
which 11 agreed to be interviewed, 11 did not return the request, and four declined. 
 Faculty who agreed to participate scheduled one hour for the interview. The 
interview format consisted of a general background statement to introduce the past and 
current issues facing academic freedom and to focus the participant on the topic of the 
study. The interviews were conducted in person (1) or by phone (18). During the 
interview, the researcher asked five open-ended questions which included the following. 
• How have federal, state, and local events affected academic freedom at your 
institution since 2000? 
• Is academic freedom a right or a privilege at your institution? What criteria 




speech as a public employee and private citizen converge and become an 
issue? 
• In what ways do the faculty governance structures at your institution respond 
when challenges to faculty intramural and extramural speech occur? 
• What effect does institutional academic freedom have on the faculty’s role in 
the governance structure at your university? 
• How have faculty at your institution altered their intramural and extramural 
speech since 2000? 
The open-ended format of the questions allowed the researcher to probe and ask follow-
up questions with the intent of identifying prevalent themes and arguments. The 
interviews were digital audio recorded, transcribed by a bonded service, and coded in a 
qualitative analysis software (NVivo) to identify dominant themes and patterns.  
The quantitative analysis part of the study included surveys of the faculty 
interviewed. The survey included seven multiple choice questions and collected 
demographic information such as region of country, age group, ethnicity, gender, 
assignment type, whether the participant has participated in shared governance at their 
institution, and whether the faculty member has published on the topic of academic 
freedom. The survey assisted in defining the characteristics of the sample so it can be 
replicated at other universities if further research is needed. 
 Data analysis. The qualitative analysis of archival information utilized a content 
analysis approach.  Krippendorff (2004) defined content analysis as “a research 




use” (p.18) and, therefore, inferred that every “content analysis must have a context 
within which texts are examined” (p. 24). Limiting the context allowed the research to 
remain focused on the phenomenon studied and reduced the diversity of the 
interpretations. Defining the context as academic intramural and extramural free speech 
since 2000 focused the data collection and analysis. 
Court opinions and amicus briefs. Full transcripts of the court case opinions and 
amicus briefs from professional academic organizations, were retrieved, dated, and filed 
in order to increase the descriptive validity of the data collection phase. First-level 
descriptive and interpretive codes (Miles & Huberman, 1994) were used to code, reduce, 
and categorize the data for analysis. As codes became obsolete, they were removed or 
combined with other codes. As codes emerged, they were added or a second-level 
coding schema developed in order to allow for further data reduction and analysis. The 
data were entered into a qualitative data package (NVivo10) for further review, 
reduction, clustering, counting, patterning, matching, and theme identification. The 
themes identified in the court opinions and amicus briefs provided the external or 
outside view of the issues and events effecting academic freedom at public universities 
in the U.S. Themes crossing more them one case were used as predetermined themes for 
the faculty interview coding and analysis.  
Interviews and surveys. The faculty interviews provided information on the 
changing landscape of academic freedom on U.S. university campuses. The interview 
questions and process were piloted with a public university faculty member to validate 




interview, to resolve technical issues, and to deal with any researcher bias. Feedback 
from the pilot was used to modify and improve the process for the one-on-one 
interviews. 
 The 19 interviews were digitally recorded and archived to provide descriptive 
validity to the study. After each interview, the recording was sent to a bonded 
transcription services, transcribed into Microsoft Word, and returned to the researcher. 
The transcripts were emailed and reviewed by each participant who reviewed, corrected, 
and returned it to the researcher in 30 days. Throughout the interviews, the researcher 
took field notes and incorporated them into the transcripts. After participant review and 
correction, the transcripts were loaded into a qualitative statistical package for content 
analysis and coding. The theme analysis of the interviews provided the internal or inside 
university view of the issues and events effecting academic freedom at public 
universities in the U.S.  
 The research then proceeded to the quantitative phase of the study in which a 
survey was used to collect demographic data in order to identify the characteristics of 
the sample. The survey collected demographic data such as region of country broken 
down by Supreme Court district, appointment track and type, generational age group, 
gender, ethnicity, whether they had participated in faculty governance at their institution 
since 2000, whether they had published on academic freedom, and a space for additional 
comments. Participants had seven days from the date of the interview to respond. 
Research validation methods. Research findings utilized four validation methods 




phenomenological validity, and triangulation (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The collection 
of data from archival documents, one-on-one interviews, and surveys allowed multiple 
independent sources to be used in order to complement the findings. The mixed methods 
allowed both qualitative and quantitative analysis to be used to corroborate and 
determine conflicts in the results.   
 To further test data quality, the effect that the researcher has on the interview 
process was checked prior to the start and during the interview stage. First, the pilot 
interview determined not only the validity of the questions but also provided feedback 
on the researcher’s communication style and the effect of the researcher on the study 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). Feedback from the pilot was recorded for verification 
during the interviews and incorporated in the actual interviews. Second, the faculty 
interviews included an environmental scan of the location, documented any interruptions 
during the interview, and recorded any reactions to questions, or changes in the setting 
during the interview. At the start of each interview, the interviewees were provided a list 
of questions to be asked in order to keep the interview focused. All interviews were 
digital-audio recorded, transcribed in full so that all points of view were included, and 
coded for patterns and themes. After each interview, the researcher documented any 
changes that might have affected the data interpretation.  
 After all interviews were completed, the researcher provided the full transcript of 
the interview to each person interviewed so that they could validate the outcomes and 
provide clarifications if needed. This “phenomenological validity” test further identified 




researcher (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The data analysis included a write-up of any 
observations, responses, changes, and effects realized during the interviews. 
 Outliers in the data were tested to determine the strength of the study’s findings. 
Validating the theme references coded during the case and interview analysis identified 
exceptions caused by data smoothing. Reviewing these exceptions protected the study 
from self-bias and allowed the researcher to build a thorough explanation of the results 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
 Finally, findings were replicated from multiple independent data sources 
throughout the study. First, the information from case analysis was pulled from cases 
that had been decided in the federal, district, or state courts. The logic used by the 
various courts included a review of the amicus briefs in order to provide a cross case 
analysis of the rulings. Second, the interviews included faculty from different regions of 
the U.S., universities, academic departments, and types of appointment to provide 
diversity in the opinions and patterns identified. Third, the surveys of the faculty 
interviewed provided a basis for determining if the sample was representative of the 
study population. The replication methods outlined compliment the triangulation method 
discussed. By using data from multiple sources as well as multiple analysis methods, the 
researcher eliminated what Miles and Huberman (1994) call “holistic fallacy” or the 
mistake of basing findings and results on biased information because outliers were 




 The analysis used the data extracted and coded from each phase to identify 
dominant patterns and themes. Using the strategy of deconstruction, the study presented 
the findings of the research. 
Major Findings 
The events affecting academic freedom in the neo-McCarthy era (2000 to 
present) are similar to those in previous eras. During the pre-McCarthy (1890 to 1939) 
and McCarthy (1940 to 1959) eras, the U.S. had fought two world wars (WWI and 
WWII) and one major conflict (Korean War). The nation’s fear of communist infiltrators 
throughout these periods allowed the government to focus on restricting the First 
Amendment speech rights of citizens declared subversive and un-American. Faculty 
members who taught or published on topics that discussed or supported communism 
were vulnerable to investigation by their institutions or by the government and 
discipline. The reaction of faculty was to self-censor themselves for fear of retaliation. 
These events and reactions are similar to the events that have occurred since 2000.    
The 6 cases and 19 interviews provided an external and internal analysis of the 
challenges facing academic freedom since 2000. To report the joint findings, the study 
addressed the four research questions to discuss the study’s major findings. 
 Research Question 1: Effect of federal, state, and local events on academic 
freedom. The major events affecting academic freedom started with the September 11, 
2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and continued with the Iraq and Afghanistan 
Wars. The conservative Supreme Court, the rise of conservative advocacy groups on 




media’s coverage on television and newspapers focused on condemning un-American 
speech, the threat by lawmakers to reduce university budgets for controversy resulting 
from faculty speech, and the increased dependence and influence of corporate research 
funding were identified as contributing factors to the current, post 9/11 legal and 
academic environment. All faculty who were interviewed reported that these events and 
factors had caused both tenured and non-tenured faculty to censor their speech as public 
employees and to maintain a low profile at their institutions. As occurred in the pre-
McCarthy and McCarthy eras, major military interventions resulted in an increase in 
patriotism, which has reduced the ability of legislators and citizens to tolerate speech 
that is critical of the government or American values. The reaction of the courts has been 
to legitimize the university’s ability to control employee speech and to reduce the 
avenues faculty have to defend their academic freedom and right to free speech. 
As court cases are also events, the six cases that were studied provided a legal 
barometer for how the decisions made by the federal, state, and local courts are affecting 
academic speech. Grutter provided a baseline for the university’s right to control its 
academic decisions and environment. While Grutter focused on law school admissions 
standards, the Supreme Court’s ruling in favor of the university recognized the right of 
the university to institutional academic freedom. In subsequent cases such as Garcetii, 
Schrier, and Hong, institutional academic freedom was reinforced by the court’s 
decision to uphold the right of the public employer to control employee speech. This 
right was buttressed by the court’s reluctance to interfere with academic decisions and 




universities, these actions have strengthened their control over the academic 
environment and weakened the ability of the faculty to speak freely on issues outside of 
the classroom.  
In May 2006, Garcetti provided the definitions for what speech public employers 
have the right to control. The Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti modified the 
Pickering test by adding an initial step to determine whether an employee was speaking 
pursuant to his official job duties. The new test, called the Garcetti/Pickering analysis, 
focused on the role from which the public employee was speaking in order to determine 
whether the employee’s speech was protected or not. In the Hong and Adams cases, 
faculty served in college leadership or on shared governance committees. Based on the 
Garcetti/Pickering analysis, their speech made in these roles categorized as public 
employees and was, therefore, unprotected. The analysis presents a quandary for faculty 
speech especially when they are required to participate in the decision-making and 
operations of the university. While the Garcetti court left the district courts to work out 
the details of their decision, the effect that it will have on academic freedom remains 
different in each of the circuits studied and dependent on whether universities are 
supportive of unfettered faculty speech regardless of their role. 
The Churchill case provided an example of how the September 11, 2001 attack 
and a tenured faculty’s academic speech resulted in an investigation by the university. 
Soon after the attacks, Ward Churchill published an essay, On the Justice of Roosting 
Chickens, concerning the attacks and condemning U.S. foreign policy. The essay 




university found his essay and speech to be protected by the First Amendment, they 
opened an investigation into other articles that Churchill published during his tenure at 
the University of Colorado. The investigation found evidence of research misconduct 
and he was terminated from his tenured position at the university. The case provided an 
example of how controversial extramural speech on a national event can trigger actions 
from people outside the university that remove a faculty member and silence his 
academic speech. While Churchill contended that the court’s actions would chill speech 
on campus, no conclusive evidence was provided to prove that assertion.   
Faculty who were interviewed discussed how these events and cases were 
interrelated. In one example, participants discussed how court decisions and legislation 
are used to wage war against academic freedom. Downs commented that “there is no 
question that different sources are using the courts to restrict certain policy decisions on 
the war on terror…and that there is no question about how [these decisions] are being 
used against academic freedom.” After 9/11, Doumani stated, that “the passage of the 
Patriot Act, the very conservative Supreme Court, and the much more right wing 
political culture in this country” have had direct implications on the faculty’s ability to 
speak openly on campuses. To this, two participants added the direct relationship 
between 9/11, a statewide newspaper, and the University of Texas at Austin 
administration’s repudiation of an editorial written by Robert Jensen. While the 
university recognized Jensen’s academic freedom, neither participant could remember a 
time when the president of a university “condemning a faculty member in public.” 




and organizing, my guess is that there’s a higher likelihood that I would be disciplined 
by the university up to and including being terminated.” These examples show the 
domino effect national, state, and local events can have on faculty’s academic speech.  
Offsetting these negative influences are organizations such as the American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP), American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 
Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression, and Foundation for 
Individual Rights in Education (FIRE). Sixteen participants discussed these 
organizations in the context of using them when institutional policies were being 
developed, academic speech was challenged, or tenured faculty were terminated. Of the 
16 faculty interviewed, four indicated that the AAUP, or FIRE had responded to actions 
against tenured faculty on their campuses. To reduce tensions in the post-Garcetti 
period, Nelson stated that the AAUP recommended that “faculty senates or other 
appropriate bodies push to have language guaranteeing shared governance without the 
possibility of retaliation built in to faculty handbooks or, where appropriate, into 
collective bargaining agreements.” He noted that about 20 universities had implemented 
this recommendation. In the cases studied, the AAUP, ACLU, and Thomas Jefferson 
Center for the Protection of Free Expression filed amicus briefs but none of the requests 
made were granted and all cases were decided in favor of the institution. As was the case 
in the pre-McCarthy, McCarthy, and post-McCarthy eras, these external organizations 
worked diligently to defend academic freedom with varied success.  
 Research Question 2: Effect these events have on the way universities and 




having more control over faculty intramural speech. The actions and comments of the 
Supreme Court in Grutter and Garcetti show their continuing reluctance to be involved 
in academic decisions that are best left to the university. Faculty who were interviewed 
found that these decisions as well as the ineffectiveness of faculty governance structures, 
the increased hiring of part-time and non-tenure track faculty, and the monitoring of 
faculty speech by conservative advocacy groups are all factors in the erosion of 
academic speech in the classroom and faculty participation in business of the university.       
As stated earlier, the Grutter and Garcetti decisions gave universities the right to 
control public employee speech and increased their right to control academic speech. 
Two cases, Hong and Adams, provided insight into how courts applied the Garcetti 
standard to determine whether their intramural speech was made pursuant to their 
official duties as public employees and not protected by the First Amendment. In Hong, 
the district court found that his intramural speech as a department chair was a matter of 
public concern but ruled that it was not protected because it was part of his official job 
duties. The district and appellate court ruled in favor of the university. In Adams, the 
district court found that the materials submitted in his tenure and promotion package 
were not protected because they were part of his official job duties. It ruled in favor of 
the university but, on appeal, the appellate court found that the district court had ignored 
the Supreme Court’s reservation of applying Garcetti to academic speech and, therefore, 
had misapplied the Garcetti analysis. Adams was remanded in 2011 for further analysis 




different circuits epitomize the issues facing faculty as public employees when the 
content of intramural speech becomes an issue with their university.  
The question of whether Garcetti applies to academic speech remains dependent 
on the role faculty hold when they speak. Intramural speech in the classroom was not 
challenged in the cases. Non-classroom intramural speech, which the university decided 
was interfering with university operations, was an issue in the Schrier and Hong cases 
and the university reacted by exerting their right to control the speech. In these cases, 
both faculty members were removed from their leadership roles due to their adversarial 
speech against their college’s decisions. While they retained their faculty positions due 
to tenure, the university successfully defended their actions in court and their right to 
control intramural speech.    
 Interviewees recognized that the academic landscape had changed but did not 
attribute the change to any single event. Two indicated that due to outside influences 
resulting from news coverage and legislative pressures, they had changed their lecture 
topics in order to remain “under the radar.” Tenure was an important factor in faculty 
not feeling that their speech was constrained or restricted by their intuitions. As such, 
they recognized that the hiring of non-tenured faculty increased the university’s ability 
to control academic speech and was a factor in faculty self-censoring themselves. One 
participant provided an example of a faculty member who did not actively participate in 
the university’s governance system until receiving tenure. The chilling effect caused by 
the practice of hiring part-time as opposed to full-time tenure track faculty provides 




administrators to control the topics discussed. Participants recognized this practice as an 
issue that will reduce the number of tenured faculty in the long term. 
 All but one participant, a professor at the University of Wisconsin, reported that 
their governance structures were advisory in nature and made recommendations to their 
institution’s senior administration for consideration. To address Garcetti, these faculty 
governance structures have worked with administrators to develop or modify 
institutional policies. At the University of Wisconsin, Downs stated the faculty senate 
“directly dealt with Garcetti.” They “proposed an amendment to their policy specifically 
provid[ing] protection for faculty members [who] question, criticize or comment on 
university policies, practices and procedures” and the senate and administration 
approved it. Another participant indicated that their university was just beginning to 
address the university’s right to control public employees’ speech. Not having strong 
shared governance was accepted by the participants as the norm. While participants 
claimed that their universities followed a majority of the faculty senate’s 
recommendations, only one reported that their faculty senate worked actively with the 
administration to address events affecting academic freedom. That institution utilized an 
outside legal service that worked with their faculty union when issues related to 
academic speech occurred. Others relied on organizations such as the AAUP, ACLU, 
and FIRE for counsel when academic speech was challenged. As challenges to 
intramural speech arise, these organizations continue to be called upon to provide 




 Research question 3: Effect these events have on the way universities and the 
faculty handle extramural speech when speaking both as a citizen and a public 
university employee. Beginning in 2004, the courts debated the difference between 
speech made by a public employee and a private citizen at an increasing rate until the 
Garcetti (2006) decision. The Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti was a pivotal point 
for determining whether the public employee speech was protected by the First 
Amendment, and what authority the public employer had to control the speech. The 
court’s discussion from 2004 to 2008 was dominated by three interrelated themes, 
speech as a public employee versus private citizen, expression pursuant to official job 
duties, and an employer’s right to control speech. Once the Garcetti court decided that 
public employers had the right to control employee speech that was part of their job 
duties, the theme, speech as a public employee versus private citizen, was not referenced 
in subsequent cases. Instead, the courts focused on determining whether the context and 
content of the employee’s speech was made as part of their job duties and whether the 
institution had a right to control the employee’s speech. While the Supreme Court left 
the district courts with the task of deciding how their decision applies to universities, the 
focus of the court’s opinions clearly turned to discussions of whether the intramural and 
extramural speech of faculty can be considered part of their job duties and within the 
university’s right to control. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti was also identified as a major event by 
the faculty interviewed. While participants stated that the circuit courts still had not 




the control that universities have over academic speech has increased since 2000 and 
that faculty are cautious when they exercise the right to speak. Nelson stated, that “the 
only guarantee that the campus will hold a faculty member harmless for extramural 
speech, speech off the campus, is the notion that academic freedom is a right that is held 
by faculty members.” Jensen argued that the faculty’s commitment to the core values of 
teaching and learning were strong but tended toward stagnation. He reasoned that  
the university is populated by people up to an including the president who do 
share those values yet constantly are adopting themselves to the institutional 
realities which are shaped now only by values internal to the institution but those 
external that increasingly have to do with funding [from the state, donors, and 
corporations]. 
As such, Doumani adds, “university administrators have adopted a non-confrontational 
stance with these outside groups and elected often not to defend or to passively defend 
their faculty.” These external funding sources are important to the operations and 
prestige of large research universities. Seventeen of the 19 participants were tenured 
faculty at large research universities.  
As decisions in Grutter and Garcetti elevated the control of academic speech to 
the institutional level, extramural speech such as research and publications which are an 
essential part of a tenured faculty member’s official duties are eligible for review and 
regulation by the university. Contributing to the institution’s desire to oversee these 
duties was the reduction in state and federal funding at public institutions and the 
increased reliance on corporate funding for research since 2000. Extramural speech that 
was controversial or conflicted with the corporate ideologies of administrators and could 




censored and silenced. The faculty who were interviewed recognized that part-time and 
tenure track faculty are the most vulnerable to this type of action. After being tenured, 
one interviewee observed that a colleague was more active and vocal in the institution’s 
governance structure.   
Research question 4: Effect these events have on faculty’s ability to defend their 
academic freedom. The ability for universities to claim immunity for their regents and 
senior administrators was an important part of their legal defense. In the cases 
researched, universities were granted immunity by the lower courts, a decision that was 
upheld in all the higher courts. Therefore, immunity was a valuable tool in reducing the 
university’s exposure to a lawsuit.      
As such, a university’s immunity can adversely affect academic freedom as it 
blocks faculty’s ability to defend their First Amendment violation claims in court. 
Shortly after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, Ward 
Churchill published his essay, On the Justice of Roosting Chickens, concerning the 
attacks and U.S. foreign policy. The essay’s content was controversial. Legislators and 
university regents called for his termination. While the university found that the essay 
and his speech were protected by the First Amendment, they opened an investigation 
into the other articles that he had published during his tenure at the University of 
Colorado. The investigation found evidence of plagiarism and he was terminated from 
the university. During the trial, the jury found that the university would not have 
investigated his publication had he not published the essay and awarded him a nominal 




university and its regents were immune from lawsuit and dismissed all of Churchill’s 
claims. The Churchill case exemplified how public institutions and universities can use 
immunity to dismiss claims against them and maintain control of academic speech 
without having to defend themselves against violations of protected speech. 
Faculty who were interviewed identified tenure as their main defense to attacks 
and restrictions on academic freedom. All participants indicated that tenure allowed 
them to publish, do research, and teach on the topics of their choice. The majority (15) 
stated that external events were chilling academic speech, mainly for non-tenured 
faculty. Contributing to this effect is the increase in part-time faculty and the decrease in 
number of tenured and tenured faculty employed at universities nationwide. Even so, 
only one participant stated that he had modified his in-class topics to address external 
pressures on the university. The remainder continued to teach topics of their choice 
without interference or restrictions by the university.  
All interviewees commented that their shared governance committees and 
structures are advisory and provide recommendations to their administrations, which the 
administration can then veto. Jensen commented that the University of Texas faculty 
committees “have no power and that when [faculty] serve on them we provide the 
illusion of faculty governance to the administration [and justify their] concern for faculty 
input.” While a majority of the participants stated that their recommendations were 
approved by their administrations, they recognized that the university’s ability to control 
academic speech has increased due to recent court decisions, the economic downturn, 




university regents and senior administration to restrict speech by faculty that is 
controversial or unpopular. These findings are similar to the ones affecting academic 
speech in the pre-McCarthy and McCarthy eras when post-depression conservative 
lawmakers disciplined faculty for speech found to be subversive and un-American. As 
occurred then, briefs submitted by the AAUP and ACLU in the six cases researched 
were not successful in changing the outcomes of the court’s decisions.   
Conclusions 
 The Supreme Court’s reservation in Garcetti has left academic speech in the 
hands of the district courts to decide whether Garcetti applies to faculty when they speak 
as public employees in their roles as deans, department chairs, or committee members. 
In Schrier, which was decided seven months after Garcetti, the 10th Circuit ruled in 
favor of the University of Colorado’s right to control Schrier’s speech. The court found 
that his speech was detrimental to the efficient operations of the institution and, even 
though it was found to be a matter of public concern, was not protected. In the 4th 
Circuit, the court used the Garcetti analysis and found that Hong’s speech as a 
department chair was made pursuant to his job duties and not protected under the First 
Amendment. In the 9th Circuit, the court also used the Garcetti analysis and found that 
the materials submitted by Adams in his application for promotion and tenure 
constituted speech made pursuant to his official duties and were also not protected. 
While the appellate court in Adams found that the lower court misapplied Garcetti and 
remanded the case for further review, no conclusive decision was eventually made 




reservations as to whether Garcetti applied to academic speech, the circuit court’s 
rulings in favor of the university in the cases studied shows that faculty intramural and 
extramural speech made outside of the classroom, in leadership and governance roles, or 
used to move faculty to tenure are not protected by the First Amendment. 
 The court’s recognition of the university’s right to control academic speech when 
it hinders their efficient operations changed academic freedom from being a right 
recognized as a special concern of the First Amendment to a privilege granted by the 
university to the faculty associated with them. Four factors contribute to this conclusion. 
First, in each of the cases researched, the courts reiterated their reluctance to be involved 
in decisions that would place them in the position of providing constant oversight or 
second guessing university practices. In doing so, the courts gave universities the 
authority to control their administrative and academic environments without court 
interference. Second, the briefs written by the AAUP, ACLU, FIRE, and The Thomas 
Jefferson Center for Free Expression in the cases researched have not been successful in 
reversing the court’s decisions in favor of the public employee. Third, while the majority 
of the faculty who were interviewed (15) indicated that academic freedom was a right, 
all were tenured and recognized that speech was being chilled on their campuses. The 
same interviewees also indicated that the chilling effect was a result of some outside 
influence such as lawmakers, corporations, donors, alumni, or elected officials that 
directed the university to control on-campus speech or face repercussions. Fourth, the 





in 1975 about one-third of faculty members were contingent or not eligible for 
tenure. By 2005, the percentage switched to two-thirds not eligible for tenure or 
off the tenure track. Now, it’s a little bit over 70% and it looks like it’s going to 
just keep increasing by some tiny increment each year.  
Based on these four factors, public universities have complete control over academic 
freedom and it is a privilege granted to faculty based on their scholarly association with 
the university. 
 At the conclusion of each interview, participants were asked if academic freedom 
was alive and well at their institution. Their responses covered the spectrum of answers 
from “not at all” to “yes, absolutely.” The following are quotations from the interviews 
answering the question.  
• Doumani: Not at all. And the basic reason for that is because the public 
culture of democracy, tolerance, and justice in this country is not alive and 
well. Only when there is a larger social movement that creates an 
environment for freedom, will academic freedom really thrive.  
• Curry: I think that academic freedom from liberal arts professors is on life 
support. I really do. I think that there is a definite constraint, a definite 
choking the life out of any kind of a robust, strong notion of academic 
freedom here. 
• Nelson: I think your academic freedom to report the research results that you 
want and publish as you choose is very well supported by the institution. I 
think that shared governance speech can be punished, never directly, and can 
have consequences. Over the last decade, the administration has become 
much less tolerant of speech critical of administration’s actions and 
proposals. So now, I think that there are consequences for various shared 
governance speech that did not occur 40 years ago, or even a generation ago.  
• Smith: I would say it’s alive. It’s under some challenge but it’s doing pretty 
well.   
• Melear: Well, K. B. Melear would tell you yes. Again, you are talking to one 
person here, but I am delighted to work at an institution like this one where 
your voice is considered to be an integral part of what we do as a function of 




research to inform our teaching. So, I would tell you yes, academic freedom 
here is absolutely in sound shape. 
These quotations reflect that academic freedom continues to be an unresolved issue at 
public universities. Decisions by the Supreme Court in Grutter and Garcetti and the 
district courts in Schrier, Hong, Churchill, and Adams contribute to the discourse of 
whether academic freedom will survive. If the number of tenured faculty decrease and 
non-tenured, part-time faculty increases, the probability that academic speech will be 
chilled and the academic freedom of faculty will decrease is highly probable.  
Significance 
 As in previous eras, academic freedom in the post-2000 moment faces an 
uncertain future as pressures attempt to curtail free speech and silence faculty. Giroux 
(2006) attributed these activities to rightwing forces that have highjacked political power 
and are undermining the principles of academic freedom in the name of patriotic 
correctness. Cole added that increased “attacks on professors…in the name of national 
security suggest that [academia] is headed toward another era of intolerance and 
repression” (2005, p. 5). Affirming these comments, Somers stated, that “academic 
freedom of expression for faculty, staff, and students has become a casualty in the post-
9/11 world” (n.d., p. 1) and concluded that “the mass psychology of wartime capitalizes 
upon citizens’ fear to allow for restricted freedoms” (p. 7). Together, these comments 
suggest the need for continued research to understand the influences affecting academic 





Academic freedom must be regularly redefined in the context of the cultural and 
political debates currently shaping higher education’s public identity. Like it or 
not, academic freedom is not simply an unchanging platonic ideal. It is reshaped 
in response to contemporary political struggles and changing legal, economic, 
and technological realties. (pp. 1-2) 
This study provided a detailed analysis of the national debate that is occurring between 
the federal, state, and local courts and free speech advocacy organizations. Faculty 
interviews added to understanding how these debates were affecting the academic 
landscape on campuses. Public university administrators, general counsels, deans, 
department chairs, and faculty would benefit from this study as it provided an intensive 
analysis of post-2000 First Amendment court cases and the perceptions that faculty have 
concerning their intramural and extramural speech rights. Overall, the study added to 
existing research on faculty speech rights and the effect legislation and court decisions 
are having on academic freedom at public universities.  
Recommendations for Research 
 The study analyzed six cases and the researcher interviewed 19 faculty at public 
universities throughout the U.S. One recommendation is to research and analyze 
additional First Amendment cases that have been decided since 2000. Dr. Robert O’Neil 
discussed Urofsky (2000), Gorham (2009), and Demers (2012) as important cases that 
could be analyzed. Others that are in the courts could also be considered for inclusion.     
 Another recommendation is to consider using a different sample. The research 
focused on public universities in the U.S. Instead, future research could focus on private 
universities or community colleges throughout the U.S., regions of the country 




Florida) or specific Supreme Court districts. Selecting one or a combination of these 
criteria as a sample could improve the significance of the research to specific institutions 
or regions of the country.  
A different sample to consider for future research would be changing the type of 
faculty selected for the interviews. The research included only tenured faculty but all 
interviewees mentioned the vulnerability of part-time and non-tenured faculty. Sampling 
from one or more of the following would provide a different perspective to the research:  
part-time and adjunct faculty, academic deans, department chairs, faculty from specific 
colleges within one or more institutions. A researcher might also consider interviewing 
administrators such as provosts, vice chancellors or vice presidents from public 
universities in order to study academic speech from their perspective. This approach 
would provide comparison and perhaps alternative voices. 
Finally, the researcher attempted to interview a diverse sample of faculty from 
each Supreme Court district. The majority of interviewees were white, male, tenured, 
full professors from the baby-boomer generation. While the sample selection process 
included faculty from of each ethnicity, gender and age group, there was one African 
American, one Asian/Pacific Islander, no Native American/Alaskan Native, and no 
Hispanic faculty interviewed. Also, faculty from Supreme Court districts 2 (CT, NY), 8 
(ND, SD, NE, MN, IA, MO, AR), or 10 (WY, UT, CO, NM, KS, OK) did not consent to 
be interviewed. Future research should consider the demographics and districts not 





 Control over academic speech has come full circle in the last 122 years. In the 
pre-McCarthy and McCarthy eras, faculty speech was controlled by the university and 
the government punished scholars for their exercise of free speech. Communism was the 
ideology most feared by the nation and the one that occupied the government’s energy. 
Academic speech was chilled on campuses as faculty and administrators were brought 
before tribunals and fired from universities for their affiliations with various 
organizations, their publications, and their speech. Throughout these eras, the AAUP 
(founded in 1919) and ACLU (founded in 1920) defended faculty and individual rights 
and liberties.   
 The post-McCarthy era began with a surge in the recognition of individual civil 
rights. Academic speech was contentious as faculty and universities debated which 
would have the ultimate control. While the era saw the Vietnam War, the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, and the end of the red scare, it ended with the rise in conservativism and the 
start of the Iraq War. Fear of another ideology, terrorism, gripped the nation as the new 
Millennium began. 
 In 2000, the neo-McCarthy era began. The era is exemplified by the September 
11, 2001 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York, the escalation of the Iraq War, the 
increase in airport, and online security and surveillance, the fall and rise of foreign 
students attending universities, faculty being investigated and disciplined for their 
research and publications, and the start of the Afghanistan War. These events and the 




chilled. While the interviewees stated that academic freedom is a right, the majority 
recognized that the university controls faculty speech at their institutions. While only 
one stated that he had modified his speech, the remainder selected the topics for their 
classes without interference from the university or outside sources.  
 Public universities and their faculty have entered a precarious time. The need for 
an honest and open dialogue between senior administrators and faculty concerning 
academic freedom must occur in order to preserve the integrity and diversity of the 
nation’s largest asset, our education system. As stated in the beginning of the research, 
everyone will remember where they were on September 11, 2001 when the first plane hit 
the north tower of the World Trade Center at 8:46 a.m. (Smith, 2003) but, unfortunately, 
few will reexamine the impact that the ensuing events have had on Constitutional rights 
and the academic freedom of faculty for the decade to come. In response to this 
statement, this research attempts to provide a thorough examination and analysis of the 
legal and academic landscape that universities and their faculty have faced since 2000 
concerning intramural and extramural academic speech. For now, academic freedom is 
alive and well, but only, for tenured faculty at public universities. Non-tenured faculty 
continue to censor their speech in fear of being fired or not having their contracts 
renewed. If actions are not taken to safeguard these freedoms and protect faculty speech, 
these rights and privileges will dwindle to the point where, as Nelson states, “the last 














University of Mississippi 1930 1931 1933 
Mississippi Agricultural and Mechanical College 1930 1931 1933 
Mississippi State College for Women 1930 1931 1933 
Battle Creek College (MI)  1933 1933 
Harris Teachers College (MO)  1933 1936 
Rollins College (Fla.) 1933 1934 1938 
DePauw University (IN) 1934 1935 1937 
U.S. Naval Academy (MD) 1934 1935 1938 
University of Pittsburgh 1935 1936 1947 
North Dakota Agricultural College 1938 1939 1940 
Montana State University 1940 1940 1945 
Saint Louis University 1939 1940 1947 
John B. Stetson University (FL) 1939 1940 1949 
University of Tennessee 1939 1940 1947 
West Chester State Teachers College (PA) 1939 1940 1959 
Central Washington College of Education 1940 1941 1948 
Adelphi College (NY) 1941 1942 1952 
University of Kansas City 1941 1942 1957 
Western Washington College of Education 1941 1942 1944 
Brenau College (Ga.) 1934 1943  
Winthrop College (SC) 1942 1943 1957 
Memphis State College 1943 1944 1949 
State Teachers College (TN) 1942 1944 1956 
University of Missouri 1945 1946 1952 
University of Texas 1946 1946 1953 
Evansville College IN) 1949 1950 1956 
University of California, Berkeley 1956 1956 1958 
Jefferson Medical College (PA) 1956 1956 1968 
North Dakota Agricultural College 1956 1956 1964 
Ohio State University 1956 1956 1959 
University of Oklahoma 1956 1956 1957 
Rutgers University (NJ) 1956 1956 1958 
Saint Louis University 1956 1956 1957 
Temple University (PA) 1956 1956 1961 
Catawba College (N.C.) 1957 1957 1964 
University of Nevada 1956 1957 1959 
Alabama Polytechnic Institute 1958 1958 1964 












Livingstone College (NC) 1958 1958 1960 
University of Michigan 1958 1958 1960 
Southwestern Louisiana Institute 1956 1958 1960 
Texas Technological College 1958 1958 1967 
Fisk University (TN) 1959 1959 1966 
New York University 1958 1959 1961 
Lowell Technological Institute (MA) 1959 1960 1971 
Princeton Theological Seminary (NJ) 1959 1960 1961 
Allen University (SC) 1960 1961 1962 
Benedict College (SC) 1960 1961 1969 
Alabama State University 1961 1962 1982 
South Dakota State University 1961 1962 1991 
Alcorn Agricultural and Mechanical College (MS) 1962 1963 1973 
State College of Arkansas 1963 1963 1968 
Grove City College (PA) 1963 1963  
University of Illinois 1963 1963 1967 
Sam Houston State College (TX) 1963 1963 1970 
Arkansas Agricultural, Mechanical, and Normal College 1964 1964 1965 
Mercy College of Detroit 1963 1964 1968 
College of the Ozarks (AR) 1963 1964 1997 
University of South Florida 1964 1964 1968 
University of Arizona 1963 1965 1966 
Lincoln College (IL.) 1964 1965 1968 
Wayne State College (NE) 1964 1965 1990 
St. John’s University (NY) 1966 1966 1971 
Amarillo College (TX) 1967 1968 2004 
Arkansas Agricultural & Mechanical College 1967 1968 1970 
Cheyney State College (PA) 1967 1968 1972 
Lorain County Community College (OH) 1968 1968 1970 
St. Mary’s College (MN) 1968 1968 1969 
Southern University and Agricultural and Mechanical 
College (LA) 
1968 1968 1987 
Texas A&M University 1967 1968 1982 
Trenton State College (NJ) 1968 1968 1969 
Wisconsin State University, Whitewater 1968 1968 1975 
Broward Junior College (FL) 1969 1969 1974 
Central State College (OK) 1969 1969 1995 
Detroit Institute of Technology 1969 1969 1981 
Dutchess Community College (NY) 1969 1969 1972 












Northern State College(SD) 1968 1969 1982 
Sonoma State University (CA) 1983 1969 1992 
Troy State University (AL) 1968 1969 1986 
Indiana Institute of Technology 1970 1970 1974 
Indiana State University 1970 1970 1975 
University of Mississippi 1970 1970 1975 
Oklahoma State University 1970 1970 1979 
Southeastern Louisiana College 1969 1970 1982 
University of Florida 1970 1971 1975 
Grambling College (LA) 1971 1971 1981 
Laredo Junior College (TX) 1970 1971 1986 
Southern State College (AR) 1971 1971 1994 
Tennessee Wesleyan University 1971 1971 1987 
Armstrong State College (GA) 1972 1972 1983 
University of California, Los Angeles 1971 1972 1980 
Columbia College (MO) 1971 1972 1973 
Onondaga Community College (NY) 1971 1972 1991 
Colorado School of Mines 1973 1973 1992 
Cornell University (NY) 1973 1973 1975 
East Tennessee State University 1973 1973 1978 
Marshall University (WV) 1972 1973 1980 
McKendree College (IL) 1973 1973 1987 
Ohio State University 1972 1973 1980 
Queensborough Community College (NY) 1973 1973 1978 
Rider College (N.J.) 1973 1973 1993 
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale 1973 1973 1977 
West Chester State Teachers College (PA) 1972 1973 1975 
Bloomfield College (N.J.) 1974 1974 1978 
Camden County College (NJ) 1973 1974 1995 
Voorhees College (SC) 1974 1974 1986 
Concordia Seminary (MO) 1975 1975  
Elmira College (NY) 1975 1975 1977 
Houston Baptist University 1975 1975 2004 
University of Science and Arts of Oklahoma 1975 1975 1976 
Virginia Community College System 1975 1975 2003 
Arizona State University 1976 1976 1983 
Blinn College (TX) 1976 1976 2001 
Marquette University (Wis.) 1976 1976 1997 
Murray State University (KY) 1975 1976  












City University of New York 1977 1977 1983 
College of Osteopathic Medicine and Surgery (IA) 1977 1977 2006 
University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston 1976 1977 1981 
Wilkes College (PA) 1977 1977 1989 
University of Detroit 1978 1978 1994 
Phillips County Community College (AR) 1978 1978  
State University of New York 1977 1978  
University of Maryland 1979 1979 1989 
University of Texas of the Permian Basin 1979 1979 1996 
Wingate College (NC) 1979 1979 2005 
Nichols College (MA) 1980 1980  
Olivet College (MI) 1980 1980 2004 
Philander Smith College (AR) 1980 1980 1981 
Bridgewater State College (MA) 1981 1981 1994 
Harris–Stowe College (MO) 1981 1981 1985 
Eastern Oregon State College 1982 1982 1989 
Yeshiva University (NY) 1981 1982  
American International College (MA) 1983 1983  
Auburn University (AL) 1983 1983 1993 
Goucher College (MD) 1983 1983 1987 
University of Idaho 1982 1983 1989 
Morehead State University (KY) 1983 1983 1987 
Illinois College of Optometry 1982 1984 2000 
Metropolitan Community College’s (MO) 1984 1984  
University of Northern CO 1984 1984 1992 
Oklahoma College of Osteopathic Medicine and Surgery 1985 1985 1989 
Southwestern Adventist College (TX) 1985 1985 2003 
Temple University (PA) 1985 1985 1992 
Westminster College of Salt Lake City 1984 1985 2006 
Clark College (Ga.) 1985 1986 1987 
Talladega College (AL) 1986 1986  
Catholic University of Puerto Rico 1987 1987  
Husson College (ME) 1987 1987  
Morgan State University (MD) 1987 1987 1992 
Southern Nazarene University (OK) 1986 1987 2005 
Claflin College (SC) 1988 1988 1990 
Hillsdale College (MI) 1988 1988  
University of Judaism (CA) 1988 1988 1999 
Maryland Institute College of Art 1988 1988 2006 












Concordia Theological Seminary (IN) 1989 1989 1999 
Southeastern Baptist 1989 1989  
Alvernia College (PA) 1990 1990 1991 
Catholic University of America (D.C.) 1989 1990  
New York University 1990 1990 2003 
Saint Leo College (FL) 1989 1990 1999 
Baltimore City Community College 1992 1992  
Chowan College (N.C.) 1992 1992 1996 
Dean Junior College (MA) 1991 1992  
Loma Linda University (CA) 1992 1992  
Wesley College (DE) 1992 1992 1999 
Clarkson College (NE) 1993 1993  
North Greenville College (SC) 1993 1993  
Savannah College of Art and Design 1993 1993  
Benedict College (SC) 1994 1994  
University of Bridgeport (CT) 1993 1994  
Alaska Pacific University 1995 1995  
Bennington College 1995 1995  
Essex Community College (MD) 1995 1995 2006 
Nyack College (NY) 1994 1995 2006 
Stevens Institute of Technology 1995 1995 1999 
National Park Community College (AR) 1996 1996  
St. Bonaventure University (NY) 1995 1996  
University of Southern California 1995 1996 1999 
Minneapolis College of Art and Design 1997 1997  
Saint Meinrad School of Theology (IN) 1996 1997  
Brigham Young University (UT) 1997 1998  
University of the District of Columbia 1998 1998  
Lawrence Technological University (MI) 1998 1998  
Johnson and Wales University (RI) 1999 1999  
Mount Marty College (SD) 1999 1999 2004 
Albertus Magnus College (CT) 1999 2000  
University of Central Arkansas 2000 2000 2003 
Charleston Southern University 2001 2001  
University of Dubuque (IA) 2001 2002  
Tiffin University (OH) 2002 2002 2007 
Meharry Medical College 2004 2005  
University of the Cumberlands 2005 2005  
Virginia State University 2005 2005  












Bastyr University 2007 2007  
University of New Orleans 2007 2007 2011 
Loyola University New Orleans 2007 2007 2011 
Cedarville University 2009 2009  
Nicholls State University 2008 2009  
North Idaho College 2009 2009  
Stillman College 2009 2009  
Clark Atlanta University 2010 2010  
University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston 2010 2010  
Bethune Cookman University 2010 2011  
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge 2011 2012  
Northwestern State University of Louisiana 2012 2012  
Southeastern Louisiana University 2012 2012  
 





Appendix B: Email to Participants 
Dear <<Name>>, 
My name is Bill Carter. I am a doctoral candidate in the Higher Education Administration 
program at the University of Texas at Austin.  
My dissertation topic is "Academic Freedom  - The Silencing of the Faculty?”  
The purpose of the study is to examine the status of academic freedom and, more specifically, 
intramural and extramural speech at universities in the U.S. since 2000. The logic and court 
opinions from benchmark court cases and the faculty’s perspective of current academic freedom 
issues will be analyzed to determine dominant trends and themes that have evolved since 2000. 
The findings could be used to inform university and faculty governance structures and leaders 
when academic freedom policies and practices are being developed.  
Part of my research is interviewing 21 tenured faculty at public universities on academic 
freedom. I am reaching out to ask you to participate in my research. The interview will require 
an hour of your time, be audio recorded and respect your confidentiality.  
If you have any question, I can be reached at 713-718-5570 (Work: 9am-5pm CMT), 512-997-
8356 (Cell: anytime) or at william.carter@hccs.edu. If you get my voice mail, please leave a 
number and I will call you back as soon as possible. 
This study has been reviewed and approved by The University of Texas at Austin Institutional 
Review Board. If you have questions about your rights as a study participant, or are dissatisfied 
at any time with any aspect of this study, you may contact-anonymously, if you wish-the 
Institutional Review Board by phone at (512) 471-8871 or email orsc@uts.cc.utexas.edu.  
IRB Approval Number: 2011-08-0066 
IRB APPROVED: 10/25/2011  
EXPIRES: 10/24/2012 
I have attached a consent form for your review and look forward to your positive response. 
Sincerely, 





Appendix C: Research Proposal 
I. Title: Academic Freedom - The Silencing of the Faculty? 
II. Investigators (co-investigators): Mr. William E. Carter 
Chair of Dissertation Committee: Dr. Patricia Somers 
III. Hypothesis, Research Questions, or Goals of the Project: 
The purpose of the proposed study is to examine the status of academic freedom 
and, more specifically, intramural and extramural speech at universities in the U.S. 
since 2000. The logic and court opinions from benchmark court cases and the 
faculty’s perspective of current academic freedom issues will be analyzed to 
determine dominant trends and themes that have evolved since 2000. The findings 
could be used to inform university and faculty governance structures and leaders 
when academic freedom policies and practices are being developed   
Research Questions 
The area of study is “Faculty Intramural and Extramural Speech” at public 
universities since 2000. This study centers on the following research questions: 
1. How have federal, state, and local events affected academic freedom since 
2000? 
2. How have these events changed the way universities and faculty handle 
intramural speech? 
3. How have these events changed the way universities and the faculty handle 
extramural speech when speaking both as a citizen and a public university 
employee? 
4. How have these events affected the faculty’s ability to defend their academic 
freedom since 2000? 
IV. Background and Significance: 
Currently, academic freedom faces the most serious challenges and setbacks since 
the McCarthy era (Doumani, 2006). The hasty passage of the USA Patriot Act in 
2001 and the subsequent efforts of well-funded and politically-connected advocacy 
groups have threatened the faculty’s academic right to free and open inquiry and 
research; to design curriculum and teach freely within their university or college 
disciplines; and to unfettered extramural utterance and action as citizens (AAUP, 
2006). As the 1915 Declaration infers, faculty in the social, political, and economic 
disciplines are the ones most likely to speak and express diverse opinions that have 
resulted in punitive actions by individuals and organizations internal and external to 




disciplines being labeled as radical, unpatriotic, or subversive and their actions have 
been countered by legislators, courts, governing boards, alumni, students, and the 
media, who all impelled faculty to censor their behaviors or face the possibility of 
legal prosecution and dismissal. 
Academic freedom’s emergence and development were the result of long processes 
of interaction between people who have power and people who pursue knowledge 
(Doumani, 2006). As in previous eras, academic freedom in the post-9/11 moment 
faces an uncertain future as pressures attempt to curtail free speech and silence 
faculty. Cole adds in stating that increased “attacks on professors…in the name of 
national security suggest that [academia] is headed toward another era of intolerance 
and repression” (2005, p. 5). Affirming these comments, Somers states that 
“academic freedom of expression for faculty, staff, and students has become a 
casualty in the post-9/11 world” (n.d., p. 1) and concludes that “the mass psychology 
of wartime capitalizes upon citizens’ fear to allow for restricted freedoms” (p. 7). 
These comments suggest the need for continued research to understand the 
influences affecting faculty intramural and extramural speech rights.  
Public university administrators, general counsels, deans, department chairs, and 
faculty benefit from the study as it provides an intensive analysis of post-2000 court 
case logic and faculty perceptions of their intramural and extramural speech rights 
and adds to existing research concerning faculty speech rights. 
V. Research Method, Design, and Proposed Qualitative Analysis: 
Research design: 
The proposed qualitative study focuses on the changing academic landscape since 
2000. The qualitative research includes (1) the review of six to eight Supreme, 
appellate, and district court cases pertinent to intramural and extramural faculty 
speech and (2) interviews of fifteen to twenty-one faculty at universities throughout 
the U.S. The interview sample will be stratified and preselected based on faculty 
who are and are not faculty senate officers and have and have not published on 
academic freedom.  
The first phase of the qualitative study is the non-random selection and retrieval of 
six to eight court cases decided by the U.S. Supreme, appellate, or district courts 
from 2000 to present that are specific to intramural and extramural academic free 
speech. The court cases are in the public domain and include but are not limited to 
Yacouvelli (2004) for classroom discussions, Al Arian (2008) and Churchill (2010) 
for extramural speech, Schrier (2005), Garcetti (2006), Hong (2007), Satar (2009), 
and Adams (2010) for faculty speech as employees, and Grutter (2003) and Gratz 
(2003) for institutional academic freedom. The cases will be analyzed to identify the 
logic of the courts’ decisions and used to highlight the patterns and issues to be 
discussed in the faculty interviews. 
The second phase of the qualitative study is one-on-one interviews of fifteen to 




cases will be used to introduce open-ended questions in order to focus the 
interviewee’s response on the academic environment since 2000. The open-ended 
format of the faculty interviews allows the researcher to probe and ask follow-up 
questions with the intent of identifying prevalent themes and arguments. The 
interviewee’s reactions and the environmental issues are to be noted in order to 
identify uncontrolled interferences and interviewer bias (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
At the end of the interview, each participant will be asked to complete a short survey 
to collect region of country, participant in faculty governance since 2000 (Y/N), 
ethnicity, gender, published on academic freedom (Y/N), and generational age 
group. All data will be discussed and collected anonymously and transcribed and 
analyzed to protect the interviewee’s identity. 
Data collection and analysis:  
The qualitative analysis of archival information utilizes a content analysis approach.  
Krippendorff (2004) defines content analysis as “a research technique for making 
replicable and valid inferences from texts to the contexts of their use” (p. 18) and, 
therefore, infers that every “content analysis must have a context within which texts 
are examined” (p. 24). Limiting the context allows the research to remain focused on 
the phenomenon studied and to reduce the diversity of the interpretations.  
Full transcripts of the court cases, law review articles, and briefs from professional 
academic organizations, will be retrieved, dated, and filed in order to increase the 
descriptive validity of the data collection phase. First-level descriptive and 
interpretive codes (Miles & Huberman, 1994) such as case jurisdiction (federal, 
district), type (faculty speech as employee, research, classroom discussion, due 
process), decision (plaintiff, defendant, appealed), consequence (termination, hire, 
rehire, tenure, loss of tenure) and case logic (adverse employment, chilling effect, 
first amendment, governance, immunity, political influence, retaliation, time and 
cost, whistle blower) are used to code, reduce, and categorize the data for analysis. 
As codes become obsolete, they will be removed or combined with other codes. As 
codes emerge, they will be added or a second-level coding schema will be 
developed in order to allow for further data reduction and analysis. The data will be 
entered into NVivo, a qualitative data package, for further review, reduction, 
clustering, counting, patterning, matching, and theme identification.  
The faculty interviews provide information on the changing landscape of academic 
freedom on U.S. university campuses since 2000. The interview questions and 
process are to be piloted with a public university faculty member to validate the 
flow and clarity of the questions, to determine the amount of time required for each 
interview, to resolve technical issues, and to deal with any researcher bias. Feedback 
from the pilot is to be used to modify and improve the process for the one-on-one 





The fifteen to twenty-one faculty interviews will be digitally audio recorded and 
archived for future reference. The archive provides descriptive validity as the actual 
one-on-one interviews become a permanent unchanged record of the study. The 
recordings are to be transcribed and upload to MS Word for final review, correction, 
and storage. Field notes taken at the time of the interviews will be incorporated into 
the transcript review and correction process and loaded into NVivo for content 
analysis and coding. Themes and codes derived from the logic of the court case and 
interview analysis provide focus to the study on the macro-level issues of public 
university academic freedom in the U.S. 
Research findings utilize four validation methods to test data quality; 1) pattern 
checking, 2) replication, 3) phenomenological validity, and 4) triangulation (Miles 
& Huberman, 1994) (see Figure 2). The collection of data from archival documents 
and interviews allows the multiple independent sources to be used to complement 
their findings. 
To further test data quality, the effect that the researcher has on the interview 
process is to be checked prior to the start and during the interview stage. First, the 
pilot interview determines not only the validity of the questions but also provides 
feedback on the researcher’s communication style and the effect of the researcher on 
the study (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Feedback from the pilot will be recorded for 
verification during the interviews and incorporated in the actual interviews. Second, 
the faculty interviews include documentation of any interruptions, a record of 
reactions to the questions, and changes in the setting that occurred during the 
interview. Prior to the start of the interview, the interviewee is to be provided a 
consent form with a description of the study. Once consent has been attained, the 
interviewee will be provided a list of questions to be asked in order to keep the 
interview focused.  
At the end of the interview, a short survey will be conducted to collect general data 
such as region of country, participant in faculty governance since 2000 (Y/N), 
ethnicity, gender, published on academic freedom (Y/N), and generational age 
group. All interviewees will be assigned a letter that will be used throughout the 
analysis. All interviews will be digitally recorded, transcribed in full so that all 
points of view are included and coded for patterns and themes. After each interview, 
the researcher will document any changes from the previous interview that might 
have affected the data interpretation.  
After the interview is transcribed, the researcher will provide each participant with 
their interview transcript so they have an opportunity to validate the outcomes and 
provide clarifications if needed. This “phenomenological validity” test further 
identifies any research bias that the researcher had on the interview as well as the 
interview on the researcher (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The data analysis includes a 






Outliers in the data analysis are to be tested to determine the strength of the study’s 
findings. Validating the patterns and themes identified in the qualitative phase with 
the survey data collected during the quantitative phase identifies exceptions due to 
data smoothing and provide a way to strengthen the findings by defining what a 
finding is not. Understanding outliers protects the study against self-bias and builds 
a better explanation of the results (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Finally, findings are to be replicated from multiple independent data sources 
throughout the study. First, the information from case logic analysis will be pulled 
from cases that have been decided in the federal, district, or state courts. The logic 
used by the various courts includes a review of the briefs and law review articles in 
order to provide a cross case analysis of the rulings. Second, the interviews include 
faculty from different regions of the U.S., universities, academic departments, and 
type of appointment to provide diversity in the opinions and patterns identified. The 
replication methods outlined compliment the triangulation method discussed earlier. 
By using data from multiple sources, the researcher eliminates what Miles and 
Huberman (1994) call “holistic fallacy” or the mistake of basing findings and results 
on biased information because outliers were ignored. The validity testing affords the 
data a level of reliability for future studies.  
VI. Human Subject Interactions 
A. Sources of potential participants 
Full transcripts of the selected court cases are available from the LexisNexis 
database and law libraries, if necessary. Briefs and law review articles related to 
cases are accessible online from law review journals, the AAUP, ACLU, FIRE, 
and the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Speech and provide 
discussions of the legal arguments and perspectives raised in the court cases. 
Participants will be tenured faculty from public 4-year universities throughout 
the U.S. The stratified and preselected sample of 21 adult participants will 
consist of faculty who have and have not served on faculty governance 
committees and who have and have not published on academic freedom. 
B. Procedure for the recruitment of the participants.  
 
Upon approval by IRB, the investigator will contact via phone and email pre-
selected university faculty who have and have not served on faculty governance 
committees and who have and have not published on academic freedom to 
explain the research study and request permission to interview them for 60 
minutes regarding the study. The contact information will be obtained from 
university and academic association directories which are available on the 
Internet. The researcher will then contact each participant to attain consent and 
set a time for the interview. The interviews will be conducted in-person at a 





C. Procedure for obtaining informed consent.  
The researcher will provide each participant with the consent form which will be 
in English via email if the interview is conducted on the phone or in-person by 
the researcher if the interview is conducted one-on-one. Participants that re 
interviewed in-person will be required to sign the consent form before the 
interview begins. Participants that are interviewed on the phone will be 
contacted to answer any questions and required to verbal consent to the 
interview over the phone before the interview begins.   
Participants will have full access to meet with the researcher via phone, email, 
or in-person to discuss any concerns and to respond to questions regarding the 
study. The researcher will sign and deliver signed consent forms to each 
participant prior to the interview. All consent forms will be stored in a locked 
file cabinet in the researcher’s locked office. 
D. Research Protocol.   
Between October 2011 and December 2011, the researcher will schedule one-
hour interviews with the participants which will be audio recorded. The 
interviews will be conducted on the phone or in-person based on the participants 
convenience. In-person interviews will be conducted at a public location away 
from the participant’s institution. Field notes will record changes in the 
interview environment.  
After the interview, the researcher will email an anonymous post-interview 
survey to the participant. The participant will have seven days from the date of 
the interview to respond. 
After the interview has been transcribed, the transcript will be emailed to the 
participant for validation and comment. All corrections and comments will be 
recorded and included in the study. 
E. Privacy and confidentiality of participants 
The court cases, briefs, and reviews used in the first phase of the study are ready 
available online from LexusNexus and other public sources. 
Participation in the second phase of the study, faculty interviews, is voluntary. 
Interviewees can skip any questions during the interviews and in the post-
interview survey that they chose. The interviews and surveys will be labeled 
based on the letter (A through Z) assigned at the time of the interview. 
Participants are encouraged to answer questions to the best of their ability, but 
are not required to respond if they choose not to. Information provided in the 
interview or survey will be kept confidential and participants may terminate 
their participation at any time without penalty. To ensure the privacy of data, the 
researcher will not use the information provided in the interview and surveys for 




Participants will be advised to not disclose any of the interview and survey 
responses outside of the interview setting. Also, the researcher will not use 
pseudonyms and will not collect the participants’ names, social security, 
address, phone numbers or anything else that could identify the participants in 
any reports of the study. The results of the findings will not contain any 
identifiers. 
F. Confidentiality of the research data.  
All consent forms will be stored in a locked file cabinet in the researcher’s 
locked office. 
All audio tapes used during the interviews will be labeled based on the letter (A 
through Z) assigned to the interview so the investigator can identify them during 
the analysis phase. The investigator will ensure the labeling does not provide 
personal information that can expose the participants.  The researcher will only 
play the tapes for the purpose of transcription and research. The tapes will be 
stored in a locked cabinet in the researcher’s locked office. The tapes will be 
destroyed at the end of the transcription process. 
The post-interview surveys will be analyzed and stored in a locked cabinet in 
the investigators locked office to maintain the confidentiality of the data. The 
investigator will have sole possession of the locked cabinet and locked office. 
The researcher will retain the data indefinitely for future analysis before 
destroying the data.  
G. Please describe your research resources.   
Full transcripts of the selected court cases will be obtained from the LexisNexis 
database and law libraries, if necessary. Briefs and law review articles related to 
cases are accessible online from law review journals, the AAUP, ACLU, FIRE, 
and the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Speech and provide 
discussions of the legal arguments and perspectives raised in the court cases. 
VII. Describe any potential risks.  
There are no known potential risks associated with this study. The potential risks are 
anticipated to be no greater than faculty are exposed to every day. 
 
VIII. Describe and assess the potential benefits. 
There are a number of significant benefits associated with this study. 
• New and reliable data will be available on the current court opinions and faculty 
perceptions of academic freedom and more specifically intramural and 




• The study will assist public universities in reviewing and developing 
institutional practices, policies and programs related to intramural and 
extramural speech. 
• The study will provide informative data and information to faculty governance 
organizations on the current status of intramural and extramural speech in the 
courts and on the campuses throughout the U.S. 
• The University of Texas researchers as well as other institutions will have 
access to new data and information that describes and analyzes the court 
opinions and faculty’s perception of academic freedom since 2000. 
• No direct benefits are anticipated for participants in the study. 
IX. Indicate the specific sites or agencies involved in the research project besides The 
University of Texas at Austin.  
The interviews will be held by phone, in person at the researcher’s office, or in a 
public location chosen by the participant. 
X. If the project has had or will receive review by another IRB, indicate this. Attach a 
copy of this approval to this application or submit it to the IRB secretary of the IRB 
when you receive it. The UT IRB will usually accept the versions of consent forms 
that have been approved by IRBs affiliated with hospitals or medical schools, or by 
the site where the research will be conducted. 





Appendix D: Consent Form 
Title: Study of Academic Freedom – Intramural and Extramural Speech 
Date: 8/28/11 
IRB PROTOCOL #: 2011-08-0066 
Conducted by: William E. Carter 
Institution: The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Educational Administration 
Contact Info: C: 512-997-8356 or w: 713-718-5570, william.carter@hccs.edu.  
You are being asked to participate in a dissertation study.  This form provides you with 
information about the study.  The person in charge of this research will also describe this study 
to you and answer all of your questions. Please read the information below and ask any 
questions you might have before deciding whether or not to take part. Your participation is 
entirely voluntary.  You can refuse to participate without penalty or loss of benefits to which you 
are otherwise entitled.  You can stop your participation at any time and your refusal will not 
impact current for future relationships with UT Austin or participating sites.  To do so simply 
tell the researcher you wish to stop participation.  The researcher will provide you with a copy of 
this consent for your records. 
The purpose of this study is to research academic freedom’s intramural and extramural speech 
privileges at universities since 2000. 
If you agree to be in this study, we will ask you to do the following things: 
• Do an audio recorded interview on your perception of academic freedom in the current 
moment. 
• Complete a brief survey to collect broad demographic information. 
Total estimated time to participate in study is 60 minutes 
Risks of being in the study 
• The risks involved in this study are minimal.  
• You might disclose a violation of academic freedom at your institution or an opinion 
that is not consistent with your institutions policies. However, this information will only 
be revealed if required to do so in a court of law. 
• The interview and survey ask for rather harmless information.  There is a small risk of 
loss of confidentiality.  Confidentially and privacy protections are described below. 
• This research may involve risks that are currently unforeseeable. If you wish to discuss 
the information above or any other risks you may experience, you may ask questions 




Benefits of being in the study 
• By talking about academic freedom, you may obtain an increased sense of personal 
power and ownership about your academic decisions and perceptions.   
• For institutions, state and federal policy makers, and those who work in faculty and 
university governance structures, the results from this study could be used to provide 
insight into the current status of academic freedom at universities and shape future 
policies and practices concerning intramural and extramural speech. 
Compensation: 
• No compensation is provided for participation in this study. 
Confidentiality and Privacy Protections: 
• The data resulting from your participation will not be made available to other researchers. 
• The data and analysis will contain no identifying information that could associate you with 
it, or with your participation in any study. 
The audio and hard-copy records of this study will be stored securely and kept confidential. 
Authorized persons from The University of Texas at Austin, members of the Institutional Review 
Board have the legal right to review your research records and will protect the confidentiality of 
those records to the extent permitted by law.  All publications will exclude any information that 
will make it possible to identify you as a subject. Throughout the study, the researchers will notify 
you of new information that may become available and that might affect your decision to remain in 
the study. 
Contacts and Questions: 
If you have any questions about the study please ask now.  If you have questions later, want 
additional information, or wish to withdraw your participation call the researchers conducting 
the study.  Their names, phone numbers, and e-mail addresses are at the top of this page.  If you 
have questions about your rights as a research participant, complaints, concerns, or questions 
about the research please contact James Wilson, Ph.D., Chair, The University of Texas at Austin 
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects at (512) 471-6978 or the Office 
of Research Support and Compliance at (512) 471-8871 or email: orsc@uts.cc.utexas.edu. 






Statement of Consent: 
I have read the above information and have sufficient information to make a decision about 
participating in this study.  I consent to participate in the study. 
Signature: ______________________________________ Date: __________________ 
_______________________________________________ Date: __________________ 
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent 





Appendix E: Academic Freedom Interview Questionnaire 
Please answer some questions about yourself and return to William.Carter@hccs.edu.  
1. Region of Country in which participant is a faculty member – Select one choice: 
□ 1 = ME, NH, MA RI 
□ 2 = CT, NY 
□ 3 = DE, PA, NJ 
□ 4 = MD, DC, WV, VA, NC, SC 
□ 5 = MS, LA, TX 
□ 6 = MI, OH, KY, TN 
□ 7 = WI, IL, IN 
□ 8 = ND, SD, NE, MN, IA, MO, AR 
□ 9 = WA, OR, CA, NV, AZ, ID, MT 
□ 10 = WY, UT, CO, NM, KS, OK 
□ 11: None of the above 
2. Appointment  
a) Appointment Track – Select one choice: 
□ 1 = Tenured 
□ 2 = Tenure Track 
□ 3 = Non-tenure track 
 
b) Appointment Type – Select one choice: 
□ 1 = Assistant professor 
□ 2 = Associate professor  
□ 3 = Full professor 
□ 4 = Other (lecturer, clinical, itinerant, etc.) 
 
3. Generation/Age Group - Select one choice:  
□ 1 = Silent Generation born 1925-1946 
□ 2 = Baby Boom Generation born 1947 to 1960 
□ 3 = Generation X born 1961 to 1982 





4. Sex - Select one choice: 
□ 1 = male 
□ 2 = female 
 
5. Race/ethnicity – Select all that apply: 
□ 1 = Caucasian 
□ 2 = Hispanic 
□ 3 = African American 
□ 4 = Asian/Pacific Islander 
□ 5 = Native American/Alaskan Native 
 
6. Participated in faculty governance since 2000: 
□ 1 = Yes   
□ 2 = No 
If Yes, please provide role in faculty governance:  _____________________                                       
7. Published on subject of academic freedom: 
□ 1=  Yes 









Academic Freedom Interview Protocol 
Background 
Prior to 2000, courts emphasized academic freedom as a special interest of the First 
Amendment based on the decisions made in two landmark cases. These cases continue to be 
reference when courts are faced with violations of faculty intramural and extramural speech and 
are provided below.  
1. In Sweezy, the target of governmental inquiry that this Court found to be constitutionally 
impermissible was a series of lectures by a scholar at a state university. Both the opinion 
of the Court and Justice Frankfurter’s seminal concurring opinion stressed the “vital role 
in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth,” concluding that 
“[t]eachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to 
gain new maturity and understanding. . . .”  (Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 1957).  
2. The Keyishian Court, two decades later, expressed special concern for “laws that cast a 
pall of orthodoxy over the classroom,” noting the “transcendent value of [academic 
freedom] to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned” (Keyishian v. Board of 
Education, 1969). 
Since 2000, two additional cases have expanded the institution’s right to govern academic 
freedom and the ability of public employers to discipline employees for utterances that are 
deemed part of their job.  
1. In 2002, the Grutter court recognized institutions academic freedom and right of the 
institution to make academic decisions (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003). 
2. In 2006, the Garcetti court ruled that “the First Amendment does not prohibit 
managerial discipline based on a public employee’s expressions made pursuant to 
official job responsibilities”(Ceballos v. Garcetti, 2004, p. 7). The court also recognized 
that “expression related to academic scholarship or teaching implicates additional 
constitutional interests that are not accounted for in this Court’s customary employee-
speech jurisprudence” (p. 7). 
 Courts have held that public institutions have the right to regulate public employees 
speech when they speak on issues related to their job. This places faculty at public universities in 
a precarious position when they serve on governance committees that are internal and/or external 






1. How have federal, state, and local events affected academic freedom at your institution 
since 2000? 
2. Is academic freedom a right or a privilege at your institution? What criteria does your 
institution use to evaluate faculty academic freedom when their speech as a public 
employee and private citizen converge and become an issue? 
3. In what ways do the faculty governance structures at your institution respond when 
challenges to faculty intramural and extramural speech occur? 
4. What effect does institutional academic freedom have on the faculty’s role in the 
governance structure at your university? 






Appendix F: Participants Who Waived Confidentiality 
 
Interview Date Interviewed Waived Confidentiality 
Bob Jensen 1/31/2012 Y 
Robert O’Neil 2/8/2012 Y 
Joan Hemmingway 2/23/2012 Y 
Jerry Kapus 2/24/2012 Y 
Todd DeMitchell 3/6/2012 Y 
Richard Fossey 3/12/2012 Y 
Cary Nelson 3/14/2012 Y 
John Blackburn 3/15/2012 Y 
Neal Hutchins 3/26/2012 Y 
Tommy Curry 3/26/2012 Y 
Timothy Sheill 4/10/2012 Y 
Michael J. Smith 5/8/2012 Y 
Bashara Doumani 6/7/2012 Y 
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